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Summary		This	thesis	presents	findings	from	a	qualitative	study	of	the	emergence	and	early	clinical	translation	of	non-invasive	prenatal	diagnosis	(NIPD)	in	the	UK.		Drawing	from	interviews	with	 a	 range	 of	 experts	 and	 users	 I	 track	 the	 enrolment	 and	 translation	 of	 this	 new	prenatal	 testing	 technology	 across	 a	 variety	 of	 clinical	 and	 social	 spaces.	 	 I	 show	 how	encounters	with	NIPD	prompt	deep	critical	examination	of	the	moral,	social	and	political	implications	-	not	only	of	the	technology	-	but	of	the	established	clinical	practices	(routine	and	 specialised	 prenatal	 testing)	 and	 specific	 policy	 contexts	 (prenatal	 screening	programmes)	within	which	NIPD	has	begun	to	sediment.		I	explore	how,	as	NIPD	advances	at	 a	 rapid	 pace	 and	 emerges	 within	 a	 culturally	 and	 politically	 complex	 context,	 the	technology	 both	 aligns	 with	 and	 disrupts	 routine	 practices	 of	 prenatal	 screening	 and	diagnosis.		I	show	how,	as	the	technology	divides	into	two	major	strands	-	NIPD	and	NIPT	-	at	an	early	stage	of	development,	and	before	becoming	naturalised/normalised	within	the	clinic,	 scientists,	 clinicians	 and	 policy	 makers	 attempt	 to	 pin	 down,	 define	 and	 ‘fix’	 the	technology,	drawing	upon	and	engaging	in	substantive	practices	of	division,	categorisation	and	 classification.	 	 I	 explore	 ambiguities	 present	 within	 such	 accounts,	 highlighting	dissenting	 voices	 and	moments	 of	 problematisation,	 and	 following	 this,	 I	 show	how	 the	‘troubling’	of	boundaries	prompts	much	examination	of	ethical	and	social	concerns.	 	As	a	location	 within	 which	 interviewees	 explored	 more	 contentious	 issues,	 I	 show	 how	abortion	 emerged	 as	 central	 to	 the	 discussion	 of	 NIPD.	 	 I	 proceed	 to	 show	 how	institutionalised,	professionalised	bioethical	debate	dominates	mainstream	discourse,	and	I	 explain	 how	 a	 particular	 construction	 of	 the	 informed,	 individual	 choice-maker	 is	mobilised	 in	order	 to	 locate	moral	and	political	responsibility	 for	 testing	 in	 the	hands	of	individuals,	 and	 to	 distance	 political/organisational	 structures	 from	 entanglement	 with	problematic	concerns.		I	explore	how	clinicians	and	patients	respond	to	this	positioning	in	multiple	ways,	both	assimilating	and	questioning	 the	mainstream	discourse	of	 ‘informed	choice’.	 	 In	conclusion,	 I	highlight	the	broader	(bio)political	aspects	of	NIPD’s	emergence	and	translation	within	prenatal	screening	and	diagnosis.	
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Chapter	One.		Introduction	and	Theoretical	Foundations			This	 thesis	 is	 a	 critical	 exploration	 of	 early	 encounters	 with	 and	 reflections	 on	 non-invasive	prenatal	diagnosis	 (NIPD),	an	emerging	and	rapidly	developing	prenatal	 testing	technology.	 	 The	 research	 assembles	 multiple	 perspectives	 on	 this	 new	 technology,	generated	 in	 interviews	with	a	wide	 range	of	actors	–	 from	 the	scientists	 involved	 in	 its	inception	through	to	the	clinicians	and	families	who	use	prenatal	testing	technologies.		By	documenting	and	examining	a	range	of	accounts,	I	explore	here	how	NIPD	testing	is	being	categorised	 and	 classified,	 how	 it	 prompts	 discussion	 and	 examination	 of	 significant	moral,	social	and	biopolitical	 issues,	and	how	it	re-ignites	and	intensifies	debates	around	the	politics	of	prenatal	testing.		The	central	aim	of	this	research	is	to	explore	experiences	of,	and	responses	to	current	and	emerging	NIPD	 technologies.	 	Building	upon	an	analysis	of	 accounts	provided	by	a	wide	range	 of	 participants	who	 encounter	NIPD	 and	 associated	 technologies	 and	 practices	 of	prenatal	testing,	the	specific	objectives	of	this	research	include:		
• To	examine	the	practical,	ethical	and	social	issues	that	are	raised	by	experiences	with	and	reflections	on	NIPD	testing.	
• To	explore	‘situated’	responses	to	emerging	and	(possible)	future	applications	of	NIPD	technology.	
• To	 gain	 an	 understanding	 of	 how	 professionals,	 patients	 and	 parents	 negotiate	 the	complexities	of	engaging	with	an	emerging	health	technology.		By	examining	the	public	discussion	and	debate	around	NIPD,	and	by	situating	this	thesis	within	 the	 context	 of	 broader	 critical	 engagements	 with	 practices	 and	 technologies	 of	prenatal	 testing,	 this	 thesis	 also	 seeks	 to	 examine	 the	 wider	 cultural	 and	 political	implications	of	this	emerging	technology.				
Theoretical	foundations		The	 analytical	 work	 of	 this	 thesis	 draws	 from	 a	 number	 of	 critical	 sources,	 including	Foucault’s	 work	 on	 dividing	 practices	 (Foucault	 1982),	 problematisation,	 biopower	 and	biopolitics,	 Latour	 and	 Callon’s	 work	 on	 practices	 of	 ‘translation’,	 and	 the	 sociological	
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examination	 of	 sorting	 processes	 and	 classifications	 as	 explored	 by	 Douglas,	 and	 then	elsewhere	by	Bowker	and	Star.		I	have	studied	the	objectivizing	of	the	subject	in	what	I	shall	call	 ‘dividing	practices.’	 	 The	 subject	 is	 either	 divided	 inside	 himself	 or	 divided	 from	others.		This	process	objectivizes	him	(Foucault	1982,	p.326)		Whilst	Foucault’s	conceptualisation	of	‘dividing	practices’	is	used	within	the	quote	above	to	illuminate	practices	 of	 division	 and	 categorisation	 as	 they	 are	 applied	 to	persons	 rather	than	technologies	(‘the	mad	and	the	sane,	the	sick	and	the	healthy’),	 this	critical	approach,	which	 foregrounds	 the	 social	 significance	 of	 divisions	 –	 ‘modes	 of	 manipulation	 that	
combine	 the	medicalisation	 of	 a	 science	 (or	 pseudo-science)	 and	 the	 practice	 of	 exclusion’	(Rabinow,	p.8)	 	–	 is	 central	 to	 the	work	of	 this	 thesis,	 as	 it	 seeks	 to	examine	NIPD	at	an	emergent	 stage	 of	 development,	 before	 it	 has	 come	 to	 be	 sedimented	 and	 naturalised.		Such	 an	 approach	 foregrounds	 a	 range	 of	 crucial	 (and	 critical)	 questions:	 	what	 kind	 of	divisions	are	being	enacted,	and	by	whom?	What	 is	being	objectivised	by	such	divisions,	what	is	made	more	tangible?		What	is	being	left	out,	what	becomes	marginalised?				A	clear	understanding	and	elucidation	of	Foucauldian	processes	of	division	allows,	in	turn,	for	a	deeper,	more	critical	level	of	enquiry	to	be	made	concerning	what	kind	of	work	such	divisions	achieve.		This	level	of	questioning	is	inherently	political	-	it	concerns	the	way	in	which	power	may	or	may	not	be	exercised,	and	by	whom:			The	 flat	and	empirical	 little	question,	 “What	happens?”	 is	not	designed	 to	introduce	 by	 stealth	 a	 metaphysics	 or	 ontology	 of	 power	 but,	 rather,	 to	undertake	a	critical	investigation	of	the	thematic	of	power.	 	“How?”	not	in	the	 sense	 of	 “How	 does	 it	manifest	 itself”	 but	 “How	 is	 it	 exercised?”	 and	“What	happens	when	individuals	exert	(as	we	say)	power	over	others?”	(Foucault	1982,	p.337)		Examining	technologies	of	 the	body,	administered	through	a	complex	network	of	clinical	practices,	 medical	 programmes,	 and	 political	 systems,	 entails	 that	 Foucault’s	 work	 on	‘biopolitics’	is	also	crucial	here:	Society's	 control	 over	 individuals	 was	 accomplished	 not	 only	 through	consciousness	 or	 ideology	 but	 also	 in	 the	 body	 and	 with	 the	 body.	 For	capitalist	 society,	 it	 was	 biopolitics,	 the	 biological,	 the	 somatic,	 the	corporal,	that	mattered	more	than	anything	else.	The	body	is	a	biopolitical	reality;	medicine	is	a	biopolitical	strategy.	(Foucault	2000b,	p.137)		
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Foucault’s	work	on	biopolitics	stresses	the	power	that	medical	practices	and	systems	hold,	particularly	 as	 they	 come	 to	 be	 administered	 through	 processes	 that	 govern	 whole	populations	-	‘the	state	has	essentially	to	take	care	of	men	as	a	population’	(Foucault	2000c,	p.417),	 for	 example	 through	 public	 health	 and	 its	 apparatus	 of	 sorting.	 	 His	characterisation	of	biopolitics	and	biopower	emphasises	the	extent	to	which	processes	of	biopolitical	 control	 have	 become	 ‘interiorised’	 –	 ‘immanent	 to	 the	 social	 field,	distributed	
throughout	the	brains	and	bodies	of	citizens’	(Hardt	and	Negri	2013,	p.216)	–	a	perspective	that	is	crucial	to	the	analysis	presented	here.				Foucault	also	highlights	the	centrality	of	‘problematisation’	within	any	critical	project,	and	it	is	this	approach	that	most	centrally	informs	the	analytical	perspective	taken	within	this	thesis:		For	 Foucault,	 “problematization”…	 is	 an	 aspect	 of	 his	 genealogical	method…	for	any	period	or	milieu,	in	any	text	or	discourse,	one	should	look	for	what	is	problematized,	for	what	is	the	subject	of	concern,	reflection	and	uncertainty	(Laidlaw	2014,	p.32)	 		Problematisation	both	informs	the	method	of	critical	analysis	taken	towards	the	subject	at	hand	here,	and	it	encourages	specific	focus	on	what	comes	to	be	‘problematised’	by	others	–	what	elements	of	the	discussion	come	to	be	framed	as	subjects	of	‘concern,	reflection	and	
uncertainty’.		Adopting	this	Foucauldian	critical	 focus	as	a	central	point	of	reference,	 this	thesis	 can	 move	 beyond	 simply	 identifying	 systems	 of	 division	 and	 categorisation.	 	 By	shifting	 focus	 onto	 what	 is	 ‘problematised’,	 by	 highlighting	 how	 relationships	 are	produced,	reproduced	and	circulated,	and	by	examining	the	positioning	and	enactment	of	(bio)power,	 stronger	 claims	 can	be	made	 concerning	whose	 interests	 are	 foregrounded,	and	whose	are	marginalised.			Questions	concerning	‘dividing	practices’	and	the	objectification	of	the	social	relate	closely	to	issues	raised	within	the	sociology	of	classification	(Douglas	and	Hull	1992).		A	number	of	theorists	having	pointed	towards	the	significance	of	classificatory	processes	within	the	rationalisation,	 objectification	 and	 ordering	 of	 new	 social	 forms	 –	 with	 Douglas	particularly	 emphasising	 the	 significance	 of	 ‘constraints	 of	 structure…	 that	 is,	 rules,	
classifications,	compartments’	(Douglas	1996,	p.	xix),	and	the	fundamental	power	that	such	concepts	 and	 processes	 hold,	 bringing	 order	 to	 the	 ‘chaos	 of	 shifting	 impressions’	 that	would	otherwise	remain	(Douglas	1966,	p.37)	‘I	 believe	 that	 ideas	 about	 separating,	 purifying,	 demarcating	 and	punishing	transgressions	have	a	 their	main	 function	to	 impose	system	on	an	 inherently	untidy	experience.	 	 It	 is	only	by	exaggerating	the	difference	
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between	within	and	without,	about	and	below,	male	and	female,	with	and	against	that	a	semblance	of	order	is	created.		(Douglas	1966,	p.4)		Hence,	 given	 the	 fundamental	power	of	division	and	 classification	processes,	persons	or	objects	 that	do	not	 fit	 -	 that	can’t	be	sorted	or	placed	-	and	 that	 lie	 ‘betwixt	and	between	
categories’	 (Latimer	 2008b)	 ‘trouble’	 boundaries,	 and	 are	 translated	 into	 sources	 of	concern	and	problematisation.		Elsewhere,	 Bowker	 and	 Star	 recognise	 that	 the	 mechanisms	 by	 which	 constitutive	classificatory	 practices	 are	 exercised	 are	 frequently	 not	 explicitly	 realised,	 that	 is,	 they	appear	 as	 deeply	 embedded	 –	 appearing	 as	 ‘routine’	 ‘natural’	 and	 ‘normal’	 -	 within	everyday	social	practices:	To	 classify	 is	 human.	 	 Not	 all	 classifications	 take	 formal	 shape	 or	 are	standardised	in	commercial	and	bureaucratic	products.		We	all	spend	large	parts	of	our	days	doing	classification	work,	often	tacitly,	and	we	make	up	and	use	a	range	of	ad	hoc	classifications	to	do	so.		We	sort	dirty	dishes	from	clean,	white	laundry	from	colorfast,	important	emails	to	be	answered	from	e-junk	(Bowker	and	Star	1999,	p.	1	-	2)		The	 analysis	 that	 follows	has	been	 achieved	by	maintaining	 a	 critical	 awareness	 of	 how	new	social	classifications	are	made,	both	explicitly,	through	processes	of	standardisation,	and	 more	 implicitly,	 through	 everyday	 talk	 and	 action,	 to	 enable	 a	 critical	 and	comprehensive	 account	 of	 NIPD’s	 entry	 into	 the	 clinic	 	 (and	 into	 the	 lives	 of	 parents,	clinicians,	 researchers	 and	 scientists).	 	 By	 ‘tracking’	 (Marcus	 1995,	 Latimer	 2013)	 the	technology	from	its	earliest	stages,	and	tracing	its	development	from	within	a	wide	range	of	 spaces,	 both	 explicit	 and	 implicit	 processes	 of	 ordering,	 rationalisation	 and	objectification	 can	 be	 made	 visible.	 	 The	 highlighting	 of	 the	 marginal	 perspective	specifically	 -	 that	 which	 exists	 outside	 ‘internal’	 systems	 of	 classification	 and	categorisation	-	has	been	characterised	as	being	particularly	valuable:		The	 idea	 of	 society	 is	 a	 powerful	 image.	 	 It	 is	 potent	 in	 its	 own	 right	 to	control	 or	 stir	 men	 into	 action.	 	 This	 image	 has	 form;	 it	 has	 external	boundaries,	 margins,	 internal	 structure.	 	 Its	 outlines	 contain	 power	 to	reward	conformity	and	repulse	attack.		There	is	energy	in	its	margins	and	unstructured	 areas.	 	 For	 symbols	 of	 society,	 any	 human	 experience	 of	structures,	margins	or	boundaries	is	ready	to	hand.	(Douglas	1966,	p.115)		Critically,	 for	the	current	study,	by	 ‘tracking’	the	development	of	NIPD	technology	at	this	early,	 ‘pre-naturalisation’	stage	–	and	by	examining	questioning	and	ambiguous	accounts	
	 5	
in	particular	 -	 the	underlying	norms	and	values	 that	contribute	 to	 the	shaping	of	NIPD’s	development	and	translation	have	been	made	visible.		By	presenting	a	range	of	encounters	with	 the	 technology,	 accounts	 that	 have	 been	 gathered	 as	 experiences	 remain	 new,	questioning	and	critical,	the	discussion	can	move	beyond	the	mainstream.		By	attending	to	areas	 that	 resist	 clear	 division,	 definition,	 categorisation	 and	 classification	 –	 by	 turning	towards	‘the	energy	in	its	margins’	-	contentious	issues	can	be	made	visible	and	dissenting	voices	can	be	heard.		Also	significant	to	the	analysis	presented	here	is	a	critical	understanding	of	technology	as	presented	within	work	on	the	sociology	of	‘enrolment’	and	‘translation’.		Latimer	(Latimer	1995)	 building	 on	 the	work	 of	 Latour,	 explains	 how	 a	 technology	 –	 as	 it	moves	 in	 and	across	a	range	of	social	spaces	-	may	function	as	a	kind	of	 ‘token’,	an	object	which,	in	the	hands	 of	 multiple	 actors,	 may	 be	 ‘enrolled’,	 ‘translated’,	 ‘aligned’	 and	 imbued	 with	meaning	according	to	local	understandings	and	processes	of	communication:	Latour	 (1986)	 uses	 the	 metaphor	 of	 a	 'token'	 to	 refer	 to	 any	 system,	technology,	 order	 or	 artefact	 which	 social	 actors	 use	 as	 forms	 for	communicating	 with	 others.	 In	 the	 hands	 of	 social	 actors,	 tokens	 are	translated	 to	 be	 reconfigured	 and,	 indeed,	 recomposed	 locally	 and	specifically.		Latour	(1986)	gives	the	following	account	of	translation:	“The	 spread	 in	 time	 and	 space	 of	 anything	 —	 claims,	 orders,	 artefacts,	goods	—	is	 in	 the	hands	of	people,	each	of	 these	people	may	act	 in	many	different	ways,	 letting	 the	 token	 drop	 or	modifying	 it,	 or	 deflecting	 it,	 to	betraying	it,	or	adding	to	it,	or	appropriating	it”	(Latour	1986,	Latimer	1995)	
	This	 thesis	 explores	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 participant	 accounts,	 as	 provided	 by	 experts,	patients	and	parents,	each	with	distinct	personal	and	professional	backgrounds,	and	with	diverse	experience	of	prenatal	testing	processes.		As	an	emergent	technology	that	is	being	‘enrolled’	 and	 ‘translated’	 –	 ‘reconfigured	 and,	 indeed,	 recomposed’	 -	 across	 a	 variety	 of	spaces,	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 process	 of	 ‘local	 translation’	 is	 essential	 to	 the	examination	of	NIPD.	 	Integral	to	this	is	the	concept	of	 ‘enrolment’.	 	As	NIPD	reaches	out	across	a	number	of	spaces,	and	as	processes	of	‘local	translation’	progress,	the	technology	
‘not	only	enrols	but	 is	 itself	enrolled’	 (Latimer	1995,	 p.214).	 	 Emerging	within	 a	 ‘complex	location’	(Latimer	2000b),	a	culture	that	has	come	to	be	shaped	by	established	practices	and	technologies	of	prenatal	testing,	NIPD	is	enrolled	within	a	number	of	existing	cultural	and	normative	frameworks.	 	And	as	the	technology	in	turn		 ‘enrols’	others	-	as	ideas	and	practices	are	produced	and	(re)produced	-	a	corresponding		generation	and	regeneration	of	 particular	 effects	 occurs	 (Strathern	 1991,	 p.97),	 with	 the	 implication	 that	 certain	perspectives	 become	 foregrounded,	 and	 others	 marginalised.	 	 By	 attending	 to	 the	particular	ways	in	which	technology	enrolls	and	is	enrolled	–	by	locating	where	and	how	
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certain	discourses	are	made	visible,	and	others	are	 ‘disposed’	 -	 the	presence	of	powerful	‘alignments’	(Latour	1990)	may,	in	turn,	be	made	visible.		Echoing	Latimer	(Latimer	2013)	then,	 as	 she	 illuminates	 the	way	 in	which	 ‘alignments,	 extensions,	 disposals,	 attachments	
and	detachments’	contribute	to	the	shaping	of	power	in	the	(genetics)	clinic,	I	show	how,	as	 NIPD	 technology	 enrols	 and	 becomes	 enrolled,	 as	 it	 is	 translated	 from	 one	 space	 to	another,	powerful	alignments	are	made	and	(disruptive)	discourses	disposed.		Given	the	wide	range	of	personal	and	professional	backgrounds	of	study	participants,		the	issue	of	identity	and	‘identity-work’	is	also	of	central	relevance	here.		Participants’	various	personal	and	professional	identities	are	affected	and	enacted	by	the	ideas	and	values	that	are	enrolled,	and	how	they	come	to	be	translated.		Specifically,	associations	with	particular	identities	did	not	give	rise	to	explanations	that	were	‘fixed’	or	‘stable’.		Rather,	participants	invoked	multiple	 identities,	 with	 accounts	 shifting	 between	 various	 terms	 of	 reference,	appealing	to	multiple	values,	and	generating	complex	and	ambiguous	perspectives	on	the	technology.	 	 Identity	here,	 then,	 is	understood	 in	 terms	 that	 reflect	 ‘a	critique	of	the	self-
sustaining	subject	of	post-Cartesian	metaphysics’		(Du	Gay	and	Hall	1996)	Identities	 are	 never	 unified	 and,	 in	 late	 modern	 times,	 increasingly	fragmented	and	fractured;	never	singular	but	multiply	constructed	across	different,	 often	 intersecting	 and	 antagonistic,	 discourses,	 practices	 and	positions.	(Du	Gay	and	Hall	1996,	p.4)		Strathern’s	 alternative	 framing	 of	 identity,	 as	 being	 related	 to	 the	 lives	 of	 divisible	 and	partible	‘dividuals’,	as	opposed	to	bounded	and	autonomous	individuals	(Strathern	1988,	Konrad	 1998,	 Latimer	 2008b),	 further	 strengthens	 a	 perspective	 that	 emphasises	 the	
‘intersecting’	 and	 specifically	 relational	 aspects	 of	 being,	 and	 highlights	 the	 centrality	 of	social	relations	and	discursive	practices	(Foucault	2000c)	to	questions	of	identity.			In	summary	then,	this	thesis	approaches	the	examination	of	NIPD	through	a	Foucauldian	lens	 that	 emphasises	 the	 constitutive	 work	 of	 ‘dividing	 practices’,	 the	 centrality	 of	‘problematisation’	 to	 critical	 analysis,	 and	 the	 contextual	 significance	 of	 ‘biopower’	 and	‘biopolitics’.	 	Building	on	this,	it	draws	from	the	sociology	of	classification	as	put	forth	by	Douglas,	 and	 Bowker	 and	 Star,	 attending	 particularly	 to	 questions	 around	 what	 is	foregrounded	 and	what	 is	marginalised	within	 the	 discussion	 at	 hand.	 	 Drawing	 on	 the	work	of	Latimer	and	Latour,	 the	 significance	of	processes	of	 ‘alignment’	 and	 ‘enrolment’	along	 with	 	 ‘local	 translations’	 within	 this	 study	 of	 an	 emergent	 technology	 –	 where	processes	of		 ‘modification’,	 ‘deflection’	and	‘appropriation’	remain	particularly	active	-	is	
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also	 highlighted.	 	 Finally,	 then,	 I	 approach	 questions	 of	 identity	 and	 ‘identity-work’,	emphasising	the	multiple	and	relational,	rather	than	the	individual	and	the	rational.	
Summary	of	the	thesis	and	chapter	contents		This	thesis	presents	a	critical	account	of	NIPD’s	emergence	and	translation	into	a	range	of	clinical	and	social	spaces.		It	shows	how	those	who	come	to	encounter	NIPD	technology	at	an	emergent	‘pre-naturalisation’	stage	of	development	engage	in	substantive	processes	of	division,	in	order	to	‘sort’	the	technology	and	situate	it	within	local	contexts,	and	to	align	it	with	 existing	 (dominant)	 normative	 and	 cultural	 frameworks.	 	 Pointing	 towards	 the	 re-surfacing	 and	 intensification	 of	 difficult	 and	 contentious	 debates,	 this	 thesis	 shows	 how	NIPD	 emerges	 as	 a	 source	 of	 significant	 problematisation	 within	 many	 of	 the	 accounts	gathered	 here.	 	 Showing	 too	 how	 institutionalised	 discourses	 fail	 to	 contain	 more	contentious	aspects	of	debate	and	discussion,	this	thesis	claims	that	NIPD	is	experienced	and	understood	as	far	from	benign,	raising	issues	of	significant	(bio)political	and	cultural	concern.			Within	 this	 first	chapter	 I	explain	 the	 theoretical	underpinnings	 that	 inform	the	analysis	presented	within	 the	 thesis	 as	 a	whole.	 	Within	 chapter	 two	 I	 ‘situate’	 NIPD	within	 the	larger	 context	 of	 prenatal	 testing	 and	 explain	 the	 historical	 development	 of	 NIPD	technology.	 	 I	 then	 provide	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 relevant	 research	 conducted	 to	 date,	pointing	towards	gaps	in	the	literature,	some	of	which	this	study	seeks	to	address.		Within	chapter	 three	 I	 explain	 how	 the	 study	 was	 designed	 and	 conducted	 in	 the	 field,	 and	 I	present	reflections	on	some	of	the	practical	and	ethical	issues	raised	during	the	conduct	of	research.		The	central	critique	of	the	thesis	is	explored	in	chapters	four	to	seven.				Within	 chapter	 four	 I	 show	 how	 NIPD	 is	 subject	 to	 a	 range	 of	 ‘dividing	 practices’,	explaining	 how	 participants	 mobilised	 talk	 of	 numbers	 particularly,	 in	 order	 to	 both	problematise	and	align	NIPD	technology	with	current	prenatal	testing	practice.		Picking	up	on	 the	 significant	 division	 that	 is	 made	 between	 NIPD	 and	 ‘NIPT’	 I	 show	 how	 the	technology	 ‘troubles’	 the	 existing	 boundary	 that	 is	 constructed	 between	 prenatal	‘screening’	 and	 prenatal	 ‘diagnosis’,	 and	 in	 doing	 so	 generates	 much	 discussion	 of	practical,	ethical	and	social	‘issues’	and	‘concerns’.			Chapter	 five	 picks	 up	 on	 what	 is	 being	 ‘problematised’,	 examining	 particularly	 the	discussion	of	abortion	as	 it	appears,	 repeatedly	and	consistently,	as	a	source	of	concern.		Showing	how	talk	of	abortion,	whilst	present	 throughout	 the	dataset,	was	problematic	–	with	 participants	 struggling	 to	 identify	 language	 that	 would	 allow	 them	 to	 account	 for	
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their	thoughts	and	experiences	–	I	show	how	the	‘difficult’	issue	of	abortion	nevertheless	emerged	 as	 central	 to	 the	 discussion	 of	 NIPD.	 	 Drawing	 from	 Taussig	 (Taussig	 1999),	 I	show	how	the	discussion	of	abortion	here	brought	with	 it	 talk	of	 ‘secrecy’	and	 ‘stigma’	 -	and	 being	 characterised	 as	 something	 that	 is	widely	 recognised,	 but	 rarely	 articulated	 -	emerges	as	a	kind	of	‘public	secret’.				Chapter	six	examines	participant	accounts	of	the	ethical	and	social	issues	raised	by	NIPD,	and	points	towards	the	prevalence	of	institutionalised	bioethical	discourse	–	characterised	by	talk	of	autonomy,	consent	and	individual	choice	-	within	both	the	public	discussion	of	NIPD,	 and	 within	 accounts	 provided	 here	 by	 those	 most	 closely	 ‘aligned’	 with	 the	technology.	 	 Proceeding	 to	 show	 how	 those	 positioned	 further	 from	 the	 technology	 are	able	to	attend,	by	contrast,	to	the	powerful	and	disruptive	margins	of	debate	–	and	are	able	to	 explicitly	 problematise	 the	 technology	 -	 I	 show	 how,	 despite	 concerted	 efforts	 to	contain	and	defuse	 the	more	 contentious	elements	of	debate,	 a	 range	of	 ‘hot’	 issues	and	entanglements	(Callon	1998,	Strathern	2002)	continue	to	surface.				Chapter	 seven	 explores	 accounts	 provided	 by	 those	 whose	 professional	 lives	 are	 most	closely	aligned	and	entangled	with	 the	politics	of	prenatal	 testing.	 	 I	 show	how,	as	NIPD	gains	momentum	 in	 the	 clinic	 and	 enters	 into	 the	 field	 of	 ‘public	 health’	 -	 as	 discussion	shifts	ever	closer	towards	talk	of	 ‘screening’	and	 ‘mainstreaming’	within	whole	pregnant	populations	-	significant	anxieties	are	raised	for	those	(potentially)	charged	with	the	task	of	 managing	 and	 administrating	 this	 emergent	 and	 rapidly-expanding	 technology.		Drawing	on	the	work	of	Strathern,	and	showing	how	the	rhetoric	of	‘choice’	in	particular	is	mobilised	 in	 order	 to	 responsibilise	 individuals	 and	 not	 systems,	 I	 show	 how	 issues	 of	significant	biopolitical	concern	and	debate	–	such	as	selective	reproduction	and	eugenics	–become	 increasingly	 problematic	 as	 the	 discussion	 of	 moral	 and	 political	 ‘concern’	intensifies,	and	I	show	how	persistent	recourse	to	the	discourse	of	‘individual	choice’	fails	to	maintain	the	division	that	is	constructed	between	public	health	and	biopolitics.		Finally,	by	 presenting	 accounts	 provided	 by	 those	 with	 significant	 lived	 experience	 of	 prenatal	‘choice’	–	mothers	who	had	experiences	of	 ‘risky’	pregnancy,	of	NIPD,	and	of	abortion	–	I	show	how	such	 ‘choices’	(and	associated	moralities)	are	explicitly	not	 individualised	and	rationalised,	 but	 appear	 as	 situated	within,	 and	 constituted	by,	 the	 richer	 context	 of	 the	bodies,	lives	and	relationships	of	women	and	their	families.		
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Chapter	eight	summarises	the	work	of	this	thesis,	elucidating	in	
particular	some	of	the	more	critical	points	raised.		It	also	
discusses	the	future	trajectory	of	the	technology,	and	what	
implications	this	may	hold,	raising	for	discussion	a	new	and	
emerging	set	of	questions	and	concerns	relevant	to	NIPD’s	
ongoing	development	and	translation.	
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Chapter	Two.		Situating	NIPD		This	 chapter	 introduces	 NIPD	 by	 first	 providing	 an	 historical	 overview	 of	 how	technologies	 and	 practices	 of	 prenatal	 testing	 have	 developed,	 and	 then	 showing	 how	NIPD	enters	this	frame,	explaining	how	and	where	this	particular	technology	has	emerged,	and	how	 it	has	come	 to	be	 translated	within	a	 range	of	 clinical	 spaces.	 	Following	 this,	 I	explain	 how	 prenatal	 testing	 has	 been	 recognised	 as	 a	 site	 of	 significant	 sociological	interest	 and	 concern,	 identifying	 and	 reviewing	 the	 relevant	 literature	 from	 within	medical	sociology	and	anthropology,	science	and	technology	studies	(STS),	bioethics	and	other	 relevant	 spaces	 (noting,	 however	 that	 many	 studies	 cross-cut	 such	 disciplinary	boundaries).		I	outline	and	review	the	small	(but	growing)	body	of	sociological,	empirical	and	critical	work	that	has	been	conducted	around	NIPD,	highlighting	the	key	issues	raised,	and	 identifying	 gaps	 in	 the	 research.	 	 As	 this	 study	 is	 UK-based,	 the	 account	 of	 NIPD’s	development	 and	 (particularly)	 clinical	 use	 outlined	 here	 concentrates	 primarily	 on	 the	UK	 context.	 	 Since	 this	 technology	 is	 however	 undoubtedly	 global	 in	 scope,	 with	 both	research	projects	and	clinical	practices	taking	place	across	geographical	borders,	relevant	international	developments	are	also	considered	here.		
Situating	NIPD:	the	history	of	prenatal	testing.			Appealing	 to	 a	 pervasive	 and	 long-standing	 human	 desire	 to	 predict	 and	 influence	 the	outcomes	of	 reproduction	 (Gammeltoft	 and	Wahlberg	2014,	p.202),	prenatal	 testing	has		been	translated	into	a	‘routine’	and	‘normal’	component	of	prenatal	care	as	it	is	practiced	within	the	UK	and	many,	(particularly	Western),	countries	worldwide	(Ginsburg	and	Rapp	1995).	 	 The	 range	 of	 testing	 technologies	 (including	 amniocentesis,	 chorionic	 villus	sampling/CVS 1 ,	 ultrasound 2 	and	 maternal	 serum	 screening/MSS 3 )	 that	 have	 been	developed	and	subsequently	 translated	 into	routine	prenatal	care	are	presented	under	a	range	 of	 guises:	 as	 tools	 for	 ‘screening’	 whole	 pregnant	 populations,	 for	 ‘diagnosing’	serious	 (and	 particularly	 genetic)	 disease	 in	 ‘high	 risk’	 pregnancies,	 for	 providing																																									 																						1	Amniocentesis	 refers	 to	 ‘the	 technique	 of	 extracting	 amniotic	 fluid	 transabdominally	 through	 a	
hollow	 catheter	 [needle]’	 –	 a	 process	 that	 allows	 for	 diagnostic	 genetic	 testing	 to	 be	 carried	 out	prenatally	–	and	CVS	is	a	similar	diagnostic	testing	technique,	that	samples	placental	tissue	rather	than	amniotic	fluid	(Rapp	1999,	p.27	–	30).			2 	The	 medical	 application	 of	 ultrasound	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 field	 of	‘ultrasonography’,	 where	 ultrasound	 probes	 are	 used	 to	 ‘send	out	a	 short	pulse	of	 high-frequency	
sound	and	detects	the	reflected	waves	(echoes)	occurring	at	interfaces	within	the	organs’	in	order	to	produce	images	of	structures	in	the	human	body.		(Martin	and	McFerran,	2014).	3	Maternal	serum	screening/MSS	refers	to	a	range	of	biochemical	blood	tests	for	‘numerous	
maternal	 protein	markers’	 and	 which	 are	 used	 for	 prenatal	 screening	 (and	 not	 direct	 diagnosis)	(Wright	2009,	p.33).		
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‘reassurance’	 (Lippman	 1991)	 and	 relieving	 parental	 anxiety	 during	 pregnancy	 and	 for	enhancing	maternal-fetal	bonding	(Roberts	2012).	 	The	proliferation	of	 technologies	and	practices	 of	 prenatal	 testing	 began	 in	 the	 post-war	 period,	 with	 the	 realisation	 that	amniocentesis	-	a	technique	that	had	previously	been	used	for	the	experimental	treatment	of	polyhydramnios4	during	pregnancy	-	could	be	used	to	gain	information	on	the	health	of	the	 fetus	 directly,	 and	 with	 the	 first	 major	 clinical	 application	 of	 amniocentesis	 being	testing	 for	maternal-fetal	blood	group	 incompatibility	 (Rapp	1999,	p.28).	 	Developments	in	 the	 technologies	 of	 fetal	 medicine	 were	 concurrent	 with	 significant	 developments	 in	human	genetics.	 	By	the	end	of	the	1950s,	by	using	a	 ‘hypotonic	solution	to	swell	the	cells,	
giving	 an	 uncluttered	 view	 of	 the	 chromosomes’5	(Gardner,	 Sutherland	 et	 al.	 2012,	 p.3)	researchers	 had	 been	 able	 to	 confirm,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 that	 humans	 each	 possessed	(typically)	23	pairs	of	chromosomes.		They	were	also	able	to	clearly	identify	‘sex	chromatin	
–	 the	 inactivated	 somatic	 cell	X	 chromosome,	or	barr	body’	 (Rapp	 1999,	 p.28)	 –	 the	male	human	sex	chromosome	-	the	identification	of	which	presented	the	opportunity	to	reliably	distinguish	 male	 and	 female	 human	 cells	 in	 a	 laboratory	 setting	 (Moore,	 Graham	 et	 al.	1953).	 	 In	 1959	 –	 claimed	 as	 ‘the	 wonderful	 year	 of	 human	 cytogenetics’	 (Gardner,	Sutherland	et	al.	2012,	p.3)	–	came	the	first	waves	of	this	new	genetic	knowledge’s	medical	translation	–	a	notable	instance	of	which	was	the	identification	of	the	chromosomal	basis	of	Down’s	syndrome6	(Lejeune,	Gautier	et	al.	1959)	–	a	move	that	would	become	central	to	the	 future	 conduct	 of	 prenatal	 testing.	 	 The	 translation	 of	 this	 new	 genetic	 knowledge	within	the	clinical	practice	of	prenatal	testing	was	rapid:	by	1960	amniocentesis	was	being	used	to	test	for	fetal	sex	during	pregnancy,	and	preliminary	research	was	being	conducted	around	 testing	 for	Down’s	 syndrome	and	other	chromosomal	conditions7	(Cowan	1994).	
																																								 																						4	Polyhydramnios	 is	 a	 common	 complication	 of	 pregnancy,	 caused	 by	 an	 excessive	 amount	of	amniotic	fluid	surrounding	the	fetus	–	it	can	lead	to	early	labour,	increased	bleeding	after	birth	and	may	indicate	that	the	fetus	is	in	the	‘wrong’	position	for	birth	(NHS,	2015)	5	Chromosomes	are	bodies	of	genetic	material	found	in	the	nucleus	of	every	cell	in	the	human	body.		Chromosomes	‘carry’	genes	and	are	composed	mainly	of	‘chromatin’,	within	which	the	DNA	helix	is	wrapped	around	proteins	to	form	the	familiar	‘beads	on	a	string’	configuration	(Bradley-Smith	et	al.	2010,	p.60)			6	Within	his	contemporary	examination	of	Down’s	syndrome	screening	in	the	UK,	Thomas	explains	how	Down’s	syndrome	is	most	commonly	perceived:	 ‘Down’s	syndrome	is	one	of	the	most	common	
chromosomal	 conditions	 in	 the	 UK,	 affecting	 approximately	 one	 to	 two	 of	 every	 1000	 live	 births.		
People	with	Down’s	syndrome	are	 likely	 to	have	a	range	of	symptoms	 including	 learning	difficulties,	
shortened	limbs,	reduced	muscle	tone,	restricted	physical	growth,	a	flat	profile	of	the	face,	and	a	large	
protruding	tongue.		The	condition	is	often	identified	as	compatible	with	life,	that	is,	as	‘not	lethal’.	This	
translates	 to	 people	 with	 Down’s	 syndrome	 being	 likely	 to	 survive	 childbirth	 and	 enjoying	 a	 good	
quality	of	 life,	although	symptoms	and	prognosis	vary	significantly	in	each	respective	case’	 (Thomas	2014,	p.1).	7 	‘Chromosomal	 conditions’	 are	 caused	 by	 abnormalities	 in	 the	 number	 or	 structure	 of	chromosomes.		Chromosome	anomalies	will	typically	lead	to	‘significant	learning	difficulty’	and	may	also	 cause	 ‘congenital	 abnormality	 in	 one	 or	 more	 body	 organs’.	 In	 most	 cases,	 chromosomal	conditions	 will	 present	 where	 there	 is	 no	 previous	 family	 history	 of	 the	 condition	 and	 will	 be	
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Pregnancy,	 then,	 emerged	 as	 one	 of	 the	 first,	 and	 one	 of	 the	 most	 significant	 sites	 of	interest	and	activity	within	the	study	and	practice	of	human	genetics.		Developments	 in	 ultrasound	 technology	 occurred	 alongside	 developments	 in	amniocentesis,	with	 researchers	 suggesting	 in	1958	 that	SONAR8	technologies,	originally	developed	for	military	use,	could	be	medically	applied	as	they	presented	the	opportunity	to	provide	enhanced	 imaging	opportunities	 for	 the	study	and	examination	of	 the	human	body	(Donald,	Macvicar	et	al.	1958).	 	The	translation	of	 this	 technology	 into	the	fields	of	antenatal	 care	 and	 fetal	medicine	 took	 a	 number	 of	 years,	 and	 it	was	 not	 until	 the	mid	1980s	that	it	was	recognised	that	ultrasound	could	be	used	to	observe	fetal	development	during	 pregnancy	 (Yoxen	 and	 Hyde	 1985).	 	 The	 visualisation	 of	 fetuses	 through	ultrasound	–	as	well	as	through	concurrent	developments	in	medical	photography,	which	allowed	 for	 the	publication	of	 ‘iconic’	 fetal	 images	 in	LIFE	magazine	 for	 instance	(Duden	1993,	p.	11	-	23)	-	represented	a	culturally	significant	moment,	with	‘the	fetal	patient’	and	‘fetal	 subjectivity’	emerging	 as	 objects	 of	 both	 public	 and	 academic	 discussion	 (Mitchell	2001,	p.	22	-	23).				Research	on	maternal	serum	screening	tests	commenced	in	the	late	1970s,	and	by	the	late	1980s	 testing	 techniques	 had	 been	 improved	 to	 such	 an	 extent	 that	 the	 widespread	routinisation	of	 testing	was	 recommended,	 specifically	 in	order	 to	 (further)	 significantly	reduce	the	number	of	Down’s	syndrome	births	in	the	UK	(Wald,	Cuckle	et	al.	1988)	–	the	expected	 rate	 of	 which	 had	 already	 been	 reduced	 through	 widespread	 application	 of	amniocentesis	 (Morris	 and	 Alberman	 2009).	 	 Each	 of	 these	 various	 prenatal	 testing	technologies	 have	 been	 successfully	 incorporated	 into	 routine	 prenatal	 care	 systems	within	the	UK	(where	they	are	made	available	within	both	NHS	and	private	prenatal	care),	and	in	many	countries	worldwide:	amniocentesis	has	become	‘one	of	the	most	routinized	of	
the	new	reproductive	technologies’	(Rapp	1999,	p.1),	ultrasound	testing	has	developed	into	
‘one	 of	 the	 most	 common	 rituals	 of	 pregnancy’	 (Mitchell	 2001,	 p.3)	 and	 is,	 along	 with	maternal	 serum	 screening,	 offered	 to	 every	 pregnant	 woman	 receiving	 routine	 NHS	antenatal	 care	 (see	 appendix	 one	 the	 Fetal	 Anomaly	 Screening	 Programme/FASP	‘Antenatal	 and	 Newborn	 Screening	 Timeline	 -	 optimum	 times	 for	 testing’	 for	 detail).		Amniocentesis	 is	 also	widely	used	within	 the	 context	of	 ‘specialist’	prenatal	 care,	within	spaces	 such	 as	 clinical	 genetics	 and	 fetal	medicine.	 	 Here,	 by	 contrast,	 testing	 is	 offered																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 																			‘limited	 to	a	 child	 presenting	 with	 the	 problem’	 (NHS	 National	 Genetics	 and	 Genomics	 Centre,	2015a).		8	SONAR	 is	 the	acronym	 for	‘sound,	navigation,	 and	radar’.	 SONAR	was	originally	developed	as	an	underwater	 system	 which	 uses	 reflected	 sound	 waves	 to	 detect	 and	 locate	 submerged	 objects	(Atkins	and	Escudier,	2014)	
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only	to	women	who	are	already	known	to	be	at	 ‘high	risk’	of	genetic	disease	or	disorder.		The	 application	 of	 CVS	 technology	 has	 been	 particularly	 relevant	 within	 such	 contexts	(Caughey,	Hopkins	et	al.	2006),	as	testing	may	be	carried	out	at	an	earlier	stage	-	from	the	11th	to	the	14th	week	of	pregnancy	(Antenatal	Screening	Wales	2008b)	-	when	compared	with	amniocentesis,	which	is	usually	carried	out	from	the	15th	week	of	pregnancy	onwards	(Antenatal	Screening	Wales	2008a).		This	is	regarded	as	a	significant	advantage	within	the	context	 of	 pregnancies	 known	 to	 be	 ‘high	 risk’	 as	 it	 provides	 an	 earlier	 opportunity	 to	either	reassure	and	relieve	patient	anxiety	 through	communication	of	a	 ‘negative’	result,	or	 to	 provide	 expert	 counselling	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 ‘positive’	 diagnosis	 (Evers-Kiebooms,	Swerts	et	al.	1988).				It	 is	difficult	 to	overstate	the	extent	to	which	these	various	practices	and	technologies	of	prenatal	 testing,	and	the	experience	of	prenatal	screening,	have	been	made	 ‘routine’	and	‘normal’	within	 the	vast	majority	of	Western	 -	 or	what	 Strathern	 terms	 ‘Euro-American’	(Strathern	1995)	-	pregnancy	experiences.		The	NHS	Fetal	Anomaly	Screening	Programme	(FASP)	 for	 instance	 exists	 specifically	 to	 ensure	 equity	 of	 access	 to	 screening	 services	across	 the	 UK,	 and	 is	 responsible	 for	 reviewing	 and	 setting	 standards	 for	 NHS-based	prenatal	testing	services.	 	Within	their	2011-12	annual	report	(more	recent	reports	have	not	 been	 made	 widely	 available),	 FASP	 explain	 that	 during	 2011	 74%	 (n=542,312)	 of	women	 receiving	 prenatal	 care	 through	 the	 NHS	 (across	 England	 and	 Wales)	 chose	 to	accept	the	offer	of	Down’s	syndrome	screening.		More	recent	documents	have	been	made	available	 regarding	 the	 national	 screening	 standards	 that	 FASP	 design	 and	 administer	(FASP	2015),	and	although	the	centrality	of	‘informed	choice’	is	persistently	stressed	here	–	with	FASP	highlighting	particularly	a	women’s	right	to	choose	‘not	to	take	up	screening’	–	they	nevertheless	describe	how	prenatal	screening	services	are	designed	with	the	explicit	aim	of	‘maximise[ing]	timely	fetal	anomaly	ultrasound	screening/first	trimester	screening	in	
the	eligible	population’	 (FASP	2015,	p.	 9	 -	 10).	 	 Screening	 services	 then,	 are	widespread,	routinely	accepted	and	are	the	subject	of	continuing	efforts	towards	‘improvement’.				Debates	 around	 whether	 practices	 of	 prenatal	 screening	 may	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 top-down	application	of	 (bio)political	power,	or	whether	 they	are	better	characterised	as	an	extension	of	‘reproductive	choice’,	are	prompted	by	such	activity	–	and	they	are	explored	in	more	depth	within	this	chapter,	as	I	outline	previous	critical	engagements	with	prenatal	testing,	 and	 then	 again	 in	 chapter	 seven	 as	 I	 relate	 such	 questions	more	 directly	 to	 the	study	at	hand.				
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The	history	and	trajectory	of	NIPD		Thus,	 as	 a	 novel	 prenatal	 testing	 technology,	 non-invasive	 prenatal	 diagnosis	 (NIPD)	 is	emerging	 into	 a	 field	 within	 which	 prenatal	 testing	 technologies	 and	 practices	 are	thoroughly	routinised	and	normalised.	 	As	 this	new	technology	enters	 into	a	clinical	and	cultural	 space	 within	 which	 prenatal	 testing	 has	 become	 so	 ‘normal’	 and	 ‘routine’,	 and	where	 an	 established	 pattern	 of	 development	 sees	 a	 succession	 of	 technologies	 arrive,	evolve	and	become	translated	within	routine	systems	and	practices,	the	emergence	of	‘just	
another	big	advance	in	testing’9	may	have	been	greeted	with	moderate	clinical,	scientific	or	critical	 interest.	 	 NIPD,	 however,	 has	 been	 widely	 characterised	 as	 representing	 a	
‘revolutionary’	step	within	the	on-going	evolution	of	prenatal	testing	–	(Greely	2011,	King	2011,	Palomaki,	Kloza	et	al.	2011,	Vermeesch	2012,	Chiu,	Lo	et	al.	2015)	–	emerging	as	a	technology	 that	 has,	within	 the	 space	 of	 just	 a	 few	 years,	 led	 to	 ‘every	aspect	of	 current	
standard	[prenatal]	care	being	questioned’	(Chitty	and	Bianchi	2013).		There	are	two	clear	and	 commonly	 cited	 reasons	 why	 NIPD	 testing	 is	 discussed	 in	 terms	 of	 being	‘revolutionary’	 rather	 than	 simply	 routine:	 1)	 the	 technology	 presents	 a	 number	 of	important	 clinical/practical	 advantages	 over	 current	 testing	 methods,	 and	 2)	 it	 is	 an	application	 of	 rapidly	 developing	 and	 increasingly	 clinically-relevant	 ‘next	 generation	sequencing’	 (NGS)	10	genetic	 testing	 technologies	 (Swanson,	Ramos	et	al.	2014),	with	 the	implication	that	the	potential	scope	of	NIPD	testing	is	not	simply	genetic,	but	 ‘genomic’11	(Bianchi	2012a,	Adams,	Berg	et	al.	2015).			Unlike	 other	 prenatal	 testing	 technologies	which	 are	 either	 highly	 accurate	 but	 present	some	 degree	 of	 risk	 of	miscarriage	 (amniocentesis	 and	 CVS),	 or	 are	 ‘non-invasive’	 (and	risk-free)	 but	 provide	 results	 that	 are	 significantly	 less	 accurate	 than	 invasive	 testing	(ultrasound	and	maternal	serum	screening),	NIPD	tests	provide	highly	accurate	results,	at	an	 early	 stage	 of	 pregnancy,	 without	 posing	 any	 risk	 to	 the	 health	 of	 the	 fetus	 or	 the	mother.		Test	results	are	typically	quoted	–	for	instance	within	the	image	below	-	as	being	between	 98%	 and	 99.5%	 accurate	 (although	 expert	 accounts	 gathered	 here	 frequently	
																																								 																						9	A	description	of	testing	provided	by	Chloe,	an	NIPD	researcher	interviewed	for	this	study.			10	‘NGS	sequencing’	has	come	to	refer	to	a	new	tranche	of	genetic	testing	technologies	which	allow	for	analysis	of	the	whole	genome	or	exome:	‘Next	generation	sequencing	(NGS)	is	often	referred	to	as	
massively	parallel	sequencing,	which	means	that	millions	of	small	fragments	of	DNA	can	be	sequenced	
at	 the	 same	 time,	 creating	 a	massive	 pool	 of	 data…	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 scientists	 to	 look	 at	 the	 entire	
genetic	make-up	of	a	patient.	The	genome	is	all	of	the	genetic	material	in	an	individual	and	includes	
all	 of	 the	 genes	 and	 DNA	 that	 each	 cell	 in	 the	 human	 body	 contains’	 (NHS	 National	 Genetics	 and	Genomic	Education	Centre,	2015b).	11	Genomics	is	defined	as	the	study	of	genes	and	their	functions	(as	opposed	to	genetics	which	is	the	study	of	heredity)	-	(World	Health	Organisation,	2002).			
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suggested	that	NIPD	tests	were	to	be	considered	99.9%	accurate12).	 	Questions	regarding	test	 accuracy	 remain	however	a	matter	of	much	debate	 (and	 they	are	explored	 in	detail	within	chapter	four	of	this	thesis).		
	
Figure	1:	Test	accuracy,	as	reported	on	the	RAPID	project	website			NIPD	testing	has	been	shown	to	be	viable	from	seven	weeks	gestation	(Devaney,	Palomaki	et	al.	2011),	although	many	specific	tests	are	recommended	for	use	from		around	10	weeks	gestation.		Nevertheless,	NIPD	reliably	produces	test	results	within	the	first	trimester13	of	pregnancy	 (Latendresse	 and	 Deneris	 2015),	 with	 laboratory	 ‘turnaround	 time’	 being	approximately	 5	 days	 (McCullough,	 Almasri	 et	 al.	 2014,	 p.3).	 	 NIPD	 requires	 only	 a	maternal	blood	sample	 in	order	 for	 testing	 to	be	carried	out,	and	 is	 therefore	defined	as	clinically	‘non-invasive’	(blood	testing	may,	however,	be	understood	as	‘invasive’	from	the	patient	perspective	-	study	participants	here	expressed	some	anxiety	around	the	physical	act	 of	 having	 their	 blood	 taken).	 	 NIPD	 can	 also	 be	 used	 throughout	 pregnancy,	 unlike	many	other	prenatal	testing	technologies,	which	require	women	to	undergo	testing	during	a	specific	‘window’	of	time	(see	appendix	one	for	detail	on	the	timing	of	current	prenatal	tests	as	provided	within	routine	NHS	practice).		This	unique	combination	of	practical	and	clinical	 advantages	 has	 placed	 NIPD	 in	 a	 position	 where	 its	 rapid	 and	 widespread	implementation	has,	from	the	earliest	stages	of	research	and	development,	been	identified	as	being	highly	‘desirable’:	
																																								 																						12	Sequenom’s	 ‘MaterniT21	 Plus’	 test	 claims	 accuracy	 rates	 of	 more	 than	 99.9%	 for	 certain	disorders.			13	Within	medical	descriptions	of	pregnancy	a	 ‘trimester’	 refers	 to	 ‘any	one	of	the	three	successive	
three-month	periods	into	which	a	pregnancy	may	be	divided’	(Martin	and	McFerran,	2014)	–	hence	the	first	trimester	refers	to	the	first	three	months	or	12	weeks	of	pregnancy.				
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One	of	the	goals	of	modern	genetics	is	the	development	of	safe	and	reliable	prenatal	 diagnostic	 tests	 which	 do	 not	 constitute	 a	 risk	 to	 the	 fetus.		Currently,	the	safety	of	available	methods	is	limited	by	the	need	to	obtain	fetal	 tissue	 for	 analysis	 by	 invasive	 means,	 such	 as	 amniocentesis	 and	chorionic	villus	sampling	(CVS),	which	present	a	finite	risk	to	the	fetus…		It	is	 hoped	 that	 further	 new	 concepts	 and	 technological	 advances	will	 now	hasten	 the	development	of	 this	 field	 and	 lead	 to	 the	 introduction	of	non-invasive	prenatal	diagnosis	into	routine	clinical	practice	(Lo	1994,	p.1060	-	1065)		 The	 working	 group	 believes	 that	 the	 implementation	 of	 non-invasive	prenatal	 diagnosis	 for	 clinically	 significant	 genetic	 disorders	 is	 desirable,	both	 to	 improve	 the	 quality	 and	 management	 of	 antenatal	 care	 and	 to	facilitate	 parental	 reproductive	 choice,	 and	 that	 the	 development	 of	 cell-free	 fetal	nucleic	acid	 technology	 for	 these	purposes	should	be	supported	within	the	UK.	(Wright	2009,	p.46)		NIPD	functions	by	exploiting	 the	presence	of	cell-free	 fetal	DNA/cffDNA14	fragments	 that	may	(reliably,	from	around	5	weeks	gestation)	be	found	within	the	maternal	bloodstream	throughout	 pregnancy,	 and	 which	 increase	 in	 volume	 along	 with	 gestation	 and	 fetal	growth	(Lo,	Corbetta	et	al.	1997,	Wright	2009).		It	is	because	NIPD	exploits	the	presence	of	fetal	genetic	material	that	it	has	come	to	be	a	viable	application	of	next	generation	genetic	sequencing	 technologies	 (Mardis	 2008),	 with	 the	 ‘fragmented’	 form	 of	 cffDNA	 being	particularly	 amenable	 to	 the	 application	 of	 ‘shotgun	 sequencing’15 	techniques.	 	 The	presence	of	cffDNA	was	first	established	by	Dennis	Lo	and	his	team	at	Oxford	University	in	1997	 (Lo,	 Corbetta	 et	 al.	 1997),	 with	 this	 discovery	 following	 on	 from	 many	 years	 of	research	(carried	out	by	Lo	and	his	team,	as	well	as	a	number	of	other	groups	worldwide)	into	potential	non-invasive	prenatal	diagnosis	testing	methods	exploiting	the	presence	of	intact	fetal	cells	(Adinolfi	1991,	Choolani,	Mahyuddin	et	al.	2012).		After	success	with	such	methods	had	proven	elusive,	 the	discovery	of	 cffDNA	sparked	much	renewed	 interest	 in	NIPD,	and	the	discussion	of	potential	applications	–	many	of	which	had	been	very	clearly	identified	 by	 those	 most	 central	 to	 NIPD	 research	 in	 previous	 years	 (Lo	 1994)	 –	 very	quickly	gained	pace.																																										 																						14	Cell-free	fetal	DNA	or	cffDNA	refers	to	fetal	genetic	material	(in	the	form	of	short	DNA	fragments)	that	is	found	in	the	maternal	plasma	and	serum	throughout	pregnancy,	and	that	is	rapidly	cleared	from	 the	 maternal	 bloodstream	 after	 birth	 (Lo	 et	 al.	 1997).	 	 The	 term	 ‘fetal	 DNA’	 is	 however	something	 of	 a	misnomer	 as	 this	 fragmented	DNA	 is	 a	 product	 of	 the	 placenta	 and	not	 the	 fetus	itself.		15‘Shotgun	 sequencing’	 refers	 to	 a	 particular	 sequencing	 method	 used	 for	 determining	 the	 DNA	sequence	of	an	organism's	genome,	and	which	 involves	 ‘breaking’	 the	genome	into	a	collection	of	small	DNA	 fragments	 that	 are	 then	 sequenced	 individually.	 Bioinformatics	 programs	 are	 used	 to	look	 for	 ‘overlaps’	 in	 the	 DNA	 sequences	 in	 order	 to	 place	 individual	 fragments	 in	 their	 correct	order	and	to	reconstitute	the	genome	(USA	National	Institute	of	Health,	2015)	
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	Mirroring	 the	development	of	 amniocentesis,	 the	 first	 clinical	 applications	of	NIPD	were	for	1)	the	identification	of	fetal	blood	group	-	where	testing	was	(and	is)	used	to	guide	the	treatment	 of	 women	 who	 are	 ‘at	 risk’	 of	 haemolytic	 disease	 of	 the	 fetus	 and	newborn/HDFN16	because	 of	 a	 potential	 blood	 group	 incompatibility	 and	 ‘sensitisation’	having	occurred	during	a	previous	pregnancy	(Avent,	Madgett	et	al.	2009)	-	 	and	2)	fetal	sex		-	where	testing	is	used	to	guide	the	clinical	management	of	pregnant	women	who	are	‘at	 risk’	 of	 sex	 chromosome-linked/X-linked17	genetic	 disease.	 	 Again	 paralleling	 the	development	 of	 amniocentesis,	 the	 next	 major	 step	 in	 the	 development	 of	 NIPD	 came	when	proof-of-principle	research	on	testing	for	Down’s	syndrome	was	published	(Lo,	Tsui	et	al.	2007,	Fan,	Blumenfeld	et	al.	2008)	–	hailed	as	a	‘watershed	moment’	(Bianchi	2012b)	in	 the	 development	 of	 NIPD.	 	 This	 was	 very	 quickly	 followed	 by	 successful	 research	concerning	testing	for	an	expanded	range	of	trisomies/aneuploidies18	(Fan,	Blumenfeld	et	al.	 2009,	 Tsui,	 Wong	 et	 al.	 2009)	 and	 other	 chromosomal	 conditions	 (Bustamante-Aragones,	Rodriguez	de	Alba	 et	 al.	 2008,	 Sehnert,	Rhees	 et	 al.	 2011,	Hill,	 Compton	et	 al.	2014a)19.		Another	‘watershed’	moment	in	the	development	of	NIPD	testing	came	when,	in	2010,	it	was	demonstrated	that	the	‘whole	fetal	genome’	was	represented	in	the	maternal	blood	 (Lo,	 Chan	 et	 al.	 2010,	 Thung,	 Beulen	 et	 al.	 2015),	 opening	 up	 the	 possibility	 that	NIPD	testing	would	at	some	point	be	able	to	exploit	the	 ‘full	potential’	of	next-generation	genetic	sequencing	technologies	(Hall,	Finnegan	et	al.	2014,	p.38).		Cowan	suggests	that	prenatal	testing	may	be	best	characterised	as	a	collection	of	practices	–	a	cultural	object	of	great	significance,	and	which	is	at	once	scientific,	clinical	social,	and	personal	in	scope:		
																																								 																						16	HDFN,	known	colloquially	as	‘blue	baby	syndrome’	is	a	serious	congenital	form	of	anaemia	which,	‘prior	to	the	introduction	of	post-delivery	anti-D	prophylaxis	in	the	1960s,	accounted	for	the	death	of	
one	baby	in	2200’	(Daniels	et	al.	2009).			17	X-linked	 diseases	 are	 caused	 by	 a	 mutation	 in	 a	 gene	 carried	 on	 an	 X-chromosome.	 	 Because	males	 have	 only	 one	X	 chromosome,	 ‘recessive’	 characteristics	 will	 be	 expressed.	 Females	 can	‘carry’	the	mutation,	which	may	then	be	expressed	in	some	(potentially	50%)	of	their	male	children	(Lackie,	2010)	18	The	 terms	 ‘trisomy’	 and	 ‘aneuploidy’	 are	 used	 interchangeable,	 and	 refer	 to	 an	 ‘error’	 in	 the	configuration	 of	 a	 person’s	 chromosomes	 –	where	 three	 (rather	 than	 two)	 copies	 of	 a	 particular	chromosome	 is	 present.	 	 A	 number	 of	 genetic	 ‘conditions’	 have	 been	 found	 to	 be	 caused	 by	 the	presence	of	 trisomy,	 including	Down’s	syndrome,	Patau	syndrome	and	Edwards	syndrome	(Rapp	1999,	p.28).		19	A	 small	 number	 of	 tests	 for	 single	 gene	 disorders	 such	 as	 Achondroplasia	 (a	 common	 form	 of	dwarfism)	were	also	developed,	(reaching	standards	sufficient	for	clinical	use	-	see	appendix	three	for	 details	 regarding	 NIPD	 tests	 currently	 licenced	 by	 the	 UK	 Genetic	 Testing	 Network),	 and	research	on	a	larger	range	of	rare	genetic	conditions	including	Huntington’s	disorder	(Bustamente-Aragones,	Rodriguez	de	Alba	et	al.	2008),	 sickle	cell	disorder	(Hill,	Compton	et	el.	2014)	has	also	been	on-going.			
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Prenatal	 diagnosis	 should	 be	 properly	 thought	 of	 as	 a	 sociotechnical	system	composed	of	several	subsidiary	parts:	the	medical	delivery	services	that	 convince	 women	 to	 become	 patients;	 the	 means	 of	 obtaining	 fetal	tissue	 from	those	patients;	biochemical	assays	of	 the	 tissue;	 the	culturing	and	karyotyping	of	fetal	cells;	molecular	analysis	of	fetal	DNA;	ultrasound	examination	and	guidance;	and	abortion.		(Cowan	1994,	p.35)		With	NIPD’s	development	closely	echoing	that	of	previous	prenatal	testing	technologies	-	with	 the	growth	of	specific	 testing	applications	 following	a	similar	developmental	order,	shifting	from	fetal	blood	group	to	fetal	sex,	then	to	Down’s	syndrome	and	on	to	tests	for	an	expanded	range	of	chromosomal	conditions	 -	 the	way	 in	which	 the	 technology	was	(and	is)	 being	 translated	 both	 scientifically	 and	 clinically	 points	 towards	 the	 presence	 of	established	 ‘pathways’	 from	within	which	 the	 routinisation	 and	normalisation	of	 testing	may	take	hold.		With	the	advent	of	NIPD	then,	‘the	genomic	analysis	of	fetal	DNA’	may	be	added	to	Cowan’s	list	as	another	‘subsidiary	part’20:	emerging	as	a	new	development	in	a	well-established	 field	 of	 research,	 where	 the	 clinical	 translation	 of	 novel	 technology	 is	similarly	 routine,	 and	 where	 clinical	 practices	 –	 such	 as	 ‘obtaining	 fetal	 tissue’	 and	‘abortion’	 –	 sit	 alongside	 social	 processes	–	 such	as	 efforts	 taken	 to	 ‘convince’	 or	 ‘guide’	women	 in	 their	 encounters	 with	 prenatal	 testing	 technology	 –	 NIPD	 emerges	 into	 a	context	 within	 which	 a	 powerful	 alignment	 between	 bioscience,	 healthcare	 and	 new	genetic	knowledge	informs	the	‘sociotechnical’	practice	of	prenatal	testing.		
Translating	NIPD	into	the	clinic		Building	 on	 the	 increasingly	 availability	 of	 NIPD	 tests,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 availability	 of	established	 pathways	 for	 the	 enrolment	 and	 translation	 of	 novel	 prenatal	 testing	technologies,	 NIPD	 has	 been	 introduced	 into	 clinical	 practice	 in	 a	 number	 of	ways,	 and	within	a	number	of	distinct	spaces.	 	Firstly,	testing	is	used	within	the	 ‘specialist’	 fields	of	clinical	 genetics	 and	 fetal	 medicine.	 	 In	 clinical	 genetics,	 NIPD	 is	 used	 within	 the	management	of	pregnancies	already	identified	as	being	at	‘high	risk’	of	genetic	disease	or	disorder,	either	as	a	result	of	a	known	family	history	of	disease,	or	as	a	result	of	previous	experiences	of	prenatal	diagnosis.	 	NIPD	testing	for	 fetal	sex	was	quickly	adopted	within	such	 spaces,	 having	 been	 offered	 within	 NHS	 laboratories	 since	 2003	 (Raymond,	Whittaker	et	al.	2010),	 and	becoming	 ‘the	most	frequently	requested	molecular	diagnostic	
																																								 																						20	Although	it	must	be	noted	here	that	genomic	prenatal	testing	is	not	limited	to	NIPD	–	it	may	also	be	carried	out	using	invasive	testing	techniques	and	has	been	the	subject	of	research	elsewhere	–	with	the	EACH	project	for	instance	evaluating	both	NIPD	and	‘array	CGH’.	
	 19	
test…	account[ing]	for	more	than	10%	of	all	prenatal	reports’	by	2008	21.	 	Testing	 for	 fetal	sex	is	used	to	guide	the	‘management’	of	these	‘at	risk’	pregnancies	in	a	number	of	ways.		For	 x-linked	 conditions	 such	 as	 haemophilia,	where	 only	male	 fetuses	may	be	 ‘affected’,	testing	is	used	to	determine	fetal	sex	at	an	earlier	stage	than	would	otherwise	have	been	possible	using	ultrasound,	and	with	none	of	the	risk	of	miscarriage	that	amniocentesis	or	CVS	would	otherwise	bring.		If	a	fetus	is	‘diagnosed’	as	female	then	the	pregnancy	can	go	on	 to	be	managed	 through	 routine	prenatal	 care.	 	 If	 the	 fetus	 is	 ‘diagnosed’	 as	male	 the	pregnancy	 can	 continue	 to	 be	 managed	 through	 ‘specialist’	 care	 services,	 and	amniocentesis	may	subsequently	be	used	to	determine	whether	the	fetus	is	in	fact	affected	by	 the	 presence	 of	 disease	 (in	 these	 circumstances	 amniocentesis	 is	 often	 delayed	 until	late	stage	in	pregnancy	where	it	brings	a	risk	of	early	labour	rather	than	miscarriage).				NIPD	acts	as	a	kind	of	‘interim’	test	in	such	circumstances:	it	is	not	used	to	directly	guide	decisions	regarding	abortion,	but	rather	to	guide	decisions	around	whether	to	undertake	further	 invasive	 testing.	 	 For	 a	 small	 number	 of	 conditions	 testing	 may	 guide	 the	management	of	pregnancy	more	directly:	for	instance,	if	a	woman	is	‘at	risk’	of	carrying	a	child	with	congenital	adrenal	hyperplasia	(CAH)22	she	may	be	offered	NIPD	for	fetal	sexing	in	 order	 to	 determine	 whether	 she	 continues	 to	 receive	 steroidal	 dexamethasone	treatment	 during	 pregnancy,	 or	 not	 (steroid	 treatment	 prevents	 ‘virilisation’	 in	 female	fetuses	and	is	given	prophylactically	to	women	at	known	risk	of	CAH	–	NIPD	would	allow	for	 those	 carrying	 male	 fetuses	 to	 avoid	 receiving	 unnecessary	 treatment23(Dreger	 and	Herndon	2009,	Dreger,	Feder	et	al.	2012)).			Similarly,	testing	for	fetal	blood	group/rhesus	status	 –	 used	within	 the	 field	 of	 fetal	medicine	 rather	 than	 clinical	 genetics	 –	may	 help	guide	treatment	during	pregnancy,	allowing	women	who	are	found	to	have	a	blood	group	compatible	 with	 that	 of	 their	 fetus	 to	 avoid	 being	 administered	 ‘anti-D’	 treatment24	unnecessarily.		NIPD	for	a	range	of	single	gene	disorders	-	Apert	syndrome,	Cystic	Fibrosis,	Achondroplasia,	Hypochondroplasia,	Muenke	Syndrome,	Thanatophoric	Dysplasia	Type	 I																																									 																						21	It	 has	 been	 noted,	 however	 that	 clinician	 knowledge	 of	NIPD	 testing	 is	 by	 no	means	 universal	(Minear,	Lewis	el.	2015),	and	this	point	was	very	clearly	echoed	within	a	number	of	expert	accounts	gathered	here.		22	Congenital	 adrenal	 hyperplasia	 (CAH)	 is	 a	 disease	 of	 the	 endocrine	 system	 that	 can	 cause	‘virilization’	-	the	development	of	masculine	traits.			in	female	fetuses.	23	Although	NIPD	 for	 CAH	was	 quickly	 introduced,	 the	 ‘treatment’	 of	 CAH	–	 along	with	 other	 sex	chromosome	 disorders	 and	 ‘disorders	 of	 sex	 development’	 -	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 debate,	 with	 critics	claiming	 that	 the	 on-going	 medicalisation	 of	 ‘benign	 behavioural	 sex	 variations’	 is	 deeply	problematic	(Dreger	2009,	Dreger	et	al	2012).		24	Anti	D	 is	 the	 rhesus-factor	 antibody,	which	 is	 formed	by	 rhesus-negative	 individuals	 following	exposure	to	rhesus-positive	blood:	‘Anti-D	immunoglobulin	is	given	to	Rh-negative	women	within	72	
hours	of	giving	birth	to	a	Rh-positive	child	(or	following	miscarriage	or	abortion),	to	prevent	the	risk	
of	haemolytic	disease	of	the	newborn	in	a	subsequent	child’	(Martin	and	McFerran,	2014)	
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and	 Thanatophoric	 Dysplasia	 type	 II	 (see	 appendix	 three	 for	 details	 regarding	 these	conditions)	–	is	also	available	for	use	within	UK	clinical	genetics.		Here,	by	contrast,	NIPD	is	positioned	a	step	closer	to	decisions	regarding	abortion,	as	it	is	able	to	directly	diagnose	the	condition	that	a	woman	may	be	‘at	risk’	for.		Practically,	however,	testing	may	in	many	circumstances	 be	 used	 for	 ‘information	 only’	 rather	 than	 to	 guide	 decisions	 regarding	abortion:	 a	 recent	 study	 examining	Cystic	 Fibrosis	 patients’	 preferences	 regarding	NIPD	suggests	 that	 the	 majority	 of	 people	 would	 seek	 to	 make	 the	 most	 of	 NIPD’s	 ‘non-invasiveness’	and	gain	information	on	their	pregnancy	in	order	‘to	prepare’	rather	than	to	make	any	decision	regarding	termination	(Hill,	Twiss	et	al.	2015).		In	the	case	of	NIPD	for	Thanatophoric	Dysplasia	-	with	testing	being	offered	to	women	with	previous	experience	of	pre-	or	post-natal	diagnosis,	but	who	are	at	little	clinical	 ‘risk’	of	experiencing	another	affected	pregnancy	25	-	 testing	 is	offered	explicitly	 to	provide	reassurance,	 rather	 than	 to	satisfy	any	clear	clinical	‘need’.		NIPD	for	Down’s	syndrome	has	also	been	the	subject	of	a	significant	volume	of	publically	funded	 research	 in	 the	UK.	 	The	National	 Institute	 for	Health	Research	 (NIHR)	provided	funding	for	a	five-year	(2009-2014)	research	programme	on	NIPD	-	the	Reliable	Accurate	Prenatal	non-Invasive	Diagnosis	(RAPID	2015)	project,	 the	aim	of	which	was	to	 ‘improve	
the	 quality	 of	 NHS	 prenatal	 diagnostic	 services	 by	 evaluating	 early	 non-invasive	 prenatal	
diagnosis’	(Hill,	Wright	 et	 al.	 2014b).	 	 Early	 research	 carried	out	within	 the	 remit	 of	 the	RAPID	 project	 led	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	 number	 of	 UK	 Genetic	 Testing	 Network	(UKGTN)-approved	testing	services	(for	fetal	sex	and	single	gene	disorders	-	see	appendix	three)	and,	by	the	end	of	the	study,	the	project	had	also	led	to	the	early	development	of	in-house	NHS	tests	for	Down’s	syndrome,	Patau’s	syndrome	and	Edwards	syndrome	(Chitty	2015b).	 	The	RAPID-developed	trisomy/aneuploidy	tests	are	currently	being	trialled	and	‘validated’	within	 the	UK,	being	offered	 to	 the	small	population	of	pregnant	women	who	are	receiving	care	through	one	of	the	‘Evaluation	of	NIPT	for	Aneuploidy	in	an	NHS	Setting’	study	(Chitty	2015a)	research	sites.		Currently,	within	the	NHS,	in	order	for	women	to	be	offered	diagnostic	testing	for	Down’s	syndrome	(amniocentesis),	they	must	first	receive	a	screening	test	result	that	suggests	they	are	at	sufficient	‘risk’:	FASP	defines	the	national	cut	off	set	at	1	in	150	at	term	for	both	first	and	second	trimester	screening	tests.	A	woman	with	a	risk	of	1	in	150,	or	greater	(1	in	2	–	1	in	150),	 of	 having	 a	 pregnancy	 affected	 by	 T21,	 T18/T13	 in	 the	 first	 trimester	 or	T21	 only	 in	 the	 second	 trimester	 will	 be	 considered	 to	 be	 in	 the	 ‘higher	 risk’	group	and	offered	an	invasive	test	
																																								 																						25	For	Thanatophoric	Dysplasia	the	 ‘risk	of	recurrence	for	parents	who	have	had	one	affected	child	is	
not	significantly	increased	over	that	of	the	general	population’	(Karczeski	and	Cutting	2014).	
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(FASP	2015,	p.11)		
	The	 non-invasive	 Down’s	 syndrome	 tests	 that	 are	 currently	 being	 validated	 are	 neither	being	 offered	 to	 this	 group	 alone,	 nor	 are	 they	 being	 offered	 to	 any	 pregnant	 woman	regardless	of	 risk.	 	Rather,	 they	are	being	offered	 to	women	at	 a	 cut	off	 of	1	 in	1000	or	greater	risk	(Hewison	2015),	establishing	therefore	a	new	group	of	‘medium-risk’	women	and	creating	another	(albeit	safe,	and	in	the	majority	of	circumstances	‘reassuring’)	step	in	the	pathway	from	screening	to	diagnosis	(Bryant	2014).			NIPD	tests	have,	since	the	advent	of	testing	for	Down’s	syndrome	particularly,	been	made	available	 to	 purchase	 privately	 in	 the	UK.	26		 The	 translation	 of	NIPD	 testing	 for	Down’s	syndrome	from	the	research	context	to	the	clinical	context	occurred	rapidly,	with	testing	being	made	available	for	the	first	time	in	the	United	States	in	October	2011	(Allyse,	Sayres	et	 al.	 2012)	 and	 UK-based	 testing	 services	 being	 launched	 in	 October	 of	 2012	(Genomeweb	2012).	 	 The	 growth	 of	 commercial	NIPD	 testing	 has	 been	 significant,	with	Sequenom	for	instance	collecting	data	from	‘more	than	100,000	clinical	samples	from	all	50	
US	states	and	13	other	countries’	(McCullough,	Almasri	et	al.	2014,	p.1),	by	 January	2014,	just	over	two	years	since	the	launch	of	testing.		By	November	of	2012	clinics	across	the	UK	were	offering	private	Down’s	syndrome	testing,	and	branded	tests	–	 ‘NIFTY’,	 ‘Panorama’,	‘MAterniT21’,	 ‘Harmony’	 –	 marketed	 by	 at	 least	 seven	 different	 (global)	 commercial	providers	 have	now	 come	 to	 be	 available	 for	 purchase	 in	 the	UK	 (see	 appendix	 two	 for	further	detail	on	the	companies,	tests	and	conditions	currently	tested	for	within	UK-based	private	services).		 	The	NIPD	development	activities	that	commercial	providers	engage	in	are	 explicitly	 market-driven,	 with	 various	 companies	 trading	 on	 the	 US-based	 NASDAQ	stock	market	(Sequenom,	Ariosa/Roche,	Natera,	Verinata/Illumina)	and	the	London	stock	exchange	(Premaitha),	and	it	has	been	claimed	that	the	‘global	market’	for	NIPD	is	likely	to	reach	‘2.38	billion	US	dollars	by	2022’	(Transparency	Market	Research	2015).	A	significant	level	of	litigious	activity	has	also	been	conducted	around	NIPD,	with	various	companies	–	Sequenom,	Ariosa,	 Illumina	–	 suing	and	 countersuing	each	other	 (Hawkins	2014).	 	 Each	company	 advertises	 non-invasive	 testing	 products	 and	 laboratory	 services	 online,	 with	websites	commonly	offering	information	tailored	to	the	requirements	of	both	parents	and	providers.	 	 Companies	 tend	 to	 complete	 within	 such	 spaces,	 explicitly,	 in	 terms	 of	 test	accuracy	(Skirton,	Goldsmith	et	al.	2015a):																																									 																						26	Before	tests	for	Down’s	syndrome	were	made	available	a	number	of	NIPD	tests	for	fetal	sex	were	available	 to	 purchase	 online,	 on	 a	 direct-to-consumer	 basis	 from	 companies	 based	 the	 USA	(Consumer	Genetics	–	The	Pink	or	Blue	Company	2012).		NIPD	for	fetal	blood	group	testing	is	also	now	also	available	to	purchase	privately	(Innermost	Healthcare	2015)	
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Figure	2:	Advertisement	for	Natera's	Panorama	test,	comparing	rates	of	test	accuracy	with	
those	of	competing	providers	(December	2013).			NIPD	 tests	 for	 Down’s	 syndrome	 have	 been	 widely	 used	 within	 ‘low	 risk’	 pregnant	populations,	with	 several	 research	 teams	 (many	of	which	are	affiliated	with	 commercial	providers)	 publishing	 information	 on	 their	 clinical	 ‘validation’	 processes	 (Nicolaides,	Syngelaki	et	al.	2012,	Fairbrother,	Johnson	et	al.	2013a,	Fairbrother,	Johnson	et	al.	2013b,	Taylor,	Chock	et	 al.	2014).	 	Tests	 such	as	Sequenom’s	 ‘VisibiliT’	 (Karow	2014),	 sold	at	 a	lower	 price	 (and	 offering	 slightly	 less	 accuracy)	 than	 their	 other	 testing	 options,	 are	marketed	explicitly	to	the	‘low	risk’	demographic.		The	cost	of	private	NIPD	testing	in	the	UK	currently	ranges	between	approximately	£400	and	 £900	 (ARC	 2015),	 and	 since	 the	 majority	 of	 commercial	 laboratories	 are	 located	outside	the	UK,	blood	samples	are	commonly	shipped	overseas	for	testing	(the	NIFTY	test	marketed	 by	 the	 Beijing	 Genomics	 Institute/BGI	 for	 instance,	 currently	 requires	 patient	blood	samples	 to	be	sent	 to	China.	 	Other	commercial	 tests	 including	Ariosa’s	 ‘Harmony’	and	Sequenom’s	‘MaterniT21	Plus’	require	that	patient	samples	are	sent	to	the	USA,	where	their	commercial	 laboratories	are	located).	 	UK-based	commercial	testing	providers	have	more	recently	entered	into	the	NIPD	‘market’	–	with	Premaitha	Health	(a	publically	limited	
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company	 trading	 on	 the	 UK	 stock	 market)	 being	 located	 in	 Manchester,	 and	 Genesis	Genetics	(a	USA-based	company)	establishing	centres	in	both	London	and	Nottingham.			Not	only	has	the	number	of	commercial	NIPD	providers	expanded	greatly	since	the	2012	launch	of	private	UK	testing,	but	the	scope	of	testing	itself	has	increased	significantly:	all	commercially-available	NIPD	tests	now	report	back	results	for	fetal	sex,	Trisomy	13/Patau	syndrome 27 	and	 Trisomy	 18/Edwards	 syndrome 28 	(on	 top	 of	 testing	 for	 Down’s	syndrome),	 as	 part	 of	 standard	 practice.	 	 In	 addition	 to	 this,	 many	 tests	 now	 provide	options	 to	 test	 for	 a	 greatly	 expanded	 range	 of	 conditions,	 including	 sex	 chromosome	disorders	 and	 chromosomal	 ‘microdeletions’	 which	 have	 been	 identified	 as	 the	 genetic	cause	of	a	rare	genetic	disease	and	disorder.		Since	this	expanded	range	of	testing	is	made	available	 for	 anyone	 (with	 sufficient	 funds)	 to	 purchase,	 regardless	 of	 predetermined	clinical	‘risk’	-	and	since	previously,	testing	for	such	conditions	would	have	been	achieved	through	amniocentesis	or	CVS,	being	offered	through	a	restricted	range	of	locations	for	the	care	of	‘at	risk’	women	only	-	the	translation	of	NIPD	testing	within	this	context	represents	the	first	time	that	prenatal	testing	for	rare	genetic	disease	has	been	made	available	to	the	‘low	 risk’	 general	 obstetric	 population	 at	 large.	 	 The	 significant	 contribution	 that	commercial	 companies	 have	made	 to	 the	 ongoing	 development	 of	 NIPD	 brings	 another	powerful	 alignment	 into	 the	 frame,	 that	 of	 ‘capital’.	 	 As	 NIPD	 technology	 is	 not	 only	translated	within	clinical	spaces,	but	commercial	ones	too,	it	enrolls	with	it	multiple	(and	powerful)	discourses:	the	discourses	of	‘risk’	and	‘reassurance’	from	within	healthcare,	the	discourses	of	‘progress’	and	‘improvement’	from	within	(bio)science	and	the	discourse	of	‘competition’	and	‘free	market	capitalism’	from	within	the	market.			
The	current	and	future	trajectory	of	NIPD		As	outlined	above,	on-going	‘progress’	around	NIPD	has	resulted	in	the	development	(and	marketing)	 of	 tests	 that	 go	 well	 beyond	 the	 remit	 of	 routine	 clinical	 intervention	 as	practiced	within	established	prenatal	screening	programmes:	with	tests	for	chromosomal																																									 																						27	Patau	syndrome	(or	trisomy	13)	is	‘associated	with	a	very	poor	outcome	in	surviving	infants	due	to	
a	combination	of	multiple	congenital	anomalies	and	severe	mental	retardation’	(Bradley-Smith	et	al.	2010,	 p.304).	 	Patau	 syndrome	 is	 less	prevalent	within	 the	population	 than	Down’s	 syndrome,	 is	associated	 with	 a	 high	 rate	 of	 early	 miscarriage,	 and	 is	 frequently	 characterised	 as	 being	‘incompatible	with	life’.		28	Edward’s	 syndrome	 is	 also	 ‘associated	with	 a	 very	 poor	 outcome	 in	 surviving	 infants’	 with	 the	major	 clinical	 features	 being:	 ‘growth	 retardation,	 dysmorphic	 features,	 congenital	 anomalies,	
developmental	disability	and	a	short	life	expectancy’.	 	It	 is	also	associated	with	a	high	 rate	of	early	miscarriage,	 and	 is	 frequently	 characterised	 as	 being	 ‘incompatible	 with	 life’,	 but	 is	 of	 greater	prevalence	 within	 the	 population	 than	 Patau’s,	 being	 present	 in	 around	 1/7900	 live	 births	(Bradley-Smith	et	al.	2010,	p.303.		
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microdeletions	and	sex	chromosome	disorders	not	only	being	developed,	but	being	very	rapidly	incorporated	into	commercial	testing	services	(see	appendix	two	for	detail)	-	with	five	 of	 the	 seven	 commercial	 tests	 currently	 on	 sale	 in	 the	UK	offering	 these	 ‘expanded’	testing	options	-	the	clinical	translation	of	scientific	and	commercial	development	around	NIPD	 has	 been	 rapid	 and	 pervasive.	 	Whereas	 tests	 for	 aneuploidies	 (and	 fetal	 sex)	 are	now	 typically	 ‘bundled	 together’29	(although	parents	may	decline	 to	 receive	 information	on	fetal	sex	if	 they	wish	to	do	so),	 testing	for	this	expanded	range	of	genetic	disease	and	disorder	 is	presented	as	an	object	of	 ‘added	value’	by	many	commercial	 testing	services.		In	 the	 image	 below	 for	 instance	 -	 taken	 from	 Sequenom’s	 web	 advertisement	 for	 their	‘MaterniT21	 Plus’	 test,	 which	 offers	 to	 provide	 potential	 consumers	 with	 an	 ‘Enhanced	
Sequencing	Series’	–	the	additional	services	offered	through	their	‘new	generation’	of	tests	are	 framed	 as	 ‘innovative’,	 and	 are	 described	 here	 as	 providing	 patients	 with	 the	opportunity	to	access	‘premium	content’:		
	
Figure	3:	Online	advertising	for	Sequenom's	MaterniT21	test	(27th	January	2015)		It	 is	 interesting	 to	 note	 here	 too,	 the	 advert	 very	 actively	 normalises	 NIPD	 –	 with	‘standard’	 testing	 for	 ‘chromosomes	 21,	 18,	 13	 X	 and	 fetal	 gender’	 being	 framed	 as	information	that	has	‘come	to	be	relied	upon’.		Although	parents	may	continue	to	choose	to	test	 for	 aneuploidy	 only,	 with	 regards	 the	 MaterniT21	 test	 at	 least,	 these	 ‘enhanced’	testing	options	are	offered	at	 the	same	price.	 	The	expansion	 in	the	scope	of	commercial	testing	 has	 continued	 onwards	 in	 more	 recent	 months,	 with	 Sequenom	 for	 instance,	launching	 another	 ‘new	 generation	 of	 tests’,	 marketed	 in	 this	 new	 instance	 as	 being	explicitly	genomic	in	scope:																																										 																						29	Within	the	commercial	sphere,	testing	for	Patau’s	and	Edwards’	very	rapidly	followed	testing	for	Down’s	 syndrome	 –	 with	 Sequenom	 re-branding	 their	 ‘MaterniT21’	 test	 for	 Down’s	 syndrome,	launched	 in	 October	 2011	 (McCullough	 et	 al.,	 2014),	 as	 ‘MaterniT21	 Plus’	 in	 February	 2012.		Identification	of	fetal	sex	was	offered	from	the	first	launch	of	Down’s	syndrome	tests.		
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Figure	4:	Online	advertising	for	Sequenom’s	MaterniT	GENOME	test.			Sequenom’s	 ‘MaterniT	 GENOME’	 test	 represents	 another	 significant	 expansion	 in	 the	scope	of	NIPD	testing,	and	like	their	MaterniT21	and	MaterniT21	plus	tests,	it	is	likely	to	be	 followed	by	 similar	 testing	 services	being	developed	by	 a	 range	of	 other	 commercial	providers	 –	 non-invasive	 genomic	 prenatal	 testing	 will	 too	 become	 the	 object	 of	 free	market	 competition	 and	 commercial	 ‘drive’.	 	 The	 full	 implications	 of	 genomic	 testing	(generally	speaking)	have	yet	to	be	identified,	with	many	test	results	providing	‘incidental	findings’	 and	 information	 on	 ‘variants	 of	 unknown	 significance’/VUS’s	 –	 a	 context	which	has	 led	 those	 charged	 with	 providing	 expert	 guidance	 to	 recommend	 ‘to	 restrict	
implementation	 of	 these	 novel	 NGS	 diagnostic	 technologies	 to	 deliberately	 target	 analysis	
and	 interpretation	 to	 disease	 associated	 genes	 consistent	 with	 the	 presenting	 patient’s	
phenotype’	(Hall,	Finnegan	et	al.	2014,	p.5).	 	 It	has	also	been	suggested	that	 issues	raised	by	 the	 application	 of	 genomic	 testing	 within	 the	 prenatal	 context	 particularly	 may	 be	profound:		The	 possibility	 of	 terminating	 the	 pregnancy	 in	 response	 to	 information	about	 the	 foetal	 genome	 triggers	 two	 additional	 concerns.	 Terminations	may	 be	 triggered	 by	 uncertainties	 of	 interpretation	 of	 the	 genome	sequence;	we	 have	 already	 considered	 such	 VUSs	 and	 IFs	 but	 these	may	now	 influence	 practice	 in	 a	 way	 that	 would	 disturb	 many	 professionals,	especially	 as	 society	 is	 only	 beginning	 to	 adjust	 to	 the	 uncertainties	 of	interpretation	 of	 genomic	 information.	 	 Basing	 serious	 and	 irreversible	decisions	on	such	provisional	interpretations,	which	are	so	liable	to	shift	in	significance,	 could	 lead	 patients	 to	make	 decision	 that	 they	 later	 bitterly	regret.	(Clarke	2014)		
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In	order	to	situate	all	of	the	above	within	the	larger	context	of	how	prenatal	testing,	and	NIPD,	 has	 been	 approached	 critically	 –	 I	 proceed	 to	 review	 the	 most	 relevant	 critical	literature	published	around	1)	prenatal	testing	in	general	and	2)	NIPD	specifically.			
Previous	research:	prenatal	testing	as	a	site	of	critical	examination		Reproductive	 medicine,	 the	 practice	 of	 prenatal	 testing,	 and	 the	 various	 technologies	employed	within	these	spaces	have	emerged	as	significant	objects	of	sociological	interest	and	concern.	 	A	 large	body	of	 literature	has	grown	out	of	 critical	engagements	with	 this	area,	with	 the	 fields	of	medical	 sociology	 and	anthropology,	 and	 science	 and	 technology	studies	(STS)	in	particular	producing	significant	work.		A	wide	range	of	themes	–	including	the	 biopolitics	 of	 reproduction,	 (womens)	 reproductive	 autonomy,	medical	 paternalism,	genetic	 determinism,	 abortion,	 eugenics,	 female	 embodiment,	 equity	 of	 access	 to	healthcare,	 and	 the	 rights	 of	 people	 with	 disabilities	 	 -	 have	 been	 raised	 and	 explored	within	this	large	body	of	literature.		The	major	moves	and	developments	within	the	broad	sociological	discussion	of	prenatal	testing	are	summarised	here.		Although	they	are	amongst	the	most	successfully	routinised	and	normalised	applications	of	new	reproductive	and	genetic	technologies	(Gammeltoft	and	Wahlberg	2014),	prenatal	screening	 and	 diagnosis	 technologies	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 raise	 significant	 political,	economic	and	ethical	concerns	(Ginsburg	and	Rapp	1991,	Lippman	1991,	Marteau,	Slack	et	al.	1992,	Rapp	1999,	Browner	and	Sargent	2011).		The	phenomena	of	‘routinisation’	has	been	 of	 key	 interest	 within	 much	 of	 the	 critical	 literature:	 it	 has	 been	 recognised,	 for	instance,	that	the	process	of	routinisation	itself	can	serve	to	obscure	many	issues	that	are	of	 central	 concern	 to	 patient	 experiences	 of	 prenatal	 care	 (Press	 and	 Browner	 1997,	Thomas	2015a).	 	Prenatal	 screening	and	diagnosis	 technologies	have	been	characterised	as	 cultural	 objects	 of	 enormous	 complexity	 and	 transformative	 power	 (Franklin	 1991,	Strathern	 1992b,	 Duden	 1993,	 Strathern	 1996),	 and	 the	 concrete	 and	 embodied	experiences	of	women,	as	reported	within	key	empirical	texts	(Rothman	1994,	Rapp	1999,	Mitchell	 2001)	 have	 served	 to	 highlight	 the	 impacts	 of	 technological	 routinisation	 as	experienced	in	the	field.				Within	her	early	empirical	study	of	amniocentesis,	Rothman	introduced	the	concept	of	the	
‘tentative	pregnancy’	(Rothman	1994)	–	using	it	to	characterise	the	way	in	which,	as	they	encountered	 new	 technologies	 of	 prenatal	 testing,	 women	 delayed	 their	 social	 and	psychological	 engagement	with	 pregnancy	 -	with	 the	 time	 spent	waiting	 for	 test	 results	being	experienced	as	particularly	problematic	as	pregnancy	becomes	transformed	into	an	
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experience	 of	 ‘suspended	animation’	 (Rothman	 1994,	 p.100).	 	Previous	 to	 this,	 Rothman	described	how	the	success	of	prenatal	screening	could	be	 traced	back	 to	a	more	general	move	 towards	 the	 increasing	 ‘commodification’	 of	 life,	 a	 process	 which	 came	 to	 be	extended	 through	 the	 rise	 of	 technologically-mediated	 and	 medicalised	 experiences	 of	pregnancy	(Bessett	2010),	which	in	turn	requires	all	women	 ‘to	confront	a	redefinition	of	
motherhood,	 and	 question	 the	 nature	 and	 origin	 of	 the	 modern	 mother-child	 bond’	(Rothman	1987).	 	 In	another	empirical	study	examining	the	emergence	of	amniocentesis	(Rapp	 1999),	 Rapp	 describes	 how	 the	 task	 of	 navigating	 both	 practical	 and	 moral	complexity	 is	ascribed	to	women	primarily,	as	they	are	required	to	negotiate	encounters	with	 new	 prenatal	 technologies,	 and	 become	 transformed	 into	 ‘moral	 pioneers’	 (Rapp	1999,	 p.3).	 	 Examining	 how	processes	 of	widespread	 technological	 routinisation	 lead	 to	the	 increased	 ‘normalisation’	 of	 testing,	 Rapp	 shows	 elsewhere	 how	 a	 growing	 and	widespread	cultural	acceptance	of	prenatal	testing	may	be	seen	to	erode	opportunities	to	refuse	 testing	 -	 with	 the	 end	 result	 that	 the	 conceptualisation	 of	 prenatal	 testing	 as	 an	appropriate	 and	 responsible	 parental	 action	 becomes	 both	 clinically	 and	 socially	consolidated	(Rapp	1998).			Prenatal	 testing	 has	 been	 recognised	 as	 being	 a	 politically	 complex	 practice	 that	simultaneously	 raises	 both	 eugenic	 and	 liberating	 agendas	 –	with	 critics	 such	 as	Duster	and	Raz	highlighting	the	eugenic	potential	of	prenatal	screening	as	administered	through	‘routine’	 and	 ‘normal’	 population-wide	 screening	 programmes	 –	what	 Duster	 terms	 the	‘backdoor	 to	 eugenics’	 (Duster	 1990)	 and	 what	 Raz	 refers	 to	 as	 the	 ‘new’	 or	 ‘liberal’	eugenics.	 	Picking	up	on	such	critiques,	Gammeltoft	and	Wahlberg	highlight	the	 inherent	‘selectiveness’	 of	 prenatal	 testing	 within	 their	 more	 recent	 anthropological	 review	 of	reproductive	 technology	 (Gammeltoft	 and	 Wahlberg	 2014).	 	 Issues	 around	 prenatal	‘selection’	 and	 eugenics	 have	 been	 raised	 in	 connection	 with	 the	 critical	 discussion	 of	disability	 and	 reproductive	 rights	 (Shakespeare	 1998,	 Parens	 and	 Asch	 2000,	 Kerr	 and	Shakespeare	 2002,	 Boardman	 2014),	 with	 the	 disability	 rights	 critique	 problematising	prenatal	 testing,	 claiming	 that	 firstly,	 by	 preventing	 the	 birth	 of	 fetuses	with	 particular	genetic	 ‘diseases’	or	 ‘disorders’	prenatal	screening	programmes	promote	 the	eradication	of	 certain	 social	 groups	 and	 actively	 constitute	 cultural	 ideas	 around	 what	 types	 of	persons	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 ‘disposable’	 (Latimer	 2007b,	 p.121,	 Thomas	 2014,	 p.211)	and	 that	 secondly,	 the	 value	 judgments	 inherent	 within	 selective	 practices	 foster	discrimination	against	those	living	with	disease,	disability	and	disorder	and	contribute	to	the	 broader	 cultural	 framing	 of	 who	 and	 what	 is	 framed	 as	 ‘normal’.	 	 Echoing	 this,	Rothman	 asserts	 that	 systems	 of	 screening,	 when	 combined	 with	 genetic	 counselling,	function	 as	 a	 form	 of	 fetal	 ‘quality	 control’	 (Rothman	 1994,	 p.2),	where	 presumptions	
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about	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘genetic	 health’	 are	 made.		 Rapp	 and	 Lippman	 too	 highlight	 the	explicitly	 selective	 nature	 of	 prenatal	 testing	 technologies	 (Lippman	 1991,	 Rapp	 1998),	with	Lippman	claiming	that	‘the	primary	aim	of	testing	is	the	separation	of	those	fetuses	we	
wish	to	allow	to	develop,	from	those	we	wish	to	discontinue’	(Lippman	1991).		The	argument	that	genetic	screening	promotes	social	injustice	has	been,	however,	characterised	as	being	particularly	complex	(Shakespeare	1998),	with	Shakespeare	particularly	recognising	that	prenatal	 screening	may	be	viewed	as	being	a	practice	 that	both	 facilitates	 the	growth	of	reproductive	freedom	and	large-scale	social	control.		The	 communication	 of	 information	 around	 prenatal	 testing	 is	 recognised	 as	 being	 a	complex	 and	 significant	 process	 (Clarke	 1991,	 Latimer	 2007a).	 	 The	 power	 inherent	within	the	clinical	portrayal	of	prenatal	genetic	test	results	has	been	highlighted	alongside	the	 subjectivity	 of	 clinical	 descriptions	 of	 disease	 and	 disorder:	 ‘every	 description	 of	 a	
genetic	 disorder	 is	 a	 story	 that	 contains	 a	message’	 (Lippman	 and	Wilfond	 1992,	 p.936).		Elsewhere,	Marteau	et	al.	describe	how	women	explicitly	do	not	act	as	passive	recipients	of	 objective	 clinical	 information	 (Marteau,	 Slack	 et	 al.	 1992),	 and,	 similarly,	 Lippman	explains	how	during	the	decision	making	process	women	tend	to	alter	the	persuasiveness	of	the	biomedical	information	on	screening	that	is	provided	to	them,	weaving	it	with	their	own	 instincts	 and	 beliefs	 in	 order	 to	 create	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 ‘embodied	 knowledge’	(Lippman	 1999).	 	It	 also	 has	 been	 shown	 that	 complex	 decision	 making	 processes	 -	involving	 the	 personalisation	 of	 risk	 information	 (Marteau	 and	 Lerman	 2001,	 Edwards,	Naik	 et	 al.	 2013),	 the	 reshaping	 of	 statistics	 and	 the	 reinterpretation	 of	 the	 concept	 of	‘health’	 (Rapp	 1998)	 are	 shared	 by	 both	 women	who	 accept	 and	 refuse	 testing.	 	Work	examining	the	experiences	of	those	who	‘refuse’	offers	of	prenatal	diagnosis	within	‘risky’	pregnancies,	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 act	 of	 ‘choosing	 not	 to	 choose’	 functions	 as	 a	strategy	through	which	parents	may	express	‘ambivalence’	towards	testing,	enabling	them	to	manage	the	complexities	of		(genetically)	‘risky’	pregnancies	as	experienced	through	the	lens	of	responsible	parenting	(Kelly	2009).		The	specific	issue	of	‘microchimerism’	–	the	presence	of	fetal	(or	other	biological)	material	within	 the	 maternal	 body	 (Gammill	 and	 Nelson	 2010)	 -	 has	 also	 been	 explored	 by	 a	number	of	critics	.		Within	her	work	examining	research	conducted	around	microchimeric	fetal	 cells,	Martin	 (Martin	 2010)	 demonstrates,	 along	with	 the	 growing	 recognition	 that	‘foreign’	 fetal	 material	 may	 be	 of	 significant	 technological	 and	 clinical	 value,	 there	 has	come	 a	 profound	 shifting	 in	 the	 metaphorical	 framing	 of	 fetal	 cells	 and	 fetal	 DNA.		Whereas,	when	the	science	of	 immunology	dominated	enquiry	 in	the	field,	such	material	were	described	as	pathological	 and	destructive	 -	 ‘insurgent	foreigners’,	with	 the	growing	
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recognition	 that	 fetal	 cells	 and	 fetal	 DNA	 could	 be	 used	 within	 a	 well-established	 and	valued	 field	 of	 clinical	 practice	 (prenatal	 testing)	 they	 were	 purposively	 re-framed	 as	
‘productive	 immigrants’.	 	 Elsewhere,	 Kelly	 (Kelly	 2012)	 points	 again	 towards	 the	intensification	 of	 interest	 around	 maternal-fetal	 microchimerism	 in	 the	 wake	 of	developments	 in	 prenatal	 testing	 using	 fetal	 cells	 and	 fetal	 DNA,	 suggesting	 that	 the	‘interface’	between	the	mother	and	the	fetus	emerges	as	an	‘interesting	biopolitical	object’	that	may	 allow	 us	 to	 critically	 examine	 the	 dominant	 framing	 of	 bodies	 and	 persons	 as	discreet	 and	 bounded	 individuals.	 	 Highlighting	 instead	 ‘the	 permeability	 and	
permissiveness	of	bodies’	Kelly	mobilises	talk	of	microchimerism	to	challenge	the	dominant	Western	framing	of	the	‘self’	(echoing	here	the	work	of	Strathern	within	her	examination	of	‘dividuals’).		Fannin	(Fannin	2014)	approaches	the	topic	of	microchimerism	by	focusing	in	 on	 the	 mechanism	 by	 which	 such	 material	 enters	 the	 maternal	 bloodstream	 –	 by	crossing	the	 ‘placental	barrier’.		Critically	examining	the	way	in	which	such	a	‘barrier’	has	been	constructed	and	since	understood,	she	draws	on	the	metaphorical	value	of	maternal-fetal	microchimerism	 in	 order	 to	 ‘re-imagine	 relations	 of	 self–other	 in	pregnancy’	and	 to	highlight	 the	 value	 of	 the	 relational,	 rather	 than	 the	 rational,	 within	 contemporary	understandings	of	pregnancy.			
NIPD	research	to	date:	empirical	studies,	bioethical	debate.			Discussion	of	ethical	and	social	 issues	raised	in	connection	with	the	technology	has	been	established	 alongside	 the	development	 and	 clinical	 implementation	of	NIPD.	 	 The	broad	field	of	‘bioethics’	particularly	has	been	active	from	the	earliest	stages	of	the	technology’s	development	–	and	with	Ethical,	Legal	and	Social	 Implications	 (ELSI)	programmes	being	incorporated	 into	 scientific/clinical	 research	 sites	 such	 as	 the	 RAPID	 project,	 the	bioethical	debate	around	NIPD	has	been	correspondingly	active.				Many	 (and	some	of	 the	earliest)	bioethical	 studies	of	NIPD	raised	 the	 issue	of	 ‘informed	consent’	–	and	the	possible	erosion	of	standard	clinical	consenting	practices	–	as	a	source	of	significant	concern	within	the	discussion	of	NIPD,	due	to	the	perceived	ease,	safety	and	corresponding	 likely	 routinisation	 of	 testing	 (de	 Jong,	 Dondorp	 et	 al.	 2010,	 Deans	 and	Newson	2010,	van	den	Heuvel,	Chitty	et	al.	2010,	Silcock,	Chitty	et	al.	2012).		Responding	to	Van	den	Heuvel	and	Chitty’s	early	empirical	study	of	healthcare	providers’	responses	to	NIPD,	 which	 suggested	 that	 ‘practitioners	 will	 view	 the	 consent	 process	 for	 prenatal	
diagnostic	 testing	 differently	 depending	 on	 whether	 it	 is	 an	 invasive	 or	 non-invasive	 test’	
(van	den	Heuvel,	Chitty	et	al.	2010,	p.27)	–	being	less	likely	to	emphasise	‘informed	consent’	procedures	 in	 the	clinic	 -	Deans	and	Newson	highlight	 the	moral	and	practical	problems	
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that	 could	 be	 raised	 if	 consent	 procedures	were	 to	 be	 relaxed	 in	 response	 to	 the	 ‘non-invasiveness’	 of	NIPD.	 	They	 suggest	 that,	 in	 contrast	 to	how	 the	 receipt	of	 results	 from	risk-based	 and	 probabilistic	 blood	 tests	 that	 are	 used	 for	 ‘screening’	may	 be	 presented,	more	 robust	 consenting	 procedures	 and	 greater	 standards	 of	 ‘pre-test	 information’	 are	necessary	when	women	receive	(diagnostic)	NIPD	results.	 	Such	robustness	 is	said	 to	be	necessary	 because,	 with	 NIPD,	 women	 would	 be	 required	 to	 negotiate	 ‘definitive’	 test	information,	and	address	a	different	set	of	concerns	(including	abortion	–	euphemistically	termed	 ‘an	important	decision	of	great	moral	and	emotional	magnitude’	here)	during	their	‘decision-making	process’.	 	 They	 claim	 that	 the	 definitiveness	 of	NIPD,	 particularly	when	examined	alongside	clinicians’	likely	lack	of	emphasis	on	informed	consent	–	entails	that	a	renewed	emphasis	on	 ‘autonomous	reproductive	choice’	will	be	 required.	 	 It	 is	 suggested	that	 this	 may	 be	 facilitated	 by	 ensuring	 that	 consenting	 procedures	 for	 NIPD	 remain	robust,	and	should	mirror	the	current	consent	procedures	adopted	for	invasive	testing	(a	claim	that	would	have	a	significant	practical	impact	if	NIPD	were	to	enter	into	population-wide	screening	programmes).		Further	issues	around	autonomy,	choice	and	consent	have	been	raised,	with	critics	highlighting	 the	possibility	 that	 -	 if	NIPD	were	 to	be	 introduced	into	 ‘routine’	 and	 ‘normal’	 population-wide	 screening	 programmes	 –	 women	 may	 feel	increasingly	 unable	 to	 ‘choose	 not	 to	 choose’	 (Kelly	 2009)	 NIPD	 testing,	 due	 to	 the	perceived	 ease	 and	 safety	 of	 NIPD	 (Hewison	 2015),	 and	 the	 routinisation	 of	 screening	programmes.			Also	 exploring	 issues	 raised	 by	 the	 possible	 widespread	 routinisation	 of	 NIPD	 within	screening,	 Skotko	 explores	 the	potential	 scenario	 that	Down’s	 syndrome	 (and	any	other	conditions	routinely	tested	for)	may	come	to	be	‘eradicated’	within	the	population	at	large	(Skotko	2009)	as	a	result	of	widespread	NIPD	testing.		Skotko	asks	then	whether,	‘with	the	
new	prenatal	 testing,	will	 babies	with	down	 syndrome	disappear?’	 -	 pointing	 towards	 the	widespread	 ‘success’	 	 (routinisation)	 of	 screening	 programmes	 which	 have	 resulted	 –	
‘since	no	prenatal	therapeutic	interventions	currently	exist’	-	in	a	greatly	increased	number	of	terminations	(abortions)	for	Down	Syndrome	within	healthcare	systems	worldwide:	In	the	USA,	there	would	have	been	a	34%	increase	in	the	number	of	babies	born	with	DS	between	1989	and	2005,	 in	 the	absence	of	prenatal	 testing.		Instead,	there	were	15%	fewer	babies	born,	representing	a	49%	decrease	between	 the	 expected	 and	 observed	 rates.	 	 In	 the	 UK	 there	 would	 have	been	a	58%	increase	in	the	number	of	babies	born	with	DS	between	1989	and	2006,	in	the	absence	of	prenatal	testing.		Instead,	there	was	only	a	4%	increase,	 representing	 a	 54%	 decrease	 between	 expected	 and	 observed	rates.	(Skotko	2009,	p.2)		
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Skotko	 argues	 that	 NIPD	 -	 holding	 the	 potential	 to	 result	 in	 earlier,	 safer,	 and	 cheaper	diagnostic	 testing	 for	Down	Syndrome	–	and	particularly	 if	 it	were	 to	be	made	available	population-wide,	 raises	 significant	moral	 and	 practical	 concerns:	 ‘unprepared,	 untrained	
obstetricians	and	midwives	will	need	to	grapple	with	new,	first	trimester	tests	that	might	be	
quickly	 adopted,	 once	made	 commercially	 available’.	 	 	 He	 voices	 concerns	 regarding	 the	impact	that	both	the	medicalisation	of	pregnancy	and	the	normalisation	of	prenatal	testing	has	had,	 at	 both	 the	 individual	 and	 social	 level,	 and	 asserting	 that	 ‘the	birth	 incidence	of	
children	with	DS	should	ideally	reflect	societal	mores	and	not	the	interventions	of	physicians	
or	medical	technology’.	 	Whilst	the	relevant	social	science	literature	may	point	to	the	fact	that	clinical	practices	and	processes	may	be	conceptualised	as	social	phenomena,	and	are	not	 so	 easily	 separated	 from	 ‘societal	 mores’,	 many	 parallels	 can	 be	 drawn	 between	Skotko’s	reasoning	here	and	that	contained	within	the	social	science	literature	addressing	disability	rights	and	the	 ‘new	eugenics’.	 	Such	concerns	have	been	revisited	in	the	light	of	significant	 developments	 in	 NIPD	 testing	 for	 Down’s	 syndrome,	 with	 Clarke	 once	 again	pointing	towards	the	possible	‘elimination’	of	Down’s	syndrome	within	society	as	a	result,	and	raising	questions	of	broader	cultural	significance:		What	would	 it	 say	about	our	 society’s	 attitudes	 towards	and	valuation	of	people	with	Down	syndrome	in	particular	but	also	those	with	 intellectual	disability	more	generally?		(Clarke	2014,	p.27)		Elsewhere,	 Bryant	 has	 raised	 concerns	 regarding	 NIPD’s	 expansion	 into	 prenatal	screening,	 particularly	 if	 testing	were	 to	 be	 restricted	 to	 certain	 ‘high	 risk’	 groups	 only	(Bryant	2014).	 If	NIPD	were	to	follow	on	from	current	non-invasive	screening	(and	if	 its	‘earliness’	were	to	be	negated	as	such)	in	this	case,	NIPD	would	operate	as	an	additional	step	 	 -	 and	 an	 additional	 delay	 –	 for	 the	 small	 number	 of	women	who	 finally	 receive	 a	confirmatory	diagnosis.		Bryant	suggests	therefore	that	NIPD	may	come	to	be	experienced	as	an	extra	psychological	burden,	particularly	within	the	most	‘tentative’	of	pregnancies:	For	 some	women,	 termination	 of	 pregnancy	may	 actually	 take	 place	 at	 a	later	 stage	 in	 the	 pregnancy	 than	 with	 current	 screening	 protocols.	 Will	women	 feel	 as	 favourably	 towards	 NIPT	 once	 it	 is	 situated	 within	 this	proposed	 pathway?	 The	 psychological	 burden	 of	 these	multiple	 tests	 for	pregnant	women	and	their	partners	is	unknown.	(Bryant	2014,	p.2)		Providing	 empirical	 evidence	 to	 support	 the	 claim	 that	 NIPD	 raises	 (public)	 concerns	regarding	 possible	 routinisation,	 Kelly	 and	 Farimond	 present	 findings	 from	 their	qualitative	research	examining	public	and	 lay	perceptions	of	NIPD	(Kelly	and	Farrimond	2012,	Farrimond	and	Kelly	2013).	 	 Four	distinct	public	 ‘viewpoints’	 emerged	 from	 their	
	 32	
data:	NIPD	was	 simultaneously	 viewed	as;	 ‘discrimination	against	the	disabled;	a	positive	
clinical	 application;	 appropriate	 for	 severe	 disorders	 only;	 [and]	 a	 personal	 choice’			Responses	that	paralleled	the	disability	rights	critique	were	particularly	strong	–	with	the	‘trivialisation’	 of	 selective	 reproduction	 and	 ‘therapeutic’	 abortion	 being	 raised	 as	 a	particular	 issue	 of	 concern.	 	 The	 identification	 of	 this	 perspective	 as	 dominant	 was	highlighted	as	particularly	significant,	particularly	given	that	more	critical	voices	‘are	often	
marginalised	or	drowned	out	by	more	dominant	clinical	and	medical	discourses	 in	debates	
about	new	genetic	technologies’.	 	A	 ‘consensus	of	concern’	was	 identified	as	being	present	throughout	 the	 data:	 every	 participant	 rejected	 the	 idea,	 for	 instance,	 of	 ‘NIPD	 being	
available	outside	traditional	clinical	pathways	(e.g.	commercially/DTC)’.				Zamerowski	 et	 al.	 conducted	 an	 early	 empirical	 study	 on	 NIPD,	 asking	 how	 high-risk	women	 might	 respond	 to	 NIPD-type	 testing	 (Zamerowski,	 Lumley	 et	 al.	 2001).		Responding	to	a	survey,	women	who	were	currently	experiencing	high-risk	pregnancies,	and	who	planned	to	have	an	invasive	test	(amniocentesis	or	CVS),	responded	favourably	to	the	technological	promise	of	NIPD:	‘only	half	of	the	women	would	seek	invasive	testing	after	
a	normal	blood	test’.		A	similar	study,	conducted	with	women	undergoing	routine	anomaly	scans	and	female	medical	students	(Kooij,	Tymstra	et	al.	2009),	produced	more	conflicted	results:	‘our	respondents	do	not	agree	about	making	the	test	generally	available:	a	majority	
of	the	pregnant	women	support	a	general	availability	of	NIPD,	whereas	the	students	are	far	
more	reluctant’.		Some	degree	of	consensus	was	reached	regarding	two	issues:	participants	were	 highly	 critical	 of	 testing	 for	 late	 onset	 disease,	 and	 they	 also	 ‘clearly	 rejected’	identification	 of	 fetal	 sex	 in	 order	 to	 facilitate	 non-medical	 sex	 selection.	 	 A	 survey	 of	women	in	their	third	trimester	of	pregnancy	(Tischler,	Hudgins	et	al.	2011)	demonstrated	that	most	women	show	an	 ‘interest’	 in	NIPD	 ‘primarily	because	of	increased	safety	for	the	
fetus,	 although	 a	 significant	 minority	 are	 uninterested	 or	 ambivalent’.	 	 Another	 survey-based	 study	 (Sayres,	 Allyse	 et	 al.	 2011),	 examining	 attitudes	 toward	 the	 clinical	implementation	 of	 NIPD	 as	 reported	 by	 obstetric	 healthcare	 providers	 in	 the	 USA,	 also	reported	 a	widespread	 level	 of	 concern	 related	 to	 testing	 for	 single	 gene	 disorders	 and	non-medical	 sex	 selection.	 	Very	 few	 respondents	 reported	 a	high	 level	 of	 knowledge	of	NIPD	 and	 a	 general	 ‘uncertainty	 among	 obstetric	 providers	 about	 the	 details	 of	
implementing	 cell-free	 fetal	 DNA	 testing’	 prevailed.	 	 The	 study	 also	 described	 how	healthcare	providers	held	the	general	perception	that	 ‘patients	face	strong	social	pressure	
to	undergo	 testing’,	and	 that	 they	 particularly	 valued	 the	 role	 of	 counselling	 in	 prenatal	testing.			Echoing	the	concerns	of	participants	here,	critics	elsewhere	have	raised	concerns	regarding	 the	 potential	 for	 NIPD	 to	 be	 used	 for	 (illegal)	 ‘social’	 sex	 selection	 and	 other	
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‘non-medical’	purposes	(Newson	2008,	Tasinato,	Montisci	et	al.	2011,	Chapman	and	Benn	2013).			
	Having	 incorporated	 ELSI	 research	 into	 the	 original	 design	 of	 the	 research,	 the	 RAPID	project	has	yielded	much	information	regarding	the	possible	practical	and	ethical	 impact	of	NIPD.	 	 Interview	based	studies	with	women	who	had	experience	of	NIPD	for	 fetal	sex	reported	that	participants	were	‘overwhelmingly	positive’	about	the	technology:		The	 participants	 valued	 a	 test	 that	 was	 easy	 to	 conduct,	 could	 be	performed	early	 in	pregnancy	and	posed	no	risk	to	the	fetus….	Moreover,	NIPD	was	viewed	as	a	positive	development,	which	facilitated	reproductive	autonomy	as	it	expanded	the	reproductive	choices	available	to	women.		(Lewis,	Hill	et	al.	2012a,	p.2)		Although	 the	 disadvantages	 of	 NIPD	were	 felt	 to	 be	 ‘minor	 in	 comparison’,	 a	 number	 of	themes	 of	 concern	 were	 identified,	 including:	 miscarriage	 risk,	 increased	 anxiety,	connection	 to	 a	 potentially	 ‘unwanted’	 fetus,	 being	 robbed	 of	 surprise,	 and	 the	 possible	future	 misuse	 of	 technology	 (Lewis,	 Hill	 et	 al.	 2012b).	 	 The	 RAPID	 team	 have	 also	conducted	 research	 on	 patient	 experiences	 of	 testing	 for	 single	 gene	 disorders,	 where	again	 ‘opinions	 about	 NIPD	were	 very	 positive’	 (Hill,	 Compton	 et	 al.	 2014a).	 	 Concerns	were	raised,	however,	with	participants	stressing	the	need	or	test	accuracy	to	be	high	‘in	
order	 for	 the	 test	 to	 be	 used	 for	 subsequent	 decision	 making	 about	 termination	 of	
pregnancy’.			De	 Jong	 et	 al.	 explicitly	 address	 the	 concerns	 raised	 by	 a	 NIPD’s	 potential	 expansion	toward	whole	genome	 testing,	pointing	 towards	problematic	 issues	raised	 in	connection	with	 the	 autonomy	 of	 the	 future	 child,	which	may	 be	 directly	 threatened	 in	 the	 case	 of	testing	 for	 late-onset	 disorders	 (such	 as	 Huntington’s	 disease)	 or	 ‘susceptibility	 genes’:	
‘testing	for	such	conditions	is	generally	regarded	as	unacceptable,	not	 just	because	benefits	
for	 the	child	 that	might	outweigh	any	burdens	are	absent,	but	also	because	 it	deprives	 the	
individual	of	his	or	her	right	to	self-determination’	(de	 Jong,	Dondorp	et	al.	2011).	 	Such	a	perspective	is	mirrored	within	typical	approaches	to	the	testing	of	children	within	clinical	genetics,	 and	 is	 well	 supported	within	 the	 literature	 (Clarke	 2014,	 Hall,	 Finnegan	 et	 al.	2014),	with	Deans,	Clarke	and	Newson	claiming	particularly	that	‘in	most	cases,	using	NIPT	
to	test	for	adult-onset	conditions,	carrier	status	or	non-serious	traits	presenting	in	childhood	
would	be	unacceptable’	(Deans,	Clarke	et	al.	2015,	p.19).		The	bioethical	discussion	here	is	closely	 linked	 to	 more	 general	 discussions	 of	 routinisation	 within	 the	 social	 science	literature:	 it	 is	suggested	 that,	once	certain	 testing	applications	have	become	routine,	an	expanded	 range	 of	 tests	 are	 likely	 to	 be	made	 available,	 simply	 in	 virtue	 of	 their	 being	
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technologically	 feasible	 rather	 than	 socially,	 morally	 or	 culturally	 appropriate	 (de	 Jong,	Dondorp	et	al.	2010).		A	handful	of	recent	studies	have	shown	that	previously-undetected	cases	 of	 maternal	 cancer	 may	 be	 ‘diagnosed’	 as	 a	 result	 of	 NIPT	 testing	 (Romero	 and	Mahoney	2015,	Sample	2015,	Bianchi,	Chudova	et	al.	2015a),	and	bioethical	commentary	has	 quickly	 followed	 (Newson	 and	 Carter	 2015),	 with	 critics	 pointing	 towards	 the	emergent	 ‘dilemma	 of	 overdiagnosis’	 that	 ‘incidental’	 maternal	 cancer	 diagnoses	 entails.		Additionally,	with	the	expanding	use	of	NIPD	for	the	testing	of	rare	genetic	disease,	comes	the	 possibility	 that	 information	 regarding	 the	 father’s	 health	 may	 be	 generated,	 with	critics	 suggesting	 that	 in	 such	 circumstances	 steps	 ought	 to	 be	 taken	 to	 ensure	 that	informed	 consent	 is	 provided	 by	 both	 parents	 prior	 to	 testing	 taking	 place	 (Skirton,	Goldsmith	et	al.	2015b)		More	recent	clinical	and	empirical	studies	of	NIPD	experiences	have	highlighted	the	speed	with	which	 tests	 for	 Down’s	 syndrome	 particularly	 have	 been	 translated	 into	 the	 clinic	(Geifman-Holtzman,	 Berman	 et	 al.	 2014,	 Krechmar	 2014,	 Nishiyama,	 Sasaki	 et	 al.	 2014,	Xiong,	Berman	et	al.	2015),	and	have	also	suggested	that	with	the	advent	of	such	tests	then	the	 uptake	 of	 prenatal	 screening	 more	 generally	 is	 likely	 to	 increase	 (van	 Schendel,	Dondorp	et	al.	2015x).		Fears	around	the	expansion	and	routinisation	of	testing	have	been	expressed	 (Agatisa,	 Mercer	 et	 al.	 2015),	 and	 a	 recent	 Japanese	 study	 suggested	 that	women	who	seek	out	NIPT	tend	to	have	higher	levels	of	anxiety	or	depression	(Suzumori,	Kumagai	et	al.	2015).				
Summary		Within	this	chapter	I	have	shown	that,	although	a	growing	amount	of	research	and	critical	commentary	 concerning	NIPD	 is	 being	 produced,	 the	 empirical	work	 conducted	 to	 date	has	 been	 limited	 in	 scope.	 	 Additionally,	many	 such	 studies	 have	 been	 closely	 affiliated	with	scientific	research	programmes,	and	do	not	approach	the	discussion	of	NIPD	from	an	explicitly	 critical	 perspective	 that	 problematises	 the	 technology	 and	 its	 implications.		Accounts	of	NIPD	patient	experiences,	being	conducted	 from	within	NHS-based	research	sites,	 accordingly	 attend	 to	 the	 voices	 of	 these	 patients	 in	 particular,	 and	 the	 voices	 of	patients	 and	 providers	 involved	 in	 the	 private	 provision	 of	 NIPD	 testing	 for	 Down’s	syndrome	have	yet	 to	be	highlighted	and	examined.	 	There	are	also	no	ethnographically	informed	 accounts	 of	 NIPD	 published	 to	 date,	 and	 data	 on	 the	 day-to-day,	 routine	 and	
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mundane	 practice	 of	 NIPD	 ‘in	 the	 clinic’	 is	 also	 currently	 absent	 from	 the	 discussion30.		What	also	emerges	as	particularly	notable	here	 is	 that	 the	pace	and	breadth	of	 research	and	 development	 around	 the	 science	 of	 NIPD	 (particularly	 since	 the	 inception	 of	 this	study)	has	been	significant,	and	that	new	applications	of	this	novel	technology	continue	to	emerge,	 and	 become	 translated,	 at	 great	 speed.	 	With	 tests	 entering	 into	 both	 ‘routine’	prenatal	care	and	‘specialised’	diagnostic	testing	services,	the	way	in	which	NIPD	has	come	to	 ‘reach	out’	 into	 the	 clinic,	 and	 into	 the	 lives	 of	 patients	 and	professionals	 involved	 in	prenatal	testing,	has	become	increasingly	complex.		NIPD’s	move	into	the	field	of	prenatal	screening	–	an	activity	that	is	‘centrally	located	in	UK	reproductive	politics’	(Thomas	2014,	p.13)	 -	 is	particularly	significant,	as	 this	brings	with	 it	 the	recognition	 that	 testing	 is	not	only	 a	 site	 of	medical	 and	 social	 activity,	 but	 (bio)political	 activity	 also	 (Lippman	 1991,	p.34).		In	addition	to	this,	the	market-driven	activities	of	commercial	companies	have	had	significant	 impact	 on	 the	 trajectory	 of	 NIPD	 research,	 as	well	 as	 its	 translation	 into	 the	clinic,	emphasising	the	technology’s	near-diagnostic	accuracy,	and	expanding	the	range	of	genetic	conditions	tested	for.		The	development	of	this	novel	prenatal	testing	technology	is	then,	 very	 clearly	marked	 by	 a	 powerful	 alignment	 between	 healthcare,	 bioscience	 and	capital,	and	the	various	discourses	they	enrol.		Within	the	next	chapter	then,	I	explain	how	the	 current	 study	 has	 been	 designed	 and	 conducted,	 in	 order	 that	 this	 complex	 field	 of	technological,	 clinical	 and	 commercial	 activity	 may	 be	 examined	 at	 an	 emergent	 –	 and	particularly	active	–	stage.			
																																								 																						30	The	 conduct	 of	 such	 work	 has,	 historically,	 been	 challenging	 as	 there	 have	 been	 no	 obvious	spaces	within	which	NIPD	is	consistently	or	continually	employed.		With	the	rise	of	private	testing	services	 however	 (and	 with	 the	 potential	 ‘mainstreaming’	 of	 the	 technology	 within	 the	 NHS)	opportunities	to	conduct	ethnographic	examinations	of	NIPD	may	arise.	
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Chapter	Three.		Design	and	Conduct	of	the	Study.			This	 chapter	 provides	 an	 account	 of	 the	 methodologies	 employed	 during	 research,	explaining	how	the	study	at	hand	was	designed	and	conducted.		As	a	site	of	rapid	change,	and	 a	 location	 within	 which	 a	 range	 of	 difficult,	 sensitive	 and	 contentious	 issues	 were	likely	to	be	discussed,	the	task	of	designing	and	conducting	a	close	critical	examination	of	NIPD	 presented	 numerous	 practical	 and	 ethical	 challenges,	 the	 scope	 of	 which	 is	 also	outlined	here.			
Study	design	and	participant	recruitment			As	 this	 research	 commenced	 NIPD	 testing	 was,	 within	 the	 UK,	 being	 carried	 out	exclusively	within	NHS	laboratories	and	clinics.		Although	NIPD	had	been	used	within	NHS	clinical	 practice	 since	 2003	 (Hill,	 Lewis	 et	 al.	 2012b),	 the	 experts	 (fetal	 medicine	consultants	and	clinical	geneticists)	that	I	spoke	to	prior	to	the	study	design	being	drafted	(in	order	to	begin	to	identify	and	locate	the	field)	explained	that	the	use	of	NIPD	for	fetal	sex	within	the	clinic	was	extremely	intermittent,	and	where	it	was	perhaps	more	frequent	(within	specialist	clinics	that	provided	testing	for	fetal	blood	group),	clinicians	explained	that	 patients	 were	 not	 actively	 involved	 in	 ‘choosing’	 NIPD	 over	 any	 other	 test	 in	 such	circumstances.	 	Whereas	this	presents	as	an	 interesting	 finding	 in	 itself,	 it	 indicated	that	clinical	 spaces	 available	 for	 study	 at	 the	 outset	 of	 this	 research	 would	 not	 generate	significant	levels	of	patient	discussion	regarding	the	technology.		Since	no	clinical	locations	could	be	identified	within	which	NIPD	was	being	used	with	enough	regularity	that	would	enable	 meaningful	 observational	 research	 on	 patient	 and	 professional	 experiences	 of	NIPD	to	be	conducted,	a	research	design	that	concentrated	centrally	on	the	generation	of	a	wide	range	of	qualitative	 interviews,	and	to	enrich	this,	 the	gathering	of	relevant	 textual	and	 visual	 material	 (in	 the	 form	 of	 clinical	 and	 scientific	 publications,	 media	 coverage,	clinical	documentation	and	other	written	material),	was	therefore	designed.				Since	NIPD	was	 being	 used	within	 the	 remit	 of	NHS	 services,	 the	 conduct	 of	 interviews	with	 NHS	 patients	 and	 staff	 with	 experience	 of	 NIPD	 (and	 other	 prenatal	 testing	technologies)	was	identified	as	being	crucial	to	this	study.		The	process	of	gaining	access	to	staff	 and	 patients	 with	 experience	 of	 NIPD	 for	 fetal	 sexing	 (the	 most	 frequently	 used	application)	 and/or	 NIPD	 testing	 for	 single	 gene	 disorders	 (used	 infrequently	 by	comparison)	 was	 therefore	 prioritised.	 	 Approaching	 the	 design	 of	 the	 study	 with	 an	awareness	that	NIPD	for	Down’s	syndrome	testing	was	(at	the	time)	in	development,	and	in	order	to	gain	some	understanding	of	how	NIPD’s	possible	incorporation	within	Down’s	
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syndrome	screening	programmes	may	come	to	be	approached	and	understood,	the	design	of	 the	 study	 was	 expanded	 to	 include	 ‘parent’	 participants	 with	 experience	 of	 routine	screening	 tests.	 	Recognising	 the	particular	value	of	 gaining	an	understanding	of	patient	experiences	with	refusing	and	accepting	prenatal	testing	(Rapp	1998,	Kelly	2009),	for	both	this	group	of	participants,	and	for	all	patient	participants,	individuals	would	be	eligible	for	inclusion	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 having	 been	 offered	 testing.	 	 	 Adopting	 a	 strategy	 that	 would	involve	 participant	 recruitment	 through	 NHS	 clinical	 services	 entailed	 that	 ethical	approval	would	need	to	be	sought	from	an	NHS	Research	Ethics	Committee	(REC)	prior	to	the	 commencement	of	 recruitment	 and	 fieldwork.	 	Detailed	plans	 for	 the	 conduct	of	 the	study	were	designed,	 therefore,	with	 the	 rigorous	 requirements	of	NHS	research	 (which	highlights	particularly	the	significance	of	‘participants’	safety,	rights,	dignity	and	well-being’	(NHS	 National	 Research	 Ethics	 Service	 2010,	 p.2))	 being	 of	 foremost	 concern.	 	 The	administration	of	 this	 task	was	complex	as	 I	was	required	to	submit	documentation	to	a	number	of	regulatory	bodies	and	 institutional	departments	(including	Cardiff	University,	Research	and	Development/R&D	Departments	at	all	clinical	sites,	the	National	Institute	of	Social	Care	and	Health	Research	Clinical	Research	Centre	and	the	NHS	Research	Passport	service)	in	order	to	gain	approval	to	commence	fieldwork.		Although	the	online	Integrated	Research	Application	System	(IRAS),	which	facilitated	the	application	process	to	both	the	REC	and	individual	R&D	departments,	was	also	complex,	the	task	of	completing	the	form	was	 beneficial	 to	 the	 study	 design	 in	 that	 all	 potential	 practical	 and	 ethical	 issues	were	addressed	 thoroughly	 in	 advance	 within	 the	 submitted	 project	 protocol	 (see	 appendix	eleven).	 	Although	the	overall	approval	process	was	somewhat	time-consuming,	the	final	study	design	benefitted	 greatly	 from	 the	 expert	 oversight	 of	 both	 the	NHS	REC,	 and	 the	various	R&D	departments	located	at	each	clinical	site	that	came	to	be	included.				Before	 the	 project	 protocol	 could	 be	 finalised	 and	 ethical	 approval	 sought	 local	 Clinical	Investigators/CIs	 who	 would	 be	 able	 to	 assist	 with	 participant	 recruitment	 and	 the	general	conduct	of	the	study	needed	to	be	identified.		At	the	outset	of	this	study	very	little	information	was	made	publically	available	concerning	exactly	where,	how	and	by	whom	NIPD	 testing	 was	 being	 used	within	 the	 UK,	 and	 the	 identification	 of	 potential	 CIs	 was	correspondingly	 problematic.	 	 The	 successful	 identification	 of	 local	 CIs	 was	 facilitated	greatly	by	the	expertise	of	 the	clinical	supervisor	assigned	to	the	study,	who	was	able	to	make	contact	with	a	number	of	clinicians	on	my	behalf	(and	arrange	for	me	to	meet	with	them	prior	to	study	design,	in	order	to	help	identify	the	field),	and	was	eventually	able	to	secure	 informal	 agreements	 for	 participant	 recruitment	 to	 take	 place	 within	 three	different	NHS	clinics	across	the	UK.		Although	this	greatly	facilitated	the	study	design	and	recruitment	 processes,	 since	 CI’s	 were	 identified	 through	 the	 clinical	 supervisor,	 the	
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sample	cannot	be	considered	as	fully	representative.	 	The	input	of	the	clinical	supervisor	was	 also	 invaluable	 to	 the	 design	 of	 the	 final	 study	 documentation,	 as	 she	 was	 able	 to	ensure	that	the	information	provided	was	consistent,	clear	and	accurate	(see	appendices	four	to	nine),	and	would	communicate	the	information	required	to	patients	effectively.		In	order	 to	 recruit	 ‘parent’	 participants	 a	 number	 of	 key	 non-clinical	 contacts	 (leaders	 of	mother	 and	 baby	 groups)	 were	 identified	 using	 publically	 available	 (online)	 business	directories.		Local	NHS	CIs	were	required	to	collaborate	on	the	process	of	applying	for	NHS	ethical	approval	and	were	fully	informed	with	regards	the	conduct	of	the	study,	and	their	obligations	 within	 it,	 prior	 to	 the	 REC	 meeting	 taking	 place.	 	 The	 REC	 raised	 very	 few	issues	 of	 concern	 during	 the	meeting.	 	 One	 REC	member	 expressed	 some	 concern	 that	women	with	experience	of	a	‘difficult’	pre-	or	postnatal	diagnosis	could	be	recruited	onto	the	 study,	 and	 that	 this	may	provoke	 some	distress	 on	behalf	 of	 the	participant.	 	 It	was	however	explained	 that	 the	participation	of	 such	 individuals	was	seen	 to	be	particularly	valuable	 within	 the	 study,	 as	 such	 experiences	 would	 be	 integral	 to	 a	 well-rounded	understanding	of	how	NIPD	may	come	to	be	broadly	experienced	and	discussed.		Approval	was	granted	subject	to	minor	amendments	after	the	first	NHS	REC	meeting	in	January	of	2013.		The	study	was	subsequently	‘adopted’	onto	the	NISCHR	clinical	research	portfolio,	and	was	included	in	the	UK	Clinical	Research	Network’s	online	portfolio	database.		 																	As	
This	 study	 involves	 the	recruitment	of	participants	 from	a	number	of	different	groups:	Service	users	
• NHS	patients	with	experience	of	NIPD	testing	
• NHS	 patients	 with	 experience	 of	 invasive	 prenatal	testing	(Amniocentesis	or	CVS)	
• Members	 of	 the	 public	 with	 experience	 of	 routine	prenatal	screening	tests	
• Private	patients	with	experience	of	NIPD	testing	Service	providers	
• NHS	professionals	who	work	with	NIPD	testing	
• NHS	professionals	who	work	with	current	prenatal	testing	(specialist/diagnostic	or	routine/screening)	NIPD	developers	
• Persons	 involved	 in	 the	 clinical	 and	 commercial	development	of	NIPD	testing	Partners	
• Partners	 of	 service	 users,	 recruited	 through	 a	process	of	“snowball	sampling”		 Figure	5:	Participant	cohort	–	extract	taken	from	Research	Protocol	version	
2.1	(see	appendix	11	for	detail).																														
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outlined	 in	 the	 approved	 study	 protocol,	 it	 was	 expected	 that	 a	 maximum	 of	 55	participants	would	 be	 recruited	 onto	 the	 study.	 	 This	 total	was	 envisaged	 to	 include	 (a	maximum	of)	40	 ‘service	users’,	10	 ‘service	providers’,	5	 ‘NIPD	experts’	and	5	 ‘partners’.		Since	I	would	be	responsible	for	carrying	out,	transcribing	and	analysing	all	interview	data	it	 was	 felt	 that	 a	 maximum	 of	 55	 participants	 would	 more	 than	 sufficient.	 	 Specific	inclusion	 and	 exclusion	 criteria	 were	 also	 set,	 in	 order	 to	 guide	 local	 CI’s	 in	 the	identification	of	potential	participants:		
	The	 phrase,	 ‘direct	 personal	 experience’	 was	 interpreted	 as	 indicating	 that	 participants’	experience	 of	 testing	would	 relate	 to	 their	 own	 previous	 experiences	 of	 pregnancy.	 	 As	mentioned,	potential	participants	who	had	both	accepted	and	refused	testing	were	eligible	for	inclusion,	and	it	was	expected	that	the	‘service’	provider	group	would	include	(but	not	be	 limited	 to):	 genetic	 counsellors,	 fetal	 medicine	 consultants	 and	 nurses,	 haemophilia	consultants	 and	 nurses,	 and	 midwives.	 	 It	 was	 noted	 that	 recruiting	 women	 who	 had	refused	testing	in	the	clinical	setting	may	prove	to	be	difficult,	as	local	CI’s	had	previously	
Participants	will	be	included	if	they	are:	
• Women	with	direct	personal	experience	of	NIPD.	
• Women	with	direct	personal	experience	of	current	prenatal	testing,	 either	 routine	 or	 specialist/invasive	(Amniocentesis/CVS).	
• Service	 providers	 with	 direct	 professional	 experience	 of	NIPD	
• Service	 providers	 with	 direct	 professional	 experience	 of	current	 prenatal	 testing,	 either	 routine	 or	specialist/invasive	(Amniocentesis/CVS)	
• Professionals	 with	 experience	 in	 the	 field	 of	 NIPD	development	
• Partners	of	women	with	personal	experience	of	either	NIPD	or	current	prenatal	testing	
	 Participants	will	be	excluded	if	they	are:	
• Persons	 unable	 to	 communicate	 fluently	 in	 written	 or	spoken	English.	
• Persons	unable	to	provide	fully	informed	consent.	
• Under	the	age	of	18.		
Figure	6:	Inclusion	and	exclusion	criteria	-	extract	taken	from	Research	Protocol	
version	2.1	(see	appendix	eleven	for	detail).	
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indicated	 that	 databases	 containing	 information	 on	 such	 patients	were	 often	 informally	kept,	and	that	contact	details	would	not	be	available	in	many	cases.			In	order	to	protect	the	confidentiality	of	potential	patient	participants	local	NHS	CIs	were	made	 responsible	 for	 identifying	 patients	 who	 met	 the	 inclusion	 criteria,	 distributing	information	packs	directly	to	those	they	had	identified	as	being	eligible	(I	supplied	each	CI	with	 a	 number	 of	 printed	 information	 packs	 containing	 participant	 information	 sheets,	consent	 forms,	 reply	slips	and	stamped,	addressed	envelopes	–	see	appendices	 four,	 five	and	six	for	further	detail).	 	Information	sheets	invited	potential	participants,	if	interested	in	 taking	 part	 in	 the	 study,	 to	 contact	 me	 via	 phone,	 email	 or	 post.	 	 The	 majority	 of	participants	 contacted	 me	 via	 postal	 reply	 (using	 the	 reply	 slip	 and	 pre-paid	 envelope	contained	in	each	pack),	and	requested	that	I	either	call	or	email	them	in	order	to	arrange	a	 suitable	 time	 and	 location	 for	 the	 interview	 to	 take	 place.	 	 Non-NHS	 recruitment	was	carried	out	concurrent	to	NHS	recruitment,	with	group	leaders	making	information	packs	available	to	eligible	parents	in	this	context.				As	I	had	permission	to	make	use	of	already-established	professional	networks	in	order	to	identify	eligible	expert	participants,	 I	was	able	 to	access	 this	group	of	participants	more	directly.	 	 This	 process	 was	 also	 less	 time-consuming	 and	 allowed	 for	 interviews	 with	expert	 participants	 to	 commence	within	 a	 few	weeks	 of	 ethical	 approval	 being	 granted.		Within	 the	 first	 year	 of	 the	 study	 (and	 with	 interest	 around	 NIPD	 intensifying)	 I	 was	provided	 with	 numerous	 opportunities	 to	 participate	 in	 and	 contribute	 to	 meetings,	seminars	 and	 conferences,	 communicating	 information	 on	 the	 proposed	 research	 to	 a	range	of	academic	and	clinical	audiences.		Observation	and	participation	in	such	activities	helped	‘situate’	the	study	within	the	wider	frame,	and	it	was	also	through	this	route	that	I	was	able	to	identify	and	recruit	a	number	of	key	experts	in	the	field,	who	may	otherwise	have	remained	unknown	to	me.		Since	I	had	permission	to	make	use	of	‘snowball	sampling’	(Atkinson	 2001)	 techniques31,	 these	 participants	 were	 in	 turn	 able	 to	 identify	 further	expert	 participants	 for	 possible	 inclusion	 within	 the	 study.	 	 The	 group	 of	 experts	 I	encountered	were	exceptionally	open	and	willing	to	help	me	with	the	conduct	of	my	study	-	 very	 frequently	 information	 on	 additional	 potential	 participants	 was	 offered	spontaneously,	 without	 interviewees	 being	 asked	 directly	 about	 the	 identification	 of	additional	 potential	 interviewees.	 	 	 This	 recruitment	 strategy	 also	 presented	 the																																									 																						31	The	research	practice	of	“snowball	sampling”	involves	working	with	participants	who	are	willing	and	able	to	further	identify	additional	potential	participants	that	the	researcher	may	otherwise	not	be	able	to	reach.	This	particular	recruitment	process	makes	use	of	participants’	own	networks	and	is	suitable	for	use	in	research	where	the	target	population	is	particularly	small	or	difficult	to	reach	(Atkinson,	2001).	
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advantage	that	the	field	came	to	‘define	itself’	to	a	significant	degree.			The	recruitment	of	expert	 participants	 progressed	 rapidly,	 and	 was	 highly	 successful,	 with	 a	 total	 of	 22	experts	 being	 interviewed	 once	 fieldwork	 was	 complete.	 	 The	 table	 below	 provides	information	 on	 the	 number	 of	 expert	 interviewees	 recruited	 onto	 the	 study,	 provides	generalised	 information	 on	 their	 professional	 role,	 and	 indicated	whether	 they	 had	 any	influence	 in	 the	 work	 of	 relevant	 advisory	 committees	 and/or	 regulatory	 bodies.	 	 The	sample	 is	particularly	notable	 for	 its	gender	bias,	with	18	of	 the	22	experts	 interviewed	being	female.			
	
Table	1:	Expert/professional	participants		Participant	 recruitment	 conducted	 through	 NHS	 clinics	 and	 mother-and	 baby	 groups	resulted	in	a	total	of	14	patients	and	parents	being	recruited	onto	the	study.		Additionally,	responding	to	significant	developments	in	the	field	-	the	launch	of	Down’s	syndrome	NIPD	
Name	(sex)	 Profession	 Advisory/regulatory	role?	1. Beth	(F)	 Scientist,	 NIPD	 research	 and	
development.		
-	2. Paul	(M)	 Consultant	in	fetal	medicine,	NHS	
practice	
Yes	3. David	(M)	 Consultant	clinical	geneticist	 Yes	4. Chloe	(F)	 Scientist,	 NIPD	 research	 and	
development.	
-	5. Kate	(F)	 Director,	patient	support	charity	 Yes	6. Lucy	(F)	 Genetic	counsellor	 -	7. Emily	(F)	 Scientist,	 NIPD	 research	 and	
development.	
-	8. Sam	(F)	 Trainee	genetic	counsellor	 -	9. James	(M)	 Consultant	in	fetal	medicine,	NHS	
and	private	practice.		
-	10. Linda	(F)	 Manager,	public	health	 Yes	11. Rob	(M)	 Director,	patient	support	charity	 Yes	12. Erica	(F)	 Consultant	clinical	geneticist	 -	13. Rachel	(F)	 Genetic	counsellor	 -	14. Cerys	(F)	 Nurse	and	midwife	 -	15. Laura	(F)	 Scientist,	 NIPD	 research	 and	
development.	
-	16. Naomi	(F)	 Genetic	counsellor	 -	17. Claire	(F)	 Consultant	in	fetal	medicine	 -	18. Will	(M)	 Manager,	patient	support	charity	 -	19. Alison	(F)	 Cytogeneticist,	NHS	 Yes	20. Natalie	(F)	 Consultant	clinical	geneticist	 Yes	21. Caitlin	(F)	 Midwife	 -	22. Jonathan	
(M)	 Manager,	public	health	 Yes	
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testing	 within	 private	 UK	 clinics	 –	 a	 significant	 amendment	 was	 made	 to	 the	 study	protocol	(and	was	approved	by	the	REC	on	the	17th	June	2013).		This	amendment	allowed	for	the	recruitment	of	private	NIPD	patients	(and	their	partners),	and	arose	subsequent	to	the	clinical	supervisor	having	identified	a	clinician	who	would	be	willing	to	act	at	as	local	CI	for	the	recruitment	of	private	NIPD	patients.		Although	it	was	feasible	only	to	recruit	a	small	number	of	private	patients	(n=3)	as	additional	participants	in	the	study	(due	to	time	constraints	and	an	already-high	rate	of	participant	recruitment),	this	step	was	regarded	as	particularly	worthwhile	since	it	would	represent	one	of	the	first	 instances	where	private	NIPD	patients	would	come	to	participate	in	UK-based	qualitative	research.		A	final	total	of	17	NHS	and	private	patients,	and	parents,	were	recruited	onto	the	study:		
	
Table	2:	Patient	and	parent	participants		In	 addition	 to	 the	 participants	 interviewed,	 one	 parent	 (a	 father),	 two	 experts	 (a	consultant	clinical	geneticist	and	a	midwife)	and	two	patients	(one	mother	who	had	used	NIPD	for	fetal	sexing,	and	one	who	had	used	private	Down’s	syndrome	testing)	were	lost	to	 follow-up	during	 the	recruitment	process.	 	Restricted	efforts	were	made	to	re-contact	these	participants	by	attempting	to	communicate	via	only	one	additional	phone	call/email,	
Name	(sex)	 Patient	or	parent?	 Experience	of	testing?	1. Frankie	(F)	 Parent		 Ultrasound	only	2. Sarah	(F)	 Parent		 Ultrasound	only	3. Jess	(F)	 Parent	 Ultrasound	only	4. Martha	(F)	 Parent	 Ultrasound	only	5. Katie	(F)	 Parent	 Ultrasound	and	MSS	6. Jo	(F)	 Parent	 Ultrasound	only	7. Liz	(F)	 Parent		 Ultrasound,	 MSS	 and	
amniocentesis	8. Rebecca	(F)	 Parent	 Ultrasound,	 MSS	 and	 nuchal	
translucency	scan		9. Simon	(M)	 Parent	 Ultrasound	only	(partner)	10. Joan	(F)	 Patient	(NHS)	 NIPD	(fetal	sex)	11. Rose	(F)	 Patient	(NHS)	 Ultrasound,	 MSS	 and	 NIPD	
(fetal	sex)	12. Abi	(F)	 Patient	(NHS)	 Ultrasound,	 amniocentesis	
and	NIPD	(fetal	sex)	13. Jodie	(F)	 Patient	(NHS)	 Ultrasound	 and	 NIPD	 (fetal	
sex)	14. Cara	(F)	 Patient	(NHS)	 CVS,	NIPD	(fetal	sex)	15. Louise	(F)	 Patient		(private)	 NIPT	 (Down’s	 syndrome	 –	
Harmony)	16. Alana	(F)	 Patient		(private)	 NIPT	 (Down’s	 syndrome	 -	
NIFTY)	17. Jamie	(F)	 Patient		(private)	 NIPT	 (Down’s	 syndrome	 -	
NIFTY)	
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as	 it	was	 felt	 that	 any	 further	 effort	 to	 re-contact	would	 risk	 causing	 distress	 or	would	represent	 an	 invasion	 of	 privacy.	 	 The	 final	 proportion	 of	 expert	 and	 patient/parent	experts	 recruited	 onto	 the	 study	 was	 significantly	 dissimilar	 to	 that	 which	 had	 been	outlined	as	ideal	within	the	project	protocol,	with	56%	(n=22)	of	participants	being	made	up	 by	 the	 expert/professional	 group	 and	 44%	 (n=17)	 being	 made	 up	 by	 the	parent/patient	group.				The	relatively	high	number	of	expert	participants	recruited	onto	the	study	may	relate	to	the	significant	pace	at	which	NIPD	was	developing	(and	the	correspondingly	intense	level	of	 professional	 interest	 that	 the	 technology	 was	 attracting	 within	 the	 field),	 along	 with	many	experts’	willingness	to	discuss	their	experiences	of	NIPD	and	prenatal	testing,	with	many	of	them	expressing	how	much	they	had	enjoyed	taking	the	time	to	talk	at	length	with	me	 about	 this	 emergent	 technology.	 	 Clear	 reasons	 for	 the	 contrastingly	 less	 prolific	recruitment	 of	 NHS	 patients	 (n=5)	 are	 difficult	 to	 identify.	 	 One	 possibility	 is	 that	 the	participant	information	sheet,	being	fairly	comprehensive	and	lengthy	(in	order	to	satisfy	the	requirements	of	NHS-based	research),	may	have	prevented	potential	participants	from	feeling	willing	or	able	to	take	part.		Another	possible	reason	for	low	recruitment	numbers	in	 this	 regard	 is	 that	 the	 subject	 of	 discussion	 –	 pregnancy	 and	 prenatal	 testing	 -	 was	simply	 not	 one	 that	 potential	 participants	 felt	 willing	 to	 speak	 about	with	 an	 unknown	person,	 and	 with	 many	 of	 the	 patient	 interviews	 that	 were	 conducted	 prompting	significant	 self-reflection	 on	 the	 part	 of	 participants,	 this	 may	 likely	 be	 the	 case.		Additionally,	 only	 one	 partner/father	 was	 recruited	 onto	 the	 study	 –	 this	 may	 have	resulted	 from	 similar	 concerns	 regarding	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 the	 topic,	 and	 could	 further	have	resulted	from	a	reluctance	to	take	part	because	their	participation	would	be	known	to	 their	 partner	 (and	 could	 re-invigorate	 discussion	 of	 the	matter	 between	 them).	 	 The	lack	of	data	gathered	here	concerning	the	male	or	partner	perspective	is	unfortunate	since	the	perspective	of	 this	group	regarding	experiences	of	pregnancy	and	prenatal	 testing	 is	known	to	be	under-researched	(Steen,	Downe	et	al.	2012).			
Conduct	of	the	fieldwork		Fieldwork	began	on	the	15th	March	2013,	when	the	first	expert	interview	took	place.		This	phase	of	 the	study	continued	until	 the	end	of	March	2014,	with	expert	 interviews	taking	place	 from	 March	 to	 October	 2013,	 ‘parent’	 interviews	 taking	 place	 from	 June	 to	September	 2013,	 and	 patient	 interviews	 taking	 place	 from	 July	 2013	 to	 March	 2014.		Fieldwork	sites	were	located	across	England	and	Wales,	and	the	remote	or	distant	location	of	 a	 number	 of	 interview	 sites	 required	 that	 I	 travel	 significant	 distance,	 and	 stay	
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overnight	in	the	local	area.		To	ensure	safety	during	the	conduct	of	fieldwork,	I	familiarised	myself	 with	 Cardiff	 University’s	 ‘Lone	 Worker	 Guidance’	 and	 ‘Health	 and	 Safety	 in	Fieldwork’	policies,	ensuring	that	I	took	every	possible	step	to	secure	my	own	safety.		Key	to	 this	 was	 the	 communication	 of	 my	 whereabouts	 to	 a	 colleague	 or	 other	 responsible	person	(close	family	member)	throughout.		
Interviews		The	majority	of	interviews	were	conducted	face-to-face	(n=36),	with	the	remainder	–	two	private	NIPD	patient	 interviews	–	being	conducted	over	 the	phone.	 	 Interview	schedules	were	designed	to	assist	with	the	conduct	of	interviews	(see	appendices	seven	and	eight	for	detail)	–	in	practice,	however,	these	were	used	only	as	a	rough	guide	to	the	themes	which	were	 to	 be	 covered	 during	 the	 interview,	 and	 individual	 questions	 did	 not	 follow	 a	particular	order,	and	were	not	phrased	in	any	particular	way.		All	interviewees	received	a	copy	of	the	study	consent	form	(see	appendix	four)	prior	to	meeting	with	me,	and	at	the	outset	 of	 the	 interview	we	went	 over	 the	 contents	 together,	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 consent	provided	was	genuine	and	as	‘informed’	as	possible.		In	order	to	gather	accounts	that	were	as	 rich	 as	 possible,	 and	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 an	 understanding	 of	 how	 interviewees’	experiences	with	and	reflections	on	NIPD	related	to	the	broader	contexts	of	their	everyday	professional	(and	personal)	lives,	a	‘narrative’	approach	to	the	conduct	of	interviews	was	adopted	 (Sandelowski	 1991).	 	 This	 approach	 –	which	 required	me	 to	minimise	my	own	input	to	the	conversation	as	much	as	possible,	and	which	allowed	participants	to	guide	the	form	and	structure	of	 the	conversation	 to	a	significant	degree-	proved	highly	successful,	with	the	resulting	dataset	being	rich	and	diverse.				Although	the	task	of	conducting	face-to-face	interviews	often	required	significant	amounts	of	travel	in	order	for	me	to	meet	with	interviewees	(with	the	majority	of	interviews	taking	place	in	participants’	homes	or	workspaces),	this	approach	presented	a	number	of	distinct	advantages.	 	Firstly,	I	was	able	to	gain	some	understanding	of	the	locations	within	which	experts	(particularly)	conducted	their	daily	professional	lives,	with	many	of	them	guiding	me	around	their	departments,	‘showing’	me	the	objects	–	next	generation	sequencers	and	other	 laboratory	 equipment	 for	 example	 –	 and	 spaces	 (laboratories,	 clinics	 and	 offices)	that	contributed	to	the	shaping	of	their	daily	lives.		Secondly,	by	traveling	to	locations	local	to	them,	I	was	able	to	spend	additional	time	with	participants	prior	to	and	after	interviews	had	taken	place.		This	presented	the	advantage	of	allowing	a	greater	sense	of	familiarity	to	develop	 between	 myself	 and	 interviewees,	 with	 the	 result	 that	 both	 participants	 and	myself	 were	 increasingly	 ‘at	 ease’	 throughout	 the	 interview	 process.	 	 Telephone	
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interviews	 presented	 a	 different	 set	 of	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages.	 	Whilst	 they	may	not	 have	 resulted	 in	 a	 similar	 sense	 of	 familiarity	 and	 ease	 being	 developed	 between	myself	 and	 participants,	 the	 conversations	 generated	 were	 nevertheless	 informal,	 and	were	particularly	direct.		The	conduct	of	telephone	interviews	with	private	NIPD	patients	in	 particular	 also	 facilitated	 the	 inclusion	 of	 this	 (particularly	 at	 the	 time	 during	which	fieldwork	was	conducted)	select	group	of	women	within	in	the	study	–	with	interviewees	reporting	that	they	felt	they	were	better	able	to	‘fit	in’	the	time	for	a	phone	call	rather	than	a	face-to-face	meeting.			Three	 ‘vignettes’	 outlining	 different	 scenarios	within	which	NIPD	may	 come	 to	 be	 used,	were	 also	 designed	 to	 assist	 with	 the	 conduct	 of	 interviews	 (see	 appendix	 nine).	 	 This	method	of	qualitative	data	collection	has	been	previously	identified	as	an	effective	way	of	generating	discussion	on	attitudes,	perceptions	and	beliefs,	particularly	within	the	fields	of	social	 and	 health	 research	 (Hughes	 and	 Huby	 2002)	 and	 within	 the	 examination	 of	‘sensitive’	 topics	 (Barter	 and	 Reynold	 1999).	 	 The	 vignettes	 were	 designed	 with	 the	guidance	 of	 the	 clinical	 supervisor,	 and	 they	 suggested	 three	 possible	 (and	 feasible)	pathways	 for	 the	 future	 development	 of	NIPD	 technology:	 1)	 entry	 into	 routine	Down’s	syndrome	 testing	 as	 offered	 within	 ‘high	 risk’	 pregnancies	 only,	 2)	 entry	 into	 prenatal	screening	 for	 Down’s	 syndrome	 as	 offered	 within	 all	 pregnancies,	 and	 3)	 continued	entrance	 and	 expansion	 within	 private	 prenatal	 testing	 services.	 	 The	 vignettes	 were	designed	to	be	useful	particularly	in	circumstances	where	participants	had	very	little	or	no	prior	 knowledge	 of	NIPD	 –	with	 parents	 recruited	 through	mother-and-baby	 groups	 for	example.	 	 Because	 NIPD	was	 yet	 to	 enter	 into	 the	 routine	 prenatal	 testing	 space	 at	 the	outset	of	the	study,	it	was	expected	that	the	vignettes	would	be	used	centrally	within	the	conduct	 of	 participant	 interviews,	 in	 order	 to	 elicit	 discussion	 of	 the	 technology	 with	persons	who	had	no	direct	experience	of	 the	 technology	–	a	group	 that	was	expected	 to	make	 up	 a	 high	 proportion	 of	 the	 total	 population	 recruited	 onto	 the	 study.	 	 However,	because	I	had	the	opportunity	to	adapt	 the	study	design	to	attend	to	the	rapidly	shifting	technological	and	clinical	landscape	surrounding	NIPD,	I	was	in	fact	able	to	recruit	a	high	number	 of	 participants	 who	 had	 direct	 personal	 or	 professional	 experience	 of	 the	technology,	 and	 as	 a	 result	 of	 this,	 the	 vignettes	 were	 in	 fact	 rarely	 used	 during	 the	conduct	of	participant	interviews.		Within	the	vast	majority	of	interviews	the	discussion	of	themes	and	topics	that	had	been	outlined	in	the	‘interview	schedules’	occurred	naturally,	during	 the	 course	of	 on-going	 conversation.	 	The	vignettes	proved	useful	within	 a	 small	number	of	 interviews	however,	prompting	more	 lengthy	and	 in-depth	discussions	of	 the	technology	 than	may	otherwise	have	been	possible	with	participants	who	had	no	direct	experience	of	NIPD.	
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Transcription,	follow	up	and	textual	data	collection.			All	 interviews	 were	 audio-recorded	 (with	 participant’s	 prior	 permission),	 and	 were	transcribed	 verbatim.	 	 The	 transcription	 stage	 occurred	 concurrent	 with	 the	 fieldwork,	and	 it	 also	 represented	 the	 first	 instance	 during	 which	 formal	 data	 analysis	 was	conducted:	 as	 transcription	progressed	 (carried	out	using	Microsoft	Word)	 in-text	notes	and	comments	were	inserted,	the	contents	of	which	were	later	used	in	order	to	generate	a	preliminary	 list	 of	 potential	 themes.	 	 Interview	 transcripts	 were	 ‘cleaned’,	 primarily	 to	ensure	 that	 participant	 anonymity	 was	 maintained	 –	 pseudonyms,	 for	 instance,	 were	assigned	and	any	potentially	identifying	information	(such	as	specific	locations,	names	of	family	members,	or	diagnoses	of	rare	disease)	was	removed.		Recognising	particularly	that	any	 discussion	 of	 prenatal	 testing	 is	 ‘a	 highly	 charged	 one’	 (Rapp	 1999,	 p.17)	 some	descriptive	 information,	 relating	 to	 expert	 participants’	 particular	 professional	 roles	 for	instance,	was	 generalised	 to	 an	 extent	which	 has	minimal	 impact	 on	 the	 context	within	which	the	data	is	presented,	but	which	maximises	the	safeguarding	of	participants’	privacy	and	confidentiality.		Where	significant	pauses	or	hesitations	were	present	within	the	audio	data,	 these	 were	 transcribed	 –	 but	 in	 order	 maintain	 clarity	 -	 and	 since	 I	 am	 not	conducting	 a	 discourse	 analysis,	 less	 significant	 hesitations	 were	 removed	 during	 the	inevitably	reductive	step	of	transcribing	interview	data	from	audio	to	text.				Any	contact	with	participants	following	the	interview	process	has	been	minimal:	although	during	 the	 interview	 process	 I	 emphasised	 that	 participants	 (particularly	 parents	 and	patients)	would	be	free	to	contact	me	directly	with	any	concerns	or	queries	they	may	have	following	 the	 interview,	 none	 of	 them	 did	 so.	 	 Having	 prepared	 relevant	 material	 in	advance	 of	 the	 fieldwork,	 I	 provided	 information	 on	 patient	 support	 groups,	 helplines,	relevant	 clinical	 contacts	 and	 other	 potential	 sources	 of	 information	where	 appropriate	during	the	interview	process.		A	single	private	NIPD	patient	contacted	me	via	email	a	few	days	 after	 the	 interview	 had	 taken	 place,	 as	 she	 felt	 that	 she	 had	 cut	 our	 phone	conversation	 short,	 and	we	had	 a	 brief	 exchange	 of	 emails	within	which	 she	 raised	 and	answered	a	small	number	of	additional	questions.		Contact	information	has	been	securely	stored	(in	order	to	comply	with	standard	archiving	procedures	–	see	appendix	eleven	for	detail),	will	continue	to	be	stored	for	ten	years	following	completion	of	the	study,	and	will	be	 used	 to	 provide	 all	 participants	with	 a	 summary	 document	 at	 the	 completion	 of	 the	study	(subsequent	to	the	thesis	being	examined).		
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Alongside	the	gathering	of	participant	accounts	of	NIPD,	I	engaged	in	a	parallel	process	of	textual	data-collection,	assembling	a	large	number	of	media	reports,	scientific	publications	and	(online)	information	regarding	commercial	testing.		A	‘Google	Alerts’32	system	was	set	up	at	the	beginning	of	the	project,	in	order	to	identify	new	information	published	online	in	relation	to	the	following	terms/phrases:	"cell	free	fetal",	"non	invasive	prenatal	diagnosis",	"non	 invasive	 prenatal	 testing"	 “NIPD”	 and	 “NIPT”.	 	 This	method	 of	 gathering	 data	was	particularly	effective	in	the	first	year	of	the	study	when	NIPD	remained	an	emergent	and	little-discussed	technology.	 	Much	of	 the	material	gathered	in	this	way	related	not	to	the	direct	 clinical	 or	 scientific	 development	 of	 NIPD,	 but	 to	 the	 numerous	 global	 markets	within	which	the	technology	was	entering.		The	year-on-year	volume	of	material	gathered	through	 this	 strategy	has	 increased	 greatly	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 study.	 	 In	 addition	 to	this,	 I	 conducted	 regular	web	 searches	 in	 order	 to	 identify	newly	published	material	 on	NIPD,	using	search	engines	as	well	as	social	media	to	gather	 information	around	the	on-going	development	of	the	technology.		Having	presented	work	at	various	conferences,	and	having	 become	 embedded	 within	 the	 field	 to	 some	 degree,	 much	 information	 was	volunteered	 to	 me	 by	 contacts	 working	 in	 the	 field	 of	 NIPD	 and	 prenatal	 testing	 more	generally.	 	The	resulting	dataset	 is	vast,	and	diverse,	and	 is	drawn	upon	throughout	 this	thesis	to	inform	and	contextualise	the	analysis	of	participant	accounts.			
Reflections	on	the	fieldwork:	practical	and	ethical	issues		Interviews	conducted	with	patients	and	parents,	the	majority	of	which	were	conducted	in	participants’	 homes,	 generated	 extremely	 rich,	 and	 often	 lengthy	 accounts.	 	 Within	 her	reflective	account	of	conducting	in-depth	qualitative	interviews	with	other	women,	Finch	points	towards	the	relative	ease	with	which	female	researchers	may	be	able	to	gain	access	to	such	accounts:	In	the	setting	of	the	interviewees	own	home	an	interview	conducted	in	an	informal	 way	 by	 another	 woman	 can	 easily	 take	 on	 the	 character	 of	 an	intimate	conversation	(Finch	1993,	p.74)		Interactions	 between	 interviewees	 and	myself,	 positioned	 in	 these	 cases	 as	 researcher,	stranger	and	‘friendly	guest’	(Finch	1993,	p.74),	produced	some	of	the	most	engaging	and	challenging	 fieldwork	 experiences	 encountered	 within	 the	 study.	 	 Every	 patient	 and																																									 																						32	The	 ‘Google	Alerts’	 system	 (https://www.google.co.uk/alerts)	 allows	 registered	users	 to	 ‘track’	online	 information	 associated	 with	 particular	 terms	 or	 phrases.	 	 Summary	 emails	 containing	information	on	all	material	gathered	may	be	received	hourly,	daily,	or	weekly.		
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parent	 interviewee	welcomed	me	warmly	 into	 their	homes	 -	 I	was	 given	 tea	 and	 coffee,	and	with	many	participants	realising	I	had	travelled	some	distance,	many	of	them	offered	me	food,	gave	me	recommendations	of	where	I	might	otherwise	eat	and	drink,	and	drove	me	 back	 to	 my	 onward	 transport	 or	 accommodation.	 	 The	 openness	 with	 which	 many	participants	approached	the	interview	process	also	entailed	that	the	interview	space	was	very	often	shared	by	other	family	members.	 	Babies	and	young	children	were	frequently	present,	and	with	many	of	them	having	been	born	as	a	result	of	the	pregnancies	that	NIPD	(or	 other	 forms	 of)	 testing	 -	 the	 central	 focus	 of	 our	 conversations	 -	 had	 taken	 place	within,	their	presence	prompted	much,	and	at	times	difficult,	emotional	reflection	on	the	part	of	interviewees.				The	emotional	impact	of	these	and	other	reflections	varied	according	to	the	specificities	of	participants’	experience	–	memories	were	at	times	affirmative	–	with	parents	recalling	the	benefits	 of	 reassurance	 that	 testing	 had	 provided	 them	 with	 during	 pregnancy,	 and	speaking	warmly	 of	 clinicians	who	 had	 helped	 guide	 them	 through	 their	 experiences	 of	‘risky’	 pregnancy.	 	 Such	 discussions	 also	 prompted	 the	 revisiting	 of	 more	 difficult	memories	 however,	with	 interviewees	 turning	 their	minds	 back	 towards	 experiences	 of	testing	 –	 and	 associated	 points	 within	 their	 pregnancy	 –	 where	 the	 future	 health	 or	continued	existence	of	the	child	that	was	now	with	them	had	perhaps	been	uncertain.		The	‘consenting’	process	was	treated	as	an	on-going	rather	than	a	discreet	form-filling	activity,	and	 as	 such	 if	 participants	 expressed	 distress	 or	 discomfort	 at	 any	 point	 during	 the	interview,	I	took	steps	to	ensure	that	they	were	actively	willing	to	continue	–	giving	them	time	 to	 calm	 their	 nerves,	 and	 explaining	 once	 again	 that	 we	 could	 stop	 the	 interview	process	 at	 any	 time.	 	 Information	 on	 relevant	 support	 services	 was	 offered	 in	 such	circumstances,	but	was	rarely,	however,	accepted.	 	Most	participants	declined	 to	receive	any	 further	 information	 subsequent	 to	 the	 interview,	 explaining	 how	 they	 felt	 that	 the	process	of	talking	through	their	experiences	–	of	having	someone	listen	without	criticism	or	question	–	had	indeed	raised	difficult	memories	and	emotions,	but	would,	they	felt,	be	beneficial	 in	 the	 long	 term.	 	 It	 has	 been	 suggested	 the	 qualitative	 interview	 space	may	function	 as	 location,	 not	 only	 for	 research,	 but	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 therapeutic	 or	 ‘counselling’	experience,	as	approached	by	the	interviewee:		Some	 aspects	 of	 qualitative	 research	 interviews	 are	 strikingly	 similar	 to	aspects	 of	 therapeutic	 interviews.	 	 For	 example,	 empathy	 and	 listening	skills	 are	 emphasized	 as	 being	 important	 for	 both	 research	 interviews	(particularly	qualitative	interviews	on	sensitive	topics)	and	for	counseling	or	therapy	interviews.	(Dickson-Swift,	James	et	al.	2006,	p.858)		
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Although	 I	 had	 not	 fully	 expected	 the	 interview	 space	 to	 function	 so	 clearly	 as	 a	‘therapeutic’	space	prior	to	the	fieldwork	being	conducted,	the	perspective	outlined	here	-	which	 acknowledges	 the	 blurring	 of	 the	 boundaries	 between	 ‘research’	 and	 ‘therapy’	 -	helps	to	explain	the	context	within	which	many	patient	interviews	came	to	be	approached.		Many	interviews	(with	patients	especially)	did	indeed	function	as	a	location	within	which	participants	were	able	to	talk	at	length	about	something	that	mattered	deeply	to	them,	and	to	someone	who	very	actively	wanted	to	listen.		A	number	of	interviewees	explained	that	during	 the	 course	of	 the	 interview	 they	had	spoken	with	me	about	 ‘difficult’	 events	 that	they	 had	 never	 (or	 very	 rarely)	 openly	 discussed	 with	 either	 friends	 or	 close	 family	members.	 	 Although	 one	 of	 the	 major	 differences	 between	 the	 therapeutic	 and	 the	qualitative	interview	space	is	that	‘in	the	former,	the	therapist	is	listening	to	the	participant	
and	helping	that	person,	whereas	 in	 the	 latter,	 the	participant	 is	helping	the	researcher	by	
providing	information’	(Dickson-Swift,	 James	et	al.	2006,	p.859)	and	although	this	was,	of	course,	very	much	the	case	here	–	the	success	of	my	research	depended	on	the	gathering	of	 rich	 participant	 accounts	 -	 interviewees	 (including	 experts	 and	 professionals)	 very	frequently	 expressed	 gratitude	 for	 being	 given	 the	 opportunity	 to	 talk	 about	 their	experiences,	 and	 although	 it	 was	 important,	 for	 instance,	 not	 to	 overstate	 the	 potential	therapeutic	 benefits	 of	 participation	 within	 study	 documentation	 sent	 out	 before	interviews	 were	 conducted	 (in	 the	 Participant	 Information	 Sheet	 for	 example,	 see	appendices	five	and	six),	by	the	conclusion	of	the	fieldwork	stage	it	had	become	clear	that	many	 interviews	 did	 indeed	 present	 some	 level	 of	 ‘therapeutic	 payoff’	 for	 many	participants.			As	 mentioned,	 the	 majority	 of	 patient	 and	 parent	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 in	participants’	 homes,	 very	 frequently	 with	 young	 children	 present.	 	 On	 a	 number	 of	occasions	 other	 family	members	 (partners	 and	 parents)	 also	made	 themselves	 present,	intermittently,	throughout	the	interview	process.		This	represented	a	significant	challenge	to	 the	 ongoing	 conduct	 of	 fieldwork,	 as	 many	 of	 the	 conversations	 held	 between	interviewees	and	myself	were	both	highly	sensitive,	and	deeply	personal.		Very	often	these	family	 members	 were	 actively	 interested	 in	 the	 conversations	 that	 they	 perceived	 we	were	engaged	in,	asking	questions	about	the	research	project	(and	in	the	case	of	families	where	rare	disease	had	been	diagnosed	–	asking	whether	 I	knew	of	any	potential	 future	therapeutic	 interventions),	 and	 offering	 opinions	 on	 NIPD	 and	 prenatal	 testing.	 	 My	priority	within	such	situations	however	was	 the	safeguarding	of	participant	privacy	and	confidentiality.	 	 In	 order	 to	 maintain	 confidentiality	 I	 paused	 interviews	 as	 family	members	entered	a	room,	and	I	spoke	with	them	separately	(as	much	as	possible)	about	their	particular	questions	and	concerns,	answering	 them	to	 the	best	of	my	ability	whilst	
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stressing	the	 limitations	of	 the	research	at	hand,	and	trying	to	avoid	covering	any	topics	that	might	come	to	influence	the	remainder	of	the	interview	at	hand.		Within	the	majority	of	 circumstances	 any	 audio	 recording	 of	 such	 moments	 that	 had	 been	 collected	 was	disregarded	 during	 the	 transcription	 process,	 with	 concise	 notes	 being	 made	 on	 the	general	topic	of	conversation,	rather	than	a	verbatim	textual	account	being	generated.		In	certain	instances	the	interviewee	actively	invited	their	partners	into	the	conversation,	and	as	 such	 partner	 responses	were	 transcribed,	 with	 the	 proviso	 that	 steps	were	 taken	 to	completely	 anonymised	 the	 data	 (I	 explained	 once	 more	 to	 these	 partners	 that	 the	conversation	was	being	audio-recorded,	and	they	consented	to	 the	 transcription	process	at	 the	 time	of	 interview).	 	Whilst	 the	unexpected	presence	 of	 partners	 and	other	 family	members	represented	a	challenge	to	the	conduct	of	fieldwork,	it	also	presented	a	valuable	opportunity	to	gain	further	insight	into	participants’	experiences	of	testing,	and	a	number	of	such	instances	are	highlighted	within	the	analysis	presented	here.			A	number	of	patient	 interviews	covered	particularly	 ‘sensitive’	 topics	of	discussion,	with	interviewees	 becoming	 visibly	 upset	 at	 intermittent	 stages	 throughout	 the	 interview	process.	 	 Whilst	 I	 was	 well	 prepared	 for	 the	 task	 of	 managing	 interviewee	 safety	 and	wellbeing,	and	although	I	had	considered	the	potential	impact	that	the	conduct	of	research	may	have	on	my	own	wellbeing	 in	advance	of	 fieldwork	 taking	place,	 I	was	perhaps	not	fully	prepared	for	the	emotional	impact	that	the	experience	of	so	actively	listening	to	these	‘difficult’	 accounts	 would	 have.	 	 I	 found,	 for	 instance,	 that	 for	 a	 number	 of	 the	 most	‘difficult’	or	‘sensitive’	interviews	I	delayed	the	task	of	transcription.		Once	I	engaged	in	the	transcription	 (and	 analysis)	 process	 I	 did	 indeed	 find	 the	 task	 of	 repeatedly	 revisiting	interviewee	accounts	of	 illness,	 testing,	pregnancy	and	abortion	was	an	emotional	one	–	having	spent	several	hours	with	such	participants,	attending	to	some	of	the	most	intimate	details	of	 their	 lives,	 I	 experienced	a	deep	and	ongoing	sense	of	empathy	 towards	 them.		The	guidance	of	my	supervisors	–	both	academic	and	clinical	–	was	invaluable	at	this	stage,	and	although	such	accounts	were	practically	and	emotionally	challenging,	they	emerged	as	particularly	 valuable	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 dataset	 as	 a	 whole,	 as	 they	 provided	particularly	rich	and	detailed	illustrations	of	the	patient	experience.				Throughout	the	course	of	this	research,	contact	with	the	field	of	clinical	genetics,	and	with	professionals	involved	in	providing	genetic	counselling	in	particular,	has	been	consistent.		Professionals	from	within	the	field	of	clinical	genetics	were	closely	involved	in	the	original	research	design,	contributed	to	the	process	of	clinical	supervision	and	became	key	clinical	contacts	 in	 the	 field.	 	 A	 significant	 number	 of	 the	 expert	 interviews	 that	 came	 to	 be	conducted	were	with	 professionals	working	within	 clinical	 genetics	 (n=7),	 and	 as	 NIPD	
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technology	continued	 to	emerge	as	 relevant	within	 this	 field,	 I	became	 familiar	with	 the	growing	body	of	literature	published	within	professional	journals	(de	Jong,	Dondorp	et	al.	2010,	Hill,	Finning	et	al.	2011,	Lewis,	Hill	et	al.	2012b,	Lewis,	Hill	et	al.	2014a)	and	other	spaces	within	which	the	genetics’	professional’s	perspective	was	highlighted	(Stoll	2013,	Resta	2015).	 	 In	addition	 to	 this	 I	was	 involved	 in	 teaching	 (on	bioethics)	 as	part	of	 the	Cardiff	 University	 MSc	 genetic	 counselling	 course,	 and	 I	 spent	 four	 days	 each	 year	attending	a	residential	ethics	course	with	MSc	students.		Taken	together,	all	of	this	activity	contributed	to	a	strong	sense	of	‘familiarity’	with	the	field	of	clinical	genetics	and	genetic	counselling.	 	To	some	degree	at	 least	 I	had	become	 ‘enrolled’	within	 this	 space,	 and	had	become	 acquainted	with	 –	 and	 at	 times	 had	 adopted	 –	 the	 language	 of	 clinical	 genetics,	speaking	perhaps	of	‘termination’	rather	than	‘abortion’,	‘fetuses’	rather	than	‘babies’,	and	being	familiar	with	concepts	such	as	 ‘non-directiveness’33	from	the	outset.	 	As	analysis	of	interviews	 with	 genetics	 professionals	 progressed	 I	 made	 concerted	 effort	 to	 ‘distance’	myself	from	the	language,	and	the	normative	frameworks,	that	had	become	natural	within	clinical	genetics	–	to	re-orientate	myself	as	a	critical	outsider,	rather	than	a	close	affiliate.			
Analysis	of	the	data		Data	were	 analysed	 in	 light	 of	 Clarke’s	 postmodern	 interpretation	 (Clarke	 2003)	 of	 the	established	 analytical	 process	 of	 ‘grounded	 theory’	 (Glaser,	 Strauss	 et	 al.	 1968).		Traditional	 ‘grounded’	approaches	 to	qualitative	research	stress	 the	active	generation	of	theory	through	the	process	of	analysis	itself,	rather	than	through	the	strict	application	of	a	pre-established	theoretical	framework:	Grounded	 theory	 is	 a	 general	methodology	 for	 developing	 theory	 that	 is	grounded	 in	 data	 systematically	 gathered	 and	 analysed.	 	 Theory	 evolves	during	 actual	 research,	 and	 it	 does	 this	 through	 continuous	 interplay	between	analysis	and	data	collection.	(Strauss	and	Corbin	1994,	p.273)		Grounded	theory	involves	a	process	of	‘coding’	data,	and	subsequently	attending	to	where	codes	 reappear,	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 ‘plausible	 relationships’	 (Strauss	 and	 Corbin	 1994,	p.280)	 that	 may	 in	 turn	 form	 the	 basis	 of	 an	 emergent	 theory.	 	 Supplementing	 this																																									 																						33	The	field	of	genetic	counselling	adopts,	explicitly,	a	‘non-directive’	approach	towards	interaction	with	 patients.	 	 This	 entails	 offering	 experts	 guidance	 and	 information,	 whilst	 simultaneously	adopting	a	position	of	emphatic	neutrality	regarding	the	decisions	or	choices	a	patient/client	in	fact	makes.	 	The	concept	of	 ‘non-directiveness’	has	been	problematised	however,	and	critical	accounts	have	come	from	both	those	approaching	the	clinical	genetics	profession	from	the	outside,	as	well	as	those	working	within	 the	 field	 itself	 (Anderson	 1999,	 Clarke	 1991,	 Farsides	 et	 al.	 2004,	 Latimer	2007a)	
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approach	–	regenerating	and	updating	it	-	Clarke	describes	how,	although	such	traditional	forms	 of	 grounded	 theory	 remain	 ‘epistemologically	 sound’	 –	 involving	 an	 interpretive,	constructionist	 approach	 -	 the	 ‘complexities	 and	 instabilities’	of	 contemporary	 social	 life	demand	 that	 a	 broader,	 and	 explicitly	 post-modern	 analytical	 framework	 is	 developed.		Clarke	therefore	outlines	a	revised	 ‘situational’	approach,	 through	which	researchers	are	able	 to	 ‘draw	 together’	 a	 range	 of	 studies,	 ‘of	discourse	and	agency,	action	and	 structure,	
image,	text	and	context,	history	and	the	present	moment’.		Working	within	this	broad	frame	then,	 interview	 data	 were	 analysed	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 range	 of	 textual	 (and	 visual)	 data,	including	media	reports,	clinical	and	scientific	publications,	and	advertising	material.		Such	an	approach	allows	for	 ‘thick	descriptions’	(Geertz	1973)	to	be	generated,	which	can	then	‘situate’	the	research	findings	within	a	broad	range	of	individual,	collective,	organisational,	institutional,	 temporal,	 geographical,	 material,	 cultural,	 symbolic,	 visual	 and	 discursive	contexts	(Clarke	2003,	p.554)	and	assist	with	the	task	of	 ‘going	from	a	text	to	the	cultural	
presuppositions	 which	 underlie	 it’	 (Agar	 and	 Hobbs	 1982).	 	 The	 specific	 way	 in	 which	differently-situated	 data,	 from	 different	 ‘registers’	 of	 social	 life	 (Latimer	 2008a)	 were	analysed	 and	 interpreted	 involved	 attending	 to	 stabilities	 and	 instabilities	 as	 they	appeared	and	re-appeared	within	and	across	these	different	forms	of	data,	as	well	as	the	multiple	 and	 competing	discourses	 that	were	 enrolled	 and	enacted.	 	 The	 final	 analytical	‘text’	therefore	draws	from	a	wide	range	of	registers,	which	are	generated	across	a	range	of	moments	and	occasions,	and	which	contribute	to	the	building	of	a	comprehensive	–	but	necessarily	partial	–	form	of	ethnographic	truth	(Clifford	1986).			The	material	collected	within	the	interview	dataset	as	a	whole	was	grouped	together	into	accounts	 provided	 by:	 NHS	 patients;	 private	 patients;	 parents;	 NIPD	 research	 experts;	clinicians	and	policy	makers.		The	analysis	process	was	conducted	iteratively,	with	themes	at	first	being	generated	within	individual	accounts	(the	transcription	process	contributed	greatly	 to	 this	 stage),	 being	 analysed	 then	 as	 they	 appeared	 within	 groups,	 and	 finally	being	considered	in	relation	to	one	another	across	the	dataset	as	a	whole.		This	approach	provided	a	rigorous	data	 interpretation,	where	crosschecks	and	balances	were	built	 into	each	 stage	 of	 the	 analytical	 process.	 	 Analysis	 was	 conducted	 using	 paper	 copies	 of	interview	transcripts:	although	the	 large	volume	of	 textual	material	generated	may	have	lent	 itself	 to	 being	managed	 through	 a	CAQDAS	 software34	package	 (Ritchie,	 Lewis	 et	 al.	2013)	 (and	 such	an	approach	was	piloted),	 it	was	 felt	 that	 the	 ‘situational’	 and	 iterative	approach	to	analysis	adopted	here	was	best	served	by	repeated	and	in-depth	immersion	in	data	generated	 through	participant	accounts,	and	 that	 the	use	of	any	kind	of	CAQDAS																																									 																						34	CAQDAS	refers	to	a	range	of	software	programs	that	have	been	designed	to	assist	with	the	task	of	qualitative	data	analysis	(www.surrey.ac.uk/sociology/research/researchcentres/caqdas)	
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software	may	risk	creating	some	level	of	 ‘distance’	between	the	data	 	and	the	researcher	(Weitzman	and	Miles	1995,	p.815).				Data	were	read	and	re-read	alongside	the	literature,	with	the	critical	analysis	of	each	area	informing	the	other,	allowing	for	the	identification	of	recurrent	themes,	and	the	eventual	mapping	 of	 relationships	 between	 them.	 	 The	 theoretical	 foundations	 as	 outlined	 in	chapter	one	contributed	to	the	specificities	of	the	critical	approach	adopted	towards	data	analysis,	 with	 instances	 of	 ‘problematisation’,	 practices	 of	 ‘division’,	 ‘moves’	 and	‘translations’	 and	practices	 of	 ‘sorting’	 and	 ‘classification’	 being	 the	 subject	 of	 particular	attention.	 	 Within	 the	 final	 crosscutting	 stage	 of	 analysis	 I	 was	 able	 to	 attend	 then	 to	broader	processes	–	 the	exercise	of	power	and	the	emergence	of	 ‘alignments’	–	enabling	for	 the	 identification	 of	 connections	 between	 the	 research	 at	 hand	 and	 the	 wider	sociological	and	cultural	frame.				
Theoretical	framework:	impact	on	study	design	and	data	analysis.			As	 outlined	 in	 chapter	 one,	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 adopted	within	 this	 study	 draws	upon	established	theories	of	problematisation	(Laidlaw	2014;	drawing	on	Foucault,	2002),		division	 (Foucault	 1982),	 biopolitics	 and	 biopower	 (Foucault	 2000b,	 Foucault	 2000c),	categorisation	 and	 classification	 (Douglas	 1966,	 Bowker	 and	 Star	 1999).	 A	 perspective	that	highlights	the	centrality	of	processes	of	enrolment/translation	(Latour	1986,	Latimer	1995)	 and	 questions	 of	 relationality	 (Strathern	 1991),	 is	 also	 adopted	 as	 part	 of	 the	framework.	 	 Following	 the	 work	 of	 established	 scholars,	 who	 explicitly	 recognise	 the	relevance	of	such	literature	within	the	critical	examination	of	practices	and	technologies	of	prenatal	 testing	 (Lupton	 1999,	 Martin	 2010,	 Lowy	 2014,	 Thomas	 2014)	 a	 critical	awareness	of	how	such	processes	and	questions	relate	to	the	sociological	study	of	prenatal	testing	 informed	 the	 design	 and	 conduct	 of	 this	 study	 –	 leading,	 for	 instance	 to	 the	development	 of	 specific	 research	 objectives	 that	 foreground	 the	 relevance	 of	 ‘practical,	ethical	and	social	issues’	and	the	‘complexities’	of	experience	(see	page	1).					With	regards	the	recruitment	of	participants	onto	the	study,	the	aim	was	to	gather	a	broad	range	of	accounts	from	those	most	closely	implicated	in	the	design,	governance	and	use	of	emergent	 NIPD	 testing	 technologies:	 participants	 were	 targeted	 for	 inclusion	 on	 the	grounds	that	they	had	experience	with	NIPD	or	closely-related	technologies,	and	explicitly	
not	 because	 they	would	be	more	or	 less	 likely	 to	produce	accounts	 that	 attended	 to	 the	concepts	 and	 questions	 central	 to	 the	 theoretical	 framework.	 	 Whilst	 the	 theoretical	framework	 was	 set	 aside	 with	 regards	 this	 aspect	 of	 the	 study,	 as	 the	 process	 of	 data	
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analysis	 began	 the	 framework	 became	 central	 once	 more,	 and	 emergent	 themes	 that	related	to	the	concepts	and	questions	central	to	the	framework	were	attended	to	closely	(as	described	in	the	section	above).			
Summary		This	 chapter	 shows	 how	 the	 research	 at	 hand	 has	 been	 designed	 and	 conducted,	 and	reflects	on	some	of	the	practical	and	ethical	issues	that	have	been	raised	during	fieldwork	particularly.	 	 Study	 design	 was	 guided,	 primarily,	 by	 the	 aims	 and	 objectives	 of	 the	research:	 to	 track	 the	 development	 of	 emerging	 NIPD	 technology,	 to	 gain	 an	understanding	of	how	those	encountering	the	technology	at	an	early	stage	of	development	and	‘implementation’	understand	and	interpret	their	experiences,	and	to	reflect	critically	upon	the	‘issues’	and	‘concerns’	that	might	be	raised.				Recognising	that	the	perspectives	of	women	and	clinicians	in	particular	would	be	central,	recruitment	strategies	were	designed	to	target	these	populations.		In	order	to	facilitate	the	‘tracking’	of	the	technology,	a	strategy	for	recruiting	experts	in	the	field	was	also	designed.		The	conduct	of	the	fieldwork	involved,	centrally,	the	carrying	out	of	 interviews	informed	by	 a	 ‘narrative’	 approach	which	 sought	 to	 generate	 rich	 and	 comprehensive	 participant	accounts.		Alongside	this,	a	range	of	textual	and	visual	data	was	identified	and	collected,	in	the	 form	 of	 publications,	 reports	 and	 other	 relevant	 artefacts.	 	 The	 transcription	 of	interview	data	represented	the	first	stage	of	data	analysis,	and	was	followed	by	a	lengthy	and	 immersive	 process	 of	 reading	 and	 re-reading	 data	 situated	 across	 a	 number	 of	different	‘registers’.				The	conduct	of	the	fieldwork	brought	with	it	a	number	of	practical	and	ethical	concerns,	including	 the	 conduct	 of	 interviews	 around	 ‘sensitive’	 topics,	 the	 navigation	 of	 family	members’	presence	within	the	interview	setting,	the	need	to	deal	with	my	own	responses	to	 ‘difficult’	 and	emotional	 conversations,	 and	 the	 requirement	 that	 I	 reflect	back	on	my	own	 professional	 alignments	 with	 the	 field	 of	 clinical	 genetics	 in	 particular.	 	 	 The	 data	analysis	process	was	 informed	by	a	grounded	and	postmodern	understanding	of	how	to	approach	 differently	 situated	 accounts,	 and	 involved	 the	 examination	 of	 data	 generated	from	 across	 a	 range	 of	 social	 registers.	 	 Data	 were	 analysed	 ‘on	 paper’	 with	 the	 final	‘textual	 body’	 (Clifford	 1986)	 being	 composed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 repeated	 readings	 of	 the	literature	and	the	eventual	mapping	and	exploration	of	themes	and	relationships	between	them.				
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Within	the	remainder	of	the	thesis	then,	I	build	upon	that	which	has	been	outlined	up	to	this	 stage:	 drawing	 from	 the	 theoretical	 foundations,	 informed	 by	 an	 understanding	 of	how	NIPD	has	come	to	be	situated	within	the	clinic	and	within	 larger	social	and	cultural	spaces,	I	examine	in	detail	the	participant	accounts	that	have	been	generated	as	a	result	of	the	study	design	and	conduct	outlined	here.	
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Chapter	Four.		NIPD	and	NIPT:	Divisions	and	Categorisations		
Introduction		This	 chapter	 explores	 questions	 of	 how	 NIPD,	 as	 it	 becomes	 enrolled	 and	 translated	 -	shifting	from	the	laboratory	to	the	clinic,	and	entering	into	lived	experiences	of	pregnancy	-	 is	being	divided,	 categorised	and	classified.	 	 It	explains	how	various	dividing	practices,	and	 efforts	 made	 to	 ‘sort’	 NIPD	 into	 different	 types,	 carry	 with	 them	 a	 number	 of	important	 implications.	 	 Examining	 interview	 accounts	 alongside	 data	 from	 different	registers	 of	 social	 life	 –	 including	 online	 advertisements	 and	 textual	 and/or	 visual	artefacts	 -	 I	 show	 how	 substantive	 processes	 of	 division	 and	 categorisation,	 along	with	processes	 of	 enrolment	 and	 translation,	 achieve	 tangible	 outcomes,	 both	 practical	 and	rhetorical.	 	 I	 identify	 the	particular	divisory	and	classificatory	moves	 that	are	made,	and	examine	what	such	moves	accomplish,	suggesting	for	instance	that	a	discursive	shift	from	talk	 of	 NIPD	 to	 ‘NIPT’	 helps	 ‘smooth’	 the	 way	 for	 NIPD’s	 translation,	 allowing	 specific	testing	technologies	to	pass	from	the	research	context,	and	into	the	routinised	world	of	the	clinic.	 	 As	 these	 emergent	 NIPD	 tests	 are	 translated	 within	 a	 range	 of	 clinical	 spaces,	bringing	with	 them	the	potential	 for	change	and	disruption,	 (rhetorical)	work	 is	done	to	classify	and	frame	NIPD	in	terms	which	allow	for	alignment	with	the	familiar	categories	of	‘screening’	 and	 ‘diagnosis’.	 	 Such	 alignments,	 however,	 are	 problematised	 within	participant	 accounts	 of	 the	 technology,	 with	 the	 broad	 discussion	 of	 division,	categorisation	 and	 classification	 processes	 being	 characterised	 by	 a	 deep	 sense	 of	ambiguity	 -	 cutting	 across	 expert	 accounts	 in	 particular	 -	 as	 they	 struggle	 to	 pin	 down,	define	and	‘fix’	this	emergent	technology.		Talk	of	numbers,	with	particular	 reference	 to	 test	accuracy,	 is	prevalent	here	–	with	 the	difference	between	the	numerical	category	of	‘100%’	on	one	hand,	and	anything	less	than	100%	on	the	other,	being	frequently	discussed.		A	range	of	scholars	have	noted	the	social	and	 cultural	 significance	 of	 numbers-talk,	 particularly	 with	 regards	 the	 ongoing	development	 of	 biologically	 (and	 bodily)	 orientated	 ‘counting	 technologies’	 and	 the	subsequent	 rise	 of	 ‘the	 quantified	 self’	 (Lupton	 2013).	 	 The	 performative	 power	 of	numbers,	 as	 they	 become	 increasingly	 present	 within	 technologically-mediated	understandings	of	the	body	and	the	self	–	allows	for	their	translation	into	‘potent	political	
and	 cultural	 agents’	 (Verran	 2013,	 p.28).	 	 The	 political	 and	 cultural	 significance	 of	numbers-talk	 within	 the	 division,	 classification	 (and	 rationalisation)	 of	 NIPD	 is	 evident	within	both	the	accounts	generated	here,	as	well	as	the	approaches	taken	by	commercial	companies	to	promote	their	new	non-invasive	tests.		
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	Participant	 reflections	 on	 the	 development	 and	 division	 of	 NIPD	 also	 prompted	 much	critical	 examination	 and	 problematisation	 of	 established	 technologies	 and	 practices	 of	prenatal	testing.	 	As	they	account	for	NIPD’s	 ‘disruptive’	emergence	experts	suggest	here	that	the	division	made	between	technologies	and	practices	of	‘screening’	on	the	one	hand,	and	 technologies	 and	 practices	 of	 ‘diagnosis’	 on	 the	 other	 –	 allowing	 for	 avoidance	 of	entanglement	with	more	 problematic	 and	 contentious	 issues,	 such	 as	 selective	 abortion	and	eugenics,	(Duster	1990,	Rothman	1994,	Clarke	1997,	Rapp	1999,	Shakespeare	2006)	-	is	 tentatively	 held,	 and	 thinly	 constructed.	 	 Drawing	 on	 these	 ambiguous	 and	 critical	accounts,	 it	 is	demonstrated	that,	as	a	new	and	emerging	technology,	NIPD	 ‘troubles’	the	boundary	 that	 has	 been	 constructed	 between	 ‘screening’	 and	 ‘diagnosis’	 –	 destabilising	categories	that	have	been	repeatedly	employed	to	organise,	manage	and	sort	technologies	of	prenatal	testing,	and	to	align	them	with	broader	social	and	cultural	norms.		Raising	both	professional	and	personal	anxieties	around	the	potential	collapsing	of	this	divide,	I	show	how	 conversations	 around	 NIPD	 and	 ‘NIPT’	 begin	 to	 prompt	 renewed	 and	 intensified	examination	 and	 problematisation	 of	 routine,	 normalised	 and	 naturalised	 testing	practices.		
NIPD	as	‘not	yet	natural’		As	NIPD	reached	beyond	 the	research	context,	 and	as	a	variety	of	 tests	were	developed,	marketed,	 trialed,	 approved	 and	 implemented	 within	 a	 range	 of	 clinical	 spaces,	 the	technology	 came	 to	 enter	 into	 the	 lives	of	 an	 increasingly	broad	 range	of	 actors.	 	 Those	who	 regularly	 engage	with	NIPD,	 in	 both	practical	 and	discursive	 contexts,	 now	 include	researchers,	 laboratory	 scientists,	 research	 managers,	 clinicians,	 policy	 makers	 and	advisors,	pregnant	women	and	their	families.		As	they	engage	with	and	experience	NIPD	in	multiple	and	heterogeneous	ways,	and	as	they	attempt	to	make	sense	of	their	encounters	by	describing,	defining	and	categorising	the	tests	that	they	use,	each	of	these	groups	-	as	well	as	the	individuals	amongst	them	-	contribute	to	the	shaping	and	constitution	of	this	new	and	evolving	technology.				Despite	 having	 been	 enrolled	 within	 a	 range	 of	 social	 spaces,	 and	 despite	 possessing	 a	history	that	stretches	back	at	least	a	decade	(see	chapter	two),	NIPD	is	still	very	frequently	characterised	as	being	a	technology	that	remains	in	the	early	stages	of	development.		The	Royal	College	of	Obstetricians	and	Gynecologists	(RCOG)	for	instance,	considering	possible	routes	for	the	‘implementation’	of	NIPD,	and	examining	the	‘ethical	issues’	raised,	presents	NIPD	as	new	and	problematic,	a	source	of	clinical,	ethical	and	policy-related	 ‘challenges’:	‘This	paper	reviews	the	issues	that	underlie	the	decisions	that	maternity	services	and	policy	
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makers	need	to	take	in	response	to	this	new	technology’	(Soothill	2014).		Situated	within	the	context	 of	 routine	 and	widespread	 prenatal	 testing	 programmes,	 and	 particularly	when	held	 in	 comparison	 with	 other	 prenatal	 testing	 technologies	 –	 such	 as	 ultrasound	 or	amniocentesis	 –	 familiar	 and	 trusted	 objects	 that	 have	 been	 ‘in	 the	 clinic’	 for	 decades,	NIPD	 continues	 to	 be	 framed	 as	 a	 new	 arrival	 in	 the	 field,	 widely	 characterised	 as	 a	technology	that	has	not	(yet)	become	‘routine’,	‘normal’	or	‘natural’.		As	 early	 encounters	 with	 and	 conversations	 around	 NIPD	 play	 out,	 a	 shifting	 set	 of	understandings	-	of	how	the	technology	can	be	defined,	how	it	can	be	divided,	what	kind	of	information	 it	 generates,	 what	 kind	 of	 ‘issues’	 it	 raises,	 and	 what	 broader	 social	 and	cultural	meanings	 it	 carries	 -	 are	 being	 generated,	 questioned,	 contested	 and	 examined.		The	presence	of	particularly	ambiguous	and	critical	characterisations	during	the	emergent	stages	 of	 a	 technology’s	 development	 has	 been	 well	 documented	 within	 the	 literature	addressing	technologies	and	their	classifications.		As	Bowker	and	Star	explain,	those	who	encounter	and	examine	technologies	at	the	point	where	they	begin	to	spread	out	–	as	they	become	translated	within	the	social	world,	and	acquire	new	social	and	cultural	meanings	-	are	 able	 to	highlight	 some	of	 the	more	 contingent	 aspects	 of	 development	 that,	 through	processes	 of	 ‘sorting’	 and	 ordering,	may	 eventually	 come	 to	 be	 rationalised,	 ‘contained’	and	forgotten:	The	 more	 naturalised	 an	 object	 becomes,	 the	 more	 unquestioning	 the	relationship	of	the	community	to	it;	the	more	invisible	the	contingent	and	historical	circumstances	of	its	birth,	the	more	it	sinks	into	the	community’s	forgotten	memory.	(Bowker	and	Star	1999,	p.299)		With	 fieldwork	 taking	 place	 at	 a	 point	 in	 time	 during	 which	 NIPD	 had	 not	 yet	 become	‘routine’	or	‘natural’	within	many	of	the	spaces	and	contexts	it	was	being	translated	within,	the	 technology	 was	 frequently	 characterised	 as	 being	 new	 and	 exiting,	 alien	 and	untrusted.	 	The	deeply	ambiguous	and	shifting	perspective	that	was	adopted	by	David	(a	clinical	geneticist	who	also	contributed	to	the	work	of	a	number	regulatory	and	advisory	bodies),	 for	 instance,	 points	 towards	 a	 deep	 vein	 of	 doubt	 and	 uncertainty	 within	 the	discussion	 of	 NIPD	 during	 this	 ‘pre-naturalisation’	 stage.	 	 Reflecting	 on	 how	 the	technology	may	 come	 to	 be	 positioned	within	 the	 field	 of	 fetal	medicine	 and/or	within	routine	prenatal	care,	David	characterises	NIPD	technology	as	something	that	holds	both	‘routine’	and	‘revolutionary’	potential:		‘it’s	much	less	of	a	leap	than	the	introduction	of	amniocentesis’			
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‘there	 is	 nothing	 to	 stop	 it,	 very	 rapidly,	 giving	 much,	 much	 more	information’			 ‘you	could	imagine,	in	a	society	with	a	well	funded	system,	that	within	five	or	 ten	 years	 you	 could	 have	 virtually	 no	 children	 with	 chromosomal	anomalies	or	recessive	disease’	(David,	consultant	clinical	geneticist)		As	David	explored	his	thoughts	and	reflections	on	NIPD	across	the	space	of	the	interview,	his	 characterisation	 of	 the	 technology	 was	 gradually	 transformed.	 	 Approaching	 the	development	of	NIPD	as	a	relatively	benign	occurrence	at	the	outset,	as	he	discussed	the	possible	translation	of	the	technology	within	the	clinic	-	situating	it	within	the	context	of	a	‘society’	 likely	to	capitalise	on	the	large	volume	of	 information	that	may	be	produced,	by	the	end	of	his	account	a	significant	 ‘move’	 is	made,	with	NIPD	emerging	as	a	 technology	that	 holds	 the	 (potential)	 power,	 not	 only	 to	 impact	 on	 individual	 experiences	 of	pregnancy,	but	to	transform	whole	populations	–	‘you	could	have	virtually	no	children	with	
chromosomal	anomalies	or	recessive	disease’.		As	a	subject	of	significant	concern,	reflection	and	 uncertainty	 then,	within	 David’s	 account	 (and	within	many	more	 accounts	 that	 are	presented	here)	NIPD’s	emergence	is	fundamentally	and	thoroughly	problematised.				
From	NIPD	to	‘NIPT’:	a	shift	in	language			As	NIPD	expands	out	in	both	social	and	technological	terms	–	as	different	types	of	test	are	translated	within	a	range	of	spaces	-	 the	process	of	defining,	categorising	and	classifying	the	 technology	becomes	 increasingly	 complex.	 	The	 complexities	of	NIPD’s	development	and	translation	to	date	has	given	rise	to	an	evolving	set	of	descriptions	and	labels,	which	are	both	used	to	refer	 to	 the	technology	at	 large,	and	to	describe	particular	 types	of	 test	and/or	their	application.		During	the	early	stages	of	development	(and	at	the	outset	of	this	study)	the	terms	‘non	invasive	prenatal	diagnosis’	or	NIPD	could	reliably	be	used	to	refer	to	and	describe	the	technology	at	hand.		However,	as	various	divergences	in	the	trajectory	of	 NIPD’s	 development	 have	 taken	 place,	 and	 as	 NIPD	 has	 entered	 into,	 and	 become	increasingly	familiar	within	a	number	of	different	social	spaces	-	being	subject	therefore	to	‘local	 translations’	 -	 a	 far	broader	 range	of	descriptors	has	emerged.	 	A	diverse	 range	of	terminologies	 and	acronyms	are	now	present	within	 the	public	discussion	of	NIPD	 (and	within	 participant	 accounts	 examined	 here).	 	 Common	 descriptors	 now	 include:	 ‘non-invasive	 prenatal	 testing’	 (‘NIPT’),	 ‘non-invasive	 prenatal	 screening’	 (‘NIPS’),	 ‘high	accuracy	screen’,	‘harmony’,	‘panorama’,	‘nifty’	–	and	each	of	these	are	present	within	the	interview	 data	 gathered	 here.	 	 Although	 a	wide	 range	 of	 descriptors	 have	 emerged,	 the	most	notable	and	persistent	shift	to	occur	within	the	scientific	and	professional	literature	
	 60	
–	 and	 within	 the	 accounts	 examined	 here	 -	 has	 been	 a	 gradual	 but	 very	 clear	 and	consistent	 move	 away	 from	 talk	 of	 NIPD	 and	 towards	 increased	 talk	 of	 ‘NIPT’.	 	 ‘NIPT’	rather	than	NIPD	has,	progressively,	been	adopted	as	the	standard	descriptor	within	more	recent	scientific	publications	(Bianchi	2012a,	Agarwal,	Sayres	et	al.	2013,	Allyse,	Sayres	et	al.	2013,	Curnow,	Wilkins-Haug	et	al.	2015,	Bianchi,	Chudova	et	al.	2015a,	Chitty	2015b),	media	 reports	 (Hughes	 2015,	 Cooper	 2015a)	 and	 sociological	 and	 bioethical	 discussion	(de	Jong,	Maya	et	al.	2015,	Deans,	Clarke	et	al.	2015,	Munthe	2015).		Talk	of	‘diagnosis’	has	then,	in	many	instances,	been	replaced	with	talk	of	‘testing’.		The	shift	in	focus	from	NIPD	to	‘NIPT’	can	be	traced	back	within	this	public	discussion	of	NIPD,	 to	 a	 clear	 point	 of	 divergence	 in	 the	 trajectory	 of	 research,	 and	 the	 eventual	translation	 of	 this	 into	 the	 clinic.	 	 Subsequent	 to	 the	 publication	 of	 proof-of-principle	papers	demonstrating	that	testing	for	Down’s	syndrome	would	be	possible	via	analysis	of	cffDNA,	 the	 major	 focus	 of	 research	 around	 NIPD	 (particularly	 within	 the	 commercial	context)	became	Down’s	syndrome	testing,	rather	than	testing	for	fetal	sex	or	rare	single-gene	disorders.	 	During	 the	early	stages	of	 this	 research,	 the	NIPD	description	remained	fairly	stable,	and	the	technology	was	still	discussed	in	terms	of	diagnosis,	or	with	reference	to	 the	 potential	 for	 diagnosis.	 	 However,	 upon	 the	 publication	 of	 a	 first	wave	 of	 clinical	studies	 assessing	 the	 performance	 of	 NIPD	 tests	 for	 Down’s	 syndrome	 amongst	 the	pregnant	 population	 (Nicolaides,	 Syngelaki	 et	 al.	 2012,	 Beamon,	 Hardisty	 et	 al.	 2013,	Chetty,	 Garabedian	 et	 al.	 2013,	 Jackson,	 Dever	 et	 al.	 2013,	 Fairbrother,	 Johnson	 et	 al.	2013a,	 Fairbrother,	 Johnson	 et	 al.	 2013b),	 the	 use	 of	 the	 term	 ‘NIPT’	 gained	 significant	momentum.	 	 Although	 the	 specificities	 of	 testing	 –	 the	 accuracy	 figures	 produced,	 the	timing	of	 the	 testing	during	pregnancy	and	the	methods	employed	–	quoted	within	such	studies	are	closely	comparable	to	those	published	in	research	papers	on	NIPD	for	Down’s	syndrome,	 the	emergence	of	 these	studies	shifted	 the	context	of	discussion	 significantly,	with	 this	 body	 of	 work	 containing	 little	 to	 no	 talk	 of	 either	 NIPD	 or	 ‘diagnosis’.	 	 The	division	 of	 the	 technology	 into	 two	 distinct	 streams	 –	 NIPD	 and	 ‘NIPT’	 -	 became	increasingly	 commonplace,	 and	 as	 the	 technology	 continued	 to	 gain	 momentum	 in	 the	clinic,	this	divisory	process	became	increasingly	visible.		The	mainstream	public	presentation	of	the	technology	in	the	UK	-	through	spaces	such	as	the	RAPID	project	website	 for	 instance	 -	 very	 clearly	 divides	 the	 range	 of	 tests	 that	 are	now	available	into	two	distinct	categories	of	NIPD	and	‘NIPT’:		
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Figure	7:	Image	from	the	RAPID	project	website		The	 explicit	 and	 persistent	 division	 of	 the	 technology	 into	 NIPD	 and	 ‘NIPT’	 within	 this	image	 (and	 within	 the	 discussion	 at	 large)	 is	 a	 significant	 classificatory	 move	 –	 it	contributes	to	the	sorting	and	objectification	of	the	technology	–	and	is	boundary-making.		Within	 this	emergent	categorical	system	then,	NIPD	 is	used	 to	refer	 to	 tests	 for	 fetal	sex	and	 single	 gene	 disorders,	 and	 ‘NIPT’	 is	 used	 (primarily)	 to	 refer	 to	 tests	 for	 Down’s	syndrome.		Accordingly,	talk	of	non-invasive	‘diagnosis’	becomes	limited	to	the	discussion	of	how	testing	has	been	translated	within	specialist	clinical	contexts	–	spaces	such	as	fetal	medicine	and	clinical	genetics	-	where	tests	for	fetal	sex	and	single	gene	disorders	are	used	for	‘targeted’	testing	within	pregnancies	that	have	been	defined	as	‘high	risk’.	 	Spaces	are	forged	 then	 for	both	NIPD	and	 ‘NIPT’,	 through	 their	 respective	 classification	as	 tools	 for	diagnosis	and	tools	for	screening,	to	become	enrolled	and	translated	in	the	clinic.			
NIPD	to	NIPT:	the	shift	from	diagnosis	to	screening			The	 clear	 division	 of	 NIPD	 from	 ‘NIPT’,	 the	 location	 of	 this	 division	 as	 being	 centered	around	 Down’s	 syndrome	 testing	 particularly,	 and	 a	 reluctance	 to	 attach	 a	 label	 of	‘diagnosis’	 to	 the	 emerging	 tranche	 of	 (commercial)	 Down’s	 syndrome	 tests,	 was	 very	clearly	articulated	within	accounts	given	by	many	expert	 interviewees	here.	 	As	 I	 raised	the	recent	move	from	NIPD	to	NIPT	with	Emily	for	instance	(a	researcher	closely	involved	in	the	UK	based	development	of	NIPD)	she	explained	how	she	regarded	this	shift	as	being	related	very	directly	to	the	accuracy	of	test	results	and	the	corresponding	categorisation	of	specific	test	applications:	
So	I’ve	noticed	the	fairly	recent	change	from	NIPD-	(laughs)	yep.	 	Um	well,	NIPD	 is	diagnosis,	 and	 I	 think	 that’s	 still	 valid	 for	single	gene	disorders	because	it	will	be	a	distinct	diagnosis	of	a	condition,	it	will	 be	 a	 clear	 yes	 or	 no	 answer.	 	 But	with	 the	 aneuploidy,	 people	 are	very	reluctant	to	say	it’s	a	diagnosis,	because	the	test	is,	it’s	99%	accurate	
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but	it’s	not	100%	accurate,	so	they	are	much	more	hesitant	to	actually	say	diagnosis.		(Emily,	NIPD	researcher)		Accounts	such	as	that	provided	by	Emily	suggested	that	the	categorisation	of	new	Down’s	syndrome	tests	as	being	appropriate	for	‘NIPT’	rather	than	NIPD	was	due	to	the	perceived	(relative)	inaccuracy	of	this	group	of	tests.		The	presence	of	small	‘false	positive’	and	‘false	negative’35	rates,	which	entail	results	that	are	not	‘100%	accurate’,	prevent	such	tests	from	smoothly	entering	into	the	category	of	‘diagnosis’.		Such	accounts	suggest	that	any	margin	of	 error	 –	 however	 small	 (‘it’s	 99%	accurate’)	 -	 acts	 as	 a	 barrier	 to	 the	 enrolment	 and	translation	of	these	new	Down’s	syndrome	tests	within	the	‘diagnostic’	class.			Echoing	 such	 accounts,	 critics	 and	 commentators	 have	 repeatedly	 suggested	 that	 the	successful	development	of	100%	accurate	NIPD	tests	for	Down’s	syndrome	is	unlikely	to	ever	materialise	(Zhou,	Liang	et	al.	2013,	Neufeld-Kaiser,	Cheng	et	al.	2015,	Wang,	Sahoo	et	al.	2015,	Bianchi	2015b),	due	to	a	range	of	‘technical	issues’	 including	 ‘early	gestational	
age…	 maternal	 obesity…multiple	 pregnancies…	 placental	 mosaicism…	 and	 maternal	
conditions’36	(Soothill	 2014,	 p.4	 -	 5).	 	 The	widespread	 realisation	 that	 non-invasive	 tests	for	 Down’s	 syndrome	 were	 unlikely	 to	 produce	 ‘fully	 diagnostic’	 results	 –	 which	 could	claim	to	be	100%	accurate	-	may	have	acted	as	a	barrier	to	the	continued	development	of	testing,	if	this	were	the	only	form	of	testing	that	would	allow	for	the	successful	translation	of	 the	 technology.	 	 Despite	 the	 technology	 being	 subject	 to	 such	 intense	 and	 detailed	scrutiny,	 the	 unsettling	 presence	 of	 small	 but	 significant	 margins	 of	 error,	 did	 not,	however,	prevent	such	tests	from	entering	into	clinical	practice.		Rather,	as	made	evident	in	 the	 accounts	 presented	 here,	 it	 altered	 the	 descriptions	 that	 were	 used	 to	 refer	 to	specific	categories	of	testing,	and	shifted	the	specific	pathways	such	tests	would	come	to	
																																								 																						35	The	‘false	negative’	rate	refers	to	the	number	of	diagnoses	that	are	present	in	a	population,	and	that	are	missed	by	screening.	 	The	 ‘false	positive’	 rate	refers	 to	 the	number	of	diagnoses	 that	are	falsely	made	by	any	given	screening	 test.	 	 	 In	 the	majority	of	 circumstances	 false	negatives	 incite	greater	 anxiety	 than	 false	positives,	 as	 this	means	 that	 the	disease	 screened	 for	 (such	as	 cancer)	may	 go	 untreated.	 	Within	 the	 prenatal	 testing	 context	 ‘false	 positives’	 incite	 greater	 anxiety	 as	these	may	lead	to	the	abortion	of	‘healthy’	and	not	‘affected’	fetuses.		36	Because	successful	NIPD	testing	depends	upon	there	being	a	certain	proportion	of	cffDNA	in	the	maternal	blood,	and	because	this	material	 increases	with	gestation,	 if	 testing	 is	carried	out	at	 too	early	a	point	in	pregnancy	NIPD	may	fail	to	produce	results.	 	Maternal	obesity	is	thought	to	affect	testing	similarly,	as	the	proportion	of	maternal	DNA	remains	higher	for	longer.		The	presence	of	a	tumour	can	also	affect	test	accuracy	as	they	release	fragmented	DNA	in	a	similar	fashion	to	fetuses,	and	multiple	pregnancies	 can	entail	 that	 testing	 is	 inaccurate	 for	 individual	 fetuses.	 	Because	 the	DNA	is	in	fact	placental	in	origin,	 ‘confined	placental	mosaicism’	–	where	the	placenta	possesses	a	trisomy	and	the	fetus	does	not,	can	also	lead	to	discordant	results.		
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take37.	 	By	publically	and	purposively	 framing	 the	 technology	 in	 terms	of	 ‘testing’	 rather	than	‘diagnosis’	-	by	dropping	the	label	of	NIPD	and	speaking	only	of	‘NIPT’	-	a	(lucrative)	space	 opens	 up	 for	 the	 technology	 (and	 its	 commercial	 applications)	 to	 be	 translated	within:	 tests	 that	are	 less	 than	100%	accurate,	but	 that	produce	results	 that	reach	ever-closer	 towards	 the	upper	 end	of	 such	 limits	become	highly	 ‘useful’	within	 spaces	where	population-wide	screening	(and	not	diagnosis)	is	the	matter	at	hand.		This	new	orientation	towards	practices	of	prenatal	screening,	particularly	as	it	is	focused	around	 testing	 for	 Down’s	 syndrome	 specifically,	 entails	 significant	 implications.		Screening	 for	 Down’s	 syndrome	 has	 been	 routine	 within	 the	 UK	 since	 the	 late	 1980’s	(Cuckle,	Wald	et	al.	1984),	and	is	integral	to	standard	prenatal	care	within	a	large	number	of	 healthcare	 systems	 worldwide	 (Chadwick,	 ten	 Have	 et	 al.	 1998,	 Reid,	 Sinclair	 et	 al.	2009)	 .	 	 ‘NIPT’	 tests	 for	Down’s	 syndrome	were	not	 simply	made	 ‘useful’	 for	 ‘screening’	and	not	 ‘diagnosis’	 as	 a	 result	 of	 inaccuracies,	 but	 because	 they	 tested	 for	 a	 disease	 –	 a	syndrome	 –	 that	 was	 already	 the	 subject	 of	 routinised,	 normalised	 population-wide	prenatal	screening	programmes.	 	The	possible	application	of	NIPT	 for	Down’s	syndrome	within	 the	 prenatal	 screening	 context	 not	 only	 allows	 entry	 into	 the	 clinic	 at	 an	 earlier	point	than	would	be	possible	 if	 ‘diagnostic’	 levels	of	accuracy	were	required	then,	 it	also	opens	 up	 the	 possibility	 that	 a	 far	 greater	 proportion	 of	 the	 pregnant	 population	 may	come	to	encounter,	and	use,	the	technology.	 	Recognising	the	significance	of	this	move,	a	number	 of	 professional	 associations	 and	 advisory	 bodies	 -	 including	 the	 NHS	 Fetal	Anomaly	 and	 Screening	 Programme	 (Fetal	 Anomaly	 Screening	 Programme	 2015),	 the	Royal	College	of	Obstetricians	and	Gynecologists	(Soothill	2014),	the	(American)	National	Society	 of	 Genetic	 Counsellors	 (Devers,	 Cronister	 et	 al.	 2013),	 the	 American	 Society	 of	Human	Genetics	 (ASHG)	and	European	Society	of	Human	Genetics	 (ESHG)	 (Dondorp,	de	Wert	 et	 al.	 2015)	 -	 began	 to	 engage	 in	 conversations	 around	 NIPD	 (and	 mirroring	 the	scientific,	 clinical	 and	 commercial	 presentation	 of	 the	 technology,	 they	 too	 consistently	adopt	the	term	‘NIPT’	and	not	NIPD).		If	 analysis	were	 limited	 to	 the	mainstream	public	 discussion	 of	 the	 technology	 then	 the	observed	shift	from	NIPD	to	‘NIPT’	may	appear	as	linear	and	complete.		There	has	been	no	explicit	 acknowledgement	 or	 discussion	 of	 this	 alteration	 in	 language,	 and	 the	 entry	 of	‘NIPT’	 into	 conversations	 around	 the	 technology,	 and	 the	 effective	division	of	NIPD	 into																																									 																						37	The	translation	of	commercial	Down’s	syndrome	into	‘routine’	clinical	spaces	was	swift.		Shortly	after	the	publication	of	a	paper	reporting	on	test	accuracy	within	a	‘routinely	screened’	population	(Nicolaides	et	al.	2012)	–	 for	which	UK	patients	had	received	discounted	NIPD	Down’s	syndrome	testing	on	a	 research	basis	–	 the	Fetal	Medicine	Centre	 in	London	became	 the	 first	 clinic	 to	offer	NIPD	for	Down’s	syndrome,	in	the	form	of	Ariosa	Diagnostics’	Harmony™	test.			
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two	 separate	 streams,	 has	 prompted	 very	 little	 critical	 commentary	 or	 analysis	 from	outside	 the	 scientific	 community	 to	 date38	.	 Fieldwork	 commenced	 approximately	 four	months	after	the	initial	introduction	of	‘NIPT’	testing	for	Down’s	syndrome	within	private	UK	clinics	–	and	as	interviews	continued	over	the	course	of	the	next	year,	the	number	of	clinics	 offering	 NIPT	within	 the	 UK	 steadily	 increased	 in	 number.	 	 This	 shifting	 clinical	context	 greatly	 informed	 expert	 participants’	 discussion	 of	 NIPD	 as	 questions	 and	concerns	 regarding	 the	 shift	 from	 NIPD	 to	 ‘NIPT’	 were	 actively	 explored	 (and	problematised).	 	 Within	 the	 conversations	 that	 ensued,	 a	 range	 of	 interrelated	 themes	were	explored,	 including:	 the	accuracy	of	 tests;	 the	 categorisation/classification	of	 tests;	the	positioning	of	 tests	 in	relation	to	established	technologies;	 the	division	of	 ‘screening’	from	 ‘diagnosis’,	 and	 the	 practical	 impact	 of	 such	 issues	 on	 counselling	 and	 the	communication	of	test	results.		The	accounts	presented	here	explore	and	problematise	the	technology’s	emergence	and	early	translation	into	the	clinic	in	two	distinct	ways.	 	Firstly	the	accuracy	of	new	NIPD	(and	NIPT)	tests	is	questioned,	with	particular	reference	to	the	significance	of	numbers,	and	the	division	that	is	made	between	100%	accuracy	on	the	one	hand	and	anything	 less	than	100%	on	the	other.	 	Secondly,	 the	seemingly-simple	shift	 in	language	 from	NIPD	 to	 ‘NIPT’	 is	 examined,	with	 participants	 presenting	 both	 optimistic	accounts	 of	 the	 technology,	 making	 effort	 to	 align	 it	 with	 current	 testing	 practice,	 and	presenting	 critical	 and	 dissenting	 accounts,	 that	 in	 turn	 shed	 light	 on	 substantive	processes	of	division,	classification	and	categorisation,	and	point	towards	what	ends	such	processes	may	achieve.		
Troubling	boundaries:	technological	comparisons	and	the	problematisation	of	
accuracy			Accounts	of	how	new	non-invasive	tests	for	Down’s	syndrome	might	be	categorised,	and	how	 these	 emerging	 tests	 may	 come	 to	 be	 positioned	 within	 the	 context	 of	 current	(routine)	Down’s	syndrome	screening	practices	in	the	UK,	were	frequently	interpreted	in	light	 of	 comparisons	 with	 well-established	 prenatal	 testing	 technologies	 such	 as	ultrasound,	maternal	serum	screening,	amniocentesis	and	CVS.	 	These	technologies	were	highly	 familiar	 to	 expert	 interviewees	 -	 having	 been	 part	 of	 routine	 clinical	 practice	 for	many	years,	from	their	professional	perspective	they	had	become	‘naturalised’	-	and	when	contrasted	 with	 NIPD	 particularly,	 it	 became	 clear	 they	 had	 lost	 their	 ‘anthropological	
strangeness’	(Bowker	and	Star	1999).		Again	in	contrast	to	NIPD,	the	clinical	application	of	these	 technologies	 had	 already	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 comprehensive	 processes	 of																																									 																						38	Questions	regarding	NIPT	test	accuracy	have	been	explored	in	a	handful	of	blog	posts	published	from	within	the	genetic	counselling	community	(Stoll	2013,	Daley	2014)	
	 65	
standardisation	 and	 regulation	 -	 their	 position	 within	 the	 clinic,	 and	 their	 respective	classification	 within	 categories	 of	 ‘screening’	 or	 ‘diagnosis’	 appeared,	 within	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 accounts,	 as	 secure	 and	 undisputed.	 	 Comparing	 NIPD	 directly	 with	 these	established	tests	and	technologies,	interviewees	explored	possible	points	of	entry	into	the	clinic	 for	 this	 novel	 technology,	 reflecting	 on	 the	 possible	 future	 classification	 and	categorisation	 of	 these	 emergent	 and	 relatively	 unfamiliar	 tests.	 	 Such	 comparisons	typically	 focused	 in	on	 the	 test’s	 accuracy	over	 and	above	 all	 other	 concerns.	 	David	 for	example	 raised	questions	around	NIPD’s	accuracy,	 and	 its	 corresponding	position	 in	 the	clinic,	with	explicit	reference	to	comparisons	with	previous	technologies:	
Does	NIPD	 strike	you	as	 similar	 to	previous	prenatal	 technologies?	 	Or	 is	 it	
different	somehow?	Well	 it’s	much	 less	 of	 a	 leap	 than	 say,	 the	 introduction	 of	 amniocentesis	was,	 you	 know,	 before	which	 there	 had	 been	 nothing,	 effectively.	 And	 of	course	ultrasound	wasn’t	really	around	at	that	time	either,	not	effectively.		But	 it’s	 clearly	 different	 than	 anything	 that’s	 gone	 before.	 It’s	 difficult	 to	compare	them,	 it’s	obviously	 less	of	an	 impact	 than	the	very	 introduction	of	any	prenatal	diagnosis,	obviously	that	has	to	be	the	biggest	leap	doesn’t	it.		I	suppose	it’s	a	bigger	step,	you	feel	that	its	more	reliable	and	it’s	sort	of	putting	on	a	firmer	footing	than,	say	the	Alfa	fetal	protein	and	other	serum	maternal	 blood	 tests.	 Those,	 the	 maternal	 biochemistry	 based	 tests,	 are	risk	 modifying,	 rather	 than	 risk-determining	 type	 tests.	 Whereas	 NIPD	firms	 that	 up	 hugely,	 and	 is	 putting	 reliability	 up	 towards	 the	 reliability	that	you’d	get	with	amniocentesis	and	CVS.		So	within	the	maternal	blood-sampling	category	of	tests	its	enormously	improving	it’s	reliability.	(David,	consultant	clinical	geneticist)		After	a	range	of	comparisons	is	drawn	between	NIPD	and	other	already-routine	prenatal	testing	 technologies,	 these	 emergent	 tests	 are	 eventually	 placed	 in	 a	 ‘maternal	 blood	
sampling	 category’.	 	 This	 particular	 classification	 positions	 the	 technology	 within	 the	‘prenatal	 screening’	 context,	 to	 be	 used	 for	 the	 identification	 (or	 ‘modification’)	 of	 ‘risk’,	rather	than	for	the	generation	of	a	concrete	diagnostic	result	that	possesses	the	power	to	confirm	or	deny	the	presence	of	disease	or	disorder.		It	is	simultaneously	recognised	here	however,	that	the	positioning	of	NIPD	alongside	routine	‘risk	modifying’	blood	tests,	rather	than	 diagnostic	 tests	 (amniocentesis	 and	 CVS),	 may	 in	 fact	 be	 problematic.	 	 NIPD	 is	described	here	as	achieving	a	‘firmer	footing’	than	any	previous	blood	testing	technologies,	with	 the	 appearance	 of	 its	 greatly-increased	 accuracy,	 and	 its	 corresponding	 ‘reliability’	suggesting	 that	 NIPD	may	 not	 so	 easily	 be	 placed	 alongside	 established	 technologies	 of	screening.	 	 An	 alternative	 characterisation	 of	 NIPD	 -	 as	 a	 technology	 that,	 once	 placed	within	their	confines,	‘troubles’	established	boundaries	–	shifting	away	from	the	screening	(‘blood	sampling’)	category,	and	inviting	closer	(but	not	exact)	comparison	with	diagnostic	tests,	 starts	 to	 surface.	 	 Accordingly,	 the	 clear	 division	 that	 has	 been	 made	 between	technologies	 of	 ‘screening’	 and	 ‘diagnosis’,	 a	 process	 which	 had	 resulted	 in	 the	
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rationalisation	 and	 ordering	 of	 testing	 as	 it	 appears	 in	 the	 clinic,	 begins	 to	 destabilise.		Such	disruptions	–	the	‘troubling’	of	these	boundaries	-	are	far	from	benign	as	they	carry	the	possibility	that	practices	attached	exclusively	to	diagnosis	–	such	selective	abortion	–	may,	with	the	advent	of	NIPD,	come	to	align	themselves	with	practices	of	‘screening’	too.				Questions	regarding	the	accuracy	of	tests	-	involving	close	examination	of	the	rates	of	false	positives	and	false	negatives	that	were	being	generated	(the	‘sensitivity’	and	‘specificity’	of	the	tests39)	-	were	explored	within	many	other	expert	interviews.		The	close	examination	of	 test	accuracy	contributed	 to	processes	of	 sorting,	 and	 the	classificatory	positioning	of	NIPD,	as	well	as	the	on	going	questioning	of	NIPD’s	orientation	in	relation	to	established	technologies	and	practices	of	‘screening’	and	‘diagnosis’.		Questions	of	whether	NIPD	tests	were	 ‘accurate	enough’	 to	be	placed	in	 ‘diagnostic’	categories,	and	if	not,	how	they	might	come	 to	 achieve	 this,	 frequently	played	out	within	 experts’	 accounts	 of	 the	 technology’s	emerging	position	within	the	clinic.	And	then	there	is	the	issue	of	accuracy,	and	what	do	you	do?		Where	do	we	put	 the	 test?	 	You	know,	do	we	do	 this	 as	 a	 first	 line	 test	 for	 everybody?	And	 I	 think	 if	 it	 comes	 back	 as-	 I	 mean	 it’s	 giving	 a	 risk	 essentially,	 it’s	trying	to	be	a	diagnostic	test,	but	it’s	not	accurate	enough.	(Erica,	clinical	geneticist)		Within	 such	 accounts	 NIPD	 technology	 was	 framed	 in	 terms	 of	 possessing	 a	 particular	intended	trajectory;	that	of	eventually	achieving	entry	into	the	category	of	 ‘diagnosis’.	 	 It	was	 suggested	 that,	 despite	 having	 successfully	 entered	 into	 the	 clinic	 as	 a	 ‘high	 level	
screening	 test’	 (a	 category	 that	was	 emerging	 alongside	 ‘NIPT’),	 an	 underlying	 desire	 to	produce	 ‘100%’,	 technically	 ‘perfect’	 results,	 which	 could	 in	 turn	 generate	 categorical,	diagnostic	–	and	crucially	not	 ‘risk’	based	-	 information,	remained	present.	 	Reflecting	on	the	move	that	had	been	made	from	NIPD	to	‘NIPT’,	Laura	(a	researcher	involved	in	the	UK	based	development	of	NIPD)	accounted	for	this	shift	by	raising	talk	of	test	accuracy,	and	imagining	a	future	for	the	technology	that	would	allow,	eventually,	for	complete	diagnostic	accuracy	to	be	achieved:	
And	 I've	 noticed	 recently	 there's	 been	 a	 shift	 from	 talking	 about	 NIPD	 to	
talking	about	NIPT,	what	do	you	think-	So	 that	 stems	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 it’s	 not	 considered	 a	 diagnostic	 tool	 in	certain	 cases.	 So	 obviously	 with	 the	 Down’s	 syndrome	 test,	 because	 it	doesn't	 have	 a	 99.9%	 accuracy	 rate	 at	 the	moment	 it's	 still	 considered	 a	high	 level	 screening	 test,	 and	 if	 the	 test	 did	 show	 that	 the	 fetus	 had	 the																																									 																						39	‘Sensitivity’	 refers	 to	 the	 proportion	 of	 patients	 (or	 test	 results)	 where	 disease	 is	 correctly	diagnosed.	 ‘Specificity’	 refers	 to	 the	 proportion	 of	 patients	 (or	 test	 results)	 where	 diagnosis	 of	disease	is	missed	(Mallett	2012).			
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condition	 they	 would	 still	 recommend	 that	 you	 had	 invasive	 testing	 to	confirm	 the	 result.	 	 And	 for	 that	 reason	 they	 don't	 want	 to	 call	 it	 a	diagnostic	result.	 	So	that's	why	they	are	calling	it	NIPT.	 	And	then	people	call	 it	 the	 harmony	 test	 because	 that's	 what	 it's	 called	 if	 you	 offer	 it	privately.	
So	you	envisage	that	NIPT	may	turn	back	towards	NIPD	at	some	point	on	the	
future?	Yeah.	Ultimately	 you	want	 it	 to	 be	 a	 diagnostic	 test	 because	 you	want	 to	eradicate	the	need	to	have	invasive	testing.	(Laura,	NIPD	researcher)		Laura’s	 optimistic	 and	 hopeful	 account	 of	 NIPD’s	 continued	 development	 nevertheless	provides	a	description	of	 the	technology	which	highlights	that,	at	 this	stage	of	entry	 into	the	 clinic,	 tests	 for	Down’s	 syndrome	were	being	used	 tentatively,	with	 further	 invasive	testing	 being	 required	 in	 order	 ‘to	 confirm’	 results	 that	 suggest	 Down’s	 syndrome	 is	present.		Crucially,	the	testing	remains	one	step	away	from	experiences	of	abortion	in	such	circumstances,	with	‘positive’	results	being	used	only	to	guide	decisions	regarding	further	invasive	testing,	and	not	to	legitimate	direct	access	to	abortion.			Accounts	 of	 whether	 NIPD	 was	 in	 fact	 likely	 to	 produce	 ‘perfect’	 results	 which	 would	enable	 the	 technology	 to	 be	 treated	 as	 diagnostic,	 varied	 greatly,	 with	 individual	perspectives	 regarding	 questions	 of	 accuracy	 being	 shaped	 by	 the	 broader	 context	 of	interviewees’	 professional	 identities.	 	 Within	 his	 work	 examining	 the	 clinical	 uptake	 of	pharmacogenetic	 testing,	Hedgecoe	 (Hedgecoe	2008)	has	 shown	how	experts’	 refusal	 to	use	any	particular	type	of	testing	may	be	understood	as	relating	more	closely	to	a	lack	of	‘usefulness’	rather	than	to	any	process	of	‘resistance’:	experts	negotiate	the	‘usefulness’	of	specific	 tests	 by	 taking	 into	 consideration	 a	 range	 of	 features,	 including	 ‘knowledge,	 the	
differing	 interests	 of	 clinicians	 and	 researchers,	 how	 context	 influences	 the	 value	 of	 tests’	
accuracy,	 the	 economic	 aspects	 of	 such	 tests	 and	 general	 cultural	 aspects	 of	 the	 clinic’	(Hedgecoe	2008,	p.2).		This	characterisation	of	expert	approaches	towards	novel	(clinical)	testing	 technologies	plays	out	clearly	within	 the	expert	accounts	gathered	here.	 	Specific	descriptions	 of	 the	 technology’s	 ‘usefulness’	 were	 presented	 in	 light	 of	 professional	understandings	 of	 what	 might	 be	 required	 for	 the	 technology	 to	 achieve	 successful	categorisation	as	a	 ‘diagnostic’	 test,	both	 in	 terms	of	 technical	standards	(sensitivity	and	specificity	 etc.)	 as	 well	 as	 more	 direct	 practical	 achievements	 that	 would	 allow	 for	translation	 into	 the	 clinic.	 	 Accounts	 provided	 by	 experts	 closely	 aligned	 with	 the	
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laboratory-based	aspects	of	testing	-	those	with	a	cytogenetics40	background	for	instance	-	tended	to	characterise	NIPD	as	a	promising	tool	for	screening,	but	one	that	would	remain	unable	 to	 achieve	 standards	 of	 accuracy	 sufficient	 to	 allow	 tests	 to	 be	 categorised	 as	‘diagnostic’	according	to	their	terms.		Comparing	NIPD	with	technologies	that	were,	within	this	 context,	 everyday	 and	 highly	 familiar	 objects	 (amniocentesis	 and	 CVS),	 NIPD	 was	framed	as	a	technology	which	possessed	inherent,	unavoidable	and	perpetual	limitations:		
There’s	been	a	shift	towards	NIPT.		What	do	you	think	that-	Because	 it’s	never	going	to	be	a	diagnostic	test.	 	And	I	actually	 feel	 that	 it	will	probably	never	be	a	diagnostic,	 because	of	 the	 cell	 type	 that	you	are	looking	at	and,	what	you-	you	know	I	think	it’s	 just	with	the	cell	type	you	are	looking	at,	you	are	never	going	to	be	100%.	
Um,	no	tests	are	100%	are	they?	Yes,	 if	 you	 have	 an	 amniocentesis.	 	 It’s	 a	 diagnostic	 test.	 	 A	 CVS	 is	 a	diagnostic	 test	 as	 long	 as	 you	 look	 at	 the	 cultures	 as	 well.	 	 So	 they	 are	diagnostic	tests.	
And	they	are	100%	reliable?	Yeah.		(Alison,	cytogeneticist)		Alison	divides	prenatal	 testing	 technologies	 (generally	 speaking)	 into	 two	very	 separate	categories,	drawing	particularly	here	on	the	persuasive	and	symbolic	power	of	numbers	-	NIPD	fails	to	become	‘useful’	 for	Alison	specifically	because	it	 is	 ‘never	going	to	be	100%’.		Firstly,	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	 complete	 diagnostic	 reliability	 –	 100%	 accuracy	 –	 can	 be	achieved,	 and	 Alison	 makes	 effort	 to	 ‘clarify	 the	 facts’	 here,	 stressing	 that	 both	amniocentesis	and	CVS	tests	can	and	do	in	fact	achieve	complete	diagnostic	accuracy	(as	the	category	is	constructed	here).	 	 In	order	for	emergent	NIPD	tests	to	be	categorised	as	‘diagnostic’	within	 such	 an	 account,	 they	must	 produce	 results	 that	 achieve	 comparable	levels	 of	 technical	 excellence,	 providing	 complete,	 100%	 reliable	 (and	 therefore	diagnostically	 accurate)	 results.	 	 Anything	 less	 than	 100%	 accurate	 	 -	 including	 NIPD	 –	may	not	be	classed	as	diagnostic	on	such	an	account.	 	As	Alison	highlights	NIPD’s	 lack	of	‘usefulness’,	 the	 technology	 is	 ‘disposed’	 of	 and	 marginalised,	 separated	 from	 the	mainstream.	 	 To	 support	 this	 divisory	move,	 Alison	 not	 only	 underlines	 the	 persuasive	power	of	numbers,	she	draws	from	her	expert	(cytogenetic)	knowledge,	pointing	towards	NIPD’s	 problematic	 reliance	 on	 certain	 fallible	 ‘cell	 types’,	 mobilising	 them	 within	 her	(boundary-making)	 description	 of	 NIPD’s	 failure	 here.	 	 Alison’s	 particular	 professional																																									 																						40	Cytogenetics	refers	to	a	branch	of	science	‘that	links	the	study	of	inheritance	(genetics)	with	that	of	
cells	(cytology),	[being]	concerned	mainly	with	the	study	of	the	chromosomes,	especially	their	origin,	
structure,	and	functions’	(Martin	2015)		
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identity	 contributes	 to	 her	 characterisation	 of	 NIPD	 as	 being	 subject	 to	 significant	limitations,	 and	 her	 closeness	 to	 the	 laboratory	 context	 brings	 with	 it	 a	 highly	 critical	perspective	 on	 the	 fine-grained	 performance	 -	 the	 ‘sensitivities	 and	 specificities’	 -	 of	emerging	‘NIPT’	tests.				Critical	focus	on	the	small-but-significant	limitations	of	NIPD	appeared	repeatedly	across	the	 dataset,	 being	 raised	 as	 a	 potential	 source	 of	 concern	 within	 accounts	 provided	 by	interviewees	from	a	broad	range	of	professional	groups,	including	those	positioned	much	closer	to	the	translation	of	testing	within	clinic	(and	further	from	the	lab).		Suggesting	then	that	that	the	impact	of	issues	around	NIPD	test	accuracy	were	unlikely	to	be	limited	to	the	lab,	 or	 to	 discussions	 relevant	 to	 the	 research	 community	 alone,	 a	 critical	 awareness	 of	these	 ‘limitations’	 allowed	 interviewees	 to	 present	 particularly	 ‘sceptical’	and	 dissenting	accounts	of	NIPD’s	translation	into	the	clinic.		Discussions	around	test	accuracy	provided	a	space	 for	 dissenting	 interviewees	 to	 highlight	 their	 perceptions	 of	 the	 ‘issues’	 they	 felt	were	 being	 raised	 by	 NIPD’s	 early	 and	 ‘problematic’	 entry	 into	 the	 clinic.	 	 Informed	 by	their	 professional	 identities,	 and	 their	 closeness	 with	 clinical	 encounters	 involving	prenatal	 testing,	 they	 were	 able	 to	 point	 towards	 the	 potential	 impact	 such	 limitations	may	have	on	the	women	who	would	come	to	use	the	tests	within	pregnancy.	 	As	I	asked	Rachel,	 a	 genetic	 counsellor,	 about	what	 she	 thought	 the	 shift	 in	 language	 from	NIPD	 to	‘NIPT’	might	signify,	aware	of	some	of	the	‘problems’	that	UK	based	NIPD	researchers	had	faced	–	‘certain	results	have	bitten	them	on	the	bum’	-	she	pointed	towards	the	centrality	of	
‘issues’	around	test	accuracy:		
There’s	been	a	move	from	calling	it	NIPD	to	NIPT,	what	do	you	think	about	
that?	Well	 I	 think	that’s	quite	 interesting	and	I	 think	that’s	because	um,	certain	results	have	bitten	them	on	the	bum.	 	Because	the	test	 is	 limited,	 the	test	can	throw	up	issues,	you	know.	
At	what	point	do	you	think,	how	will	it	become	a	robust	enough	test-	I	 think	 it’s	 experience.	 	 Before	 I	 did	 this	 job	 I	 was	 a	 clinical	 scientist,	 I	worked	in	a	cytogenetics	laboratory.		So	from	a	professional	point	of	view	I	have	 a	 lot	 of	 experience	 of	 when	 tests	 throw	 up	 results	 that	 are	problematic	 in	 interpretation…	 So	 it’s	 not	 surprising	 that	 sometimes,	 I	would	 imagine,	 and	 from	 the	 evidence	 I’ve	 seen	 in	 the	 literature,	 that	sometimes	 these	are	going	 to	be	reflected	 in	 the	non-invasive	results.	 	So	it’s	not	a	surprise,	and	perhaps	I	come	from	a	position	that’s	perhaps,	not	sceptical,	 but	 that	 is	 not	 surprised	 that	 results	 come	out	 and	bite	 you	on	the	bum,	so	to	speak...	So	therefore	I	think,	you	know,	it’s	not	fair	to	say	to	women	 that	 this	 is	 the	 panacea,	 this	will	 give	 you	 the	 yes	 or	 no	 answer,	because	tests	are	not	like	that,	life	is	not	like	that,	results	are	not	like	that.		Genetics	is	not	that	simple.	(Rachel,	genetic	counsellor)		
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Here,	 Rachel	 draws	 very	 clearly	 upon	 her	 specific	 professional	 identity,	 and	 the	 values	inherent	to	the	clinical	genetics	perspective	–	‘from	a	professional	point	of	view	I	have	a	lot	
of	experience	of	when	tests	throw	up	results	that	are	problematic	in	interpretation…	genetics	
is	 not	 that	 simple’	 –	 in	 order	 to	 present	 an	 account	 of	 NIPD	 that	 highlights	 the	 more	‘problematic’	aspects	of	emerging	tests.		Rachel	appeared	as	a	dissenting	and	critical	voice	within	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 technology	 throughout	 -	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 interview,	 for	instance,	she	explained	that	although	NIPD	for	fetal	sex	had	been	made	available	for	her	to	use	within	the	genetics	clinic	for	a	number	of	years	(Rachel	spent	much	of	her	professional	life	 providing	 expert	 genetic	 counselling	 to	 ‘couples	 who	 are	 seeking	 information	 about	
either	 a	 diagnosis	 in	 their	 family,	 or	 something	 that’s	 going	 on	 in	 the	 pregnancy’),	 she	‘rarely’	felt	that	NIPD	would	be	experienced	as	useful	to	the	patients	that	she	counselled:	So	 basically	 speaking	 we	 talk	 about	 what	 the	 advantages	 and	disadvantages	of	it	are,	what	the	limitations	are,	because	you	know	there	is	an	error	 rate.	 	 I	 think	you	need	 to	 stress	 to	 the	patient,	 you	know	 it	 isn’t	100%	 accurate,	 and	 that	 in	 my	 experience	 has	 really	 influenced	 what	women	have	done…	I	don’t	know	whether	that’s	down	to	counselling	style	or	 practice,	 but	 I	 think	 that	 perhaps	 it’s	 not	 always	 reflected	 in	 other	centres.		(Rachel,	genetic	counsellor)		Once	again	NIPD	is	‘disposed’	of,	and	marginalised,	as	its	lack	of	‘usefulness’		-	its	inability	to	 deliver	 anything	 other	 than	 ‘risk-based’	 information	 and	 to	 provide	 clinicians	 and	patients	 with	 diagnostic	 certainty	 -	 is	 highlighted	 here.	 	 Whilst	 elsewhere,	 Natalie	 (a	consultant	in	clinical	genetics)	–	echoes	Rachel’s	account	of	NIPD:	‘we	do	offer	it,	you	know	
–	it	is	talked	through.		We	talk	through	what	it	will	do	and	what	it	won’t	do….	and	for	most	of	
the	 women,	 they	 would	 rather	 not	 bother,	 they	 would	 rather	 go	 straight	 to	 the	 CVS’	 -	 a	number	of	other	clinicians	–	those	who	reported	using	NIPD	on	a	regular	basis	(and	who	had	some	involvement	in	UK-based	NIPD	research,	by	recruiting	patients	to	provide	blood	samples,	for	instance)	-	expressed	frustrations	regarding	what	they	perceived	to	be	a	lack	of	 ‘belief’	in	the	accuracy	of	NIPD,	and	a	corresponding	lack	of	 	 ‘understanding’	regarding	NIPD’s	clinical	utility:	
Have	you	come	across	any	challenges	whilst	working	with	NIPD?	Um,	 we	 have	 had	 partly,	 issues	 of	 understanding	 from	 fetal	 medicine	people	 about	 how	 accurate	 it	 is,	 and	 whether	 we	 ought	 to	 confirm	diagnosis,	and	that’s	an	on-going	debate..	 	and	we	occasionally	see	people	who	say	well	I	don’t	want	to	do	that,	I	 just	want	the	CVS	anyway...	A	local	centre	 is	 just	repeating	 the	 free	 fetal	DNA,	because	 they	are	not	happy	 to	confirm	 by	 scan…	 but	 there	 are	 also	 the	 people	 that	 don’t	 believe	 in	 the	accuracy.	 	 We’ve	 spent	 some	 time	 trying	 to	 give	 them	 the	 figures	 and	explain	to	them.	(Erica,	consultant	clinical	geneticist)		
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	The	 significance	 of	 identity	 comes	 to	 the	 fore	 within	 these	 competing	 and	 contrasting	accounts	of	NIPD.		Professionals	working	within	locations	more	closely	aligned	with	NIPD	(Laura	and	Erica	for	instance)	-	those	whose	professional	identities	were	more	invested	in	the	success	of	the	technology	-	imagined	a	future	path	of	development	within	which	NIPD	may	achieve	standards	of	diagnostic	accuracy	sufficient	for	it	to	become	a	replacement	for	amniocentesis	and	CVS	–	to	‘eradicate	the	need	for	invasive	testing’		-	expressing	frustration	at	 clinicians’	 unwillingness	 to	 approach	 the	 test	 as	 a	 clinically	 ‘useful’	 tool.	 	By	 contrast,	Rachel	 and	Natalie	 approach	 the	 test	 from	within	 locations	 that	 are	 distanced	 from	 the	conduct	of	NIPD	research,	and	their	professional	identities	are	aligned	more	closely	with	the	 everyday	work	 of	 the	 clinic,	 and	 the	 experiences	 and	 perspectives	 of	 their	 patients.		Approaching	 the	 technology	critically,	 as	 relative	 ‘outsiders’,	 and	examining	how	 ‘issues’	and	 ‘problems’	 regarding	 NIPD’s	 accuracy	 –	 however	 small	 (‘they	 are	 99.9	 accurate’)	 -	might	 come	be	 translated	 and	experienced	within	 the	 clinic,	 they	 are	 able	 to	preserve	 a	space	 for	 clinical	 judgement	 in	 the	 face	of	proliferating	 technological	developments,	 and	therefore	maintain	what	Latimer	terms	‘the	alignment	of	the	clinic	and	the	gene’:			The	alignment	of	the	clinic	and	the	gene	helps	to	revive	medical	dominance	in	 a	 number	 of	 ways….	 the	 dysmorphology	 clinic	 appears	 to	 be	 being	reborn	as	a	site	of	knowledge	production	rather	than	just	as	a	space	for	the	consumption	of	a	science	that	is	developed	elsewhere…	at	the	same	time	as	participation	in	the	clinic	tasks	mothers	and	fathers	with	choices	that	may	determine	 the	 future,	 they	 are	 also	 entangled	 in	 deferral,	 in	 the	need	 for	more	knowledge,	more	genetic	techno-science,	and	more	clinical	judgment.	(Latimer	2007b,	p.29	-	30)		Within	 her	 work	 examining	 the	 contemporary	 conduct	 of	 dysmorphology	 –	 another	(closely	 related)	 field	 within	 which	 the	 work	 of	 the	 ‘new	 genetics’	 appears	 as	 central	 -	Latimer	 shows	 how	 clinicians	 (and	 parents)	 work	 in	 ways	 that	 maintain	 spaces	 of	‘deferral’.	 	 Specifically,	 technologies	 are	 not	 passively	 defused,	 but	 actively	 translated,	mobilised	in	ways	that	preserve	the	power	of	medical	knowledge	and	clinical	judgement:	the	contemporary	genetics	clinic	becomes	 ‘a	site	of	knowledge	production	rather	than	just	
as	a	space	for	the	consumption	of	a	science	that	is	developed	elsewhere’.	 	Similar	processes	of	 ‘deferral’	 are	 visible	 here:	 through	 adopting	 a	 ‘sceptical’	 and	 dissenting	 approach,	drawing	 on	 their	 professional	 identities	 and	 responsibilities	 as	 spaces	within	which	 the	power	 of	 emergent	 technologies	 may	 be	 translated	 or	 denied,	 by	 refuting	 NIPD	technology’s	 diagnostic	 potential	 and	 its	 corresponding	 ‘usefulness’,	 and	 instead	emphasising	its	unreliability,	Rachel	and	Natalie	actively	preserve	a	space	for	the	exercise	of	clinical	judgement	and	the	stability	of	current	practice.		
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The	translation	of	‘NIPT’:	moving	emergent	tests	into	the	clinic		
	
Figure	8:	card	with	comparative	information	on	prenatal	test	accuracy	
The	image	reproduced	above	is	a	scanned	copy	of	a	small	plastic	card	(wallet-sized)	given	to	
me	by	a	research	participant	(towards	the	end	of	the	fieldwork	stage,	in	February	of	2014),	
who	had	been	provided	with	several	copies	whilst	visiting	a	clinical	site	she	had	regular	
contact	with	(but	was	not	formally	affiliated	with).		The	card	was	distributed	to	GPs	in	
England	and	Wales,	and	was	also	made	available	to	midwives,	student	midwives	and	
obstetric	trainees.		The	expert	accounts	explored	above	concerned	 the	discussion	of	both	NIPD	 for	 fetal	 sex	and	 ‘NIPT’	 for	Down’s	syndrome	–	and	with	the	Down’s	syndrome	tests	entering	private	clinics	 as	 a	 new	 development	 whilst	 the	 fieldwork	 interviews	 were	 being	 conducted,	participants	 frequently	discussed	the	technology	–	NIPD	and	 ‘NIPT’	 -	as	a	whole,	shifting	between	 talk	 of	 specialist	 care	 and	 diagnostics	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 routine	 care	 and	‘screening’	on	the	other.			In	contrast	to	the	accounts	above	however,	a	number	of	experts	whose	 professional	 identities	 were	 more	 closely	 affiliated	 with	 practices	 of	 routine	screening	–	and	who	had	become	more	familiar	with	the	emerging	‘NIPT’	tests	for	Down’s	syndrome	–	began	 to	 suggest	 that	 issues	 regarding	accuracy	would	not	be	of	 continuing	concern,	and	that	the	new	tranche	of	commercially-developed	tests	would	not	be	required	to	 provide	 complete	 (100%)	 diagnostic	 accuracy	 in	 order	 for	 non-invasive	 Down’s	syndrome	 testing	 to	 become	 widely	 regarded	 as	 ‘useful’.	 	 Whereas	 the	 accounts	highlighted	 above	 either	 suggested	 that	 1)	NIPD	 tests	were	 currently	 lacking	 diagnostic	power,	 but	would	 eventually	 become	 “100%”	 accurate,	 or	 2)	 NIPD	 could	 never	 provide	complete	reassurance	and	act	as	a	‘replacement	technology’	for	diagnostic	tests,	this	group	of	 experts	 denied	 the	 need	 for	 complete	 accuracy,	 suggesting	 instead	 that	 current	 (or	near-future)	 testing	 standards	were	 likely	 to	 be	 ‘accurate	enough’	 for	 the	 technology	 to	
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provide	a	similar	level	of	reassurance	as	(and	act	as	a	replacement	for)	a	range	of	routine	prenatal	testing	technologies,	including	some	of	those	usually	treated	as	‘diagnostic’:	As	you	get	better	at	 it,	 the	chances	of	 the	 laboratory	producing	abnormal	genetic	 results	because	 they’ve	screwed	up,	 I	 think,	 is	 infinitesimally	 low.		And	I	think	that	to	me,	my	thinking	is	that	NIPT	is	just	a	non-invasive	CVS,	and	if	you	are	prepared	to	accept	CVS	as	being	accurate	enough	to	act	on	it,	then	I	think	quite	soon	it	should	be	much	the	same	for	NIPT.	(James,	private	NIPT	provider)		
Do	you	have	to	have	100%	specificity,	sensitivity?	You	 can’t.	 	 It-	 I	mean	 amniocentesis	 isn’t	 100%.	 	 Nothing	 is	 100%.	 	 So	 I	think-	 I	 think	 you	 can’t	 have	 100,	 100.	 	 But	 if	 you	 knew,	 that	 there	was	potentially	a	risk	with	something	 like	CVS,	 it	almost	becomes-	makes	CVS	negated	 in	 that	position.	 	And	 it	would	still	be	ok,	but	women	would	still	have	it	be	told,	actually	do	you	know	what-	this	is	still	not	100%.		And	you	could	have,	for	example,	if	it’s	a	female	fetus	then	potentially	you’ve	got	an	issue	 on	 amnio.	 	 Um,	 it’s	 very,	 very	 rare	 you	 know,	 but	 there	 is	 always	going	to	be	that	tiny,	tiny,	tiny	risk	of	error.	(Linda,	public	health	policy)		Both	James	and	Linda,	as	they	discuss	the	accuracy	of	‘NIPT’,	shift	the	conversation	away	from	talk	of	problems	with	the	emergent	technology,	and	instead	point	towards	what	they	perceive	 to	 be	 corresponding	 shortfalls	 in	 accuracy	 produced	by	 tests	 already	 treated	 –	and	trusted	-	as	‘diagnostic’.		Unlike	those	whose	professional	alignments	with	diagnostic	testing	technologies	led	them	to	emphasise	the	need	for	complete	reliability,	for	James	and	Linda	 ‘nothing	 is	100%’.	 	 By	 denying	 the	 possibility	 of	 ‘100%	 accuracy’	 they	 are	 able	 to	align	NIPD	more	closely	with	routine	and	trusted	‘diagnostic’	technologies,	not	by	claiming	that	the	emergent	technology	achieves	100%	accuracy,	but	rather	by	re-interpreting	what	the	 class	 of	 diagnostic	 means,	 pointing	 towards	 the	 embeddedness	 and	 widespread	acceptance	of	prenatal	tests	(CVS)	which	-	they	suggest	–	may	in	fact	be	regarded	as	less	than	100%	accurate.	 	Echoing	the	image	of	the	text	on	the	card	(in	figure	5,	above),	both	Linda	and	 James	directly	compare	NIPT	with	existing	(and	trusted)	 technologies	such	as	CVS41,	in	order	to	highlight	the	emergent	technology’s	power	–	with	James	suggesting	that	‘NIPT’	may	be	 treated	as	equivalent	 to	CVS,	 and	Linda	 suggesting	 that	 the	emergence	of	NIPT	may	effectively	‘negate’	the	test’s	‘usefulness’,	given	the	risk	of	miscarriage	that	CVS	presents.		These	accounts	lie	in	stark	contrast	then	to	those	provided	by	experts	elsewhere	and	 the	 emergence	 of	 such	 profoundly	 different	 accounts	 of	 NIPD’s	 (and	 other	 testing	technologies’)	 ‘accuracy’	 once	 again	 points	 towards	 constitutive	 power	 of	 ‘local	
translations’.	 	 Whereas	 Alison	 (cytogeneticist)	 very	 clearly	 asserted	 that	 both																																									 																						41	The	card	in	fact	presents	NIPT	as	achieving	greater	–	(98	-	99%)	-	accuracy	than	CVS	(98%).		
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amniocentesis	and	CVS	were	completely	(‘100%’)	reliable,	the	possibility	that	any	prenatal	test	 may	 produce	 results	 that,	 once	 translated	 into	 the	 clinic,	 would	 be	 received	 as	completely	reassuring	and	trusted	–	100%	accurate	-	is	questioned	here.		The	‘diagnostic’	class	of	prenatal	 tests	 is	destabilised,	and	correspondingly,	 concerns	around	 the	need	 to	achieve	 ‘perfect’	 results	 are	 placed	 aside.	 	 Although	 the	 same	 boundaries	 are	 being	‘troubled’	here,	and	although	 the	same	divisions	are	being	questioned,	NIPD	 is	explicitly	not	‘disposed’	of	or	marginalised	here,	but	is	enrolled	within	new	spaces,	and	aligned	with	trusted	 technologies	 and	 practices.	 	 Drawing	 once	 more	 on	 the	 persuasive	 power	 of	numbers,	 appearing	 as	 ‘potent	political	and	cultural	agents’	 (Verran	2013,	 p.28),	 experts	here	are	able	to	‘make	room’	for	NIPT,	carving	out	a	space	that	exists	‘betwixt	and	between’	(Latimer	2008b,	drawing	on	Douglas,	1966)	current	technologies	of	screening	and	current	technologies	of	diagnosis,	and	contributing	to	the	successful	translation	of	the	technology	from	the	research	context	into	the	clinic.				
NIPT	and	prenatal	screening:	promises	and	(further)	problematisations		As	 emerging	NIPD	 and/or	NIPT	 tests	 carve	 out	 new	 -	 but	 contested	 -	 spaces	within	 the	clinic,	 as	 they	 lie	 ‘betwixt	 and	between’	categories,	 they	 hold	 the	 potential	 to	 both	 align	with	 and	 sediment	within	 current	 practices	 and	processes,	and	 to	 disorder	 and	disrupt.		The	 multiple	 emergence	 and	 translation	 of	 NIPD	 and	 ‘NIPT’	 testing	 carried	 with	 it	significant	complexity	–	with	experts	attending	to	both	the	‘promise’	of	the	technology	as	well	as	the	‘problems’	they	felt	it	might	bring.		As	a	technology	that	‘troubles’	boundaries	and	 de-stabilises	 established	 categories,	 it	 generated	 significant,	 and	 at	 times	 polarised,	debate	and	discussion.		
	Echoing	 the	 perspective	 put	 forth	 by	 Linda	 and	 James,	 clinicians	working	 in	 the	 field	 of	fetal	medicine	responded	to	the	‘promise’	of	NIPD	-	and	although	they	recognised	that	the	tests	may	not	come	to	achieve	perfect	diagnostic	accuracy,	and	would	require	 the	use	of	invasive	testing	as	a	follow-up	–	they	felt	that	emergent	and	‘evolving’	non-invasive	tests	for	 Down’s	 syndrome	 would	 come	 to	 present	 significant	 advantages	 over	 current	
screening	 technologies	 at	 least.	 	 Paul,	 for	 instance,	 expressed	 hope	 that	 the	 new	 ‘NIPT’	tests	 would	 reduce	 the	 ‘complexity’	 of	 screening,	 by	 generating	 information	 that	 was	persuasive	 and	 ‘reassuring’	 enough	 to	 be	 communicated	 in	 clear,	 and	 near-categorical	terms	that	would	be	‘far	less	difficult	to	explain’:	It’s	going	to	be	interesting	to	see	how	that	test	evolves.		What’s	happening	at	the	moment	is	that	they	are	given	a	very	high	accuracy	rate,	so	if	the	test	comes	 back	 as	 negative	 that	will	 be	 very	 reassuring	 for	women,	 and	 if	 it	comes	back	as	positive,	most	of	those	women	at	the	moment	are	having	a	confirmatory	 CVS.	 	 But	 actually	 you	 don't	 really	 mind	 having	 a	
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confirmatory	CVS	when	you	are	 told	 that	 it	 is	a	99.99%	chance	 that	your	baby	 is	 going	 to	 be	 affected.	 And	 I	 think	 there	 will	 be	 a	 little	 bit	 of	confusion,	 but	 I	 think	 in	many	ways	 there	will	 be	 far	 less	 confusion	 than	there	currently	is	with	the	screening	test.		Because	first	of	all,	many	of	the	medical	 staff	 who	 offer	 the	 combined	 screening	 don't	 really	 fully	understand	 the	whole	process,	 and	 I	 think	 its	actually	a	 complex	 issue	 to	explain	to	a	woman,	this	concept	of	low	risk	and	high	risk,	and	quantifying	that	risk,	and	what	is	an	acceptable	risk	for	her,	versus	what	is	you	know	deemed	an	acceptable	risk	by	public	health	doctors.		To	actually	have	been	given	 a	 test,	 a	 blood	 test	 which	 says	 your	 baby	 is	 extremely	 unlikely	 to	have	Down’s	syndrome,	or	your	baby	is	extremely	likely	to	have	it,	it	would	be	far	less	difficult	to	explain.		
So	you	think	the	test	could	be	treated	as	diagnostic?	Pretty	much,	I	think	it	wont	be	long.	(Paul,	consultant	in	fetal	medicine)		For	Paul,	as	he	approaches	the	test	from	within	a	context	where	the	issue	of	 ‘risk’	brings	significant	 complexity	 –	 ‘I	 think	 its	 actually	 a	 complex	 issue	 to	 explain	 to	 a	 woman,	 this	
concept	of	low	risk	and	high	risk,	and	quantifying	that	risk,	and	what	is	an	acceptable	risk	for	
her,	versus	what	 is	you	know	deemed	an	acceptable	risk	by	public	health	doctors’	 -	 perfect	diagnostic	accuracy	is	not	required	in	order	for	NIPD	to	become	‘useful’.		If	the	results	that	are	 produced	 by	 ‘NIPT’	 tests	 are	 accurate	 enough	 to	 be	 framed	 and	 communicated	 in	terms	 of	 being	 ‘extremely	 likely’	 or	 ‘extremely	 unlikely’,	 rather	 than	 involving	 ‘complex’	numerical	 interpretations	 of	 risk	 or	 chance,	 the	 desirability	 of	 these	 emerging	 tests	 is	greatly	increased.		Paul	presents	an	optimistic	account	of	NIPD’s	(and	NIPT’s)	emergence	here,	 establishing	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 ‘useful’	 space	 for	 tests	 that	 present	 near-diagnostic	(but	 not	 quite	 diagnostic)	 results,	 those	 that	 lie	 ‘betwixt	 and	 between’.	 For	 Paul,	 the	technology	 holds	 significant	 promise,	 bringing	 the	 potential	 to	 impart	 greater	‘reassurance’	and		‘far	less	confusion’	within	the	clinic.		Strengthening	 his	 optimistic	 account	 of	 NIPD,	 Paul	 describes	 the	 problems	 that	 are	experienced	by	both	patients	and	clinicians,	as	they	are	faced	with	the	task	of	interpreting	screening	 tests	 which	 provide	 risk-type	 (and	 not	 categorical)	 results.	 	 Explaining	 the	difficulties	 (that	 he	 nevertheless	 presents	 as	 ‘the	 interesting	bits’	 of	 his	 job)	with	which	such	issues	are	approached	in	the	clinic,	he	points	towards	the	emotional	 ‘quagmire’	that	patients	become	enrolled	within	as	a	result	of	encounters	with	‘uncertain’	screening	tests:	
I’m	interested	in	when	something	becomes	diagnostic,	it’s	interesting-	It	 is.	These	are	the	sorts	of	things	that	make	my	job	interesting.	 	Because,	my	definition	of	high	 risk	will	be	very	different	 from	yours,	 and	anybody	else’s…	 I	mean	 it’s	one	of	 the	most	enjoyable	bits	about	my	 job,	how	you	help	the	patient	navigate	their	way	through	that	quagmire.		
And	how	do	you,	if	someone	is	struggling…	
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Well	I	think	I	try	and,	I	try	to	get	away	from	this	concept	of	high	risk	and	low	risk,	 and	 I	 try	 to	 say	well	 look,	 this	 is	a	 figure	 that,	 a	 cut-off	 that	has	arbitrarily	been	decided	by	national	health	policy.	 	But	 actually	 let’s	 stop	using	 the	word	risk,	 let’s	 just	say	 the	chance	of	your	baby	having	Down’s	syndrome	is	one	in	seventy,	and	you’ve	got	to	 imagine	yourself	 in	a	room	with	sixty-nine	other	people	and	I’m	going	to	say	to	you,	look	one	of	you	is	carrying	a	baby	with	Down’s	syndrome,	and	you’ve	got	to	imagine	looking	around,	and	do	you	 feel	 reassured	enough	 that	 there	are	sixty-nine	other	people	in	that	room?	Or	do	you	think,	well	actually	there	don’t	seem	to	be	that	many	people	in	this	room,	and	I	want	to	know.		I	try	not	to	use	emotive	language…	when	you	 start	 telling	people	 they	 are	high	 risk	 it	 has	 a	 huge	amount	of	an	impact	in	terms	of	how	they	perceive	their	risk.		(Paul,	consultant	in	fetal	medicine)		By	highlighting	the	difficult	and	complex	processes	of	contextualisation	and	interpretation	that	must	currently	be	‘navigated’	as	clinicians	and	patients	enter	the	‘quagmire’	-	as	they	face	‘difficult’	encounters	with	routine	screening	tests	-	Paul	underlines	the	practical	and	psychological	 advantages	 that	NIPD’s	 greater	 level	 of	 accuracy,	 and	 the	 correspondingly	greater	sense	of	‘reassurance’	and	lesser	sense	of	‘confusion’,	could	bring	to	the	clinic.		The	perception	 that	NIPD	presents	 significant	 ‘advantage’	here,	 rests	on	 the	assumption	 that	the	 presence	 of	 Down’s	 syndrome	 within	 pregnancy	 is	 fundamentally	 problematic	 –	 a	perspective	and	a	value	that	underpins	the	practice	of	routine	prenatal	screening	(Thomas	2014).		As	Paul	approaches	the	test	from	within	a	space	where	Down’s	syndrome	testing	is	‘natural’	 and	 ‘normal’	 –	 and	 as	 his	 professional	 identity	 is	 bound	 up	 in	 the	 underlying	values	 of	 a	 culture	within	which	 the	 systematic,	 population-wide	 testing	 has	 become	 so	thoroughly	routine	-	the	possible	presence	of	Down’s	syndrome	is	very	clearly	constructed	as	a	‘poor’	outcome	(for	women	who	have	‘chosen’	screening	at	least).		A	clear	division	is	made	between	‘healthy’	babies,	and	those	that	are	‘affected’:	for	instance,	when	discussing	the	 scenario	 of	 applying	 ‘risky’	 testing	 to	 a	 pregnancy	 where	 the	 presence	 of	 Down’s	syndrome	 is	 ‘99.99%’	 certain,	 CVS	 is	 no	 longer	 presented	 as	 something	 that	 brings	significant	clinical	 ‘risk’	as	 it	may	 lead	only	 to	 the	demise	of	an	 ‘affected’	 fetus	and	not	a	‘healthy’	baby:	 ‘you	don't	really	mind	having	a	confirmatory	CVS	when	you	are	told	that	it	is	
a	 99.99%	 chance	 that	 your	 baby	 is	 going	 to	 be	 affected’.	 	 Divisions	 made	 between	 the	healthy	and	the	affected,	the	normal	and	the	abnormal,	appear	repeatedly	throughout	the	dataset,	and	are	explored	in	greater	depth	within	chapters	seven	and	eight.			The	characterisation	of	NIPD	as	producing	results	that	may	quite	clearly	be	distanced	from	those	 generated	 by	 current	 screening	 tests,	 feeds	 into	 positive	 characterisations	 of	 the	technology	 explored	 elsewhere,	 as	 it	 is	 once	 again	 presented	 as	 a	 possible	 method	 for	improving	and	‘simplifying’	clinical	practice:	You	 could	 say	 its	 a	 lot	 simpler,	 because	 when	 you	 are	 explaining	 a	screening	test	you	have	to	explain	all	these	things,	like	it	won't	give	you	a	
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yes	or	no	answer,	it	will	give	you	a	risk.		And	then	if	you	are	a	high	risk,	that	means	less	than	one	in	150,	or	more	than	one	in	150.		And	then	you	have	to	think	about	an	invasive-	and	actually	that's	a	lot	of	information	to	take	in	if	you've	 never	 really	 been	 pregnant	 before	 and	 you	 don't	 know	 anything	about	 it.	 	Whereas,	 if	 I	was	 just	 to	 turn	and	say,	we	can	offer	you	a	blood	test,	 it's	highly	accurate,	over	95%,	and	 it	will	 tell	you	yes	or	no	whether	the	baby	has	Down's	syndrome.	That's	simple.	 	That's	 like	most	 tests	you	take	where	you	get	a	yes	or	no	answer.		In	fact	screening	is	the	only	test	I	know	of	where	you	get	a	risk	and	not	a	yes	or	no.	(Laura,	NIPD	researcher)		Situating	NIPD	within	the	context	of	current	prenatal	screening	practices,	and	imagining	a	future	 where	 testing	 will	 effectively	 ‘tell	 you	 yes	 or	 no	 whether	 the	 baby	 has	 Down’s	
syndrome’,	even	if	it	fails	to	achieve	100%	accuracy,	Laura	characterises	the	technology	as	representing	a	significant	step	forward	–	one	that	negates	the	‘issues’	raised	as	clinicians	and	parents	negotiate	what	Paul	described	as	 ‘arbitrary’	cut-off	points,	and	one	that	may	be	presented	–	particularly	to	those	with	little	prior	experience	of	pregnancy	or	testing	–	as	 a	 simple,	 clear	 and	 easy	 test.	 	 Similar	 discourses,	 which	 stress	 the	 ‘simplicity’	 and	‘clarity’	 of	 NIPD,	 and	which	 once	 again	 draw	 on	 the	 power	 of	 numbers	 to	 highlight	 the	‘confidence’	with	which	 test	 results	may	be	approached,	are	employed	within	 the	online	advertising	material	that	is	published	by	commercial	NIPT	providers:		
	
	
Figure	9:	Online	advertising	material	published	by	Sequenom		These	discourses	–	of	reassurance	and	rationality	-	are	circulated	and	re-circulated	as	the	NIPD	 becomes	 enrolled	 and	 translated	within	 an	 increasing	 range	 of	 clinical	 and	 social	spaces.	 	Whereas	more	dissenting	voices	mobilised	talk	of	(in)accuracy	to	point	 towards	NIPD’s	 lack	 of	 usefulness,	 repeated	 talk	 of	 particular	 (and	 powerful)	 numbers	 as	 they	appear	here	–	 ‘100%’,	‘99.9%’,	‘0.9%’	–	enables	the	discussion	of	accuracy	to	function	as	a	
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tool	for	enhancing	reassurance	and	for	providing	certainty	–	such	talk	‘fixes’	the	position	of	 the	 technology	 as	 it	 stands	 in	 comparison	 with	 routine	 tests,	 contributing	 to	 the	sedimentation	of	NIPD	within	 the	clinic,	and	anchoring	 the	 technology	within	a	complex	and	contested	socio-cultural	backdrop.				Persistent	 talk	of	numbers	 also	brings	 a	 greater	 sense	of	rationality	 to	 the	discussion	of	NIPD.		Whereas	older	‘invasive’	technologies,	involving	the	insertion	of	needles,	the	close	examination	of	pregnant	bellies,	and	the	extraction	of	fluids	and	tissue,	appear	as	‘messy’	and	 disruptive	 –	 relating	 to	 bodily	 objects	 and	 occurrences,	 and	 bringing	 talk	 of	 ‘risk’	 –	numbers	appear	as	contrastingly	rational	and	benign,	as	 ‘neutral,	apolitical,	unbiased,	and	
more	 accurate	 than	 human	 perceptions	 and	 judgments’	 (Lupton	 2013,	 p.27).	 Elsewhere	within	 her	 account	 Laura	 explains	 that	many	 of	 the	NIPD	patients	 she	 had	 spoken	with	reported	feeling	‘more	likely	to	trust	a	test	that	is	done	in	a	lab’,	and	less	likely	to	trust	tests	and	 examinations	 that	 are	 done	 in	 the	 clinic,	 which	 are	 seen	 to	 present	 risk	 of	 ‘human	
error’	–	‘somebody’s	tired	or	missing	something	or	you	know,	is	not	that	experienced’:	
So	you	think	the	sort	of,	mechanisation,	is	valued?	Yeah	I	think	generally	if	you	tell	somebody	you	are	taking	a	blood	test	and	you	are	sending	it	off	to	the	lab,	they	feel	far	more	confident	in	that,	than	if	you	are	rubbing	a	thing	in	their	stomach	and	looking	at	something	on	the	TV		Laura	 draws	 from	 discourses	 here	 which	 emphasise	 the	 value	 of	 the	 rational	 over	 the	relational:	 ultrasound	 examinations	 are	presented	not	 as	 a	way	of	 ‘looking	 at’	 babies	 or	fetuses	–	they	are	looking	at	‘something’	–	a	remote	object	and	an	‘other’	–	a	thing	on	a	TV.		Situated	 within	 such	 discourses,	 NIPD	 may	 be	 characterised	 as	 representing	 a	 clear	advantage	 over	 other	 tests,	 specifically	 because	 it	 negates	 the	 ‘bodily’	 and	 relational	aspects	 of	 testing,	 and	 presents	 information	 that	 is	 quantifiable,	 rationalisable	 and	objective.	 	Within	 her	work	 examining	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 ‘quantified	 self’,	 Lupton	 describes	how	 the	 enrolment	 and	 interiorisation	 of	 such	 discourses	 has	 become	 increasingly	powerful	 as	 ‘technologies	 of	 the	 self’	 (Foucault	 1997,	 p.154)	 proliferate,	 and	 provide	 ‘a	
greater	degree	of	control	over	the	messiness	and	unpredictability	of	the	fleshly	body’:	From	 the	 beginning	 of	 discussions	 of	 the	 quantified	 self	 concept…	 the	discourse	of	trusting	data	over	embodied	knowledge,	the	machine	over	the	human,	 was	 evident.	 	 Data	 appeared	 to	 offer	 certainty,	 while	 the	 body’s	perceptions	 were	 represented	 as	 untrustworthy,	 inexact,	 inaccurately	mediated	through	human	experience	as	opposed	to	being	objective	(Lupton	2013,	p.27)		
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The	 valuing	 of	 the	 rational	 both	 plays	 out,	 and	 is	 subsequently	 questioned,	 within	 an	account	of	‘NIPT’	testing	provided	by	Alana,	a	private	patient	who	had	purchased	the	test	for	 ‘reassurance’	 during	 her	 second	 pregnancy.	 	 Alana	 had	 ‘wanted	 to	be	as	prepared	as	
possible’	 for	her	 second	pregnancy	–	 she	was	a	 full-time	professional	 and	explained	 that	she	had	very	little	spare	time	outside	of	work	hours:		 ‘I	work	in	consultancy,	it’s	quite	long	
hours.		It’s	not	going	to	be	easy	with	a	second	child’.		She	described	how	she	had	undertaken	a	 great	 deal	 of	 ‘research’	 on	 the	 testing	 before	 approaching	 private	 providers	 and	explained	that	she	had	decided	to	seek	out	NIPT	because	‘it	just	seemed	like	a	better	option	
than	just	a	scan,	which	isn’t	particularly	accurate’.	 	Alana	described	how	she	 ‘believed’	 in	the	 test	 because	 ‘these	 things	 have	 to	 come	 with	 really	 strict	 monitoring	 and,	 um,	
governance	 procedures	 I	 guess,	 for	 them	 to	 be	 able	 to	 offer	 it’,	 and	 she	 was	 reassured	particularly	by	the	knowledge	that	the	technology	was	being	trialled	within	the	NHS	-	the	
NHS	 is	 planning	 on	 rolling	 it	 out	 as	 an	 experiment	 -	 (Alana’s	 sister	 had	 recently	 been	offered	NIPT	as	part	of	 a	 clinical	 trial,	 and	 it	was	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 she	came	 to	know	about	the	test).		As	she	reflected	back	on	her	feelings	regarding	test	results	however,	Alana	began	 to	 question	 her	 confidence	 in	 the	 test	 results	 –	 explaining	 for	 instance	 that	 she	planned	to	seek	out	additional	 (ultrasound)	 testing	 to	check	 that	 the	sex	of	 the	baby	(as	reported	by	the	NIPT	test)	was	correct	–	and	repeatedly	stressing	her	underlying	mistrust	of	the	results	-	‘I	only	know	what	I’ve	been	told’:	
So	once	you’ve	had	the	baby,	you’ll	know.	Um,	I	guess	so.		But	you	don’t	really	do	you.		I	mean	if	we,	touch	wood,	have	a	healthy	baby	girl	then	that	is	everything	the	test	has	said.		But	then,	that	could	have	happened	with	us	not	having	the	test,	or	it	could	have	happened	if	 the	test	 is	only	40%	accurate.	 	You	 just	don’t	really	know.	 	 I	mean	all	 it	does-	you	know	you	have	to	believe	what	you	are	told,	and	let	it	put	your	mind	at	rest…	So	yeah,	I	believe	it,	but	you	haven’t	got	a	lot	of	choice	but	to	believe	it.		I	have	got	no	reason	not	to	believe	that	the	results	are	accurate,	you	just	go	with	what	you	are	told,	don’t	you?		(Alana,	private	NIPT	patient)		NIPD	results	are	experienced	here	–	despite	Alana	previously	describing	how	she	felt	the	test	 would	 provide	 ‘pretty	 much	 a	 yes	 or	 no	 answer’	 -	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 belief,	 and	 not	certainty.		The	test’s	rationality,	its	remoteness	from	bodily	experience	–	translates	here	as	a	 source	 of	 doubt	 rather	 than	 reassurance	 –	 she	 felt	 that	 she	 simply	 had	 to	 ‘trust’	 the	results	 of	 the	 test,	 and	 explained	 that	 even	 if	 the	 results	 appeared	 to	 be	 accurate	 after	birth,	she	felt	this	could	be	a	matter	of	coincidence:	‘that	could	have	happened	with	us	not	
having	the	test,	or	it	could	have	happened	if	the	test	is	only	40%	accurate’.	 	The	ambiguities	present	 within	 such	 an	 account	 suggest	 that	 despite	 an	 overwhelming	 focus	 on	 talk	 of	accuracy,	and	despite	 the	repeated	mobilisation	of	numbers	 in	order	 to	persuade	and	to	‘fix’	the	position	of	emerging	tests,	the	sense	of	certainty	and	reassurance	such	discourses	
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are	employed	to	achieve	may	not	successfully	be	translated	within	the	patient	experience	-	with	even	the	most	‘informed’	and	‘rational’	of	patients	questioning	such	objectivised	and	rationalised	framings	of	pregnancy.						
‘NIPT’	in	the	clinic		Approaching	the	technology	from	within	the	context	of	the	private	clinic,	those	involved	in	the	 commercial	 provision	 of	 ‘NIPT’	 for	 Down’s	 syndrome	 suggested	 that	 the	 test	 was	already	operating	 in	a	way	 that	would	allow	 for	 the	presentation	and	communication	of	results	as	near-categorical	information.		Reflecting	back	on	the	rapid	development	of	NIPT,	these	experts	explained	how,	as	developments	in	commercial	testing	services	progressed,	and	 as	 NIPT’s	 accuracy	 –	 as	 presented	 within	 the	 lab	 reports	 sent	 through	 by	 test	developers	 -	has	 increased,	 the	way	 in	which	 test	 information	was	communicated	 in	 the	clinic	 very	 quickly	 altered	 in	 response,	with	 tests	 eventually	 being	 presented	 as	 ‘99.9%’	accurate:	Now,	 as	 well	 as	 getting	 a	 kind	 of	 positive	 or	 negative	 result,	 and	with	 a	negative	 result	 you	 are	 saying	 that	 you	 would	 have	 excluded	 99%	 of	Down’s	babies,	you	are	also	able	to	give	an	idea	of	the	accuracy	and	validity	of	the	tests,	and	most	of	them	are	coming	back	with	an	error	rate	of	one	in	ten	 thousand.	 	 So	 for	 the	 bulk	 of	 those,	 once	 they	 are	 reported,	 patients	don’t	 know	 about	 this	 until	 they	 have	 had	 the	 test,	 but	 once	 they	 are	actually	 reported,	 they	 are	 actually	 getting	 a	 test	 which	 has	 really	 got	 a	99.99%,	rather	 than	1%	risk	of	error.	 	And	now	that	we	are	getting	 large	numbers	 through	with	 that	 sort	of	 result	we	are	 saying	 to	 them	 it’s	99%	plus…			(James,	private	NIPT	provider)		Accounts	provided	by	patients	who	had	purchased	the	new	Down’s	syndrome	tests	very	clearly	echoed	such	perspectives,	as	they	too	quoted	figures	of	‘99.9’	percent	accuracy,	and	spoke	of	the	test	being	‘massively	reassuring’	and	‘as	good	as	you	are	going	to	get’:		
How	do	you	feel	about	the	accuracy?		Yeah	 I	 mean	 frankly,	 you	 can’t	 beat	 sort	 of	 99.9.	 And	 I	 think	 that	 in	anyone’s	mind	you	would	feel	massively	um,	reassured	by	that.		You	and	I	both	know	you	are	never	going	to	get	100%	with	anything,	frankly.		So	99.9	really	is	as	good	as	you	are	going	to	get	it.		So	I	think	as	soon	as	I	found	that	out,	it	was	99.9	then	absolutely	that	gave	me	the	confidence	in	the	results	really.		But	yeah	I	didn’t	have	any	issues	with	that	at	all.		Because	like	I	said,	you	know,	it	doesn’t	get	much	better	than	that.	(Jamie,	private	NIPT	patient)		Any	characterisation	of	the	technology	as	being	closely	comparable	with	routine	screening	tests	has	faded	here,	with	both	clinicians	and	patients	stressing	the	extremely	high	rates	of	
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accuracy	 that	 commercial	NIPT	 testing	achieves.	 	Although	 the	success	of	 testing	 is	very	clearly	 and	 repeatedly	 underlined,	 with	 the	 ‘near-diagnostic’	 character	 of	 results	 being	consistently	 foregrounded,	 at	 least	 one	 aspect	 of	 the	 division	 between	 screening	 and	diagnosis	is	very	actively	maintained.		Elsewhere,	James	explains	that,	although	the	results	of	 ‘NIPT’	 are	 so	 persuasive,	 and	 so	 highly	 accurate,	 invasive	 testing	 is	 nevertheless	required	as	a	confirmatory	follow-up	upon	receipt	of	any	‘high	risk’	or	‘positive’	results:	‘if	
it’s	negative	accept	that	you	are	probably	ok,	if	it’s	positive	then	you	probably	need	to	go	on	
and	have	a	confirmatory	diagnostic	test	and	make	whatever	decision	you	are	going	to’.	 	The	‘decisions’	alluded	to	here,	the	‘choices’	that	are	prompted	where	diagnostic	information	is	provided	prenatally	-	involve	the	abortion	(termination),	or	not,	of	fetuses	diagnosed	with	Down’s	 syndrome	 (or	 any	 other	 conditions	 tested	 for).	 	 Within	 such	 accounts	 these	emergent	 ‘NIPT’	 tests	–	so	 frequently	compared	with	diagnostic	 tests	elsewhere	(and	by	the	same	interviewees)	-	are	aligned	instead	with	current	screening	practices,	and	in	being	framed	 as	 such,	 they	 remain	 one	 step	 away	 from	 decisions	 regarding	 the	 abortion	 of	‘affected’	pregnancies.	 	As	an	emergent	technology	that	remains	in	the	pre-naturalisation	stage	here,	NIPT	does	not	yet	possess	the	power	to	‘legitimate’	access	to	abortion	via	the	clinic.			Maintaining	the	stability	of	established	dividing	practices,	women	are	still	required	–	 no	 matter	 how	 persuasive	 ‘NIPT’	 results	 are	 made	 –	 to	 continue	 to	 pass	 through	established	 pathways	 of	 (medical)	 legitimisation,	 by	 accepting	 (and	 waiting	 for 42 )	confirmatory	diagnostic	testing	before	seeking	abortion.			The	 separation	 of	 ‘NIPT’	 from	 the	 practice	 of	 abortion	 is	 not,	 however,	 presented	 as	 a	‘fixed’	or	permanent	approach,	and	it	is	recognised	that	given	time,	non-invasive	tests	for	Down’s	 syndrome	 may	 effectively	 replace	 invasive	 tests,	 and	 may	 eventually	 allow	 for	abortion	 decisions	 to	 be	made:	 ‘NIPT	 is	 just	a	non-invasive	CVS,	and	you	are	prepared	 to	
accept	CVS	as	being	accurate	enough	to	act	on	it,	then	I	think	quite	soon	it	should	be	much	
the	 same	 for	NIPT’.	 	 If	 ‘NIPT’	 tests	 for	 Down’s	 syndrome	may	 be	 thought	 of	 in	 terms	 of	being	‘just	a	non-invasive	CVS’	-	if	they	do	not	need	to	achieve	complete	(100%)	diagnostic	accuracy	and	function	instead	as	a	new	kind	of	‘near-diagnostic’	test,	then	the	re-framing	and	 the	 re-positioning	of	NIPD	as	 ‘NIPT’,	 as	 a	 test	 that	 is	 separated	 from	 the	practice	of	prenatal	 diagnosis	 and	 the	 associated	 practice	 of	 selective	 abortion,	 becomes	 highly	problematic.		The	collapsing	of	the	boundary	between	screening	and	diagnosis	in	response	to	NIPD/T	could	represent	a	powerful	moment	in	the	development	of	prenatal	testing.		If	‘NIPT’	were	 to	 become	 established	within	 routine	 prenatal	 screening,	 and	 emerges	 as	 a																																									 																						42	With	NIPT	 taking	 place	 at	 around	 ten	weeks	 gestation,	 and	 providing	 results	within	 five	 days,	women	who	receive	a	‘positive’	NIPT	result	may	face	a	wait	of	around	four	weeks	before	they	can	access	‘confirmatory’	amniocentesis	results.		
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test	 that	 is	 ‘accurate	 enough’	 to	 legitimate	 abortion	 decisions,	 such	 a	 move	 would	represent	 the	 first	 time	 that	 effectively	 diagnostic	 prenatal	 tests	 enter	 into	 the	 prenatal	care	 of	 the	 ‘low	 risk’	 pregnant	 population43.	 	 Currently,	 women	 (and	 their	 pregnancies)	must	 pass	 through	 robust	 clinical	 categorisation	 processes,	 and	must	 be	 categorised	 as	‘high	risk’	 in	order	 to	gain	access	 to	diagnostic	 testing	(within	 the	NHS).	 	The	possibility	that	 access	 to	 risk-free,	 highly	 accurate	 and	 early	 non-invasive	 prenatal	 testing	 may	become	 routinised	 and	 normalised	 within	 the	 clinic,	 and	 that	 this	 may	 lead	 to	 the	‘normalisation’	 of	 selective	 abortion	within	whole	 pregnant	 populations,	 prompts	much	anxiety	 and	 discussion,	 particularly	 from	 within	 the	 clinical	 genetics	 community.	 	 Old	debates	–	around	abortion	and	eugenics	particularly	–	open	up	once	more	 in	 the	 face	of	NIPD	and	‘NIPT’	(and	are	explored	in	detail	within	subsequent	chapters).			
Summary		Within	this	chapter	I	have	shown	how	NIPD,	examined	during	a	‘pre-naturalisation’	stage	of	 development	 here,	 is	 not	 experienced	 as	 benign	 and	 unproblematic,	 but	 is	 subject	 to	much	criticism	and	concern,	and	emerges	as	an	area	of	intense	problematisation.		I	show	how,	 as	 the	 technology	 emerges	 within	 multiple	 fields	 and	 contexts,	 and	 as	 experts	struggle	 to	 clearly	 ‘fit’	 and	 align	 the	 technology	 with	 established	 tests	 and	 practices	 of	prenatal	 testing,	 NIPD	 is	 subject	 to	 substantive	 ‘dividing	 practices’,	 which	 result	 most	clearly	in	the	separation	of	the	technology	into	two	streams:	NIPD	and	‘NIPT’.		I	show	how	the	emergence	of	tests	for	Down’s	syndrome,	despite	concerns	raised	around	inaccuracy,	are	made	 ‘useful’	 particularly	 within	 the	 field	 of	 prenatal	 screening	 –	 a	 location	 within	which	 Down’s	 syndrome	 testing	 has	 become	 routinely	 and	 thoroughly	 enrolled.		Examining	more	dissenting	accounts	of	 the	 technology’s	early	development,	 I	 show	how	NIPD	 ‘troubles’	 the	 boundaries	 that	 have	 been	 constructed	 between	 technologies	 and	practices	 of	 ‘screening’	 and	 ‘diagnosis’.	 	 Proceeding	 then	 to	 highlight	 the	 way	 in	 which	professional	 identities	 contribute	 to	 the	 interpretation	 and	 ‘local	 translation’	 of	 the	emergent	 technology,	 I	 show	 how	 experts	 more	 closely	 aligned	 with	 the	 practice	 of	‘diagnosis’	 persistently	 emphasise	 problems	 of	 (in)accuracy,	 denying	 NIPD	 testing’s	‘usefulness’,	and	‘disposing’	of	it	within	the	context	of	the	clinical	spaces	they	work	within.		Such	 disposals	 allow	 more	 dissenting	 actors	 to	 mitigate	 the	 power	 of	 emergent	technologies	and	to	preserve	a	space	for	clinical	judgement.		I	then	show	how,	by	contrast,	those	more	closely	aligned	with	‘screening’	deny	the	need	for	NIPD’s	‘complete	accuracy’,																																									 																						43	All	of	the	 ‘NIPT’	patients	 interviewed	for	this	study	would	have	been	categorised	as	 ‘low	risk’	–	none	 of	 them	had	 received	 a	 ‘high	 risk’	 screen	 result	 prior	 to	 seeking	 out	NIPT,	 and	 none	 had	 a	family	history	of	disease.		
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re-interpreting	 the	 ‘diagnostic’	 category,	 and	 highlighting	 the	 ‘usefulness’	 of	 near-diagnostic	 ‘NIPT’	 tests,	 making	 efforts	 to	 align	 them	 with	 and	 enrol	 them	 within	 the	routine	practice	of	prenatal	screening.		I	describe	how	clinicians	charged	with	the	task	of	navigating	 current	 screening	 tests	 respond	 positively	 to	 the	 discourse	 of	 ‘simplicity’,	‘clarity’	and	‘reassurance’	that	‘NIPT’	brings	to	the	field,	and	I	show	how	talk	of	numbers	is	mobilised	particularly	 (across	a	 range	of	 registers)	 in	order	 to	highlight	 the	 (valued	and	persuasive)	 rationality	 of	 the	 test.	 	 I	 show,	 however,	 that	 such	 discourses	 are	 not	unproblematically	 translated	 to	 the	patient	 experience	of	 testing,	with	 the	 ‘rational’	 and	‘objective’	 aspects	 of	 testing	 bringing	 a	 remoteness	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 relationality	 to	 the	context	 of	 lived	 experiences	 of	 	 pregnancy	 and	 testing.	 	 Finally,	 I	 show	 how	 NIPT	 tests	arrive	 in	 the	 (private)	 clinic	 as	 highly	 persuasive,	 holding	 the	 potential	 to	 become	‘accurate	 enough’	 to	 replace	 diagnostic	 tests	 and	 to	 further	 ‘trouble’	 the	 boundary	between	 screening	 and	 diagnosis.	 	 With	 this	 move	 comes	 the	 opening	 up	 and	intensification	 of	 discussion	 and	debate	 around	 selective	 abortion	 and	 eugenics,	 themes	that	are	explored	in	depth	within	the	following	chapters.		
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Chapter	Five.		NIPD	and	Abortion:	Encounters	with	a	Public	Secret	
	
Introduction	
	Abortion	emerged	as	one	of	the	most	significant,	recurrent	and	problematised	themes	of	discussion	 raised	 within	 this	 examination	 of	 NIPD.	 	 Talk	 of	 abortion	 occurred	 within	almost	 every	 fieldwork	 interview	 conducted,	 with	 the	 range	 of	 people	 who	 chose	 to	approach	 and	 explore	 the	 issue	 being	 particularly	 diverse:	 patients,	 parents	 and	professionals	 alike	 consistently	 identified	 abortion	 as	 being	 very	 closely	 linked	 to	 their	experiences	with,	and	reflections	on,	NIPD.		Talk	of	abortion	cut	across	the	entire	data	set,	being	 spoken	 about	 in	 connection	with	 diverse	 experiences	 of	 pregnancy,	 reproduction	and	 motherhood.	 	 Abortion	 was	 raised	 by	 pregnant	 women	 who	 had	 purchased	 tests	through	 private	 clinics,	 by	 mothers	 who	 were	 managing	 the	 everyday	 impact	 of	 their	child’s	 disease,	 and	 by	 parents	who	 had	 declined	 the	 use	 of	 all	 prenatal	 testing.	 	 It	was	raised	by	clinicians	who	had	decades	of	experience	in	fetal	medicine	and	prenatal	care,	by	scientists	who	had	little	or	no	contact	with	patients,	by	professionals	who	also	identified	as	 patients,	 and	 by	 consultants	 and	 genetic	 counsellors	 whose	 routine	 professional	practice	involved	close	contact	with	abortion,	as	a	direct	result	of	their	work	with	prenatal	testing	 and	 diagnosis.	 	 It	 was	 in	 connection	 with	 conversations	 around	 abortion	particularly	 that	 participants’	moral	 concerns	 regarding	NIPD,	 as	well	 as	 the	 practice	 of	prenatal	 testing	 more	 generally,	 began	 to	 surface.	 	 It	 was	 also	 within	 the	 context	 of	conversations	 around	 the	 ethics	 of	 NIPD	 and	 abortion	 that	 further	 areas	 of	problematisation	 regarding	 the	 possible	 (bio)political	 implications	 of	 NIPD	 (with	participants	questioning	 the	 influence	of	 routine	prenatal	 screening	programmes	on	 the	shaping	 of	 reproductive	 choice,	 and	 raising	 concerns	 around	 the	 social	 construction	 of	‘normal’	 pregnancies	 and	 disease)	 started	 to	 emerge	 (and	 the	 full	 implication	 of	 these	conversations	are	explored	in	following	chapters).			As	participants	discussed	their	experiences	and	thoughts	on	NIPD,	and	as	they	approached	the	topic	of	abortion,	they	also	engaged	in	conversations	around	the	politics	and	morality	of	abortion	more	generally.		The	Abortion	Act	1967	(1967)	legalised	abortion	throughout	England,	 Wales	 and	 Scotland	 for	 the	 first	 time	 (the	 act	 does	 not	 extend	 to	 Northern	Ireland),	 and	 although	 the	 act	 did	 not	 completely	 decriminalize	 abortion,	 requiring	 for	instance	 that	 ‘two	registered	medical	professionals’	 provide	 expert	 opinion	 in	 all	 cases,	 it	gave	all	women	the	right	to	seek	an	abortion	under	the	following	circumstances:	(1)	Subject	to	the	provisions	of	this	section,	a	person	shall	not	be	guilty	of	an	 offence	 under	 the	 law	 relating	 to	 abortion	 when	 a	 pregnancy	 is	
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terminated	by	a	 registered	medical	practitioner	 if	 two	registered	medical	practitioners	are	of	the	opinion,	formed	in	good	faith—	(a)	 that	 the	 pregnancy	 has	 not	 exceeded	 its	 twenty-fourth	 week	and	 that	 the	 continuance	 of	 the	 pregnancy	 would	 involve	 risk,	greater	 than	 if	 the	 pregnancy	 were	 terminated,	 of	 injury	 to	 the	physical	 or	mental	 health	 of	 the	 pregnant	woman	 or	 any	 existing	children	of	her	family;	or	(b)	 that	 the	 termination	 is	necessary	 to	prevent	 grave	permanent	injury	to	the	physical	or	mental	health	of	the	pregnant	woman;	or	(c)	that	the	continuance	of	the	pregnancy	would	involve	risk	to	the	life	 of	 the	 pregnant	 woman,	 greater	 than	 if	 the	 pregnancy	 were	terminated;	or	(d)	 that	 there	 is	 a	 substantial	 risk	 that	 if	 the	 child	 were	 born	 it	would	 suffer	 from	such	physical	 or	mental	 abnormalities	 as	 to	be	seriously	handicapped.	(The	Abortion	Act	1967,	article	1)		Although	the	Abortion	Act	has	remained	in	place	since	1967	(being	subject	to	only	minor	amendments,	 such	 as	 those	 designed	 to	 incorporate	 the	 Human	 Fertilisation	 and	Embryology	 Act)	 debates	 around	 the	 ‘ethics’	 of	 abortion	 have	 remained	 contrastingly	active.	 	 Abortion	 continues	 to	 be	 approached	 as	 a	 topic	 of	 on-going	 philosophical	 and	bioethical	debate	(Theodosiou	and	Mitchell	2015),	with	issues	such	as	the	moral	status	of	the	embryo/fetus	(Jensen	2014,	Kluge	2015),	a	clinicians’	right	to	exercise	conscientious	objection	(Gerrard	2009,	Faundes,	Duarte	et	al.	2013,	Nordberg,	Skirbekk	et	al.	2014),	the	medicalisation	 of	 abortion	 experiences	 (Lee	 2003,	 Dadlez	 and	 Andrews	 2010)	 and	 the	impact	of	abortion	legislation	on	women’s	reproductive	autonomy	(Smyth	2006,	McDaniel	2015)	 attracting	 continued	 -	 and	 heated	 -	 discussion.	 	 The	 legal	 status	 of	 abortion	(particularly	 with	 reference	 to	 ‘clause	 D’,	 outlined	 above	 -	 abortion	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	
‘physical	or	mental	abnormalities’)	-	has	also	recently	attracted	renewed	political	interest,	with	the	unofficial	parliamentary	 ‘Inquiry	on	Abortion	on	the	Grounds	of	Disability’	(Bruce	2013),	led	by	Fiona	Bruce	MP,	being	put	forward	in	February	of	2013.		Reporting	back	in	July	of	2013,	 the	 Inquiry	made	a	number	of	recommendations,	 including	 ‘either	reducing	
the	upper	time	limit	for	abortions	on	the	grounds	of	disability	from	birth	to	make	it	equal	to	
the	upper	limit	for	able	bodied	babies	or	repealing	Section	1(d)	altogether.’	–	a	move	which	would	 represent	 a	 significant	 change	 to	 existing	 legislation,	 either	 severely	 limiting	 or	completely	 preventing	 access	 to	 abortion	 for	 fetal	 abnormality	 (and	 impacting	 on	 the	routine	 practice	 of	 screening	 and	 diagnosis	 significantly).	 	 The	 Inquiry’s	recommendations,	 however,	 received	 considerable	 criticism	 from	 expert	witnesses	who	demonstrated	 the	 deep	 incongruities	 present	within	 a	 discussion	which	 pitted	women’s	reproductive	 rights	 against	 the	 rights	 of	 those	 with	 disabilities	 –	 showing	 how	women	were	disproportionately	responsibilised	within	 the	report,	which	also	 failed	 to	attend	 to	
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the	relevant	broader	systematic	and	cultural	perspectives	on	disability:	‘the	starting	point	
for	an	analysis	about	discrimination	should	not	be	on	the	isolated	issue	of	abortion,	but	upon	
a	society	that	industriously	pays	lip	service	to	the	equality	and	dignity	of	existing	individuals	
with	disability’	(Priaulx	and	Horan	2013,	p.42).	 	The	problematic	ethical	and	social	issues	raised	within	prenatal	care	systems	that	provide	prenatal	 testing	without	corresponding	access	to	abortion	services	had	also	been	explored	previously	(Ballantyne,	Newson	et	al.	2009),	 with	 critics	 suggesting	 that	 those	 responsible	 for	 the	 development	 of	 prenatal	testing	 technology	 and	 also	 who	 ‘witness	 its	 implementation’	 –	 ‘geneticists,	 physicians,	
policy	 makers’	 –	 should	 work	 to	 ensure	 safe,	 legal	 and	 equitable	 access	 to	 abortion	services,	 particularly	 given	 the	 centrality	 of	 ‘reproductive	autonomy’	 to	 the	discussion	of	prenatal	testing	at	large.		Participants’	 conversations	 around	 abortion	 and	 NIPD	 then,	 were	 emerging	 within	 a	broader	 cultural	 context	 characterised	 by	 an	 active,	 and	 somewhat	 polarised,	 debate	around	 the	 ethics	 of	 abortion	 itself,	 particularly	 as	 it	 is	 discussed	 in	 connection	 with	disability	 and	 ‘fetal	 abnormality’.	 	 Although	 it	 is	 explicitly	 not	 my	 aim	 here	 to	 draw	conclusions	around	the	social,	moral	and	cultural	questions	raised	within	such	debates	–	my	 role	 here	 is	 to	 illuminate	 the	way	 in	which	 those	 encountering	 NIPD	 approach	 and	make	 sense	 of	 abortion,	 and	 to	 examine	 how	 various	 abortion	 discourses	 impact	 on	(particularly	women’s)	 experiences	 of	 NIPD.	 	 I	 do,	 however,	 approach	 the	 discussion	 at	hand	 from	 a	 perspective	 that,	 echoing	 Priaulx	 and	 Horan,	 avoids	 ascribing	 moral	responsibility	 to	 certain	 individuals	 or	 ‘groups’	 –	 such	 as	 patients	 or	 providers	 -	 and	instead	 recognises	 the	 centrality	 and	 profound	 relevance	 of	 broader	 social	 and	 cultural	factors	within	the	discussion	at	large.			It	has	been	shown	that	direct	talk	of	abortion	and	abortion	experiences	is	very	frequently	absent	from	mainstream	and/or	public	discussions	of	prenatal	testing	in	general	(Thachuk	2007),	as	well	as	NIPD	more	specifically	(Farrelly,	Cho	et	al.	2012).		It	has	also	been	shown	that	when	 abortion	 is	 raised	 as	 an	 issue	 of	 interest	 or	 concern,	 it	 is	 often	 glossed	 over,	remaining	unexamined,	and	presented	 instead	as	an	 ‘essential	component	of	reproductive	
choice’	(Simpson	2010,	p.29).		Within	more	critical	spaces,	however,	the	acute	relevance	of	questions	 regarding	 abortion	 to	 the	 discussion	 of	 prenatal	 testing	 has	 been	 recognised,	and	 the	 close	 alignment	 of	 abortion	 and	 prenatal	 testing	 has	 been	 thoroughly	problematised	 (Ballantyne,	 Newson	 et	 al.	 2009,	 Fisher	 2011,	 Aune	 and	 Moller	 2012).		Paralleling	 the	 recent	 statement	 from	 Priaulx	 and	 Horan	 (quoted	 above),	 a	 number	 of	scholars	 have	 noted	 that	 discussions	 regarding	 the	morality	 of	 abortion,	 as	 practiced	 in	conjunction	with	prenatal	 testing,	 tend	to	position	the	 interests	of	 two	marginalised	and	
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vulnerable	 groups	 -	 women,	 and	 those	 diagnosed	 with	 disease	 or	 disability	 –	 in	 direct	opposition	with	one	another	(Sharp	and	Earle	2002,	McLaughlin	2003,	Tsuge	2010).		It	has	been	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 such	 dilemmas	 continues	 to	 raise	 complex	problems	for	both	feminists	and	disability	rights	activists	(Shakespeare	2006,	Mackenzie	2007),	as	well	as	the	people	living	with	disability	who	are	caught	in-between	(Boardman	2014).	 	The	impact	of	such	dilemmas	was	explicitly	recognised	within	the	interview	data	generated	here.		Kate,	director	of	a	charity	that	provides	support	for	parents	and	patients	as	 they	 navigate	 diagnoses	 of	 genetic	 disease	 and	 (related)	 decisions	 around	 prenatal	testing,	pointed	towards	the	presence	and	significance	of	 this	problematic	context	 to	the	discussion	 of	 NIPD	 –	 claiming	 that	 even	 those	 who	 are	 ‘pro-choice’	 and	 who	 would	 be	generally	supportive	of	the	‘issue’	of	abortion	at	large,	‘struggle’	with	the	moral	complexity	of	abortion	as	it	is	experienced	and	understood	in	connection	with	prenatal	testing:	It’s	also	 interesting	 this	 sort	of	general	area	of,	of	 the	pro-choice	world	 if	you	 like-	 it’s	 quite	 sensitive	 and	 ethically	 charged.	 	 Which	 is	 the	 other	difficulty,	you	are	not	going	to	get	swathes	of	people	 taking	up	this	cause	because	there	are	people	who	ostensibly	are	pro-choice	who	struggle	with	this	area	of	choice,	because	of	the	disability	rights	issues	etc.	so	it’s	tricky.	(Kate,	policy	maker)		Mirroring	 these	 wider	 social	 and	 political	 debates	 around	 abortion,	 and	 especially	‘therapeutic’	 or	 ‘selective’	 abortion,	 participants	 approached	 the	 discussion	 as	 a	 clear	location	 for	 the	problematisation	of	prenatal	 testing,	entering	 into	conversations	around	abortion	with	much	concern,	reflection	and	uncertainty.		Concentrating	centrally	on	what	is	problematised,	 I	explore	how	NIPD	and	its	relationship	to	abortion,	provoking	a	set	of	complex	and	challenging	responses,	represents	a	point	which	must	be	pressed.			
The	‘public	secret’		 This	reconfiguration	of	repression	in	which	depth	becomes	surface	so	as	to	remain	 depth,	 I	 call	 the	 public	 secret,	 which,	 in	 another	 version,	 can	 be	defined	as	that	which	is	generally	known,	but	cannot	be	articulated.	(Taussig	1999,	p.5)		Within	this	chapter	I	draw	particularly	on	Taussig’s	concept	of	the	‘public	secret’,	exploring	the	 idea	 that	 abortion,	 as	 described	 in	 this	 context	 particularly,	manifests	 as	 something	that	 is	 hidden	 but	 ever-present,	 a	 kind	 of	 object	 that	 ‘is	 generally	 known,	 but	 cannot	 be	
articulated’.	 	 Descriptions	 of	 abortion,	 although	 frequent	 within	 participant	 accounts	 of	NIPD,	 were	 characterised	 by	 much	 concealment	 and	 ambiguity:	 abortion,	 as	 discussed	within	this	context	appeared	to	function	very	clearly	as	a	kind	of	 ‘public	secret’.	 	The	link	
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between	abortion	and	secrecy,	as	well	as	the	related	issue	of	stigma,	has	been	articulated	elsewhere.		A	number	of	studies,	the	majority	of	which	report	on	experiences	of	abortion	occurring	 outside	 the	 context	 of	 prenatal	 care,	 have	 explored	 the	 relationship	 between	abortion,	secrecy	and	stigma	in	depth	(Thachuk	2007,	Ludlow	2008,	Sanger	2012,	Cowan	2014).		These	studies	show	that,	although	abortion	exists	as	a	topic	of	much	political	and	moral	debate	and	discussion,	and	although	the	legalisation	of	abortion	is	often	assumed	to	bring	 an	 ‘implied	 social	 acceptance’	 (Thachuk	 2007)	 women	 very	 frequently	 experience	abortion	in	silence,	as	a	source	of	stigma	and	shame.		It	has	been	shown	that	many	women	adopt,	 therefore,	 ‘strategies	 of	 non-disclosure’	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 against	 the	 possible	harmful	 social	 and	 psychological	 effects	 (Astbury-Ward,	 Parry	 et	 al.	 2012)	 that	 the	‘revelation’	 of	 abortion	 experiences	 may	 bring.	 	 Strategies	 of	 ‘concealment’	 adopted	 to	mitigate	 against	 stigma	 and	 shame	 have,	 in	 turn,	 been	 shown	 to	 entail	 ‘profound	
psychological,	behavioral	and	interpersonal	consequences’	 (Major	and	Gramzow	1999)	 for	women,	with	prolonged	secrecy	and	efforts	to	‘suppress’	feelings	leading	to	lasting	harm	in	the	 form	 of	 ‘intrusive	 thoughts	 of	 the	 very	 thing	 the	 secret	 keeper	 is	 trying	 to	 conceal’.		Secrecy	and	stigma	–	along	with	what	Ludlow	refers	to	as	the	‘traumatization’	of	abortion	-	have	 been	 shown	 to	 affect	 abortion	 providers	 similarly,	 with	 the	 result	 that	 there	 has	come	to	exist	 ‘a	politically	and	socially	constructed	gap	between	what	we	experience	at	our	
clinics	and	how	we	talk	about	those	experiences	in	public’	(Ludlow	2008).			The	 clear	 alignment	 of	 abortion	 and	 NIPD	 (and	 by	 association,	 the	 practice	 of	 prenatal	testing	more	generally)	as	well	as	the	relationship	between	abortion,	secrecy,	and	stigma,	is	 examined	 here,	 through	 analysis	 of	 participant	 accounts,	 some	 of	 which	 report	 very	directly	on	‘difficult’	abortion	experiences.		I	show	how	the	phenomena	of	public	secrecy,	as	constituted	through	the	prevalence	of	unspoken,	contested	and	ambiguous	knowledge,	envelops	 experiences	 with	 and	 talk	 of	 abortion	 as	 it	 materialises	 here.	 	 As	 a	 prenatal	testing	technology	that	is	being	enrolled	within	a	cultural	space	where	the	‘public	secrecy’	of	abortion	 is	deeply	embedded,	 the	way	 in	which	NIPD	 is	emerging	and	sedimenting	 in	the	 clinic	 is	 being	 actively	 shaped	 by	 routine	 practices,	 and	 established	 repertoires	 for	(not)	 talking	about	 selective	abortion.	 	 I	 argue	here	 then,	 that	despite	an	explicit	 lack	of	public	 discussion	 the	 (unspoken)	 practice	 of	 the	 ‘selective’	 or	 ‘therapeutic’	 abortion	 of	pregnancy	is	central	to	experiences	and	encounters	with	NIPD.		I	show	how	the	practice	of	selective	abortion,	although	its	availability	may	help	relieve	the	anxiety	that	is	experienced	within	contemporary	‘tentative’	experiences	of	pregnancy	(Rothman	1994),	offers	limited	(and	problematic)	opportunities	for	the	exercise	of	reproductive	‘choice’	and	control,	and	is	 experienced	 as	 an	 emotionally,	 practically,	 socially	 and	 politically	 contested	 act,	enveloped	in	secrecy,	and	deeply	stigmatised.		
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Context:	the	therapeutic	gap		The	practice	of	prenatal	testing,	whether	it	is	carried	out	under	the	banner	of	 ‘screening’	or	 ‘diagnosis’,	 aims	 to	 provide	 women	 and/or	 couples	 with	 some	 kind	 of	 information	about	 the	 health	 of	 their	 unborn	 baby	 (fetus).	 	 Within	 a	 very	 limited	 number	 of	circumstances	 this	 information	 may	 be	 used	 to	 inform	 the	 clinical	 management	 of	pregnancy,	 fetal	health	or	birth.	 	NIPD,	 for	 instance,	 is	used	to	 ‘diagnose’	 fetal	sex	within	pregnancies	 that	 are	 ‘at	 risk’	 of	haemophilia	because	 in	 these	 circumstances	a	diagnosis	may	 help	 guide	 clinical	 management	 of	 birth44.	 	 A	 very	 limited	 range	 of	 surgeries	 and	therapies	 have	 also	been	performed	directly	 on	 the	 fetus	 or	 the	pregnant	 patient:	 these	include	 fetal	 blood	 transfusions	 where	 the	 fetus’	 blood	 type	 is	 incompatible	 with	 the	maternal	 blood	 (and	 where	 the	 fetus	 is	 at	 risk	 of	 severe	 anemia),	 cardiac	 procedures,	interventions	 for	urinary	 tract	obstructions,	and	surgical	 laser	 treatment	of	 twin-to-twin	transfusion	 syndrome	 (Van	 Mieghem,	 Al-Ibrahim	 et	 al.	 2014).	 	 Access	 to	 fetal	 therapy,	however,	 is	very	 limited	and	remains	 ‘reserved	for	well-selected	fetuses	at	the	most	severe	
end	 of	 the	 spectrum’	 being	 ‘offered	 in	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 centres’	 (Van	 Mieghem,	 Al-Ibrahim	et	al.	2014).		The	 limited	 scope	 for	 treatment	 of	 the	 fetus	 entails	 that	 in	 the	majority	 of	 pregnancies,	when	 a	 diagnosis	 of	 ‘fetal	 abnormality’	 is	 provided	 as	 a	 result	 of	 prenatal	 testing,	 this	information	may	be	used	to	guide	decision	making	around	a	single	intervention:	whether	to	continue	with	a	pregnancy,	or	whether	to	end	that	pregnancy	through	abortion	(Annas	1996,	p.S6).		This	particular	‘type’	or	category	of	abortion	is	frequently	distinguished	and	divided	from	the	practice	of	‘social’	abortion,	with	legislation	governing	abortion	in	the	UK	making	 this	 categorisation	 explicit	 (see	 text	 quoted	 above).	 	 This	 category	 or	 ‘type’	 of	abortion	 is	 more	 frequently	 referred	 to	 as	 either	 ‘genetic	 termination’	 (Thachuk	 2007)	‘selective	 termination’	 (Press	 and	 Browner	 1997,	 Shakespeare	 1998)	 or	 ‘therapeutic	
termination/abortion’	 (Clarke	 1997,	 p.134,	 Priaulx	 2008).	 	 This	 general	 pattern	 of	technological	 and	 clinical	 development,	 where	 opportunities	 for	 testing	 far	 outweigh	opportunities	for	treatment	or	therapy,	has	been	observed	elsewhere	and	with	increasing	frequency	 as	 genetic	 and	 genomic	 tests	 enter	 into	 the	 clinical	 sphere	 -	 and	 this	phenomenon	has	come	to	be	known	as	the	‘therapeutic	gap’	(Holtzman	and	Shapiro	1998,	Kelly	 2009,	 Gammeltoft	 and	 Wahlberg	 2014).	 	 The	 presence	 of	 the	 ‘therapeutic	 gap’	
																																								 																						44	Haemophilia	 is	 a	 blood	 clotting	 disorder	 which	 affects	 only	 males.	 	 Affected	 babies	 are	 at	increased	risk	of	prolonged	and	significant	bleeding	(or	hematoma/bruising)	during	birth	–	if	NIPD	identifies	 the	 fetus	 as	 female	 the	 pregnancy	 can	 be	 managed	 within	 standard	 antenatal	 care	services,	and	if	it	is	male	arrangements	can	be	made	to	ensure	that	specialist	services	are	available	at	a	later	date	to	either	conform	diagnosis	or	help	manage	the	birth.	
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greatly	 informs	 the	 context	 within	 which	 contemporary	 discussions	 of	 prenatal	 testing	and	abortion	take	place:	For	many	genetic	disorders	however,	the	ability	to	diagnose	the	condition	has	not	been	matched	by	the	ability	to	offer	an	effective	treatment	for	the	condition,	 described	 as	 the	 ‘therapeutic	 gap’.	 	 This	 means	 that	 until	therapies	are	developed,	prenatal	testing	followed	by	the	termination	of	an	affected	foetus	is	the	only	option	available	for	preventing	the	disease	(Ekberg	2007,	p.68)	citing	(Marteau	and	Croyle	1998).		Within	her	 study	of	 the	 ‘pre-emptive	cultures	that	shape	the	new	predictive	genetics’	 -	 the	application	of	which	have	led	to	the	construction	of	new	patient	identities	such	as	‘pre-ill’	and	 ‘pre-symptomatic’	 -	 Konrad	 explains	 how,	 in	 contrast	 with	 the	 prevailing	 culture	 of	twentieth	century	Western	medicine,	where	‘the	ready	availability	of	a	cure	dominated	the	
medical	 repertoire’,	 contemporary	 processes	 of	 genetic	 diagnosis	 take	 place	 within	 a	clinical	culture	 that	 is	no	 longer	guided	by	the	promise	of	 treatment	or	 therapy	(Konrad	2005).	 	 Knowledge	 of	 a	 genetic	 diagnosis	 leads	 to	 knowledge	 of	 prognosis:	 genomic	medicine	 has	 introduced	 a	 new	 ‘age	 of	 genetic	 prognostication’	 where	 ‘uncertainty	 and	
subjective	 emotion	 prevail	 in	 expansive	 proportions’	 and	 where,	 in	 the	 majority	 of	circumstances,	 treatment	and	therapy	remain	distant,	hopeful	 futures.	 	The	gap	between	diagnosis	 and	 treatment	 has	 also	 been	 explored	 with	 more	 explicit	 reference	 to	 the	prenatal	 context:	 within	 her	 work	 on	 the	 practice	 of	 dysmorphology,	 Latimer	characterises	 the	prenatal	genetics	 clinic	as	a	 ‘space	of	ambiguity	and	uncertainty’	where	parents	 become	 enrolled	 and	 entangled	 in	 processes	 of	 deferral,	 particularly	 around	reproductive	 choice	 (Latimer	 2007a).	 	 Elsewhere,	 Simpson	 underlines	 how	 the	termination	‘as	a	‘‘therapeutic’’	option’	is,	in	the	majority	of	circumstances,	the	only	choice	offered	 by	 prenatal	 testing,	 and	 he	 points	 towards	 the	 strong	 alignment	made	 between	practices	of	prenatal	testing	and	abortion	as	a	consequence:	In	reproductive	genetic	testing,	as	it	occurs	in	the	West,	there	is	an	implicit	link,	widely	 taken	 for	 granted,	 between	 the	 results	 of	 genetic	 testing	 and	the	ability	to	act	on	those	results	by	way	of	terminating	pregnancy	(Simpson	2010,	p.31)		Within	her	seminal	work	on	the	emergence	of	amniocentesis	and	the	rise	of	‘the	tentative	pregnancy’,	 Rothman	 too	 describes	 how	 prenatal	 testing	 operates	 within	 a	 kind	 of	‘therapeutic	 vacuum’,	 with	 the	 result	 that	 the	 practice	 of	 testing	 and	 the	 practice	 of	abortion	are,	inevitably,	aligned:	 ‘Abortion	is	an	integral	part	of	this	new	technology.		Fetal	
treatments	 do	 not	 exist	 for	 these	 diseases’	 (Rothman	 1994,	 p.4),	 and	 elsewhere	 Clarke,	reflecting	 on	 the	 tension	 inherent	 within	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘therapeutic	 abortion’	 itself,	
	 91	
highlights	 the	 severe	 limitations	 within	 which	 practices	 of	 prenatal	 screening	 must	operate:	Prenatal	 screening	 programmes	 for	 genetic	 conditions	 and	 congenital	malformations	 do	 not	 meet	 the	 standard	 criteria	 for	 screening	programmes	because	 the	usual	 intervention	made	when	an	affected	 fetus	is	identified	is	termination	of	pregnancy.		This	is	clearly	not	‘therapy’	in	the	usual	sense	of	the	word,	and	is	not	in	any	sense	therapeutic	for	the	affected	fetus.	(Clarke	1997,	p.134)		A	 number	 of	 NIPD	 researchers,	 as	 they	 discussed	 the	 clinical	 implications	 of	 testing,	acknowledged	 the	 relevance	 of	 this	 ‘therapeutic	 gap’	 (although	 they	 did	 not	 directly	describe	it	as	such)	within	the	broader	context	of	their	work:	With	 genetic	 testing	 as	well	my	 frustration	 is	 that	 for	 a	 lot	 of	 people	we	can’t,	do	much	to	help	we	can	tell	somebody	you’ve	got	a	mutation	in	such	and	such	a	gene	but	at	 the	moment	 there	 isn't	actually	anything	practical	that	you	can	do	(Beth,	NIPD	researcher)		This	I	think	people	see	it	as	a	big	breakthrough,	but	um	I	think	the	fact	that	you	 still	 have	 to	 have	 an	 invasive	 test	 for	 the	 aneuploidy	 and	 things	 like	that,	um	it’s	not	actually,	it’s	not	a	cure	of	anything,	there’s	no	treatment,	so	it	is,	it’s	just	another,	it’s	a	big	advance	in	testing	(Chloe,	NIPD	researcher)		Approaching	 the	 discussion	 of	 possible	 therapeutic	 interventions	 from	within	 the	 NIPD	research	 ‘community’,	 Beth	 stresses	 the	 sense	 of	 ‘frustration’	 that	 is	 generated	 when	comprehensive	 opportunities	 for	 genetic	 testing	 and	 diagnosis	 are	 enrolled	 within	 the	clinic,	 but	 are	 not	matched	 by	 equally	 powerful	 interventions	 and	 treatments	 that	 may	offer	 the	 opportunity	 to	 treat	as	 well	 as	 identify	 disease.	 	 Chloe	 directly	 implicates	 the	‘therapeutic	 gap’	 within	 the	 discussion	 NIPD’s	 possible	 future,	 suggesting	 that	 those	without	an	appropriate	 level	of	expertise,	 ‘people’	who	 ‘see	it	as	a	big	breakthrough’,	may	overstate	 the	 significance	 of	 NIPD’s	 emergence	 because	 they	 do	 not	 immediately	comprehend	the	limitations	within	which	NIPD	is	operating.		NIPD’s	potential	for	positive	practical/clinical	 impact	 is	 mitigated	 and	 limited	 here	 by	 its	 emergence	 within	 a	 space	where	 ‘there’s	 no	 treatment’,	 and	 where	 the	 ‘choices’	 that	 test	 results	 present	 are	accordingly	 limited.	 	 Despite	 NIPD	 researchers’	 professional	 enthusiasm	 for	 this	 ‘big	
advance	 in	 testing’,	 it	 was	made	 explicitly	 clear	 that	 they	 felt	 NIPD	 technologies	 offered	little	hope	of	 enabling	 treatment.	 	Although	 they	do	not	 speak	directly	of	 abortion	here,	such	accounts	allude	to	 the	 fact	 that	NIPD	operates	within	a	clinical	context	where,	with	few	 exceptions,	 only	 one	 kind	 of	 decision	may	 be	made	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 test	 results:	 the	
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choice	 of	 whether	 to	 continue	 a	 pregnancy,	 or	 whether	 to	 end	 the	 pregnancy	 through	abortion.	 	 The	 underlying	 influence	 of	 the	 ‘therapeutic	 gap’	 constitutes	 one	 of	 the	ways	through	which	abortion	has	become	so	closely	aligned	with	practices	and	technologies	of	prenatal	 diagnosis,	 and	 currently	 –	 given	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 legislative	 framework	 that	requires	a	‘diagnosis’	to	be	made	in	order	for	a	women	to	access	abortion	via	‘clause	D’	–	the	 practice	 of	 ‘selective’,	 ‘therapeutic’	 or	 ‘genetic’	 abortion	 is	 limited	 to	 circumstances	within	 which	 ‘diagnostic’	 tests	 are	 used.	 	 This	 broader	 clinical,	 legislative	 and	 political	context	may	contribute	to	the	anxieties	that	are	raised	by	the	way	in	which	NIPD	‘troubles’	the	boundary	between	screening	and	diagnosis.		Since	this	emergent	technology	offers	the	novel	opportunity	to	provide	near-diagnostic	testing	within	‘low	risk’	populations,	and	is	not	 limited	 to	 use	 within	 ‘high	 risk’	 pregnancies,	 NIPD	 could	 bring	 forth	 not	 only	 the	‘mainstreaming’	 of	 diagnosis,	 but	 the	 mainstreaming	 of	 ‘therapeutic’	 abortion	 too.		Anxieties	 raised	 by	 NIPD’s	 possible	 (or	 probable)	 entry	 into	 the	 ‘diagnostic’	 class	prompted	 much	 discussion	 and	 examination	 of	 abortion	 (particularly	 within	 expert	interviews),	and	such	accounts	will	also	be	highlighted	here.	
	
Abortion	and	secrecy:	problems	with	language	
	 Knowing	is	essential	to	its	power,	equal	to	the	denial.		Not	being	able	to	say	anything	is	likewise	testimony	to	its	power.	(Taussig	1999,	p.6)		Whilst	 talk	 of	 abortion	was	 consistently	 present	within	 the	 fieldwork	 data,	 participants	tended	 to	approach	 the	 issue	with	some	degree	of	caution	and	ambivalence,	with	only	a	handful	of	dissenting	and	politicised	voices	being	willing	or	able	to	approach	the	topic	of	abortion	directly.	 	As	a	 theme	of	discussion,	 the	majority	of	participants	 raised	abortion	implicitly,	 within	 moments	 of	 reflection	 around	 related	 themes.	 	 The	 language	 that	participants	approached	the	topic	with	reflected	a	deep	level	of	ambiguity	and	uncertainty	regarding	the	topic:	the	terms	used	to	describe	abortion	were	frequently	euphemistic,	and	the	 flow	of	conversation,	whilst	at	other	 times	relaxed	and	conversational,	often	became	stilted	 and	 awkward.	 	 Participants’	 vague	 and	 elusive	 talk	 reflected	 the	 self-reported	difficulty	 with	 which	 they	 approached	 abortion	 as	 a	 theme	 of	 discussion,	 or	 even	contemplation	 -	 many	 interviewees	 repeatedly	 struggled	 to	 find	 language	 that	 would	enable	 them	 to	 clearly	 articulate	 their	 point	 of	 view	 -	 and	 in	 place	 of	 direct	 talk	 of	‘abortion’	 or	 ‘termination’	 participants	 pointed	 towards	 the	 issue	 in	 ambiguous	 and	euphemistic	 terms,	 employing	 phrases	 such	 as	 the	 ‘management	 of	 pregnancy’,	 ‘that	
decision’,	a	‘sensitive	issue’,	 ‘the	final,	ultimate	decision’,	‘that	conversation’	and	 ‘what	might	
have	to	be	done’.	 	The	prevalence	of	 such	euphemistic	and	vague	 language	suggests	 that,	
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for	the	majority	of	participants,	the	task	of	clearly	articulating	thoughts	and	reflections	on	abortion	 was	 experienced	 as	 deeply	 problematic.	 	 The	 presence	 of	 such	 difficulties	regarding	 talk	 of	 abortion	 has	 been	 articulated	 within	 the	 previous	 examination	 of	emergent	prenatal	testing	technologies:	In	 the	 face	 of	 a	 confusing	 a	 traumatic	 experience,	 they	 often	 described	themselves	 as	 at	 a	 loss	 for	 words.	 	 These	 women	 were	 working	 in	 a	communicative	 system	 whose	 vocabulary	 is	 exclusively	 medical,	 whose	grammar	is	technological,	and	whose	syntax	is	yet	to	be	negotiated.	(Rothman	1994,	p.5)		Elsewhere,	 Kent	 has	 described	 how,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 proliferating	 medicalisation	 of	pregnancy	and	the	growing	use	of	human	(fetal)	‘tissue’	within	the	development	of	novel	health	 technologies,	 contemporary	 cultural	 conceptions	 of	 the	 fetus	 are	 diverse,	ambiguous	 and	 contradictive:	 we	 have	 available	 to	 us	 a	 set	 of	 ‘shifting	 meanings	 and	
understandings	of	 ‘the	fetus’	as	waste,	corpse,	research	tool,	baby,	body	part	of	the	woman’	(Kent	 2012,	 p.165).	 	 This	 conceptualisation	 of	 the	 fetus,	 as	 holding	 multiple	 and	contradictory	 meanings,	 was	 also	 very	 clearly	 reflected	 within	 participants’	 struggle	 to	find	 the	 language	 to	 articulate	 their	 position,	 and	 in	 the	 multiplicity	 of	 alternative,	euphemistic	terms	that	were	utilised	within	talk	of	abortion	as	explored	here.				Further	 distancing	 conversations	 away	 from	 direct	 talk	 of	 abortion,	 and	 adding	 to	 the	complex	task	of	producing	articulate	and	clear	accounts,	a	range	of	technical	terms	were	also	frequently	utilised	within	the	accounts	generated	here.		Experts	made	use	of	a	diverse	set	 of	 clinical	 terms	 to	 refer	 either	 to	 abortion,	 or	 to	 the	 fetus:	 they	 spoke	 of	 ‘T.O.P’45,	
‘feticide46’,	 ‘D	and	C’	and	the	 ‘products	of	conception’47.	 	Such	distanced,	technical	language	lay	 in	 clear	 contrast	with	 the	 language	present	 in	more	personal	 accounts	 of	 pregnancy	and	 pregnancy	 loss.	 	 Mothers	 with	 experience	 of	 abortion	 spoke	 of	 ‘having	 him	 put	 to	
sleep’,	delivering	a	 ‘dead	baby’	and	 ‘killing	my	child’.	 	Both	experts	and	mothers	were	able,	however,	 to	 switch	 between	 these	 two	 registers.	 	 James,	 for	 example,	 a	 fetal	 medicine	consultant	involved	in	the	provision	of	‘NIPT’	testing	for	Down’s	syndrome	within	private	clinics,	 spoke	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘TOP’	 and	 the	 ‘products	 of	 conception’	 as	 he	 discussed	 the	practical	 issues	 that	 he	 felt	 were	 raised	 by	 NIPT.	 	 As	 the	 focus	 of	 conversation	 shifted	towards	 talk	of	 the	patient	experience	however,	his	 language	became	warmer	and	more	uncertain.		He	switched	to	talk	of	‘what	they	might	do’,	‘the	baby’,	and	making	decisions	to	
																																								 																						45	‘TOP’	is	an	acronym	for	‘termination	of	pregnancy’	46	The	terms	‘feticide’	and	‘D	and	C’	are	used	here	to	refer	to	‘surgical’	abortion	methods.	47	The	 phrase	 ‘product	 of	 conception’	 or	 ‘POC’	 is	 used	 to	 refer	 to	 fetal	 remains	 obtained	 after	abortion	or	miscarriage	(and	which	are	often	used	for	follow-up/confirmatory	genetic	testing).		
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‘end	the	pregnancy’	when	speaking	of	direct	contact	with	patients,	and	the	potential	ending	of	their	 ‘wanted	pregnancies’.	 	Abi,	a	mother	of	two	young	children,	who	had	experienced	medical	 termination 48 	after	 a	 diagnosis	 of	 anencephaly	 in	 the	 second	 trimester	 of	pregnancy,	referred	to	her	 ‘baby’	by	name	throughout	 the	 interview.	 	She	also,	however,	explored	 the	 possibility	 that	 her	 baby	 could,	 in	 certain	 circumstances,	 be	 classed	 as	
‘medical	waste’:	 her	 language	 shifted	 in	 conjunction	 with	 her	 particular	 reflections	 and	memories	of	 the	abortion	experience.	 	Although	 the	 range	of	 terms	used	 to	 speak	about	and	around	abortion	was	diverse,	direct	talk	of	‘abortion’	or	‘termination’	remained	rare.		Conversations	 with	 mothers	 in	 particular	 faltered	 as	 they	 struggled	 -	 somewhat	unexpectedly	 	-	to	explore	their	thoughts	and	feelings	around	abortion.	 	Very	often	these	conversations	appeared	as	unintentional,	with	talk	of	abortion	arising	in	connection	with	related,	rather	than	direct	questions	–	for	instance	as	I	asked	participants	about	who	they	had	spoken	to	about	testing,	or	why	they	had	sought	out	a	particular	test	–	the	topic	was	stumbled	across,	and	then	lingered	over.		Louise	had	used	the	new	‘NIPT’	tests	for	Down’s	syndrome	 within	 her	 last	 pregnancy.	 	 During	 the	 interview	 she	 spoke	 of	 abortion	 in	connection	with	her	memories	of	whom	she	had	discussed	testing	with	during	pregnancy	and	her	thoughts	around	how	she	may	have	dealt	with	a	diagnosis	of	Down’s	syndrome.		Probably	 selfish	 reasons	 really,	 I	 just	 thought	 the	 age	 that	we	 are-	 and	 I	didn’t	 really	 want	 burden	 [daughter]	 with	 a	 child	 who	 would	 be,	potentially	 quite	 dependent.	 	 So	 that	 was	 in	 my	 mind	 really.	 	 Well,	obviously	 it	would	have	been	heart	breaking	 to	make	a	decision,	 and	 I’m	not	sure	I	would	have	made	that	decision	if	I’d	had	that	kind	of	a	result.		I	don’t	know	what	I	would	have	done.		But	I	think,	going	into	it	I	thought	that	might	be	what	might	have	to	be	done.	
Mum	 became	 upset	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 interview,	 as	 she	 spoke	 about	
potentially	having	to	make	termination	decisions….	she	was	breastfeeding	at	
the	time	and	explained	that	she	felt	emotional,	tired,	hormonal.			(Louise,	NIPT	patient	and	extract	from	field	notes)		Although	 Louise	 raised	 the	 issue	 of	 abortion	 spontaneously	 -	 within	 the	 context	 of	conversations	 around	 NIPD	 -	 she	 was	 unable	 to	 approach	 abortion	 directly,	 speaking	instead	 only	 of	 ‘that	 decision’,	 ‘that	 kind	 of	 result’	 and	 the	 ‘heart-breaking’	decision	 that	NIPD	testing	may	have	 led	her	 to.	 	Despite	 this	cautious	and	distanced	approach,	Louise	nevertheless	 experienced	 the	 conversation	 as	 distressing	 and	 upsetting.	 	 She	 explained	after	the	interview	that	she	had	found	it	difficult	to	think	about	such	issues	at	a	point	when	she	was	so	intimately	involved	in	caring	for	her	young	child,	particularly	as	that	child	had	resulted	from	the	pregnancy	that	she	had	tested.	 	Louise	explained	that	she	had	found	it																																									 																						48	The	 phrase	 ‘medical	 termination’	 is	 used	 to	 refer	 to	methods	 of	 abortion	 involving	 the	 use	 of	medication,	and	which	involve	vaginal	delivery	of	the	fetus.			
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difficult	 to	 talk	 about	 the	 testing	 even	with	 those	 closest	 to	 her,	 to	 the	 point	where	 she	sought	 expert	 counselling	 to	 relieve	 the	 anxieties	 that	 she	 was	 experiencing	 during	pregnancy.	 Louise	 described	 a	 difficult,	 contested	 and	 relational	experience	 of	 prenatal	testing	 -	 one	 which	 she	 had	 struggled	 to	 come	 to	 terms	 with	 -	 even	 as	 no	 ‘risk’	 was	identified,	no	particular	diagnosis	was	made	and	the	final	outcome	was	‘positive’.			I	 started	 seeing	 [counsellor]	 in	 about	 July,	 um,	 and	 she	 was	 very	 good,	because	she	was	obviously	trained	specifically.		It’s	quite	difficult	to	talk	to	your	 partner	 about	 these	 things	 because	 he’s	 sort	 of	 feeling	 his	 feelings,	and	you	are	feeling	your	feelings	and	you	kind	of	protect	each	other	by	not	talking	about	it	for	a	long	time,	so	it	just	kind	of	builds	up.	(Louise,	NIPT	patient)		Although	 talk	 of	 abortion	 was	 indirect	 and	 cautious,	 the	 theme	 of	 abortion	 was	nevertheless	positioned	centrally	within	Louise’s	account	of	decision	making,	and	testing,	and	it	informed	her	understanding	of	how	experiences	of	testing	during	pregnancy	had	(or	might	 have)	 impacted	 on	 the	 broader	 context	 of	 her	 family	 life.	 	 Reflecting	 on	why	 she	chose	 to	 seek	 out	 and	 use	 ‘NIPT’	 testing	 for	 Down’s	 syndrome,	 Louise	 returns	 to	 the	moments	 where	 she	 was	 forced	 to	 consider	 the	 ‘choice’	 that	 a	 diagnosis,	 ‘that	 kind	 of	
result’	may	have	led	her	to	confront:	whether	to	continue	with	pregnancy	or	whether	to,	in	order	to	avoid	having	a	child	who	would	be	‘potentially	quite	dependent’,	have	an	abortion	-	 ‘what	might	have	to	be	done’.	 	Within	Louise’s	account	 then,	 it	 seems	abortion	operates	quite	 clearly	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 ‘public	 secret’	 -	 even	 as	 it	 is	 understood	 and	 experienced	‘internally’	-	something	‘which	is	generally	known,	but	cannot	be	articulated’.		Difficulties	with	talk	of	abortion	were	present	throughout	the	accounts	given	by	parents,	but	 they	 were	 not	 limited	 to	 such	 ‘personal’	 accounts	 alone.	 	 Within	 many	 expert	interviews	also,	as	conversations	turned	towards	abortion,	accounts	became	increasingly	strained,	awkward,	and	vague.	 	At	certain	moments,	as	 the	 topic	of	abortion	entered	the	frame,	 conversations	which	were	 otherwise	 flowing	 and	 natural,	 were	 quite	 simply	 cut	dead:	
So,	with	prenatal	testing	the	only	treatment	is	termination-	Yes,	um.		Yes.	(Beth,	NIPD	researcher)	
	The	presence	of	such	problematic	and	difficult	accounts	of	abortion,	arising	as	the	‘issue’	comes	 to	 be	 so	 closely	 aligned	with	 testing,	 not	 only	 points	 towards	 the	 inadequacy	 of	common	 forms	 of	 language	within	 the	 context	 of	 such	 conversations,	 it	 points	 towards	(despite	 the	 relevance	 of	 such	 conversations	 to	 the	 practice	 of	 prenatal	 testing)	 the	pervasive	‘silencing’	and	‘disposal’	of	abortion.	
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Abortion	and	secrecy:	patient	and	provider	experiences			The	 difficulty	 that	 participants	 experienced	 in	 talking	 about	 abortion,	 as	 well	 as	 the	pervasive	level	of	secrecy	with	which	talk	of	abortion	is	approached	more	generally,	was	clearly	reflected	within	both	personal	and	professional	accounts	of	abortion	experiences.		Abi,	 who	 had	 used	 NIPD	 for	 fetal	 sexing	 in	 a	 pregnancy	 occurring	 after	 her	 abortion49,	described	 how	 a	 sense	 of	 secrecy	 had	 enveloped	 her	 experience	 of	 abortion	 and	 its	aftermath,	and	how	she	had,	effectively,	been	‘silenced’	by	her	own	distress,	as	well	as	the	responses	of	others	 to	her	experience.	 	Abi	explained	 for	 instance,	 that	despite	knowing	about	her	pregnancy,	some	of	her	close	relatives	 ‘didn’t	even	tell	their	children’	about	 the	subsequent	diagnosis	and	abortion.		She	also	described	how	she	had	long-deferred	talking	about	her	abortion	with	those	closest	to	her,	including	her	partner:	 ‘I	don’t	know	what	he	
went	 through’,	 and	 reflecting	 back	 on	 this,	 as	 she	 imagined	 some	 of	 the	 future	conversations	 she	 might	 have	 concerning	 her	 abortion,	 Abi	 presented	 them	 as	 being	extremely	difficult,	or	even	impossible	to	approach:	
Were	you	able	to	talk	to	your	mum?	Yeah,	kind	of	cagily.		Yeah	I	do	talk	to	her,	but	I’ve	not	had	the	conversation	yet	about	how	do	you	feel	having	lost	a	grandchild.		And	I	don’t	know	if	we	ever	will	because	of	the	potential-	you	know.	(Abi,	NHS	patient)		Caitlin,	 a	 midwife	 who	 was	 involved	 in	 the	 provision	 of	 ‘NIPT’	 for	 Down’s	 syndrome	testing	 in	 private	 clinics,	 highlighted	 how	 pervasive	 the	 sense	 of	 secrecy	 surrounding	abortion	 had	 been	 to	 her	 professional	 experience	 to	 date.	 	 She	 described	 how	 she	 felt	abortion	 had	 been	 approached	 with	 great	 caution	 and	 difficulty,	 even	 within	 clearly-relevant	 professional	 spaces	 -	 such	 as	 midwifery	 and	 fetal	 medicine	 -	 locations	 within	which	 care	 providers	may	 come	 to	 be	 very	 directly	 involved	 in	 the	 delivery	 of	 abortion	services:	
Have	you,	do	you	sit	in	on	terminations	in	the	clinic?	Um,	they	don’t	do	them	in	clinic.		But	I’ve	done-	it’s	part	of	our	training	that	we	 sort	 of	 get	 involved	 with	 them.	 	 Yeah	 I’ve	 never	 done	 any	 for	 social	reasons,	more	for	anomalies	and.	
And	how	was	that?	
																																								 																						49	Abi	 was	 offered	 fetal	 sexing,	 not	 as	 a	 direct	 result	 of	 any	 clear	 ‘risk’	 of	 x-linked	 disorder,	 but	because	 the	 ‘cause’	 of	 abnormality	 within	 her	 previous	 pregnancy	 was	 still	 a	 matter	 of	 some	dispute	during	the	point	at	which	she	became	pregnant.	 	When	it	came	to	speaking	about	the	test	itself	then,	Abi	was	not	completely	sure	why	she	had	been	offered	NIPD.				
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Um,	 difficult	 I	 think.	 	 The	 most	 difficult	 thing	 I	 have	 seen	 is	 a	 feticide.		Mainly	 because	 I	 didn’t	 understand	 what	 was	 going	 to	 happen,	 and	 you	think,	I	was	in	my	third	year	when	I	saw	that.	 	As	a	student	you	assume,	I	had	read	about	it,	I	had	the	gist	of	what	was	going	to	happen,	I	 just	never	realised	 you	 would	 see	 everything	 on	 screen	 and	 suddenly	 it’s	 stopped	moving.		So	that	was	really	difficult.		And	after	that	I	think	I	understood.		It	is	 so	 important	 when	 people	 are	 coming	 in	 for	 these	 tests,	 that	 it’s	informed	 consent.	 	 That	 they	understand	 the	 test	 is	 going	 to	 give	 them	a	result	that	they	will	have	to	make	choices	about,	rather	than	it	is	just,	you	know,	another	part	of	pregnancy.		It	was	a	big	learning	curve.	(Caitlin,	midwife	and	private	NIPT	provider)	
	Caitlin	expresses	shock	both	regarding	the	practicalities	of	the	abortion	procedure	itself,	‘I	
just	never	realised	you	would	see	everything	on	screen	and	suddenly	it’s	stopped	moving.		So	
that	was	 really	 difficult’,	as	well	 as	 the	 lack	 of	 attention	 that	 had	 been	 paid	 to	 abortion	within	 the	 context	 of	 her	 midwifery	 training	 -	 ‘the	 most	 difficult	 thing	 I	 have	 seen	 is	 a	
feticide.		Mainly	because	I	didn’t	understand	what	was	going	to	happen,	and	you	think,	I	was	
in	 my	 third	 year	 when	 I	 saw	 that’.	 	 Her	 account	 both	 points	 towards	 the	 silencing	 of	abortion	within	relevant	professional	spaces,	and	it	makes	the	alignment	of	abortion	and	prenatal	 testing	 also	 particularly	 clear.	 	 Caitlin	 describes	 how	 her	 ‘exposure’	 to	 this	experience	of	abortion	(the	practical	details	of	which	had	previously	been	hidden	or	made	secret)	allows	her	to	gain	clarity	on	the	patient	perspective,	albeit	from	within	the	context	of	a	professional	framework	that	prioritises	the	rational	–	which	talks	of	‘informed	consent’	–	rather	than	the	relational:	‘after	that	I	think	I	understood...	that	they	understand	the	test	is	
going	to	give	them	a	result	that	they	will	have	to	make	choices	about,	rather	than	it	is	just,	
you	know,	another	part	of	pregnancy’.		The	particular	impact	of	the	‘therapeutic	gap’	within	the	practice	of	prenatal	testing	becomes	acutely	evident	here:	abortion	is	experienced	as	both	 a	 secretive	 and	 a	 deeply	 problematic	 issue,	 and	 one	 that	 arises	 directly	 out	 of	 the	extremely	 limited	 ‘choices’	 that	 prenatal	 testing	may	 impose.	 	 Bringing	 order	 to	 such	 a	problematic	 and	 ‘difficult’	 experience,	 Caitlin	 emphasises	 the	 value	 of	 ‘informed	consent’	and	 the	 corresponding	 need	 for	 comprehensive	 pre-test	 counselling,	 which,	 she	 feels	would	enable	to	patients	to	‘understand	the	test	is	going	to	give	them	a	result	that	they	will	
have	to	make	choices	about’.	 	Caitlin	very	clearly	draws	on	mainstream	discourse	around	the	 clinical	 practice	 of	 prenatal	 testing	 in	 general	 (Green,	 Hewison	 et	 al.	 2004,	 van	 den	Berg,	 Timmermans	 et	 al.	 2005,	 van	 den	 Berg,	 Timmermans	 et	 al.	 2006),	 and	 NIPD	specifically	(Wright	and	Chitty	2009,	Silcock,	Chitty	et	al.	2012)	here,	resolving	the	‘issue’	of	routinisation	and	abortion	with	recourse	to	a	dominant	professional	framework	which	emphasises	the	value,	and	power,	of	 ‘informed	consent’.	 	By	foregrounding	the	discussion	of	 individual	 reproductive	 ‘choice’	 –	 by	 framing	 choice	 in	 terms	 of	 personal	 or	 private	decision	making,	 such	discourses	manage	 and	 contain	 the	 ‘problems’	 raised	by	prenatal	testing	 –	 such	 as	 the	 underlying	 presence	 (and	 centrality)	 of	 ‘selective’	 or	 ‘therapeutic’	
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abortion	 -	 by	 responsiblising	 individual	 women	 and	 parents	 rather	 than	 examining	 the	broader	social	and	cultural	constructs	 that	have	been	enrolled	and	translated	within	 the	clinic	 (the	 full	 implications	 of	 the	 circulation	 and	 re-circulation	 of	 such	 discourses	 are	explored	in	chapter	seven).			Contributing	to	the	discussion	of	abortion	as	a	‘secret’	experience	here,	genetic	counsellors	described	how	their	patients	were	frequently	reluctant	to	engage	in	talk	of	abortion,	or	to	even	 contemplate	 the	 types	 of	 ‘decisions’	 and	 ‘choices’	 that	 testing	 might	 bring.	 	 They	explained	 that	 a	 pervasive	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 regarding	 abortion,	 and	 a	 general	unwillingness	 to	 confront	 the	possibility	 that	abortion	may	arise	as	an	 issue	of	practical	concern,	 raised	 many	 problems	 for	 them	 in	 the	 clinic.	 	 Naomi	 (a	 genetic	 counsellor	working	across	a	range	of	specialties),	for	instance,	explained	how	many	of	her	patients	-	when	 faced	with	 talk	 of	 abortion	 -	were	 often	 left	 completely	 unable	 to	 articulate	 their	thoughts	and	feelings:	I	think	there	are	some	times	when,	you	see	some	couples	and	you	feel	they	probably	have	made	a	decision	but	cant	quite	bring	themselves	to	say	it,	or	admit	 it,	 you	 know	 that	 they	maybe	 have	made	 a	 decision	 that	 they	 are	going	to	have	a	termination	but	they	are	just,	feel	they	cant	say	it	out	loud.		And	 I	 think	you	 can	get	 to	 a	point	where	you’re,	 you’re	kind	of	 affirming	that	decision…	I’ve	seen	people	who	won’t	say	the	word	termination,	 just	can’t	bring	themselves	to	say	the	word	out	loud.		Naomi’s	 account	 of	 her	 patients’	 struggle	 to	 articulate	 themselves,	 to	 speak	 directly	 of	abortion,	 and	 to	 ‘say	 the	word	 out	 loud’,	 clearly	 echoes	 the	 accounts	 generated	 through	interviews	with	 patients	 and	parents	 here.	 	 Even	within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 semi-private	and	 confidential	 space	 of	 the	 genetics	 clinic,	 conversations	 around	 abortion	 were,	reportedly,	 negotiated	 through	 indirect	 and	 convoluted	 forms	 of	 communication,	 rather	than	through	any	direct	engagement	with	the	topic	at	hand.		This	reluctance	to	talk	is	not	merely	reported	back	here	by	genetic	counsellors	as	a	point	of	interest,	it	is	problematised	and	raised	as	an	issue	that,	given	the	centrality	of	abortion	within	prenatal	testing,	is	seen	to	require	some	level	of	management	or	intervention.		Accordingly,	Naomi	also	describes	how,	when	 faced	with	 such	 reluctance	 to	 contemplate	or	 speak	of	 abortion,	 she	actively	encourages	patients	to	confront	some	of	the	more	difficult	issues	that	a	lived	experience	of	abortion	may	entail:		I	 think	 people	 need	 to	 know.	 	 You	 know	 at	 the	 start	 of	 that	 process	 you	need	 to	 know	actually,	what	will	 happen	when	we	get	 to	 the	 end	of	 this.		And	 actually	 practically	 how	 will	 that	 happen	 if	 we	 choose	 to	 have	 a	termination,	 what	 does	 that	 involve.	 	 Because	 I	 don’t	 think	most	 people	would	 really	 understand	 how	 a	 termination	 happens,	what	 their	 options	would	be...	and	I	think	you	can	get	to	a	point	where	you’re,	you’re	kind	of	affirming	 that	 decision.	 	 You	know-	but	 again,	 that’s	 got	 to	be	used	quite	
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carefully,	 because	 if	 you	 time	 that	 wrong,	 you	 might	 sway	 them	 in	 one		direction	or	another.			(Naomi,	genetic	counsellor)		As	a	genetic	counsellor,	Naomi	acts	here	to	encourage	her	patients	to	engage	directly	with	the	decisions	and	‘choices’	that	are	raised	by	genetic	testing,	in	order	to	provide	them	with	appropriate,	balanced,	comprehensive	and	‘non-directive’	counselling.		The	dominance	of	a	‘nondirective’	approach	to	the	management	of	information	provision	and	decision	making	within	the	clinician-patient	relationship	is	central	-	and	somewhat	particular	–	to	the	field	of	 genetic	 counselling	 (Bosk	 2003,	 p.xv):	 ‘Clinical	 geneticists,	 in	 contrast	 to	 most	 other	
medical	practitioners,	are	said	to	espouse	a	“non-directive”	method	of	 “counselling”	clients’	(Elwyn,	Gray	et	al.	2000).		It	has	been	described	how,	as	a	result	of	such	emphasis	on	the	value	 of	 non-directiveness,	 related	 practices	 such	 as	 ‘informed	 consent’	 and	comprehensive	‘pre-test	counselling’	have	gained	particular	centrality	within	the	genetics	clinic	(Petersen	1999).		Naomi	shows	how,	within	the	context	of	prenatal	testing	–	as	it	is	so	 clearly	 aligned	 with	 the	 practice	 of	 abortion	 -	 the	 task	 of	 providing	 non-directive	counselling	translates	into	the	difficult	challenge	of	breaking	the	silence	around	the	‘public	secret’	of	abortion,	as	she	 is	required	to	enrol	patients	within	problematic	conversations	and	encourage	 them	 to	 think	about	 some	of	 the	most	 ‘difficult’	 aspects	of	 abortion	both	clearly	 and	 directly:	 they	 ‘need	 to	 know’	 about	 ‘how	 a	 termination	 happens,	 what	 their	
options	would	be’.		She	acknowledges	that	this	task	is	made	more	problematic	because,	not	only	 do	 patients	 tend	 to	 have	 little	 knowledge	 regarding	 the	 practicalities	 of	 abortion,	many	do	not,	before	arriving	in	the	clinic,	make	the	link	between	testing	and	abortion	at	all:		 I	think	there	are	people	that	just	haven’t	thought	about	it.		That	happens	a	lot,	people	come	and	say	ok	well	 I’ll	have	a	 test,	and	 then	 I’ll	wait	 for	 the	result	and	then	I’ll	decide	what	 to	do.	 	And	we	are	saying	well,	you	know	maybe	you	need	to	think	about	it	now,	and	you	need	to	start	having	those	conversations	 now…	 you	 are	 going	 to	 need	 to	 make	 a	 decision,	 and	emotions	are	going	to	be	heightened.	(Naomi,	genetic	counsellor)		Secrecy	 and	 silence	 around	 abortion	 is	 figured	 here	 as	 a	 problem	 for	 those	working	 in	prenatal	genetics,	and	one	which	‘needs’	to	be	addressed	by	asking	the	patient	to	confront	the	issues	that	they	(and	many	others)	have	such	difficulties	in	facing	and	articulating:	‘we	
are	 saying,	 you	know	maybe	you	need	 to	 think	about	 it	now’.	 	Elsewhere,	 Rachel,	 another	genetic	 counsellor	 (who	 specialised	 in	 the	 provision	 of	 prenatal	 counselling),	 describes	coming	 across	 similar	 anxieties	 within	 the	 clinic,	 again	 raised	 by	 patients’	 inability	 or	unwillingness	to	engage	with	questions	of	abortion:	
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Sometimes,	a	lot	of	families	prefer	to	be	ostriches.	 	They	want-	they	know	that	 it	 is	 in	 their	 family	 but	 actually,	 they	 don’t	want	 to	 raise	 their	 head	above	the	parapet.		And	I	think	that’s	because	they	are	not	going	to	make	a	decision	 to	end-	because	 the	 final,	 the	ultimate	choice	 is	are	you	going	 to	start	on	this	road	because	it	will	alter	the	management	of	your	pregnancy.		And	 some	 women	 and	 couples	 will	 have	 this	 conversation	 sort	 of	superficially	sort	of	pre-conceptually,	saying	oh	yeah	we	would	do	this,	but	once	 they	 see	 that	 scan,	 once	 they	 hear	 that	 heartbeat	 it	 feels	 really	different.	(Rachel,	genetic	counsellor)		As	genetic	counsellors	struggle	here	to	deal	with	the	significant	 ‘gap’	that	exists	between	their	 knowledge	 of	 abortion,	 and	 the	 profoundly	 contrasting	 level	 of	 knowledge	 that	patients	 approach	 the	 prenatal	 clinic	 with,	 their	 recognition	 of	 the	 alignment	 between	testing	 and	 termination	 is	 explicitly	 emphasised:	 ‘the	 final,	 the	ultimate	choice	 is	are	you	
going	to	start	on	this	road	because	it	will	alter	the	management	of	your	pregnancy’;	‘you	are	
going	 to	 need	 to	 make	 a	 decision’.	 Such	 conversations	 (being	 approached	 from	 within	clinical	 spaces	 where	 established	 forms	 of	 diagnostic	 testing	 are	 required	 to	 legitimate	access	 to	 abortion)	may	 seem	 remote	 to	 the	 discussion	 of	 emergent	NIPD	 tests.	 	 Given,	however,	the	shifting	trajectory	of	the	technology	as	discussed	within	the	previous	chapter	–	the	way	in	which	NIPD	has	come	to	be	so	closely	compared	and	aligned	with	established	diagnostic	 technologies	 and	 practices	 –	 and	 the	 corresponding	 ‘troubling’	 of	 the	boundaries	between	screening	and	diagnosis,	 conversations	around	prenatal	 testing	and	its	alignment	with	abortion	remain	acutely	relevant.		Louise	(who	used	‘NIPT’	for	Down’s	syndrome)	provides	a	complimentary,	but	somewhat	contrasting	 account	 of	 how	 abortion	 secrecy,	 and	 the	 alignment	 between	 testing	 and	termination,	 may	 be	 understood.	 	 Speaking	 directly	 to	 the	 concerns	 raised	 by	 genetic	counsellors	as	they	discussed	abortion	and	secrecy	–	and	their	patients’	lack	of	knowledge	–	she	explains	that	 ‘you	do	tend	to	go	in	with	your	head	stuck	in	the	ground’.	 	 	Louise	also,	however,	highlights	 the	difficulty	with	which	even	an	 ‘informed’	patient	might	approach	talk	of	abortion:	
How	prepared	were	you	for	a	positive	result?	Oh,	well	 you	 can	never,	 I	 don’t	 think.	 	Obviously	 I	was	 aware.	 	 I	 suppose	subconsciously	I	kind	of-	we	worked	out	what	we	might	do.		But	you	don’t	really	know	how	you	will	react	until	you	have	that	result,	I	think.		Because	there	 is	 always	 that-	 you	might	 change	your	mind…	you	do	 tend	 to	go	 in	with	 your	 head	 stuck	 in	 the	 ground	 a	 little	 bit,	 just	 because	 it’s	 hard	 to	contemplate.		So,	um.		Yes	I	knew	there	was	a	possibility,	but	I	was	hoping	for	the	best	really.		(Louise,	private	NIPT	patient)		
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Louise	approached	the	test	 from	a	relatively	well	 ‘informed’	and	 ‘empowered’	position	–	she	 had	 prior	 experience	 of	 pregnancy,	 had	 achieved	 a	 high	 level	 of	 education,	 and	explained	 that	 she	was	highly	 familiar	with	 the	 kind	of	 statistics	 employed	within	NIPD	testing	 as	 a	 result	 of	 her	 profession:	 ‘I’ve	been	on	 the	wrong	 side	of	 statistical	measures’.		Despite	 Louise’s	 ‘awareness’	 of	 the	 issues	 that	 came	 tied	 to	 testing,	 and	 having	‘subconsciously’	 worked	 out	 how	 she	 and	 her	 partner	might	 deal	 with	 a	 diagnosis,	 she	nevertheless	 highlight	 the	 relationality	 –	 and	 not	 the	 rationality	 –	 with	 which	 such	decisions	 are	 approached:	 ‘you	 don’t	 really	 know	 how	 you	will	 react	 until	 you	 have	 that	
result’.		
Secrecy	and	stigma		The	pervasiveness	of	abortion	secrecy,	and	the	difficulty	with	which	accounts	of	abortion	were	 approached	 and	 articulated,	 was	 repeatedly	 explained	 with	 reference	 to	 closely	connected	 experiences	 of	 stigma.	 	 The	 connection	between	 abortion	 secrecy	 and	 stigma	has	been	articulated	within	the	broader	literature	(Major	and	Gramzow	1999,	Cockrill	and	Nack	2013,	Cowan	2014),	and	has	been	raised	as	a	particular	source	of	concern	by	those	reporting	on	experiences	of	working	within	the	field	of	abortion	provision:		It	was	not	unusual	to	discover	that	I	was	the	first	person	to	be	told	about	these	pregnancies	and	the	only	person	to	hear	why	these	women	decided	they	 wanted	 to	 abort…	 	 	 They	 often	 talked	 as	 though	 they	 had	 done	something	wrong,	and	abortion	was	simply	the	price	they	would	pay:	two	hundred	dollars,	bad	cramps,	and,	in	many	cases,	a	big	secret	to	keep	from	everyone	in	their	lives	who	mattered	(Simonds	1996)		Cowan	 explains	 that	 the	 connection	 between	 abortion,	 secrecy	 and	 stigma	 may	 be	 so	pervasive	that	experiences	of	stigma	may	accompany	almost	every	experience	of	abortion:	
‘despite	 its	 widespread	 prevalence,	 stigma	 concerning	 abortion	 is	 dramatic…	Women	 are	
disinclined	 to	 disclose	 their	 abortion	 histories	 and	 perceive	 strong	 social	 disapproval	 in	
nearly	 every	 context’	 (Cowan	 2014,	 p.472)	 and	 Cockrill	 shows	 how	 abortion	 secrecy	contributes	 to	 and	 continually	 reinforces	 abortion	 stigma:	 ‘aspects	 of	 abortion	 stigma—
such	 as	 its	 concealability	 and	 episodic	 expression—interfere	 with	 women’s	 potential	 to	
collectively	manage	or	dismantle	abortion	stigma’.				Adding	 to	 such	 accounts,	 interviews	 provided	 here	 by	 mothers	 who	 had	 experience	 of	using	 invasive	 prenatal	 diagnosis	 technology	 during	 pregnancy	 highlighted	 how	 central,	and	 how	 stigmatised,	 conversations	 around	 abortion	 had	 been	 to	 their	 testing	experiences.	 	Cara,	for	instance,	provides	a	clear	account	of	how	decision	making	around	
	 102	
testing	 and	 abortion	 -	 and	 open	 talk	 of	 abortion	 -	 can	 be	 experienced	 as	 highly	problematic:	
Cara	 started	 chatting	 very	 quickly	 after	 welcoming	 me	 with	 a	 cup	 of	 tea.		
Before	I	asked	her	any	questions	she	quickly	 launched	into	telling	me	about	
her	 decision	 regarding	 termination	 of	 pregnancy,	 at	 a	 point	 where	 her	
brother	 had	 been	 diagnosed	 with	 a	 serious	 genetic	 illness	 and	 her	 young	
daughter	was	in	recovery	after	treatment	for	cancer	[from	field	notes]	Um,	when	I	found	out	I	was	pregnant	it	was	very	soon	after	[1st	daughter]	had	 finished	 treatment,	 and	 I	 remember	 ringing	 [husband]	 and	 saying	 I	think	 I’m	pregnant.	 	And	 I	went	 to	see	 [genetic	 counsellor]	who	 is	 lovely,	and	 we	 talked	 through	 things	 and	 she	 said	 right	 we’ll	 send	 you-	 there’s	testing	you	can	have	if	you	want,	and	I	remember	saying	to	her	I	can’t,	you	know	 I	 just	 couldn’t	progress	with	 the	pregnancy-	you	know,	my	brother	was	 not	 well	 at	 all,	 I	 knew	 that	 for	 [genetic	 disease],	 there	 was	 no	particular	 cure,	 a	 very	difficult	 condition,	we	had	 just	 had	 [1st	 daughter]	come	 off	 treatment	 so	 we	 didn’t	 know	 what	 it	 was.	 	 And	 [genetic	counsellor]	wrote	me	a	letter	kind	of	summarising	and	referring	me	for	the	first	scan,	bits	and	pieces.		And	she	wrote	on	it,	um,	you	said	you	would	not	be	able	to	proceed	with	the	pregnancy,	you	know,	blah	blah,	full	stop.		And	then	she	wrote,	this	is	fine.		And	I	phoned	her	up	and	said	you	know,	those	three	words.	 	 I	cried.	 	You	know	those	words	were	so	 important	to	me	in	terms	 of	 somebody	 going,	 that’s	 ok.	 	 Because	 you	 feel	 so,	 I	 don’t	 know	judged,	and	defensive,	and	 that’s	why	when	you	 look	at	 these	 things,	you	know	 in	my	situation	 I	had	a	brother	on	a	 timescale,	a	daughter	 that	had	just	come	out	of	chemotherapy,	and	not	knowing-	there’s	a	point	at	which	it’s	just	overload	isn’t	it.		And	all	those	people	who	say	you’re	playing	god,	I	think	you	need	to	spend	a	day	in	someone	else’s	shoes.		I	say	that	to	people,	I	can’t	ever	really	articulate	what	it	is	like.	(Cara,	NHS	NIPD	patient)	
	Cara’s	positive	experience	of	receiving	support	from	within	clinical	genetics	-	of	receiving	clear	and	direct	affirmation	 that	her	decision	regarding	abortion	could	be	approved	and	treated	as	acceptable	and	legitimate	-	is	contrasted	here	with	her	inability	to	talk	to	others	more	generally,	and	her	clear	perception	of	-	as	a	result	of	becoming	enrolled	within	the	abortion	 experience	 -	 being	 subject	 to	 acute	 moral	 judgment.	 	 The	 interview	 itself	provided	a	space	from	within	which	Cara	was	able	to	articulate	her	experience,	again,	 in	contrast	 to	 her	 reported	 inability	 to	 speak	 openly	 about	 her	 experiences	 of	 prenatal	testing	and	selective	termination	elsewhere.		Cara’s	willingness	to	talk	about	her	abortion	with	 me,	 coupled	 and	 contrasted	 with	 her	 reported	 experiences	 of	 feeling	 ‘judged	 and	
defensive’	 more	 generally,	 suggests	 that	 she	 had	 experienced	 a	 need	 or	 desire	 –	accompanied	 by	 a	 (socially	 and	 culturally	 constructed)	 inability	 however	 -	 to	 talk	more	widely	about	her	experience.	 	Abortion’s	positioning	as	a	 ‘public	secret’	 seems	 to	have	a	very	direct	 impact	on	 the	experience	of	prenatal	 testing	here:	Cara	has	been	silenced	by	secrecy	and,	as	she	explains,	this	entails	that	she	‘cant	ever	really	articulate	what	it	is	like’.		Cara’s	 account	 also	 points	 towards	 the	 power	 of	 the	 genetics	 clinic	 –	 and	 the	 power	 of	medical	 care	 -	 here,	 in	 being	 able	 to	 confer	 legitimacy	 on	 such	 difficult	 and	 contested	
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decisions,	and	provide	crucial	(and	rare)	support	to	those	charged	with	facing	stigmatised	and	 deeply	 problematic	 encounters	 with	 abortion:	 ‘those	 three	words.	 I	 cried.	 You	 know	
those	words	were	so	important	to	me	in	terms	of	somebody	going,	that’s	ok.			Accounts	of	 stigma	also	arose	within	descriptions	of	 the	professional	 lives	of	 those	who	are	 most	 closely	 implicated	 in	 guiding	 the	 patient	 decision	 making	 process	 around	diagnosis	and	abortion.		Natalie,	a	consultant	clinical	geneticist,	explained	how	she	felt	the	prenatal	 field	 stood	apart	 from	other	 areas	of	medical	practice	 in	 its	willingness	 to	deal	with	the	‘messiness’	of	testing,	even	within	the	context	of	clinical	genetics:	 ‘I	think	we	are	
quite	brave	as	a	service,	in	that	we	do	the	hard	stuff’	(an	description	that	very	clearly	echoes	Bosk’s	 (Bosk	 1992,	 p.xiv)	 ethnographic	 account	 of	 how	 the	 genetics	 clinic	 appears	 as	 a	
‘mop	up	 service’).	 	Natalie	 reflects	 on	 the	 particular	 challenges	 that	 the	 prenatal	 testing	context	 raises,	 as	 a	 field	 that	 is	 subject	 to	 intense	 levels	 of	 political	 and	 moral	interrogation.	 	The	language	that	she	employs	also	points	directly	towards	the	contested	nature	 of	 prenatal	 genetics	 -	 she	 speaks	 of	 ‘emotive’	work,	 outcomes	 that	 can	 end	 in	
‘tragedy’,	experiences	of	being	accused	of	‘murder’,	and	describes	the	more	difficult	aspects	of	her	prenatal	work	as	concerning	‘the	death	of	hope’:	
What	do	you	think	is	particular	about	the	prenatal	field?	Um,	 I	 think	 it’s	 very	 emotive.	 	 I’ve	 had	 the,	 ‘you	 cant	murder	my	 baby,	 I	won’t	let	you’,	you	know?		There’s	a	timeframe.	 	It	can,	all	of	it	can	end	in	the	 death	 of	 a	 baby	 one	way	 or	 another.	 	 You	 get	 the	 tragedy	 of	 a	much	wanted	 baby	 who	 is	 affected,	 so	 you	 will	 have	 a	 woman	 who	 has	 had	eleven,	twelve,	thirteen	terminations	because	of	a	risk	of	whatever.	 	Then	you	will	 have	 the	 other	 side	 of	 it	where	 there	 is	 a	 baby	who,	 everything	looked	fine	and	then	suddenly	there	is	something	wrong.		So	it’s	about	the	death	of	hope,	expectations.		I	think	it’s	hard	for	the	counsellors,	I	think	it’s	hard	 to	 tell	a	woman	her	baby	 is	affected.	 	 I	 think	emotionally,	you	know	we	do	tough	stuff	 in	genetics	all	 the	 time,	but	 there	 is	something	about	 it	being	a	baby	that’s	really	quite	hard.	(Natalie,	consultant	clinical	geneticist)		Natalie’s	 characterisation	of	 pregnancy	 loss	 here	 as	 being	 about	 the	death	 of	 ‘hope’	 and	‘expectation’	is	particularly	nuanced	and	sensitive:	she	avoids	the	pitfall	of	having	to	speak	of	either	a	baby	or	a	 fetus	-	of	having	to	emphasise	either	the	relational	or	 the	rational	 -	and	 articulates	 instead	 the	 powerful	 symbolic	 meaning	 that	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 ‘wanted’	pregnancy,	and	the	figure	of	a	‘healthy’	baby,	holds.		In	doing	so	she	points	towards	some	of	the	underlying	social	and	cultural	reasons	why	experiences	of	abortion	in	this	particular	context	are	so	contested	and	problematic.	 	Elsewhere,	Rachel,	another	genetic	counsellor	speaks	of	how	she	feels	her	patients	are	exposed	to	‘common	themes	of	being	judged’	and	she	describes	how	she	approaches	talk	of	abortion	or	‘termination’	in	the	clinic	with	much	difficulty	and	caution:	
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And	 I	 think,	 it’s	 not	 a	 nice	 subject,	 and	 I	 think	 how	 do	 you?	 	 And	 in	my	counselling	I	do	say	look	this	is	not	a	pleasant	topic	to	talk	about,	it’s	a	very	sensitive	area	and	it’s	a	very	personal	area.		Sam,	a	genetic	counselling	student	who	had	experience	of	counselling	patients	using	NIPD	during	her	 clinical	 placements,	 explicitly	 linked	 experiences	 of	 testing,	 abortion,	 secrecy	and	stigma	in	relation	to	the	development	of	NIPD,	exploring	how	women’s	experiences	of	stigma	and	moral	judgment	could	come	to	be	mitigated	by	the	early	testing	opportunities	NIPD	technology	may	afford:	If	 a	 person	 has	 the	 option	 of	 terminating	 earlier,	 so	 that	 people	 are	 not	aware	 of	 the	 pregnancy	 it	might	 be	 easier	 for	 her.	 	 You	 know,	 kind	 of	 in	terms	of	no	one	has	 to	know,	and	she	won’t	have	stigma	attached	 to	her.		So	that	might	be	an	advantage,	you	know,	to	have	it	in	Ireland	anyway,	it’s	definitely	a	pro.	 	And	 in	 the	UK,	 I’m	sure	people	will	 ask	questions	about	pregnancy	and	if	women	will	choose	to	terminate	then.		You’d	like	to	think	there	is	no	stigma,	but	sometimes	there	is,	or	you	know	gossip-	and	people	can	take	that	into	account	when	they	are	choosing	whether	or	not	to	have	a	termination.	 	How	will	everyone	else,	how	will	society	view	me	if	I	have	a	termination?	(Sam,	genetic	counselling	student)		Sam	had	previous	experience	of	working	in	Ireland	(where	abortion	is	illegal	under	most	circumstances,	including	after	the	majority	of	prenatal	diagnoses).		She	is	clear	that,	within	the	 context	 of	 a	 healthcare	 system	 where	 abortion	 remains	 illegal,	 abortion	 is	 highly	stigmatised.	 	 She	 describes	 how	 early	 diagnosis,	 and	 abortion,	may	 allow	women	 living	within	 such	 constraints	 to	 preserve	 the	 secrecy	 that	 surrounds	 their	 pregnancy:	 ‘no	one	
has	 to	 know,	 and	 she	won’t	 have	 stigma	 attached	 to	 her’	 –	 it	 recognised	 here	 then,	 that	within	such	contexts	secrecy	can	act	in	a	way	that	preserves	privacy	and	prevents	harm	–	where	the	exposure	or	 ‘revelation’	 (Taussig	1999)	of	a	secret	may	be	problematic,	 	 	 then	‘ignorance	has	its	uses’	(Croissant	2014).		She	also	highlights	the	heavy	moral	pressure	that	women	may	 experience	 in	 connection	with	 their	 choices,	 because	 of	 the	 politicised	 and	controversial	 debates	 that	 continue	 to	 surround	 abortion:	 ‘people	 can	 take	 that	 into	
account	when	they	are	choosing	whether	or	not	to	have	a	termination.	 	How	will	everyone	
else,	 how	will	 society	 view	me	 if	 I	 have	 a	 termination?’.	 	 Stigma,	 as	 it	 is	 employed	 here,	functions	 as	 a	 powerful	 resource.	 	 Talk	 of	 stigma	 allows	 Sam	 to	 frame	 NIPD	 as	 an	opportunity	 to	 enhance	 ‘reproductive	 autonomy’	 by	 constructing	 a	 need	 for	 a	 test	 like	NIPD,	 that	may	mitigate	against	broader	 social	harm.	 	 Such	an	approach,	whilst	offering	practical	 advantage	 in	 an	 already-problematic	 testing	 context	 (where	 abortion	 is	 so	heavily	polarised),	nevertheless	 contributes	 to	–	and	risks	exacerbating	–	 the	 framing	of	abortion	 as	 a	 public	 secret.	 	 Whilst	 Sam	 focuses	 upon	 abortion	 as	 it	 is	 experienced	 in	Ireland	(though	not	exclusively),	such	issues	were	also	explored	in	relation	to	the	UK,	and	again	in	relation	to	the	development	of	NIPD	in	particular.	
	 105	
	Caitlin	 -	who	was	 involved	 in	 the	provision	of	private	NIPD	tests	 -	explained	 that	 talk	of	‘termination’	had	started	to	enter	into	these	early	clinical	encounters	with	NIPD,	and	she	explained	 that	 she	 felt	 this	 was	 a	 result	 of	 the	 type	 of	 demographic	 and	 clinical;	information	that	commercial	test	providers	had	been	requesting.		Once	again,	her	account	of	how	such	discussions	play	out	explicitly	 links	experiences	of	testing,	abortion,	secrecy	and	stigma	in	relation	to	the	development	of	NIPD:	[commercial	NIPT	 test	 providers]	 ask	 things,	 some	 of	 it	 I	 suppose	 seems	unnecessary-	 so	 rather	 than	 just	 asking	 about	 previous	 pregnancies	 they	want	 to	know	how	many	terminations,	miscarriages,	molar	pregnancies…		And	I	think	there	is	sometimes	a	stigma	attached	to-	especially	doing	these	tests	when	you	ask,	 is	 this	your	 first	pregnancy?	 	And	 if	 they	say	oh	no,	 I	have	 had	 two	 terminations.	 	 And	 then	 you	 ask	 why.	 	 I	 think	 just	 to	understand	how	people’s	feelings	are	around	them,	their	emotions.	(Caitlin,	midwife	and	private	NIPT	provider)		Caitlin	characterises	 talk	of	abortion	here	as	emotional	and	difficult,	and	she	relates	 this	very	 directly	 to	 the	 ‘stigma	attached’	 to	 experiences	 of	 abortion.	 	 She	 expresses	 a	 clear	sense	of	reluctance	around	the	task	of	 initiating	talk	of	abortion,	as	she	describes	feeling	required	 to	 prompt	 a	 conversation	 that	 ‘seems	 unnecessary’:	 despite	 her	 professional	familiarity	with	pre-test	 counselling	 for	prenatal	 screening,	 abortion	 is	 experienced	as	 a	‘disruptive’	issue	that	threatens	the	stability	of	the	clinical	encounter,	prompting	atypical	and	uncomfortable	conversations.		
	Kate,	 one	 of	 the	 few	 interviewees	 who	 clearly	 and	 directly	 articulated	 her	 position	 on	abortion,	and	who	emerged	as	a	politicised	and	dissenting	voice,	also	explored	the	issue	of	stigma,	as	it	is	connected	with	abortion.		Kate,	however,	shifted	the	locus	of	conversation	away	 from	 talk	 of	 ‘individual’	 choice	 and	 decision	 making	 around	 prenatal	 testing,	focusing	more	explicitly	upon	the	broader	social	and	cultural	shaping	of	 the	relationship	between	 abortion	 and	 stigma.	 	 	Within	 her	 account,	 Kate	 pointed	 towards	 not	 only	 the	significance	 of	 stigma,	 but	 the	 potentially	 harmful	 implications	 of	 abortion	 secrecy,	particularly	 as	 the	 emerging	 technology	 of	 NIPD	 extends	 out	 into	 mainstream	 prenatal	testing	practice:	We’d	 need	 to	 do	 more	 research	 to	 get	 to	 the	 bottom	 of	 it.	 	 My	 um,	 gut	feeling	it	that	there’s	more	and	more	of	a	stigma	around	being	an	abortion	provider	 or	 learning	 the	 skills.	 	 It’s	 absolutely	 outrageous	 to	me	 that	 not	every	obstetrician	and	gynecologist	has	to	learn	to	do	a	D&E.		It	should	be	a	part	 of	 the	 basic	 training,	 but	 no	 it	 isn’t,	 the	 RCOG50	don’t	 want	 to	 get	involved	 in	 it…	 I’ve	been	 talking	quite	 a	 lot	 about	 it	 in	presentations	 I’ve	given	and	often	 there	will	be	doctors	 that	come	up	 to	me	afterwards	and																																									 																						50	Royal	College	of	Obstetricians	and	Gynecologists	
	 106	
say	 it’s	 such	a	horrible	procedure	 to	do	at	 fourteen	weeks,	and	you	 think	come	on	you	are	a	bloody	doctor.	 	And	you	know,	you	say	 I’m	not	asking	you	 personally	 to	 do	 it	 but	 it’s-	 removing	 a	 gangrenous	 leg	 is	 pretty	horrible,	 it’s,	 it’s	 part	 of	 the	 job.	 	 So	 it’s	 political,	 I	 think	 the	 anti-choice	movement	 have	 been	 quite	 successful	 in	 upping	 the	 stigma,	 and	 distaste	and	 squeamishness	 about	 abortion	 in	 general…	 It’s	 quite	 sensitive	 and	ethically	charged.			(Kate,	policy	maker)		Kate	 very	 clearly	 suggests	 here	 that	 abortion	 is	 approached	 and	 constructed,	 by	 policy	makers	 and	 clinicians,	 as	 something	 that	 is	 highly	 stigmatised	 -	 a	 ‘sensitive	and	ethically	
charged’	 experience.	 	 She	 claims	 that	 the	 ‘stigma	 and	 distaste	 and	 squeamishness’	 that	surrounds	the	practice	of	abortion	is	heavily	institutionalised	within	UK	medical	practice,	being	present	at	both	the	organisational	level	-	 ‘the	RCOG	don’t	want	to	get	involved’	-	and	the	personal	level	-	 ‘there	will	be	doctors	that	come	up	to	me	afterwards	and	say	it’s	such	a	
horrible	procedure	to	do	at	fourteen	weeks’.	 	Given,	 then	that	Kate	appeared	as	one	of	 the	very	few	people	who	were	able	to	talk	directly	of	‘abortion’	within	the	accounts	provided	by	 interviewees	 across	 the	 board,	 the	 data	 generated	 here	 (though	 it	 is	 a	 very	 small	sample	and	may	not	be	treated	as	representative)	would	seem	to	provide	support	for	the	claim	 that	 abortion,	 despite	 its	 centrality	 within	 the	 practice	 of	 prenatal	 testing,	 is	approached	with	much	reluctance	and	‘squeamishness’.				A	 number	 of	 interviewees	made	 comparisons	with	 differing	 political	 and	 legal	 contexts	that	surround	abortion	as	it	is	practiced	outside	the	UK.		Such	comparisons	highlighted	the	presence	 of	 alternative	 discourses	 around	 abortion,	 and	 pointed	 towards	 how	 abortion	secrecy	and	(non)talk	 relates	closely	 to	broader	social	and	cultural	 considerations.	 	 Sam	had	 spent	 a	 long	 period	 of	 time	 in	 Ireland	 (where	 abortion	 is	 illegal	 under	 most	circumstances,	 including	 for	 the	vast	majority	of	prenatal	diagnoses),	 and	 she	described	how	 her	 understanding	 of	 abortion	 had	 been	 shaped	 by	 her	 exposure	 to	 an	 education	system	that	actively	encouraged	talk	of	abortion:	I	remember	even	growing	up…	we	were	taught	about	terminations	from	a	really	early	stage,	 I	was	 thirteen,	 fourteen	and	shown	 images	of	 it.	 	And	 I	think	 growing	 up	 in-	 it’s	 funny	 but	 I	 think	 in	 Ireland	 we	 have	 a	 better	understanding	of	 terminations	because	we	are	 told	 you	know,	 this	 is	 not	what	you	do,	and	maybe	we	are	a	bit	more	educated	on	terminations	than	you	are	over	here,	because	it	is	an	option.	(Sam,	genetic	counselling	student)		Sam’s	 account	 seems	 to	 throw	 into	 question	 the	 idea	 that	 abortion	 secrecy	 may	unproblematically	 and	 consistently	 be	 experienced	 and	 understood	 as	 harmful.	 	 She	explains	that	where	access	to	abortion	is	routine	(in	the	UK),	there	exists	a	corresponding	
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lack	of	knowledge	(and	a	high	level	of	secrecy	and	silence)	around	abortion.		Contrastingly,	she	reports	that	there	is	a	greater	knowledge	of	abortion	where	access	is	denied,	because	people	are	actively	 ‘told,	you	know,	this	is	not	what	you	do’.	 	Where	abortion	 is	 so	 clearly	politicised	and	made	publically	problematic	then,	it	is	explicitly	not	a	matter	of	secrecy	or	silence.	 	 This	 may	 suggest	 that	 abortion	 secrecy,	 as	 it	 operates	 within	 the	 context	 of	cultures	where	abortion	is	made	a	contentious	and	problematic	‘concern’,	may	function	in	a	way	 that	protects	 rather	 than	harms	 those	 that	 face	personal	 entanglement	with	 such	issues.			
Professional	anxieties:	the	routinisation	of	NIPD	(and	NIPT)	and	its	alignment	with	
abortion		Within	 the	previous	chapter	 I	explored	 the	 implications	of	a	persistent	and	notable	shift	that	has	occurred	in	the	field,	from	talk	of	NIPD	to	talk	of	NIPT,	and	I	connected	this	shift	to	 practices	 of	 division,	 classification	 and	 categorisation.	 	 Established	 categories	 of	‘screening’	and	‘diagnosis’	were	invoked,	as	both	clinical	and	scientific	experts	compared	NIPD	 with	 trusted	 and	 routine	 technologies,	 and	 examined	 specifically	 the	 accuracy	 of	NIPD.		As	they	discussed	at	length	the	meaning	of	NIPD’s	relative	accuracy	or	inaccuracy,	experts	 explored	 complex	 questions	 regarding	 how	 NIPD	 may	 fit	 into,	 or	 how	 it	 may	trouble,	 established	 boundaries	 and	 disrupt	 associated	 clinical	 practices.	 	 The	 potential	collapsing	 of	 the	 boundary	 between	 NIPT/screening	 and	 NIPD/diagnosis	 was	 also	frequently	discussed	 in	relation	to	practical,	moral	and	political	 ‘concerns’	and	 ‘worries’:		experts	problematised	the	collapse	of	such	boundaries,	making	repeated	reference	to	the	potential	routinisation	and	normalisation	of	NIPD.				Those	 involved	 in	the	development	and	provision	of	NIPD/diagnosis	explicitly	described	tests	for	Down’s	syndrome	as	tools	for	screening	and	not	diagnosis,	stressing	that	if	NIPT	tests	were	 to	 give	 a	 ‘positive’	 result,	 indicating	 the	 presence	 of	 Down’s	 syndrome,	 then	such	 results	 ought	 to	 be	 ‘backed	 up’	 by	 repeating	 the	 testing	 process	 using	 routine	 and	trusted	(but	‘invasive’	and	potentially	harmful)	technologies	such	as	amniocentesis	or	CVS.			The	 possibility	 that	 women	 might	 seek	 ‘termination’	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 NIPT	 Down’s	syndrome	 testing	 alone	 was	 repeatedly	 raised	 as	 an	 issue	 of	 concern,	 and	 gave	 rise	 to	much	anxiety:	experts	were	highly	apprehensive	about	NIPT’s	increasing	closeness	to,	and	possible	alignment	with,	the	practice	of	abortion.		A	number	of	NIPD	scientists	raised	this	 issue	directly	during	interviews:	Chloe,	who	was	working	on	the	UK-based	development	of	NIPD,	expressed	her	concern	that	‘because	NIPT	
is	a	screening	tool	there	would	be	a	real	risk	that	if	somebody	got	a	positive	result	they	would	
go	 an	 have	 a	 termination,	 they	 wouldn’t	 have	 an	 invasive	 test	 for	 confirmation’.	 	 Beth,	
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another	scientist	working	in	the	NIPD	field,	acknowledged	that	although	the	test	was	not	diagnostic,	 because	 of	 its	 high	 level	 of	 accuracy,	 ‘although	 its	 only	 a	 blood	 test	 the	
implications	are	 just	as	great	as	having	an	invasive	test’.	 	Particular	 anxieties	were	 raised	around	the	potential	generation	of	 ‘false	positives’,	which	could,	 if	diagnostic	testing	was	not	sought	as	back-up,	result	in	the	termination	of	healthy	fetuses:		So	the	false	positive	rate,	we	can	kind	of	cope	with	by	offering	women	an	invasive	test	to	confirm	and	I	think	that	should	be,	for	the	time	being,	good	practice.		Whether	we	would	figure	that,	I	don't	know,	it	would	be	horrible	if	someone	aborted	a	baby	on	the	basis	of	a	false	positive	result.	(Beth,	NIPD	researcher)		Throughout	 many	 expert	 interviews	 the	 looming	 presence	 of	 ‘false	 positives’,	 and	 the	possible	demise	-	through	‘therapeutic’	abortion	-	of	 ‘healthy’	babies	arose	as	a	source	of	much	anxiety	and	concern.	 It	became	clear	 that	more	powerful	 ‘dividing	practices’	were	being	 achieved	 through	 NIPT’s	 enrolment	 within	 prenatal	 screening	 particularly	 –	 the	figure	of	the	healthy	fetus/baby/pregnancy	(constructed	as	vulnerable	and	valuable)	was	divided	from	the	figure	of	the	‘affected’	fetus/baby/pregnancy,	which	was	constructed	as	an	object	or	an	outcome	to	be	systematically	 identified	and,	potentially,	 ‘disposed’.	 	This	underlying	 (normative)	division,	between	 the	 ‘healthy’	and	 the	 ‘affected’,	 is	 foundational	to	 the	 practice	 of	 prenatal	 screening,	 and	 came	 to	 inform	 much	 of	 the	 discussion	 and	debate	around	NIPD.		The	implications	of	such	conversations	are	explored	in	more	depth	within	chapters	six	and	seven.				The	ambiguity	and	uncertainty	that	remains	attached	to	NIPT,	as	 it	enters	the	clinic	as	a	99.9%	accurate	(but	not	100%	accurate)	test,	which	‘troubles’	the	boundary	of	screening	and	 diagnosis,	 leads	 to	much	 professional	 anxiety	 from	within	 clinical	 genetics,	 around	potential	 loss	 of	 oversight	 and	 expert	 guidance	 regarding	 women’s	 decision	 making	around	prenatal	diagnosis	and	abortion.		The	presence	of	such	professional	identity-work,	which	 (when	 successful)	 maintains	 a	 space	 for	 clinical	 judgment	 and	 expertise,	 echoes	Latimer’s	 account	 of	 the	 dysmorphology	 clinic,	 another	 space	within	which	 ‘moments	of	
ambiguity	and	undecidability	create	a	 space	of	deferral	 that	 legitimates	 the	need	 for	more	
expertise	and	more	technology	through	which	to	differentiate	the	genetic	and	fix	diagnoses’	(Latimer	2013,	p.200).		As	Natalie,	 a	 consultant	 clinical	 geneticist	 and	head	of	 the	prenatal	 section	of	 a	 regional	genetics	 service,	 discusses	 her	 thoughts	 on	 the	 development	 of	 NIPT	 for	 Down’s	syndrome,	 she	 voices	 a	 clear	 sense	 of	 frustration	 and	 concern	 at	what	 she	 views	 is	 the	most	likely	path	NIPT	technology	will	take;	the	routinised	and	widespread	application	of	testing	within	NHS-based	prenatal	screening	services:	
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Services	have	no	business	doing	it	unless	they	can	manage	the	fallout,	and	I	think	that	 is	 the	trick	that	everybody	is	missing,	because	we	are	certainly	not	going	to	step	in	and	mop	it	up,	they	can	sod	off	frankly.		And	I	think	this	is	where	society	and	the	NHS	are	not	getting	it.	 	That	if,	you	know	it’s	like	the	Down’s	 syndrome	 screening,	 and	 if,	 believe	me	 it	will	 go	 to	 the	 least	qualified	person	 in	clinic,	 that’s	where	 it	will	end	up.	 	And	 that’s	 fine,	cos	we	are	not	mopping	it	up.		Because	we	can’t,	we	haven’t	got	the	hours	to	do	it.		And	we	will	stick	to,	to	rare	diseases	and,	and	I	think	it’s	a	real	shame,	I	think	it’s	a	real	shame.	(Natalie,	consultant	clinical	geneticist)		Again,	Natalie	draws	on	the	metaphor	of	‘messiness’	to	highlight	in	particular	the	difficult	and	challenging	character	of	the	genetics	clinic	(Bosk’s	 ‘mop	up	service’)	–	a	space	which,	she	 fears,	 may	 come	 to	 be	 managed	 (and	 perhaps	 colonised)	 by	 those	 without	 the	appropriate	and	required	expertise.	 	 	As	genetics	professionals	problematise	the	possible	‘routine’	and	‘normal’	future	application	of	NIPT	in	particular,	they	extend	their	criticism	beyond	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 technology	 at	 hand,	 expressing	 much	 frustration	 at	 how	
current	Down’s	syndrome	screening	is	managed	in	the	clinic.		They	speak	of	being	‘aware	
of	 how	 flawed	 the	 Down’s	 syndrome	 counselling	 is’	 and	 describe	 fears	 regarding	 the	possibility	that	the	task	of	providing	NIPD	for	Down’s	syndrome	testing	‘will	go	to	the	least	
qualified	person	in	the	clinic’	–	a	critical	and	dissenting	position	 that	 is	nevertheless	very	well	 supported	 by	 the	 findings	 of	 recent	 ethnographic	work	 examining	 the	 provision	 of	routine	 Down’s	 syndrome	 screening	 in	 the	 UK	 clinic	 (Thomas	 2014).	 	 Although	 these	experts	 are	 approaching	NIPT	 from	within	 the	 clinical	 genetics	 community	 explicitly	 -	 a	space	 where	 (rare	 and	 serious)	 ‘at-risk’	 pregnancies	 are	 managed,	 and	 the	 need	 for	diagnostic	certainty	is	accordingly	high	–	and	a	location	within	which	concerns	around	the	routinisation	of	 counselling,	 a	highly-valued	practice	within	 the	genetics	 clinic,	might	be	expected,	similar	accounts	were	also	provided	by	scientists	working	within	NIPD	research:	You	think,	with	the	Down's	syndrome	screening	because	it’s-	it’s	staggered,	it’s	not	so	 important,	because	by	time	you	get	 to	the	point	where	you	are	having	 an	 amnio	 you	 know	 you	 are	 at	 high	 risk,	 you've	 been	 counselled,	you’ve	had	everything.	 	Whereas	 if	we	 start	 just	bleeding	 somebody,	 and	then	say	da-da!	 	Sorry,	you've	got	Down's	syndrome.	That	might	be	bang-	might	sort	of	smack	them	in	the	face.	 	So	this	kind	of-	although	it’s	only	a	blood	test,	 the	 implications	of	 that	are	 just	as	great	as	having	an	 invasive	test.	(Beth,	NIPD	scientist)		Beth’s	account	mirrors	those	provided	by	Lucy	and	Natalie,	and	she	draws	the	discussion	back,	 once	 again,	 towards	 the	 contingency	 that	 surrounds	 the	 NIPD/NIPT	 divide:	 ‘the	
implications	 of	 that	 are	 just	 as	 great’.	 	Within	 this	 account,	 fears	 over	 routinisation	 are	explicitly	 connected	 to	 the	 potential	 collapsing	 of	 the	 screening/diagnosis	 boundary	 –	NIPT	 testing	 is	 presented	 as	 an	 activity	 that	 may	 hold	 unexpected	 and	 difficult	
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implications:	 ‘that	 might	 be	 bang-	 might	 sort	 of	 smack	 them	 in	 the	 face’.	 	 As	 anxieties	around	 the	 routinisation	of	NIPT	were	 repeated	 across	 expert	 accounts,	 it	 became	 clear	that	 a	 deeper	 level	 of	 anxiety	 lay	 beneath	 the	 surface.	 	 Accounts	 provided	 by	 clinical	geneticists	and	scientists	alike	began	to	point	towards	a	sense	of	profound	discomfort	and	unease	around	NIPT’s	clear	potential	to	raise	concerns	around	more	broad-ranging	social	and	 cultural	 issues	 such	 as	 an	 intolerance	 of	 disability,	 constraints	 on	 reproductive	‘choice’,	and	the	widespread	normalisation	of	genetic	diagnosis:	I	 do	 wonder	 if	 there	 will	 be	 a	 shift-	 well	 it	 wasn’t	 interventional,	 you	weren’t	 going	 to	 put	 your	 pregnancy	 a	 risk,	 so	 why	 didn’t	 you	 have	 the	test?...	There’s	much	more	sympathy	and	understanding	 for	 that	position,	when	yes,	she	could	have	lost	a	healthy	baby.	 	Whereas	you	are	not	going	to	 put	 the	 pregnancy	 at	 risk	 from	 the	 new	 technology,	 and	 therefore	 the	question	is	why	didn’t	you	have	it?		So	is	there	going	to	be	less	tolerance	of	disability,	and	less	tolerance	of	not	testing?	I	don’t	know.			(Rachel,	genetic	counsellor)		Here,	 it	 is	NIPD	and	NIPT’s	non-invasiveness,	 its	departure	 from	routine	 technologies	of	prenatal	diagnosis,	that	prompts	such	acute	concern.		Whilst	the	‘invasiveness’	of	current	testing	 is	seen	to	act	as	a	kind	of	barrier	 to	widespread	utilisation	of	prenatal	diagnosis,	NIPD	 and	 NIPT	 circumnavigate	 such	 boundaries,	 and	 in	 doing	 so,	 potentially	 place	 the	issues	 raised	 by	 ‘selective’	 or	 ‘therapeutic’	 abortion	 –	 the	 potential	 exacerbation	 of	
‘intolerance’	around	disability,	and	the	associated	commodification	and	‘perfectionism’	of	human	 life	 -	 on	 a	 far	 greater	 scale	 (the	 discussion	 of	 such	 issues	 is	 explored	 in	 greater	depth	within	chapter	six).		Elsewhere,	issues	regarding	the	potential	routinisation	of	NIPD	and	NIPT	tests	that	expand	far	beyond	the	current	scope	of	routine	prenatal	testing	(but	which	are,	increasingly,	being	made	real	–	see	chapter	two)	are	explored:	
And	how	would	you	imagine	the	state	of	NIPD	science	to	be	in	five	years	time	
then?	I	don’t	 know	 it’s	 a	bit	 scary	 in	 some	ways	because	um,	 like	being	able	 to	sequence	a	whole	genome,	which	they	have	shown	that	they	are	able	to	do,	and	then	what	do	you?	What	do	you	tell	someone	about	that,	and	what	do	you	actually	use	it	for?		And	what’s	important	you	know,	do	we	really	need	to	be	investing	so	much	in	doing	that?		So,	but	I	can	easily	see	it	going	that	way,	when	you	speak	to	women	about	what	is	important	to	them	and	they	sort	 of	 say	 they	want	 as	much	 information	 about	 their	 baby	 as	 possible,	and	so	if	you	offer	them	a	test	and	say	well	we	can	tell	you	everything,	as	if	they	are	going	to	say	no	(laughs).		You	know,	they	will	feel	pushed	into,	to	saying	yes,	I	want	to	consume	that,	if	it’s	available	I	want	it,	so.		(Emily,	NIPD	researcher)		The	account	presented	in	this	thesis,	along	with	other	critical	accounts,	highlights	the	deep	and	 powerful	 alignment	 that	 exists	 between	 the	 fields	 (and	 values)	 of	 healthcare,	bioscience	 and	 capital,	which	 in	 turn	 facilitates	 the	 rapid	 and	 successful	 enrolment	 and	
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translation	of	testing	in	the	clinic.		Within	Emily’s	account,	however,	it	is	parents	(and	not	developers,	 commercial	 providers,	 or	 clinicians)	 who	 are	 figured	 as	 enthusiastic	 (if	somewhat	coerced	–	‘pushed’),	‘consumers’	of	this	new	prenatal	testing	technology.		Emily	mobilises	powerful	discourses	of	reassurance	and	risk	(Lippman	1991),	and	suggests	that	the	parents	who	want	to	know	‘everything’	mobilise	them	too,	as	part	of	their	quest	to	find	
‘as	much	information	about	their	baby	as	possible’.		Again,	NIPD	and	NIPT’s	non-invasiveness,	coupled	with	its	clear	potential	for	expansion	in	technological	scope	and	in	volume	of	use,	prompts	anxiety	and	concern	around	the	future	–	and	specifically	because	it	 is	so	closely	connected	to	the	practice	of	abortion.	 	It	 is	only	through	 the	 exercise	 of	 ‘selective’	 or	 ‘therapeutic’	 abortion	 that	 NIPD	 threatens	 to	diminish	tolerance	of	disability	(by	facilitating	selection	against	‘affected’	fetuses)	and	it	is	only	through	the	connection	to	selective	abortion	that	widespread	genetic	testing	via	NIPD	might	 come	 to	 raise	 concerns	 such	 as	 those	 outlined	 by	 Emily	 here	 (by	 expanding	 the	range	of	conditions	and	diseases	that	are	made	legitimate	for	‘disposal’).		Emily	asks	here	-	
‘what	do	you	use	it	for?’	 -	but	she	does	not	suggest	an	answer,	and	she	avoids	making	the	connection	with	abortion	explicit.		Researchers	elsewhere,	however,	make	the	connection	clear:	Chloe	 (an	NIPD	researcher)	 for	 instance,	explains	 that	 ‘because	NIPT	is	a	screening	
tool,	there	would	be	a	real	risk	that	if	somebody	got	a	positive	result	they	would	go	and	have	
a	termination,	they	wouldn’t	have	an	invasive	test	for	confirmation’,	suggesting	that	the	root	cause	of	anxiety	around	NIPD	and	NIPT’s	routinisation	lies	in	the	‘risk’	of	women	choosing	abortion	 without	 confirmatory	 diagnosis	 via	 routine,	 normal,	 trusted	 technologies	 of	diagnosis,	and	therefore	without	medical	legitimisation.				Kate,	who	was	involved	in	the	very	early	discussion	of	NIPD	policy,	and	who	had	regular	professional	 contact	 with	 women	 making	 decisions	 regarding	 prenatal	 diagnosis,	suggested	that	such	‘risks’	were,	in	fact,	very	likely	to	manifest	in	practice:	There	will	be	those	women	that	say,	stop,	I	want	to	get	off,	I	can’t	do	this,	I	cannot	go	through	these	weeks	and	weeks	of	anxiety	 to	be	you	know,	 for	that	to	stay	with	me	potentially	after	birth…	and	they	say	no	I’m	going	to	terminate	on	the	strength	of	what	is	uncertain	information.		(Kate,	policy	maker)		Bryant,	 discussing	 the	 potential	 psychological	 effects	 of	 NIPT’s	 routinisation	 within	prenatal	 screening	 programmes,	 questions	 the	 practical	 and	 moral	 validity	 of	 asking	women	 to	 pass	 through	 further	 processes	 of	 medical	 ‘legitimation’	 in	 order	 to	 access	abortion	after	a	‘positive	‘NIPT	result,	suggesting	that:	If	 NIPT	 is	 added	 to	 the	 current	 NHS	 screening	 test	 repertoire	 as	 a	contingent	test,	this	would,	however,	mean	that	some	women	will	undergo	
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four	prenatal	 testing	procedures	before	receiving	a	definitive	diagnosis:	a	nuchal	fold	scan	and	a	blood	test,	a	NIPT	test	if	the	result	is	higher	than	the	cut-off	risk,	and	a	subsequent	 invasive	test	 if	 they	receive	a	positive	NIPT	result.	For	some	women,	termination	of	pregnancy	may	actually	take	place	at	a	later	stage	in	the	pregnancy	than	with	current	screening	protocols.	(Bryant	2014)		Accounts	 provided	 here	 by	women	who	 had	 used	NIPT	 tests	 for	Down’s	 syndrome	 (via	private	UK	clinics)	seemed	to	point	towards	a	possible	future	within	which	many	of	these	professional	 fears	 and	 anxieties	 around	 the	 routinisation	 or	 normalisation	 of	 ‘selective’	abortion	may	be	realised.		Alana,	a	private	patient,	had	used	NIPD	after	having	experience	of	 private	 prenatal	 care	 within	 previous	 pregnancies.	 	 The	 pathway	 taken	 to	 NIPT	technology	 was	 largely	 unproblematic	 for	 Alana:	 testing	 took	 place	 within	 a	 clinic	 she	trusted,	and	involved	a	professional	team	with	which	she	had	already	been	made	familiar.		She	was	 interviewed	 during	 the	 third	 trimester	 of	 her	 pregnancy,	 after	 having	 received	
‘screen	negative’	 NIPT	 results	 (Alana	was	 told	 that	 the	 test	 had	 a	 one	 in	 10,000	 ‘risk’	 of	error).	 	Whilst	Alana	was	positive	about	 the	testing	experience	overall,	as	she	recounted	the	time	spent	waiting	for	results,	she	described	the	anxieties	that	had,	at	that	point,	come	to	the	fore:	You	know,	it	doesn’t	matter	how	bad	the	disease	is	if	you	come	back	with	low	 risk,	 does	 it?	 	 It’s	 only	 if	 it	 comes	 back	 as	 high	 risk,	 that	 you	 start	looking	into	it	more...	 	But	it	is	a	relief	when	you	get	your	results	through,	and	 they	 all	 say	 low	 risk.	 	 Even	 though	 you	 didn’t	 really	 know	 that	 you	were	anxious	before.		I	don’t	think	you	realise	how	anxious	you	are	about	it	until	 you	get	 your	 results.	 	 	And	 the	phone	 rings	 and	 they	 say	oh	 it’s	 the	clinic	with	your	results,	and	at	that	point	you	kind	of	hold	your	breath,	and	it’s	at	that	point	you	kind	of	realise	you	were	worried	about	it.	(Alana,	private	NIPT	patient)		Many	 professional	 anxieties	 around	 NIPD	 and	 NIPT’s	 routinisation	 are	 realised	 here:	Alana	approached	and	passed	 through	 testing	with	very	 little	knowledge	of	 the	diseases	tested	for,	she	did	not	place	any	particular	value	on	the	experience	of	pre-test	counselling	(suggesting	 that	 ‘it’s	only	if	 it	comes	back	as	high	risk,	that	you	start	looking	into	it	more’)	and	experienced	much	anxiety	and	uncertainty	as	she	waited	for	results.				Strathern	suggests	that	‘alongside	innovations	in	reproductive	medicine	come	innovations	in	
the	 way	 people	 turn	 them	 to	 their	 own	 ends’	 (Strathern	 1999,	 p.10),	 and	 within	 the	accounts	 of	 NIPD	 examined	 here	 we	 have	 an	 example	 of	 how	 the	 anticipation	 of	 such	phenomena	-	the	shaping	of	an	emerging	prenatal	testing	technology	by	the	patients	who	make	 use	 of	 it,	 rather	 than	 the	 clinicians	 and	 scientists	who	 are	 directly	 involved	 in	 its	development	and	application	–	greatly	exacerbates	professional	anxiety	around	the	test’s	
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possible	routinisation	and	normalisation.	 	Within	this	context	particularly,	the	stakes	are	already	 high:	 innovative	prenatal	 testing	 technologies	 and	 practices	 raise	 issues	 around	the	 ‘selection’	 of	 fetuses,	 babies,	 and	 pregnancies,	 and	 the	 sorting	 and	 dividing	 of	 the	population	 into	categories	of	 ‘normal’	and	 ‘abnormal’,	 ‘healthy’	and	 ‘diseased’.	 	Anxieties	around	 the	 routinisation	 of	 NIPD	 also	 belies	 a	 deeper,	 and	 (in	 the	 majority	 of	circumstances)	concealed,	anxiety	around	 the	potential	 routinisation	of	another	prenatal	technology:	 that	 of	 selective	 abortion.	 	 NIPD	 and	 NIPT’s	 characterisation	 as	 a	 powerful	technology,	holding	the	potential	to	bring	(near)	diagnostic	prenatal	testing	-	and	with	it	choices	 regarding	 selective	 abortion	 -	 to	 the	 pregnant	 population	 at	 large,	 begins	 to	emerge.		Such	anxieties,	in	turn,	point	towards	NIPD’s	potential	routinisation	to	become	a	significant	exercise	in	Foucauldian	‘biopower’:		We	 should	 understand	 the	 society	 of	 control…	 in	 which	 mechanisms	 of	command	are	ever	more	 “democratic”,	 ever	more	 immanent	 to	 the	 social	field,	 distributed	 throughout	 the	 brains	 and	 bodies	 of	 citizens.	 	 The	behaviours	 of	 social	 integration	 and	 exclusion	 proper	 to	 rule	 are	 thus	interiorized	within	the	subjects	themselves	(Hardt	and	Negri	2013,	p.216)		As	 technologies	 such	 as	 NIPD	 continue	 to	 become	 enrolled	 and	 translated	 into	 clinical	practice	-	entering	into	the	lives	of	‘high	risk’	women	receiving	specialist	care	in	the	form	of	 diagnosis,	 and	 ‘low	 risk’	 women	 seeking	 extra	 reassurance	 in	 the	 form	 of	 near-diagnostic	 prenatal	 screening	 -	 and	 as	 they	 begin	 to	 translate	 within	 the	 context	population-wide	screening	programmes,	they	become	internalised,	embedded	in	the	lives	of	all	pregnant	women,	as	they	each	become	enrolled	within	systems	of	routine,	repeated,	and	normalised	clinical	practice.		The	accounts	highlighted	here	do	not	limit	themselves	to	a	narrow	discursive	focus	around	individual	choice,	autonomy	and	reproductive	freedom:		both	experts	and	patients	alike	 contemplate	 the	broader	cultural	values	 that	encounters	with	 NIPD	 elucidate,	 and	 as	 such,	 the	 (bio)political	 power	 that	 NIPD	 and	 associated	technologies	and	practices	possess	becomes	increasingly	clear.		
Summary		Within	 this	 chapter	 I	 show	 how	 talk	 of	 abortion	 appeared	 as	 central	within	 participant	accounts	 of	 NIPD,	 being	 deeply	 problematised,	 and	 arising	 within	 a	 broader	 social	 and	cultural	context	where	the	politics	of	abortion	is	an	on-going	matter	of	(polarised)	debate	and	discussion.	 	 I	 show	how	 the	 language	with	which	participants	 approached	 the	 topic	was	problematic,	 and	how	 talk	of	abortion	was	only	 rarely	direct	and	clear	–	within	 the	majority	 of	 participant	 accounts	 it	 emerged	 as	 a	 source	 of	 discomfort	 and	 uncertainty,	
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brought	to	the	fore	only	within	the	context	of	related,	and	not	direct,	discussions.		In	order	to	 illuminate	 the	 particular	 kind	 of	 difficulty	 with	 which	 abortion	 conversations	 were	approached	I	draw	from	Taussig’s	concept	of	 ‘the	public	secret’	–	that	which	is	generally	known	 but	 cannot	 be	 articulated.	 	 I	 also	 highlight	 the	 prevalence	 of	 abortion	 secrecy	within	 some	 of	 the	 relevant	 critical	 literature,	 and	 show	 how	 it	 has	 been	 widely	conceptualised	as	harmful.				I	proceed	to	highlight	the	relevance	of	the	 ‘therapeutic	gap’	to	the	discussion	of	abortion	and	prenatal	testing,	describing	how	practices	of	prenatal	screening	and	diagnosis	operate	within	 a	 wider	 clinical	 context	 where	 opportunities	 for	 treatment,	 beyond	 ‘therapeutic’	abortion,	 remain	 rare.	 	 I	 then	 highlight	 participant	 accounts	 of	 ‘abortion	 secrecy’,	demonstrating	 the	 profound	 difficulties	 that	 abortion	 experiences	 –	 in	 connection	 with	prenatal	 testing	 –	 may	 (and	 do)	 bring	 to	 pregnant	 women	 and	 mothers	 who	 must	approach	 such	experiences	 from	within	a	 social	 and	cultural	 context	 that	prevents	open	and	 direct	 discussion	 (and	which	 is	made	more	 problematic	 by	 the	 vague	 and	 faltering	language	 that	 is	employed	within	mainstream	discussion	and	debate).	 	 I	 show	then	how	difficult	 experiences	 of	 ‘stigma’	 are	 both	 connected	 to,	 and	 exacerbated	 by	 abortion	secrecy,	highlighting	some	of	the	more	‘difficult’	accounts	provided	by	women	here.			Within	the	final	part	of	the	chapter	I	explore	the	anxieties	that	are	raised	by	professionals	and	 experts	 regarding	 the	 possible	 routinisation	 of	 NIPD	 (and	 NIPT)	 and	 its	 growing	alignment	 with	 routine	 (rather	 than	 specialist)	 testing,	 and	 the	 associated	 practice	 of	‘selective’	 abortion.	 	 I	 show	 how	NIPD’s	 growing	 closeness	 to	 abortion	 generates	much	professional	 ‘concern’	 and	 leads	 to	 rising	 tensions	 regarding	 the	 possible	 ethical,	 social	and	 (bio)political	 implications	 of	 testing,	 the	 discussion	 of	which	 is	 explored	 in	 greater	depth	within	the	following	chapters	(six	and	seven).				
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Chapter	Six.		NIPD	and	NIPT:	Accounting	for	Social	and	Moral	
Implications.		
Introduction			In	 the	 preceding	 two	 chapters	 I	 show	 how,	 as	 experiences	 with	 and	 understandings	 of	NIPD	and	NIPT	tests	are	explored	by	those	encountering	the	 technology	as	 it	 is	enrolled	and	 translated	 within	 the	 clinic,	 a	 number	 of	 established	 categories	 and	 boundaries	(which	 have	 been	 previously	 constructed	 around	 routine,	 everyday	 technologies	 of	prenatal	testing)	are,	repeatedly,	called	into	question.		The	active	problematisation	and	de-stabilisation	 of	 categories	 and	 boundaries	 occurred	 as	 participants	 both	 witnessed	 and	reflected	on	NIPD	technology’s	divergence	into	two	different	strands.		Expert	participants,	particularly	 those	 with	 a	 clinical	 or	 scientific	 background,	 explained	 how	 two	 separate	developmental	 trajectories	 were	 (within	 the	 mainstream/public	 discussion	 of	 NIPD	particularly)	 being	 defined	 and	 (tentatively)	 separated	 through	 tests’	 respective	categorisation	 as	 either	 tools	 for	 diagnosis	 (NIPD)	 or	 tools	 for	 screening	 (NIPT).		Participants’	awareness	of	the	high	levels	of	accuracy	that	could	be	achieved	through	NIPT	testing	(an	emerging	class	of	tests	that	achieve	almost,	but	not	quite,	100%	sensitivity	and	specificity),	 particularly	 when	 examined	 in	 comparison	 with	 (and	 in	 the	 light	 of	 much	professional	 experience	 with)	 established	 prenatal	 screening	 technologies,	 acted	 to	disrupt	 attempts	 made	 towards	 a	 simplistic,	 binary	 process	 of	 categorisation:	 in	 and	around	 discussions	 of	 NIPD	 (and	NIPT)	 the	 boundary	 between	 screening	 and	 diagnosis	became	resolutely	blurred.		With	the	stability	of	screening	and	diagnosis	categories	acting	as	 the	 foundation	 upon	 which	 routine	 practices	 crucial	 to	 prenatal	 care	 -	 the	categorisation	of	pregnancies	 into	 ‘high	 risk’	 and	 ‘low	 risk’,	 the	division	of	 labour	 in	 the	clinic,	 the	 selective	 application	 of	 diagnostic	 ‘invasive’	 testing	 –	 had	 been	 built,	 this	sustained	 blurring	 of	 boundaries	 presented	 further	 (disruptive)	 implications.	 	 The	prevailing	 discursive	 separation	 of	 prenatal	 screening	 from	 prenatal	 diagnosis,	 coupled	with	 the	 construction	 of	 separate	 classifications	 for	 technologies	 of	 screening	 and	technologies	of	diagnosis,	had	allowed	for	practices	very	closely	associated	with	prenatal	
diagnosis	 –	 ‘selective’	 or	 ‘therapeutic’	 abortion	 –	 to	 be	 separated	 from	 the	 practice	 of	prenatal	 screening.	 	 NIPT’s	 accuracy,	 together	 with	 its	 growing	 applicability	 (and	 rapid	accessibility)	within	 ‘low-risk’	 pregnancies,	and	 its	 potential	 for	widespread	 application	within	whole	pregnant	populations,	was	 seen	 to	 further	disrupt	 this	 boundary	–	moving	the	 practice	 of	 abortion,	 which	 experts,	 patients	 and	 parents	 alike	 characterised	 and	experienced	 as	 contentious,	 stigmatising	 and	 politically	 problematic,	 a	 kind	 of	 ‘public	
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secret’	(Taussig	1999)	-	closer	towards	the	routine	practice	of	prenatal	screening	and,	by	extension,	 everyday	 experiences	 of	 pregnancy.	 	 Building	 on	 this,	 within	 the	 following	chapter	 I	 show	 how	 the	 sustained	 blurring	 of	 the	 boundary	 between	 screening	 and	diagnosis	brings	with	it	further	complexity,	and	further	problematisation,	and	I	show	how	a	wide	 range	 of	 participants	 navigate	 the	 growing	 debate	 that	 has	 opened	 up	 around	 a	number	of	morally,	socially	and	politically	significant	issues	connected	to	the	development	of	NIPD.				The	 potential	 social	 and	 moral	 significance	 of	 NIPD-like	 testing	 was	 discussed	 with	prescience	 within	 Barbara	 Katz-Rothman’s	 study	 on	 the	 emergence	 of	 amniocentesis	(Rothman	 1994).	 	 Speaking	 at	 a	 point	 when	 non-invasive	 diagnostic	 testing	 was	 an	established	 goal	 within	 fetal	 medicine,	 but	 was	 yet	 to	 become	 practically	 feasible,	Rothman	suggests	that	many	of	the	issues	which	were	central	to	the	critical	examination	of	 early	 encounters	 with	 amniocentesis	 –	 the	 risk	 of	 miscarriage,	 the	 timing	 of	 testing	within	 pregnancy,	 the	 high	 level	 of	 clinical	 skill	 that	 testing	 required	 –	 would,	 if	 non-invasive	 testing	 were	 to	 arise	 in	 the	 clinic,	 cease	 to	 dominate	 discussion	 and	 debate	around	prenatal	testing:	I	 think	 that	 an	 early	 blood	 test	 will	 strip	 the	 problem	 down	 to	 its	 bare	bones.		I	think	it	will	take	us	past	questions	of	risk,	of	date	and	technique,	to	confront	the	essential	moral	and	ethical	issues.		It	will	take	us	straight	to	the	meaning	of	motherhood,	the	ethics	of	abortion,	and	the	human	ability	to	control	nature.	(Rothman	1994,	p.79)		The	suggestion	 that	NIPD’s	enrolment	within	 the	clinic,	when	examined	critically,	would	not	 simply	 shed	 light	on	new	 techno-scientific	 and	 clinical	practices,	 but	 serve	 to	 reveal	and	 render	 public	 the	 ‘essential	 moral	 and	 ethical	 issues’	 that	 may	 be	 raised	 by	technologies	and	practices	of	prenatal	 testing,	plays	out	very	clearly	within	 the	personal	and	 professional	 accounts	 of	 NIPD	 gathered	 here.	 	 This	 chapter	 explores	 participant	accounts	 of	 the	 moral	 and	 social	 issues	 they	 feel	 are	 raised	 by	 experiences	 with,	 and	imagined	 futures	 for,	 NIPD	 (and	 NIPT)	 testing.	 	 As	 interviews	 progressed,	 and	 as	participants	explored	in	greater	depth	the	possible	implications	of	NIPD,	much	talk	around	‘ethical’	and	‘social’	‘issues’,	‘worries’	and	‘concerns’	was	generated.		Interviewees	began	to	both	explicitly	and	implicitly	characterise	NIPD	and	NIPT	testing	technologies	as	being	not	only	of	practical	and	clinical	significance,	but	of	moral	and	political	significance	too.	 	The	‘public	 secrets’	 rendered	 visible	 here	 –	 experiences	 of	 abortion,	 the	 embeddedness	 of	abortion	 within	 prenatal	 screening	 and	 the	 inherent	 ‘selectiveness’	 of	 screening	programmes	 –	 were	 identified	 and	 explored	 as	 sites	 of	 particular	 moral	 and	 political	instability	and	debate.	
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Let	me	start	with	Callon’s	observations	on	what	he	calls	hot	entanglements.	These	are	conditions	of	extreme	overflowing	as	one	might	end	in	crises	or	dilemmas	 that	 seem	 to	 have	 many	 ramifications.	 And	 the	 usual	 remedy,	making	more	and	more	elements	of	the	situation	explicit,	often	makes	hot	things	hotter.	Not	only	are	 ‘hot’	situations	becoming	more	commonplace,	 it	 is	becoming	exceedingly	difficult	to	cool	them	down,	i.e.,	arrive	at	a	consensus	on	how	the	 situation	 should	 be	 described.	 .	 .	 	 Externalities	 are	 at	 the	 centre	 of	public	debates	[i.e.	the	focus	of	them]	with	no	obvious	conclusions.	(Strathern	2002),	p.	254,	drawing	on	(Callon	1998),	p.262	–	263.			Building	my	 analysis	 here	 around	 concepts	mobilised	 by	 Strathern	 (Strathern	 2002),	 as	she	draws	from	the	work	of	Callon	(Callon	1998)	-	‘hot’	situations	and	‘hot’	entanglements	-	 I	 show	 how	 NIPD	 and	 NIPT	 testing	 is	 approached	 critically	 within	 the	 majority	 of	participant	 accounts	 gathered	 here:	 the	 technology	 is	 thoroughly	 problematised	 and	 is	identified	 as	 disruptive	 -	 it	 is	 explicitly	 not	 experienced	 and	 understood	 as	 a	 benign	extension	of	the	routine,	normalised	practice	of	prenatal	testing.		I	show	how	participants	very	clearly	identify	the	presence	of	‘hot’	entanglements	within	the	discussion	of	NIPD	at	large	 -	 moral	 and	 social	 dilemmas	 with	 multiple	 ramifications,	 and	 with	 ‘no	 obvious	
conclusions’.	 	 Tracing	 the	 contours	 of	 mainstream	 bioethical	 discourse	 around	 prenatal	testing	 and	NIPD,	 and	 showing	 how	different	 groups	 variously	 align	with	 and	 challenge	such	 perspectives,	 and	 I	 also	 show	how,	 despite	 concerted	 efforts	 to	 contain	 these	 ‘hot’	issues,	a	range	of	moral	and	social	 ‘concerns’	continue	 to	be	problematised,	and	debates	remain	far	from	defused.		To	frame	the	discussion,	I	begin	by	showing	how	a	particular	type	of	moral	discourse	has,	being	 circulated	 and	 re-circulated,	 come	 to	 dominate	 mainstream	 bioethical	 debate	 on	prenatal	testing	and,	alongside	this,	the	growing	public	discussion	of	NIPD.		I	then	examine	participant	accounts	in	light	of	the	recognition	that	within	any	broad	or	public	discussion	of	 ethical	 and	 social	 issues	 a	 range	 of	 different	 groups	 (each	 with	 varying	 levels	 of	influence	 in	 the	debate)	 tend	 to	emerge:	 ‘views	and	attitudes	create	 ‘groups’	of	their	own,	
minorities	and	majorities	based	on	the	opinion	they	hold’	(Strathern	2002,	p.258).		I	divide,	therefore,	the	analysis	of	participant	accounts	here	into	three	broad	categories:	‘insiders’,	‘critical	 users’	 and	 ‘outsiders’.	 	 I	 show	 how	 ‘insiders’,	 expert	 interviewees	 whose	professional	lives	were	very	closely	tied	to	the	development	and	implementation	of	NIPD	in	the	UK,	and	who	have	a	correspondingly	strong	voice	within	the	public	discussion	of	the	technology,	account	for	the	ethical	and	social	dimensions	of	the	technology	in	a	way	that	very	 closely	 aligns	with	mainstream	 bioethical	 discourse.	 	 I	 proceed	 then	 to	 show	 how	‘critical	 users’,	 those	who	 encounter	NIPD	within	 the	 context	 of	 their	 professional	 lives,	but	 who	 are	 less	 closely	 involved	 in	 research	 and	 development,	 and	 whose	 voices	 are	
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positioned	 less	centrally	within	 the	public	debate,	approach	 the	 technology	with	greater	ambivalence	 and	begin	 to	 extend	 the	 critical	 argument	 out,	 identifying	 and	 examining	 a	broad	range	of	moral	and	social	‘concerns’	that	tend	to	be	marginalised	within	mainstream	bioethical	discourse.	 	Finally,	 I	show	how	‘outsiders’	 -	 those	without	direct	experience	of	NIPD	 -	 and	whose	 voices	 lie	 furthest	 from	 the	 foreground	 of	 public	 debate,	 thoroughly	problematise	 NIPD	 technology,	 approaching	 and	 exploring	 a	 range	 of	 morally	 and	politically	 contentious	 issues,	 and	pointing	 towards	 the	 clear	 and	persistent	presence	of	‘hot’	entanglements.	
	
Mainstream	bioethical	discourse,	prenatal	testing,	and	NIPD.		‘Mainstream	 bioethics’	 is	 typically	 concerned	 with	 the	 ethical	 analysis	 of	 scientific	 and	technological	developments	in	Western	medicine	(Konrad	2005,	p.37).		Within	the	public	discussion	 of	 the	 ‘new	 genetics’	 in	 particular,	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 mainstream	 bioethics	 has	emerged	as	central	(Caulfield,	Chandrasekharan	et	al.	2013),	with	bioethical	perspectives	having	been	actively	sought	from	the	very	earliest	stages	of	research	and	development	in	this	 field.	 	 As	 the	 NHGRI51		 established	 its	multi-national	 scientific	 research	 programme	concerning	 the	 ‘decoding’	 of	 the	 human	 genome,	 for	 instance,	 a	 comprehensive	 Ethical,	Legal	 and	 Social	 Implications	 (ELSI)	 Research	 Programme	was	 initiated	 alongside,	with	the	 specific	 aim	 of	 generating	 and	 incorporating	 into	 practice	 (and	 corresponding	regulation)	 a	 range	 of	 expert	 opinion	 on	 the	 ethical,	 legal	 and	 social	 dimensions	 of	 this	emerging	 field	 of	 ‘the	 new	genetics’.	 	 Although	 the	NHGRI’s	 ELSI	 programme	eventually	attracted	 criticism	 for	 failing	 to	 tackle	 fundamental	 moral	 problems	 (Kerr	 and	Shakespeare	 2002,	 p.164),	 it	 provided	 a	 successful	 model	 for	 much	 of	 the	 large-scale	research	 and	 public	 engagement	 activity	 that	 would	 be	 conducted	 around	 the	 ‘new	genetics’,	 and	 was	 foundational	 to	 the	 character	 and	 the	 content	 of	 subsequent	mainstream	 bioethical	 discourse	 around	 the	 ethical	 and	 social	 dimensions	 of	 bio-	 and	techno-science	 (Latimer	 2013,	 p.41).	 	 Contemporary	 public	 debates	 around	 the	 moral,	social,	 legal	and	political	 implications	of	emerging	 technologies	 typically	 involve	a	broad	range	 of	 participants	 or	 ‘stakeholders’	 (Green,	 Guyer	 et	 al.	 2011,	 Oliver	 and	 McGuire	2011).	 	 Effort	 is	 made	 to	 include	 voices	 from	 beyond	 the	 scientific	 and	 technological	context,	 and	 as	 novel	 technologies	 develop,	 a	 range	 of	 ‘public	 opinion’	 (and	 public																																									 																						51	The	National	Human	Genome	Research	Institute	(USA)	was	first	established	in	1989	to	represent	the	 National	 Institutes	 of	 Health	 (NIH)	 within	 the	 International	 Human	 Genome	 Project	 (HGP)	which	 had	 as	 its	 primary	 goal	 the	 sequencing	 of	 the	 human	 genome.	 Since	 the	 successful	completion	 of	 this	 project	 the	 NHGRI's	 mission	 has	 expanded	 to	 encompass	 a	 broad	 range	 of	studies	 aimed	 at	 understanding	 the	 structure	 and	 function	 of	 the	 human	 genome	 and	 its	 role	 in	health	and	disease.	(National	Human	Genome	Research	Institute	2015)	
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support)	 is	 sought	 alongside	 (or	 prior	 to)	 the	 application	 of	 novel	 technologies	 within	established	 systems	 or	 institutions.	 	 Bioethics	 has	 become	 integral	 to	 the	 political	management	 of	 emergent	 techno-scientific	 developments,	 with	 advisory	 bodies	 such	 as	the	 Nuffield	 Council	 on	 Bioethics	 	 -	 which	 exists	 to	 ‘identify	 and	define	 ethical	 questions	
raised	 by	 recent	 advances…	 promote	 public	 understanding	 and	 discussion…	 form	 new	
guidelines…	 publish	 reports	 and	 to	 make	 representations’	 (Nuffield	 Council	 on	 Bioethics	2015a)	 -	 becoming	 embedded	 within	 the	 processes	 that	 shape	 the	 regulation	 and	standardisation	of	novel	technologies.		Accounts	of	public	opinion	are	gathered,	generated	and	reproduced	(in	the	form	of	enquiries,	reports	and	clinical	guidance)	through	the	work	of	various	advisory	and	regulatory	bodies	–	 institutions	charged	with	 the	dual	 task	of	a)	representing	 public	 opinion	 and	 contributing	 to	 consensus	 concerning	 controversies	 in	science,	 and	 b)	 providing	 expert	 bioethical	 advice	 and	 negotiating	 policies	 that	 will	 be	acceptable	to	scientists	and	their	patrons	(Kelly	2003,	p.356).		Although	bioethics	may	tell	‘a	 heroic	 story	 about	 its	 origins	 and	 purpose’	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 mainstream	bioethical	approaches	may	have	come	to	be	so	closely	aligned	with	political	and	regulatory	processes	 that	 the	 field	has	 ‘moved	from	occupying	the	perspective	of	a	critical	outsider	to	
enjoying	 the	 status	 of	 a	 respected	 insider,	 whose	 primary	 role	 is	 to	 defend	 existing	
institutional	arrangements	and	its	own	privileged	position’	(Haliburton	2013,	p.1).				The	 sedimentation	 of	mainstream	 bioethics	 within	 contemporary	 scientific,	 clinical	 and	technological	research	has,	since	the	advent	of	professionalised	and	institutionalised	ELSI	research	particularly,	attracted	much	critical	discussion	from	within	the	fields	of	medical	sociology,	 science	 and	 technology	 studies	 and	 critical	 anthropology.	 	 Noting	 the	 ‘huge	
proliferation	 of	 bodies	 concerned	 with	 ethics’	 Strathern	 suggests	 that	 mainstream,	institutionalised	bioethics	is	explicitly	not	concerned	with	expanding	and	fostering	public	debate	around	the	‘constantly	overflowing’	situations	that	novel	technologies	and	practices	produce,	 but	 rather,	 operates	 as	 a	 tool	 that	 defuses	 and	 ‘contains’	 the	more	 contentious	aspects	of	the	discussion	at	hand	(Strathern	2002).	 	Contemporary	mainstream	bioethics	may	be	understood	 then,	not	as	an	 inventive	 force,	but	as	a	passive,	 responsive	exercise	that,	 when	 it	 makes	 effort	 to	 address	 the	 issues	 raised	 by	 scientific	 and	 technological	research,	does	so	after	the	fact	(Konrad	2005,	p.32).		A	growing	number	of	commentators	have	 highlighted	 the	 problematic	 political	 implications	 that	 such	 an	 approach	 implies.		Evans,	for	instance,	suggests	that	processes	of	professionalisation	and	institutionalisation,	which	 have	 been	 observed	 to	 occur	 widely	 within	 bioethics	 as	 its	 regulatory	 role	 has	flourished	 (Kerr	 and	Shakespeare	2002,	p.161),	 contribute	 significantly	 to	 the	 reduction	and	‘thinning’	of	public	debate:	A	bigger,	deeper,	more	fundamental	or	“thicker”	debate	has	been	replaced	by	a	smaller,	shallower,	more	superficial	or	“thinner”	one…	the	debate	has	
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been	 restricted	 to	 only	 a	 few	 institutionalized	 ends.	 	 At	 a	 time	when	we	should	 be	 attempting	 to	 derive	 societal	 ends,	 we	 have	 shifted	 decision	making	to	the	autonomous	individual...		The	professionals	who	debate	this	topic	are	not	so	free.		They	are	operating	with	 a	 very	 constrained	 list	 of	 universal,	 commensurable	 ends	 that	 have	become	institutionalised	by	the	dominant	profession	in	the	debate.	(Evans	2002,	p.4,	p.11)		Evans’	assertion	that	mainstream	bioethical	debate	has	become	seriously	impoverished,	to	the	detriment	of	critical	discourse	around	broader	‘societal	ends’,	is	also	echoed	elsewhere.		Feminist	 theorists	 in	 particular	 have	 pointed	 towards	 the	 paucity	 of	 debate	 within	contemporary	mainstream	bioethics,	claiming	that	the	ascendancy	of	individual	autonomy	as	 ‘almost	 the	 only	 value	 of	 importance	 within	 mainstream	 bioethics’	 has	 made	 it	particularly	 difficult	 to	 illuminate	 and	 assert	 the	 contextual	 and	 social	 aspects	 of	 the	discussion	at	hand	(Widdows	2009,	p.98).		These	critics	show	too,	how	the	dominance	of	this	narrow	field	of	vision	can	entail	significant	 implications,	with	mainstream	bioethical	views	concerning	issues	such	as	sex	selection	or	the	international	trading	of	gametes/eggs	(Pfeffer	2011)	serving	‘to	justify	what	is	overt	gender	discrimination	and	exploitation	on	the	
grounds	of	individual	choice’	(Widdows	2009,	p.98).		Elsewhere	it	has	been	suggested	that	the	narrowing	of	bioethical	 debate,	 the	privileging	of	 certain	voices	over	others	 and	 the	persistent	 ‘institutionalization	 of	 norms’	 (Jelsoe	 et	 al.	 in	 Bauer	 and	 Gaskell	 2006,	 p.45),	holds	significant	(political)	power:		The	 institutionalisation	 of	 bioethics	 raises	 serious	 problems	 concerning	the	 development	 of	 public	 debate…	 there	 is	 the	 serious	 danger	 of	supressing	 the	diversity	of	 ethical	opinions…	and,	 instead	 imposing	upon	society	the	‘ethics	of	the	scientific	establishment.	(Galloux	et	al.	in	Bauer	and	Gaskell	2002,	p.146)		Cunningham-Burley	and	Kerr	(Cunningham-Burley	and	Kerr	1999)	recognise	in	particular	that	those	closest	to	emergent	technologies	–	the	scientists	and	clinicians	involved	in	early	development	 and	 use	 –	 have	 become	 ‘powerful	players’	within	 bioethical	 discussion	 and	debate,	 being	 able	 to	 influence	 discussions	 around	 the	 implications	 of	 technological	developments,	and	by	pointing	especially	towards	‘beneficial	applications’.			
	Scholars	have	reflected	critically	on	the	historical	construction	of	UK	bioethics,	explaining	how	the	location	of	biopower	–	exercised	here	in	the	form	of	‘expert	ethical	opinion’	-	has	shifted	as	a	result	of	bioethicists’	growing	cultural	influence:	‘bioethicists	now	play	an	equal	
and	 sometimes	 greater	 role	 than	 doctors	 and	 scientists	 in	 publicly	 discussing	 the	 ethics	 of	
issues	 such	 as	 assisted	 dying,	 embryo	 research	 and	 genetic	 engineering’	 (Wilson	 2014,	p.257).		Such	critics	describe	how	the	field	of	bioethics	has	contributed	to	the	growth	of	a	
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‘cultural’	 biopolitics,	 where	 ethicists	 contribute	 directly	 to	 the	 shaping	 of	 the	 moral	dimensions	 of	 bioscience	 and	 biotechnology	 (Salter	 2004),	 guiding	 the	 way	 in	 which	mainstream	 debate	 and	 discussion	 is	 established	 and	 conducted.	 	 The	 influence	 of	mainstream,	 institutionalised	 bioethics,	 its	 power	 located	 within	 ‘publically	 accountable	
regulatory	mechanisms’	coupled	with	continuing	efforts	made	to	extend	the	‘public	control	
of	 science’	 	 (Evans	 2002,	 p.72),	 is	 particularly	 and	 acutely	 evident	 within	 the	 public	debates	 around	 reproductive	 technology	 and	 reproductive	 medicine,	 and	 within	 the	significant	 proliferation	 of	 governance	 and	 regulation	 in	 the	 area.	 	 As	 she	 critically	examines	 development	 of	 the	 Human	 Fertilisation	 and	 Embryology	 Act	 (HFE	 Act),	Franklin	 demonstrates	 how,	 as	 In	 Vitro	 Fertilisation	 (IVF)	 and	 related	 reproductive	technologies	gained	momentum	in	both	the	lab	and	the	clinic,	a	corresponding	increase	in	the	scale	and	volume	of	governance	and	regulation	very	quickly	occurred	alongside:	Like	nature	society	will	not	tolerate	a	vacuum.	 	Parliament	has	succeeded	in	 its	 aim,	 by	 enacting	 laws,	 to	 fill	 the	 ‘legislative	 vacuum’	 surrounding	embryos.	 	 Yet	 by	 so	 doing,	 the	 vacuum	 is	 not	 dissipated,	 and	 instead	proliferates…	In	the	end,	it	is	not	the	embryo,	but	scientific	progress	which	requires	regulation.	(Franklin	1999)		Reproductive	 futures	 were	 then,	 within	 this	 new	 technological	 context,	 seen	 to	 raise	complex	 and	 unfamiliar	 issues,	 explicitly	 requiring	 both	 legislative	 and	 institutional	control	 (Franklin	 1999,	 p.163).	 	 In	 order	 to	 address	 these	 concerns	 the	UK	 government	commissioned,	 and	 later	published,	 a	 report	on	 the	ethics	of	 IVF	 technologies	 (Warnock	1984),	 and	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 way	 IVF	 technology	 was	 presented	 by	 those	 involved	 in	research	 and	 clinical	 implementation	 -	 as	 a	 treatment	 that	 promised	 to	 relieve	 painful	experiences	 of	 infertility	 for	 ‘hopeful’,	 ‘desperate’	 women	 and	 couples	 (Franklin,	 1990,	p.200)	 –	 this	 report	 foregrounded	 IVF	 technology’s	 potentially-disruptive	 power,	exploring	 the	 moral	 and	 political	 scope	 of	 the	 questions	 that	 they	 raised.	 	 Responding	directly	 to	 the	 results	 of	 the	 Warnock	 enquiry,	 a	 new	 advisory	 body	 -	 the	 Human	Fertilisation	and	Embryology	Authority	(HFEA)	-	was	created,	and	from	(1991)	began	to	‘assert	 a	 strong	 regulatory	 regime’	 around	 the	 development	 and	 use	 of	 reproductive	technologies	(Franklin	and	Roberts	2006,	p.60).			NIPD	 technology	 is,	 then,	 emerging	 in	 an	 era	 where	 the	 regulation	 and	 governance	 of	reproductive	 technologies	 has	 become	 thoroughly	 normalised.	 	 With	 much	 of	 the	bioethical	 debate	 ‘safely	cordoned	off’	within	ELSI	 research	programmes	 that	 do	 ‘little	 to	
challenge	practices	and	professional	values’	(Kerr	and	Shakespeare	2002,	p164),	 it	 is	also	emerging	into	a	space	where	the	mainstream	discussion	of	(bio)ethical	and	social	issues	is	subject	to	a	range	of	reductive	processes,	which	serve	to	produce	a	debate	that	is	remote	
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and	 removed	 from	experience,	 lacking	 in	 context	and	 relationality,	 and	 is	 informed	by	a	narrow	focus	on	established	and	explicitly	rational	bioethical	norms	such	as	 ‘autonomy’,	‘informed	consent’	and	‘individual	choice’	(Evans	2002,	p.11,	Chattopadhyay	and	De	Vries	2008,	 Widdows	 2009,	 Haliburton	 2013).	 	 The	 wider	 influence	 of	 this	 mainstream	bioethical	approach	is	evident	within	much	of	the	literature	that	addresses	the	ethical	and	social	 issues	 raised	by	prenatal	 testing.	 	Whilst	 a	 significant	body	of	 empirical	work	has	been	 conducted	 around	 parental	 attitudes	 towards	 and	 experiences	 of	 prenatal	 testing	(Dormandy,	Michie	et	al.	2005,	van	den	Berg,	Timmermans	et	al.	2005,	Chiang,	Chao	et	al.	2006,	van	den	Berg,	Timmermans	et	al.	2006,	Favre,	Guige	et	al.	2009,	Rowe,	Fisher	et	al.	2009,	Aune	and	Moller	2012,	Skirton,	Goldsmith	et	al.	2014),	analysis	of	ethical	and	social	implications	here	 tends	 to	 rely	upon	established	bioethical	norms	of	 ‘informed	consent’,	‘reproductive	 autonomy’,	 ‘informed	 decision	 making’	 and	 ‘informed	 choice’.	 	 Similarly,	studies	of	parental	decision	making	regarding	prenatal	testing	have	depended	on	a	narrow	framing	 which	 privileges	 the	 value	 of	 rationalised	 concepts	 such	 as	 ‘autonomy’	 and	‘informed	 choice’	 (Green,	 Hewison	 et	 al.	 2004,	 van	 den	 Berg,	 Timmermans	 et	 al.	 2008,	Harris,	 Franck	 et	 al.	 2012).	 	 The	 concept	 of	 the	 autonomous	 individual	 dominates	 and	frames	 the	 discussion	 of	 prenatal	 testing’s	 moral	 and	 social	 dimensions	 then,	 with	 the	result	 that	 rational	 decision-making	 processes	 are	 foregrounded	 and	 given	 core	 value.		Although	 many	 more	 critical	 accounts	 of	 the	 broader	 cultural	 implications	 of	 prenatal	testing	 have	 been	 produced	 (Duster	 1990,	 Rothman	 1994,	 Clarke	 1997,	 Rapp	 1999,	Shakespeare	 2006,	 Kelly	 2009,	 Thomas	 2014),	 this	 body	 of	 work	 remains	 positioned	outside	 mainstream	 bioethical	 discourse,	 and	 the	 issues	 that	 are	 raised	 –	 the	commodification	 of	 life,	 the	 practice	 of	 ‘backdoor’	 eugenics	 via	 routine	 application	 of	selective	 abortion,	 the	 responsibilisation	 of	 parents,	 and	 the	 persistent	 limitation	 of	reproductive	‘choice’	–	remain	at	the	margins	of	public	debate.		As	powerful	discourses	of	autonomy/individualisation	and	rational/informed	choice	have	been	 repeatedly	 mobilised	 within	 the	 mainstream	 bioethical	 debates	 on	 reproductive	technologies	they	have	also	greatly	informed	the	broader	context	within	which	NIPD	and	NIPT’s	 development	 has	 been	 most	 publically	 discussed.	 	 The	 division	 between	mainstream	bioethical	discourse	and	more	critical	 accounts	of	 testing,	 together	with	 the	privileging	of	the	former	within	public	debate,	is	particularly	evident	within	the	small	(but	growing)	 body	 of	 literature	 that	 has	 been	 published	 around	 the	 ethical	 and	 social	dimensions	 of	 NIPD	 and	 NIPT.	 	 With	 NIPD	 research	 attracting	 a	 significant	 amount	 of	public	 funding	 within	 the	 UK	 and	 Europe	 particularly	 (and	 with	 the	 technology’s	development	being	more	commercially-focused	within	the	USA,	China	and	Hong	Kong)	the	majority	 of	 studies	 examining	 the	 social	 and	 ethical	 dimensions	 of	 NIPD	 have	 emerged	
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from	within	these	locations.		Much	bioethical	research	around	NIPD	has	been	produced	as	a	 direct	 result	 of	 large	 publically-funded	 research	 programmes	 (RAPID,	 SAFE52),	 which	incorporated	ELSI	work-packages	into	their	original	research	design	and	have	produced	a	variety	 of	 publications	 as	 a	 result	 (Newson	 2008,	 Deans	 and	 Newson	 2010,	 van	 den	Heuvel,	 Chitty	 et	 al.	 2010,	 Hill,	 Compton	 et	 al.	 2011,	 Deans	 and	 Newson	 2012,	 Hill,	Compton	 et	 al.	 2012a,	 Lewis,	 Hill	 et	 al.	 2012a,	Hill,	 Lewis	 et	 al.	 2012b,	 Lewis,	 Hill	 et	 al.	2012b,	Lewis	2012c,	Deans,	Hill	et	al.	2013,	Hill,	Karunaratna	et	al.	2013,	Hill,	Compton	et	al.	2014a,	Lewis,	Hill	et	al.	2014a,	Lewis,	Hill	et	al.	2014b)	–	an	approach	that	has	not	been	mirrored	 by	 commercial	 organisations	 involved	 in	 NIPD	 research.	 	 Although	 a	 small	number	of	explicitly	critical	studies	(from	scholars	working	outside	of	 the	remit	of	NIPD	research	programmes)	have	been	conducted	around	the	ethical	and	social	implications	of	NIPD,	and	have	 identified	the	presence	of	more	contentious	 issues	relevant	 to	a	broader	public	debate	-	including	the	potential	‘eradication	of	Down’s	syndrome’	(Skotko	2009),	the	devaluing	of	those	with	disability	(Newson	2014)	and	the	possible	commercialisation	and	‘trivialisation’	 of	NIPD	 testing	 (Kelly	 and	 Farrimond	2012,	 Farrimond	 and	Kelly	 2013)	 -		these	 studies	 are	 much	 fewer	 in	 volume	 and,	 again,	 remain	 positioned	 outside	 the	mainstream	 of	 debate.	 	 Within	 the	 more	 institutionalised	 examination	 of	 ‘stakeholder	
perspectives’	and	‘client	and	professional	views’	the	locus	of	discussion	is	once	again	around	issues	such	as	 ‘informed	consent’,	 ‘informed	choice’	and	the	associated	value	of	practices	such	 as	 ‘pre-test	 counselling’,	 ‘education’	 and	 ‘training’;	 recommendations	 designed	 to	ensure	practical	and	visible	compliance	with	a	mainstream	bioethical	approach:		These	 observations	 emphasize	 the	 need	 for	 expert	 pre-test	 counseling	before	screening	and	add	to	concerns	that	implementing	NIPD	may	erode	informed	choice.		(Lewis,	Hill	et	al.	2012a)		These	 findings	 highlight	 the	 need	 for	 careful,	 detailed	 and	 nondirective	counselling	to	ensure	proper	informed	consent.		(Lewis,	Hill	et	al.	2012a)		This	study	has	revealed	positive	views	of	health	professionals	on	NIPD	for	the	detection	of	CF,	sickle	cell	disease	and	thalassemia,	but	has	emphasized	the	requirements	for	informed	consent	and	appropriate	counseling	as	well	as	 the	 need	 for	 education	 and	 training	 of	 health	 professionals	 before	widespread	implementation	can	occur.																																									 																						52‘SAFE’	 (Special	Non-Invasive	 Advances	 in	 Fetal	 and	Neonatal	 Evaluation)	was	 an	 EU/European	project	 ‘set	up	to	implement	routine,	cost-effective	NIPD	and	neonatal	screening	through	the	creation	
of	 long-term	 partnerships	 within	 and	 beyond	 the	 European	 Community’.	 The	 project	 led	 to	 the	standardisation	of	fetal	blood	group	testing	through	the	establishment	of	a	‘Network	of	Excellence’	(Maddocks	2009)		
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(Hill,	Karunaratna	et	al.	2013)		These	 studies	 repeatedly	 emphasise	 the	 perceived	 capacity	 that	 bioethical	 norms	 (and	associated	practices)	hold	to	ameliorate	any	‘concerns’	that	might	be	raised.		Mainstream	bioethical	 discourse	 is	 purposively	 deployed	 here	 then,	 in	 order	 to	 contain	 issues	 of	‘concern’	and	to	prevent	entanglement	with	larger,	more	contentious	debates	around	the	far-reaching	 political,	 social	 and	 cultural	 implications	 of	 prenatal	 testing.	 	 With	 this	approach	 being	 so	 thoroughly	 adopted,	 and	 with	 the	 professionalisation	 and	institutionalisation	of	the	bioethical	debate	around	NIPD	occurring	at	such	an	early	stage	of	development,	 significant	 (bio)power	 is	 exercised	here,	working	 to	 contain	and	defuse	‘hot’	entanglements.		The	following	analysis	of	participant	accounts	seeks	to	demonstrate	exactly	 which	 issues	 are	 being	 contained	 and	 which	 debates	 hold	 the	 potential	 to	‘overflow’,	 and	 to	 disrupt	 mainstream	 discourse.	 	 It	 also,	 however,	 seeks	 to	 show	 who	encourages	the	 ‘containment’	of	contentious	issues,	and	who,	by	contrast	encourages	the	‘overflowing’	 of	 such	 issues	 –	who	 encourages	 the	 broadening	 and	 deepening	 of	 debate	and	who	is	able	to	‘make	things	hotter’.			
	
Expert	‘insider’	accounts:	alignments	and	moral	ambiguities		Expert	 interviewees	 from	 a	wide	 range	 of	 professional	 backgrounds	 -	 clinical	 scientists,	genetic	counsellors,	fetal	medicine	consultants	and	academics/consultants	working	in	the	broad	field	of	bioethics,	public	engagement,	patient	advocacy	and	public	policy	–	made	up	the	 ‘insider’	 group,	with	 their	 professional	 lives	 and	 their	 daily	work	 being	 very	 closely	tied	 to	 the	 development	 and	 implementation	 of	NIPD	 and	NIPT	 in	 the	UK.	 	 Participants	from	 this	 group	 provided	 much	 detailed	 explanation	 of	 the	 technology’s	 development,	describing	specific	encounters	with	NIPD	and	NIPT	testing,	and	explaining	how	they	had	witnessed	 the	 gradual	 translation	 of	 the	 technology	 into	 the	 clinic.	 	 Reflecting	 back	 on	their	knowledge	and	experiences,	as	they	responded	to	questions	around	the	impact	(and	potential	 impact)	 of	 NIPD	 testing	 on	 both	 individual	 patients	 and	 potential	 ‘target’	populations,	the	vast	majority	of	participants	within	this	group	began	to	discuss,	examine	and	interpret	the	possible	moral,	social	and	political	dimensions	of	the	technology.	 	With	at	 least	 some	 proportion	 of	 their	 professional	 lives	 being	 involved	 in	 the	 development,	implementation	 or	 regulation	 of	 NIPD,	 their	 accounts	 were	 informed	 by	 a	 detailed	understanding	of	the	technology,	and	a	strong	familiarity	with	the	clinical	and	regulatory	contexts	 within	 which	 the	 technology	 had	 been	 emerging.	 	 With	 a	 great	 proportion	 of	expertise	 within	 this	 group	 coming	 from	 participants	 working	 in	 a	 laboratory-based	research	or	academic	context,	these	accounts	also	tended	to	be	somewhat	distanced	from	
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contextualised,	 relational	 experiences	 of	 prenatal	 testing,	 pregnancy	 and	 parenthood.		Additionally,	 since	 the	 presence	 of	 social,	 moral	 and	 political	 concerns	 and	 dilemmas	linked	 to	 NIPD	 held	 significant	 potential	 to	 directly	 impact	 on	 their	 professional	 lives,	participants	 in	 this	 group	 tended	 to	 address	 the	 more	 contentious	 aspects	 of	 the	technology	 in	 a	 carefully	 conducted	 and	 controlled	manner.	 	 As	 they	 accounted	 for	 the	presence	 of	 ethical	 and	 social	 ‘issues’	 and	 ‘concerns’,	 their	 approach	 towards	 the	discussion	very	closely	mirrored	that	which	is	present	within	the	public	discussion	of	the	ethical	 and	 social	 issues	 raised	 by	 NIPD,	 with	 interviewees	 repeatedly	 identifying	 the	concepts	of	‘informed	consent’,	‘risk’	and	‘individual	reproductive	choice’	as	being	central	to	the	debate.		The	language	of	mainstream	bioethical	discourse	was,	in	this	way,	actively	mobilised,	with	interviewees	repeatedly	referring	back	to	these	bioethical	norms	as	they	attempted	 to	 defuse	 and	 contain	 the	 discussion	 of	 contentious	 issues	 and	 ‘hot’	entanglements.			Emily	stood	apart	from	the	majority	of	participants	interviewed	for	this	study,	in	that	she	was	guarded	towards	questions	raised	during	the	interview	process.		She	was	very	closely	involved	 in	 the	 management	 and	 conduct	 of	 a	 number	 of	 studies	 focusing	 on	 NIPD’s	development	 and	 implementation	 in	 the	 UK.	 	 During	moments	 where	 the	 conversation	shifted	 away	 from	 the	 technical	 and	 practical	 aspects	 of	 testing,	 the	 discussion	 of	more	difficult	or	contentious	issues	was	avoided.		Aware,	perhaps	that	she	had	been	guarded	in	this	 respect,	 as	 the	 interview	 came	 to	 a	 close	 Emily	 commented	 on	 how	 she	 felt	 it	was	unlikely	to	provide	valuable	insight	‘I	don’t	think	I’ve	been	that	useful.		Have	there	been	any	
golden	 quotes?’.	 	 Despite	 this	 approach	 Emily	 did,	 to	 a	 limited	 degree,	 engage	 in	conversations	around	 the	social	and	ethical	aspects	of	 the	 technology.	 	Reflecting	on	 the	potential	 impact	 of	 NIPD	 within	 routine	 prenatal	 testing	 programmes,	 and	 aware	 that	concerns	regarding	the	possible	routinisation	of	NIPD	had	been	raised,	she	dismissed	the	idea	that	the	technology	would	give	rise	to	any	particular	disruptions	to	the	status	quo:	‘I	
don’t	see	that	a	non-invasive	test	is	going	to	be	any	different,	you	know	it’s	just	another	test	
that	women	have	 in	pregnancy,	 I	 think	 it	 just	needs	to	be	carefully	counselled’	(it	 is	worth	noting	 here	 that	 Emily	 speaks	 as	 if	 it	 is	 the	 test	 –	 and	 not	 the	 pregnant	 patient	 –	 that	requires	 counselling.	 	 Issues	 regarding	 the	 rationalising	 and	 reduction	 of	 the	 relational,	bodily	 aspects	 of	 the	 testing	 experience	 are	 explored	 in	 more	 depth	 within	 the	 next	chapter).	 	As	 I	 proceeded	 to	 press	 the	 issue,	 Emily	 explained	 how	 she	 felt	 the	 power	 of	established	 regulation,	 combined	with	 the	 presence	 of	 clearly	 defined	 clinical	 pathways	within	the	NHS,	would	be	substantial	enough	to	offset	many	of	the	concerns	that	might	be	raised:		
Ethical	issues	have	been	raised	around	sex	selection	as	well,	using	NIPD.	
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Ok.		I	don’t.		I	think	that’s	so	well	regulated	in	the	UK	that	it’s	not	an	issue,	so	if	someone-	uh	if	you	get	referred	and	your	sample	comes	to	the	lab,	to	any	NHS	lab	I	think,	and	it	doesn’t	have,	 it	hasn’t	come	from	a	recognised	person,	it	hasn’t	come	from	a	genetic	counsellor.		If	it’s	come	from	a	GP,	the	lab’s	not	going	 to	 test	 it	until	 they’ve	called	 that	GP	and	said	you	need	 to	refer	this	person	to	genetics.		So	I	don’t	think	it’s	really	an	issue	in	the	UK	at	all.	(Emily,	NIPD	researcher)		Although	 the	 strategy	 that	 Emily	 describes	 seems	 to	 require	 a	 significant	 number	 of	players	to	work	in	harmony	together	–	GPs,	laboratory	technicians,	genetic	counsellors	–	it	is	 presented	here	 as	 a	 straightforward,	 achievable	 solution	 to	 the	 potential	 ‘problem’	 of	NIPD’s	unregulated	(and	medically	illegitimate)	use	as	a	tool	for	‘social’	sex	selection.		The	daily	work	of	medical	 professionals	 is	 identified	 as	 central	 to	 the	 task	of	 regulating	 and	normalising	NIPD	technology,	holding	the	power	to	contain	and	defuse	any	practical	and	ethical	 issues	 that	 may	 arise	 as	 testing	 becomes	 increasingly	 routine	 and	 widespread.		Genetic	 counsellors	 in	 particular	 are	 identified	 as	 those	who	 possess	 the	 dual	 power	 to	both	 legitimate	 testing,	 and	 to	 guard	 against	 illegitimate	 use:	 ‘it	 hasn’t	 come	 from	 a	
recognised	person,	 it	hasn’t	come	from	a	genetic	counsellor’.	 	Although	Emily	 explores	 the	possibility	 that	 patients/consumers	 may	 choose	 to	 access	 NIPD	 testing	 from	 services	located	outside	 ‘the	clinic’	elsewhere	in	the	interview–	‘I	mean	already	you	can	get	sexing	
direct	to	consumer	in	the	States,	I	think.		And	yeah	it’s	certainly	very	possible	that	you	could	
do	it	like	that,	just	pop	in	a	blood	sample’	–	she	repeatedly	mobilises	a	vision	of	the	future	that	preserves	a	space	for	medical	power,	a	space	that	has	already	been	carved	out	via	the	routinisation	and	normalisation	of	established	technologies	and	practices	of	prenatal	and	genetic	testing.		By	appealing	to	the	power	of	existing	regulation	and	practice,	by	aligning	very	closely	with	mainstream	bioethical	discourse	and	by	‘doing	fixed,	managed	medicine’	(Latimer	2013,	p.198)	 in	this	way,	Emily	 is	able	to	present	a	vision	of	NIPD’s	 future	that	simultaneously	 recognises	 and	 contains	 the	 emergence	 of	 significant	 social	 and	 ethical	‘issues’	and	‘concerns’,	steering	the	discussion	at	hand	away	from	the	destabilising	threat	of	the	unknown	(Latimer	2013,	p.198).		Laura,	 a	 researcher	 who	 was	 also	 very	 closely	 involved	 in	 the	 development	 and	implementation	of	NIPD,	adopted	a	similar	perspective.		She	too	began	by	describing	how	she	 felt	 that	 NIPD	 and	 NIPT	 were	 likely	 to	 have	 very	 little	 impact	 on	 established	programmes	 and	 practices	 of	 testing:	 ‘I	 don’t	 think	 the	 pathway	 will	 have	 to	 change	
considerably	because	I	think	it	will	be	just	another	test	that	you	offer,	but	within	sort	of,	the	
current	 prenatal	 testing’.	 	Recognising,	 however,	 that	 the	 increased	 diagnostic	 power	 of	NIPT,	 when	 applied	 within	 routine	 screening	 programmes,	 could	 give	 rise	 to	 ‘difficult’	issues	–	‘you	could	say	that	the	implications	of	the	NIPD	test	are	far	sort	of,	um,	more	definite	
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and	more	 difficult	 than	 screening’	 –	 she	 very	 quickly	 adopted	 a	 discursive	 strategy	 that	emphasised	 containment.	 	 By	 proceeding	 to	 outline	 practical	 solutions	 that	 once	 again	aligned	with	mainstream	discourse,	and	mobilising	in	particular	the	normative	concept	of	
‘informed	 consent’,	 Laura	 again	 highlighted	 the	 perceived	 centrality	 and	 power	 of	‘informed	decision	making’:		Um,	 because	 you	 are	 telling,	 you	 are	 giving	 a	 more	 yes	 no	 answer,	somebody	 that	 doesn't	 even	 realise	 they	 are	 having	 a	 Down’s	 syndrome	test	 could	 then	 get	 told	 their	 baby	has	Down's	 syndrome.	 They	might	 be	wholly	 unprepared	 for	 that	 kind	 of	 information.	 	 So	 I	 think	 we	 need	 to	make	sure	that	safeguards	are	in	place,	to	ensure	informed	consent,	and	to	make	 sure	 women	 realise	 they	 are	 making	 a	 decision	 about	 Down's	syndrome	 testing.	 	 And	 whether	 that's	 through	 asking	 them	 to	 sign	 a	written	consent	form,	which	might	be	one	way	of	doing	it,	or	asking	them	to	take	a	few	days	and	come	back	and	think-	to	go	away	and	think	about	it,	and	 come	back	and	make	a	decision.	 	Those	might	be	 two	ways	 that	 you	might	ensure	informed	consent.	Um,	there	are	probably	others,	but,	those	are	things	we	need	to	think	about.		(Laura,	NIPD	researcher)		Although	Laura	identifies	the	presence	of	significant	problems	and	concerns,	and	potential	sources	 of	 harm	 –	 such	 as	 the	 early	 and	 completely	 unexpected	 diagnosis	 of	 Down’s	syndrome	 within	 a	 ‘low	 risk’	 pregnancy	 –	 she	 very	 clearly	 adopts	 an	 approach	 that	suggests	 that	 recourse	 to	 routine	 practices	 built	 around	 the	 established	 norms	 of	mainstream	 bioethics	 (the	 signing	 of	 consent	 forms,	 the	 visible	 exercise	 of	 ‘informed	
decisions’)	 would	 be	 powerful	 enough	 to	mitigate	 any	 harms	 that	 may	 be	 conferred	 by	NIPD’s	‘mainstreaming’	within	the	population	at	large.		Laura’s	account	here	demonstrates	both	 the	 perceived	 power	 and	 the	 pervasiveness	 of	 mainstream	 bioethical	 debate,	 a	discourse	that,	it	appears,	has	become	thoroughly	normalised	within	the	NIPD	community,	even	at	this	early	stage	of	development.			A	 somewhat	 contrasting	 ‘insider’	 account	 was	 provided	 by	 Beth,	 who	 provided	 a	particularly	 rich	 and	 insightful	 account	 of	 NIPD’s	 on-going	 development.	 	 Beth	 was	 a	clinical	scientist,	working	within	the	NHS,	whose	daily	work	was	also	very	closely	tied	to	the	 development	 and	 implementation	 of	 NIPD	 and	NIPT	 in	 the	 UK.	 	 Although	 Beth	 had	previously	been	involved	in	setting	up	lab-based	services	to	provide	NIPD	for	fetal	sexing,	at	 the	 time	 of	 interview	 the	 great	majority	 of	 her	 research	work	 focused	 on	 developing	
‘NIPT	 for	 Down’s’	 and	 she	 explained	 how	 these	 tests	 were	 being	 developed	 with	implementation	into	screening	programmes	particularly	in	mind.	 	Beth	was	also	involved	in	teaching,	research	management,	and	the	provision	of	more	traditional/established	lab-
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based	diagnostic	services	–	such	as	‘prenatal	testing	by	QFPCR53’	-	she	explained	that	a	‘big	
crossover’	existed	between	her	research	work	and	these	other	components	of	professional	life.	 	Approaching	 the	opportunity	 to	 talk	about	NIPD	 technology	with	much	enthusiasm	Beth	provided	a	highly	reflective	and	insightful	‘insider’	account	of	NIPD	that	stood	apart	in	this	way	from	those	highlighted	above.		As	she	explained	how	she	came	to	be	involved	in	 NIPD	 research,	 and	 what	 her	 daily	 work	 entailed,	 she	 naturally	 began	 to	 explore	questions	 regarding	 the	 possible	 moral	 and	 social	 implications	 of	 the	 technology.		Although	her	work	was	primarily	 focused	on	 the	basic	 science	of	NIPD	 -	 ‘thinking	about	
how	 to	 do	 things,	 what	 are	 the	 most	 sensible	 approaches,	 what's	 feasible	 in	 terms	 of	
diagnostics’	 -	 Beth	 explained	 that,	 as	 she	 had	 been	 working	 within	 a	 multidisciplinary	project	 team,	 she	 had	maintained	 regular	 contact	with	 colleagues	working	 on	 the	 ‘ELSI’	(ethical,	legal,	social	implications)	components	of	UK-based	NIPD	research:	So	we	tend	to	just	meet	as	a	lab	group,	then	we	meet	as	a	project	sub-group	every	 year,	which	 is	 everybody…	 It’s	 good,	 I’m	very	 interested-	 I	 like	 the	ELSI	 stuff	 because	 it’s	 obviously	 that’s	 very	different	 to	what	we	do	on	a	day-to-day	basis,	and	because	it’s	a	bit	more	human	you	just	get	drawn	to	that	a	bit	more.	(Beth,	NIPD	researcher)		Echoing	the	accounts	of	other	‘insiders’	Beth	proceeded	to	identify	the	primary	ethical	and	social	 implications	 of	 NIPD	 as	 being	 focussed	 around	 issues	 such	 as	 the	 erosion	 of	informed	 consent,	 the	 possible	 routinisation	 of	 NIPD	 testing,	 and	 the	 possible	normalisation	 and/or	 expansion	 of	 selective	 termination	 via	 the	 population-wide	application	of	NIPD.		Drawing	on	her	knowledge	of	this	professionalised,	mainstream	ELSI	discourse,	Beth	explained	 that	 she	was	particularly	 concerned	about	 the	possible	harms	that	widespread	routinisation	of	non-invasive	testing	might	bring	-	‘there’s	a	lot	of	evidence	
to	 suggest	 that	when	women	give	bloods	 for	Down’s	 syndrome	screening	 for	example,	 that	
they	don’t	really	understand	what	 they	are	doing’	–	and	 she	 discussed	 in	 some	detail	 her	understanding	of	related	issues	around	the	provision	of	information	in	the	clinical	setting,	and	the	requirement	that	patients	provide	informed	consent	prior	to	testing:	To	 start	with	 I	was	 quite	 puzzled	 by	 this	whole	 erosion	 of	 consent.	 	 The	first	 time	 I	 heard	 people	 talk	 about	 it	 I	 thought,	 ah	 that's	 rubbish.	 	 You	know,	 you'd	 spend	 just	 as	 much	 time	 talking	 to	 people	 about	 a	noninvasive-	but	when	you	realise	that	women	don't,	that	pregnant	women	coming	 through	 the	 system,	 although	 the	 health	 professionals	 are	 telling	
																																								 																						53	QFPCR	is	a	laboratory	technique	used	to	copy	small	sections	of	DNA	in	order	to	precisely	quantify	the	 amount	 of	DNA	present	 in	 a	 sample	 (NHS	National	Genetics	 and	Genomics	 Education	Centre	2015c).		
	 129	
them	 the	 information,	 they	might	not	be	hearing	 it.	 	 So	 there	 are	 a	 lot	 of	things	that	for	me,	um,	I	found	quite	fascinating.	(Beth,	NIPD	researcher)		Although	 she	 had	 been	 involved	 in	 the	 development	 of	 NIPD	 and	 NIPT	 testing	 for	 a	number	of	years	 it	was	only	as	a	result	of	 this	growing	professional	 familiarity	with	 this	ELSI	discourse	 that	Beth	came	to	 find	the	discussion	of	 the	ethical	and	social	 issues	 that	might	 be	 involved	 so	 ‘fascinating’	 (elsewhere	 she	 explained	 that	 she	 had,	 in	 the	 early	stages	of	 the	project,	been	concentrating	more	exclusively	on	 ‘the	science’:	 ‘I	was	at	that	
point	thinking	about	it	in	very	scientific	terms,	and	it	was	just	a	challenge	to	get	the	test	to	
work,	and	you	kind	of	forget	why	you	are	doing	it’).		Beth’s	reported	shifting	in	perspective	supports	the	view	that,	despite	being	‘constrained’	by	the	professional	environment	within	which	 they	 must	 operate,	 ELSI	 scholars	 are	 able	 to,	 at	 the	 very	 least,	 stimulate	 some	degree	 of	 debate	 around	 ethical	 and	 social	 issues	 (Kerr	 and	 Shakespeare	 2002,	 p.162)	within	 professional	 groups	 that	may	 otherwise	 ‘marginalise	more	critical	 commentaries’,	being	 able	 to	 help	 break	 down	 the	 kind	 of	 ‘boundaries	 between	 science	 and	 society’	(Cunningham-Burley	and	Kerr	1999,	p.647)	that	Beth	points	towards	here.		Beth	returned	to	 the	 issue	 of	 informed	 consent	 throughout	 the	 interview,	 repeatedly	 emphasising	 the	value	 of	 professional	 (genetic)	 counselling	prior	 to	 testing,	 and	 raising	 concerns	 around	the	 potential	 for	 NIPD	 and	 NIPT	 testing	 to	 become	 available	 to	 purchase	 and	 use	 via	illegitimate	sites	that	existed	outside	of	the	appropriately-regulated	and	professionalised	clinical	context:	‘with	the	kind	of	scenario	where	it	could	be	direct	to	consumer…	I	would	find	
that	quite	disturbing	if	it	went	down	that	route,	I	think	it	needs	to	be	quite	gently	managed’.		Once	 again,	 significant	 power	 is	 attributed	 to	 the	 practice	 of	 genetic	 counselling	 in	particular	here,	and	as	Beth	imagines	counsellors	being	faced	with	an	increasing	range	and	volume	of	professional	challenges	as	a	result	of	NIPD	and	NIPT,	her	immediate	response	is	to	suggest	a	course	of	action	that	would	reinforce	rather	than	challenge	the	status	quo	–	strengthening	routine	approaches	by	ensuring	that	patients	are	further	enabled	to	become	both	‘informed’	and	‘autonomous’	through	the	receipt	of	 ‘good,	balanced	information’	and	‘pre-test	counselling’.		As	 the	 interview	progressed,	however,	Beth	began	 to	extend	her	criticism	out,	exploring	some	 of	 the	 broader	 social,	 ethical	 and	 cultural	 implications	 that	 she	 felt	 NIPD	 and	prenatal	screening	might	give	rise	to.	 	As	part	of	her	work	on	NIPD,	Beth	had	attended	a	
‘study	 day’	 organised	 by	 the	 Down’s	 syndrome	 Association	 (DSA)54.	 	 Having	 previously																																									 																						54		The	Down's	 Syndrome	Association	 is	 a	patient	 support	 charity	 that	 ‘provides	 information	and	support	on	all	aspects	of	 living	with	Down's	syndrome’	and	also	 ‘works	to	champion	the	rights	of	
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described	how	she	was	‘pulled	towards	the	NIPT’	as	a	result	of	intellectual	and	professional	curiosity,	 Beth	 described	 how	 her	 perspective	 on	 the	 technology	 had	 altered	 quite	significantly	once	she	confronted	the	lived	experience	of	diagnosis	and	disease	in	this	way:			And	I	actually	went	to	a	Down's	Syndrome	Association	study	day,	and	they	interviewed	 four	women	who	had	had	Down’s	 babies,	 one	unexpectedly-	one	of	 them	hadn't	had	 screening.	And	 it	was	 a	 really-	 it	 really	made	me	think	very	hard	about	why	we	do	Down’s	syndrome	screening,	because	all	of	the	women,	once	they	had	got	over	the	fact	that	they	had	had	a	Down’s	baby	when	they	were	expecting	to	have	a	normal	baby-	um,	it	was	one	of	the	better	things	that	had	happened	in	their	lives.		And	Down’s,	the	quality	of	care	now	for	Down’s	syndrome	children,	you	know.	 	Ok	some	are	very	sick,	 but	 I	 sometimes	 find	 it	 all	 a	 little	 bit	 difficult	 to	 reconcile….	 	 And	 I	think	we-	we	test	for	it	because	it’s	traditionally-	its	easy	to	test	for.		You're	looking	 for	 a	whole	 chromosome	 21,	 and	 it	 does	 have	 a	 high	 prevalence	within	society.	 	But	then	some	of	the	micro-deletion	syndromes	are	much	more	 devastating	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 phenotype	 of	 the	 children.	 	 And	 I	remember	 the	 women	 on	 the	 Down’s	 syndrome	 study	 day	 saying,	 you	know	what,	what	kind	of	society	do	we	want	to	live	in?		Do	we	include	or	exclude	 individuals?	And	I	 found	that	quite	challenging.	 	Because	I	was	at	that	 point	 thinking	 about	 it	 in	 very	 scientific	 terms,	 and	 it	 was	 just	 a	challenge	to	get	the	test	to	work,	and	you	kind	of	forget	why	you	are	doing	it.		But	then	there	are	an	awful	lot	of	women	that	wouldn't	be	able	to	cope	with	 having,	 um.	 	 So	 you,	 you	 have	 to	 offer	 information.	 	 But	 as	 an	individual?		I	wouldn't	have	any	genetic	testing,	it’s	funny,	not	for	anything.		I	know	I	probably	shouldn't	say	that	as	a	geneticist	but	I	feel-	I	guess,	you	know,	you	deal	with	it	as	it	occurs.	(Beth,	NIPD	researcher)		Within	 this	 moment,	 as	 Beth	 focuses	 in	 on	 contextualised,	 personal	 experiences	 of	disability,	 and	 resists	 defaulting	 to	 issues	 so	 familiar	 within	 mainstream	 bioethical	discourse,	she	alters	the	way	 in	which	she	 frames	the	social	and	moral	 implications,	and	corresponding	 political	 and	 cultural	 scope,	 of	 NIPD	 and	 NIPT.	 	 Shifting	 away	 from	 her	previous	alignment	with	mainstream	bioethical	discourse	–	expressed	through	her	talk	of	risk,	individual	decision	making	and	informed	consent	-	Beth	explores	the	implications	of	non-invasive	testing	technologies	and	practices	of	prenatal	screening	in	far	greater	depth.		Reflecting	 back	 on	 her	 exposure	 to	 questions	 of	 profound	moral	 and	 political	 weight	 –	‘what	kind	of	 society	do	we	want	 to	 live	 in?	 	Do	we	 include	or	exclude	 individuals?’	 –	Beth	recognises	here	the	presence	of	key	dilemmas,	issues	that,	for	her,	remain	contentious	and	
‘difficult	 to	 reconcile’.	 	 Whilst	 the	 language	 that	 Beth	 employs	 reproduces	 rather	 than	challenges	the	divisions	that	the	routine	practice	of	prenatal	testing	frequently	constructs	-	 between	 ‘a	 Down’s	 baby’	 and	 ‘a	 normal	 baby’	 for	 instance	 (Sierra	 2010,	 p.77,	 Thomas																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 																			people	 with	 Down's	 syndrome,	 by	 campaigning	 for	 change	 and	 challenging	 discrimination’	 DSA	(2012).	 Continuing	 Pregnancy	 with	 a	 Diagnosis	 Of	 Down’s	 Syndrome:	 A	 Guide	 for	 Parents.	 The	Down's	Syndrome	Association.	
	 131	
2014,	p.183)	-	in	contrast	to	this,	she	questions	the	strength	and	location	of	this	division,	pointing	towards	what	she	recognises	as	the	valued	and	valuable	lives	of	those	living	with	Down’s	 syndrome:	 ‘it	was	 one	 of	 the	 better	 things	 that	 had	 happened	 in	 their	 lives.	 	 And	
Down’s,	 the	 quality	 of	 care	 now	 for	Down’s	 syndrome	 children,	 you	 know’.	 	Beth	 not	 only	explores	the	ethical	and	social	implications	of	NIPD	here,	she	extends	her	critical	gaze	out,	finally	and	most	significantly	problematising	the	whole	project	of	prenatal	screening	itself.		As	 Beth	 questions	 the	 foundations	 of	 prenatal	 testing,	 a	 practice	 that	 is	 central	 to	 her	professional	 identity,	 she	 struggles	 to	 reconcile	 the	 approach	 that	 she	 feels	 has	 been	adopted	within	 the	 ‘scientific’	 community	 towards	 testing	 -	where	 the	 social	meaning	of	screening	 programmes	 is	 marginalised,	 and	 where	 routinisation	 and	 the	 privileging	 of	biomedical	choice	takes	hold,	 ‘I	think	we-	we	test	for	it	because	it’s	traditionally-	its	easy	to	
test	 for’	 -	with	 her	 own	 thoughts	 and	 feelings	 around	 the	 broader	 societal	 aims	 of	 the	practice	 at	 large:	 ‘it	 really	made	me	 think	 very	 hard	 about	 why	 we	 do	 Down’s	 syndrome	
screening…	it	was	one	of	the	better	things	that	had	happened	in	their	lives’.	 	Although	Beth	very	clearly	identifies	and	discusses	here	the	more	contentious	issues	raised	by	NIPD	and	prenatal	screening,	she	retreats	from	any	suggestion	that	the	project	of	prenatal	screening	itself	may	perhaps	be	re-thought.		And	finally,	as	she	considers	how	these	issues	ought	to	be	 dealt	 with,	 Beth	 appeals	 once	 more	 to	 the	 power	 of	 ‘institutionalised	 ends’	 (Evans	2002):	‘you	have	to	offer	information’.		
Dissenting	voices	from	the	clinic:	‘critical	users’		Participant	 accounts	 that	 clearly	 aligned	 with	 mainstream	 bioethical	 discourse	represented	 a	 minority	 of	 those	 gathered	 within	 the	 dataset	 as	 a	 whole,	 with	 the	 vast	majority	of	 interviewees	approaching	the	ethical	and	social	 issues	raised	by	NIPD	with	a	much	 greater	 sense	 of	 critical	 dissent.	 	 Accounts	 provided	 by	 genetic	 counsellors	 and	midwives	particularly	–	those	most	frequently	encountering	NIPD	and	NIPT	in	the	clinic	at	this	early	stage	–	began	to	identify	and	discuss	a	much	broader	range	of	ethical,	social	and	political	 issues	 that	 they	 felt	 were	 relevant	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 NIPD	 and	 NIPT.	 	 Such	concerns,	 however,	 frequently	 held	 the	 potential	 to	 impact	 upon	 the	 routine,	 everyday	processes	 that	 were	 so	 closely	 bound	 to	 their	 professional	 lives.	 	 Much	 ambiguity	 was	therefore	 present	 within	 these	 accounts,	 with	 interviewees	 frequently	 defaulting	 to	 the	power	of	 established,	 institutionalised	bioethical	norms	and	discourses	 (and	 the	 routine	practices	 built	 upon	 these),	 even	 as	 they	 began	 to	 explore	 the	 ethical	 and	 social	implications	of	NIPD,	NIPT	and	prenatal	testing	at	a	much	deeper	level.				
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Lucy	was	a	genetic	counsellor,	who	had	worked	with	‘at	risk’	patients	using	NIPD	(for	fetal	sexing)	 within	 her	 previous	 job.	 	 With	 her	 current	 role	 involving	 both	 research	 and	teaching,	 she	 had	 made	 effort	 to	 keep	 up-to-date	 with	 developments	 in	 the	 field.		Reflecting	back	on	the	content	of	the	NIPD-related	presentations	and	publications	she	had	become	 familiar	 with,	 Lucy	 explained	 her	 critical	 perspective	 on	 the	 technology,	identifying	 and	 exploring	 a	 number	 of	 concerns	 that	 she	 felt	 were	 raised	 by	 NIPD	 and	NIPT’s	‘implementation’,	and	possible	routinisation,	in	the	UK:		The	other	thing	that	concerns	me	is.		I’m	not	completely	satisfied	with	what	they	are	planning	to	do	in	terms	of	evaluation	as	well.		It	concerns	me	that	their	 implementation	 plan	 involves	 only	 educating	 health	 professionals,	and	they	think	they	have	all	bases	covered	because	they	are	doing	face-to-face	 teaching,	 e-learning	 and	 apps.	 	 Which	 is	 fine.	 	 But	 I	 don’t	 think	education	 is	 enough…	They	said	 they	would	gather	 stakeholder	opinions.		And	 that	 just,	 to	me-	 I’m	not	 sure	 it	would	generate	 the	kind	of	 evidence	that	 would	 reassure	 me.	 	 	 What	 is	 it	 exactly	 that	 concerns	 me?	 	 I’m	concerned	mainly	that	women	won’t	have	the	opportunity	to	make	a	fully	informed	decision.	 	 And	 you	know,	 I	 already	don’t	 like	 the	way	 it	works,	without	 NIPT.	 	 Because	 of	 the	 experiences	 that	 I’ve	 had.	 	 Not	 so	 much	personal	experiences	but	the	experiences	I’ve	seen	my	friends	have.		And	I	don’t	 know	what	 the	 answer	 is	 because	 I	 don’t	 think	 genetic	 counsellors	want	to	take	on	Down’s	syndrome	work,	because	that	would	become	very	routine.	 	 I	 suppose	 I’m	 just	 a	 little	 bit	 disappointed,	 that	 this	 new	technology	could	have	been	an	opportunity	to	really	look	at	that,	and	to	re-deign	antenatal	care	to	better	meet	the	needs	of	women…	I	suppose	 it	all	comes	back	to	the	whole	question	of	who	drives	the	research	agenda?	 	 Is	the	research	agenda	and	the	technological	development	agenda,	is	it	driven	by	 people’s,	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 population,	 or	 is	 it	 driven	 by	 scientists	 and	you	 know,	 people	 who	 have	 technical	 expertise	 and	 their	 own	 personal	vision	 of	 the	 future?	 	 Um,	 and	 I	 think	 I	 would	 prefer	 to	 live	 in	 a	 world	where	 there	 was	 much	 more	 social	 involvement	 in	 developing	 these	agendas,	 but	 that	 just	 isn’t	 the	 way	 it	 happens,	 because	 it	 is	 driven	 by	whoever	is	putting	the	money	in.	(Lucy,	genetic	counsellor)		Lucy	expresses	a	great	deal	of	cynicism	regarding	the	approach	taken	towards	the	public	discussion	 of	 NIPD	 ethics	 as	 she	 had	 observed	 it	 occurring	within	mainstream	UK/NHS	based	NIPD	research.	 	Suggesting	 that	an	overly	narrow	focus	on	professional	education	and	the	gathering	of	‘stakeholder’	opinions	would	be	insufficient	-	‘they	think	they	have	all	
bases	covered…	I	don’t	think	education	is	enough’	-	she	points	towards	the	relative	paucity	and	 thinness	 of	 mainstream	 bioethical	 debate	 around	 NIPD.	 	 Although	 Lucy	 closely	mirrors	mainstream	 discourse	 as	 she	 emphasises	 the	 value	 of	 ‘fully	 informed’	decisions,	she	 simultaneously	 extends	 her	 critical	 gaze,	 problematising	 both	 NIPD	 and	 current	testing	 technologies.	 	 Lucy	 uses	 the	 discussion	 at	 hand	 to	 explore	 problems	 associated	with	current	screening	practices	–	‘I	already	don’t	like	the	way	it	works,	without	NIPT’	–	and	suggests	 that,	 although	 she	 recognises	 that	 the	 emergence	 of	NIPD	 and	NIPT	presents	 a	
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valuable	 opportunity	 to	 reflect	 critically	 upon	 the	 structure	 and	 purpose	 of	 prenatal	screening	 programmes	 -	 by	 foregrounding	 the	 needs	 and	 voices	 of	 ‘women’	 and	 ‘the	
population’	 at	 large	 -	 that	 such	an	approach	had	 failed	 to	be	exploited	so	 far,	 and	would	likely	 remain	unexplored:	 ‘I’m	just	a	little	bit	disappointed,	that	this	new	technology	could	
have	 been	 an	 opportunity	 to	 really	 look	 at	 that,	 and	 to	 redesign	 antenatal	 care	 to	 better	
meet	the	needs	of	women’.	 	The	alternative	pathway	for	development	that	Lucy	outlines	–	one	that	engages	critically	with	the	routine	practices	and	procedures	which,	she	feels,	fail	to	genuinely	address	the	needs	of	the	population	at	hand	despite	much	recourse	to	talk	of	‘informed	consent’,	–	is	imagined	to	be	stifled	by	the	vested	interests	of	powerful	others:	‘is	
it	driven	by	people’s,	the	needs	of	the	population,	or	is	 it	driven	by	scientists	and	you	know,	
people	who	have	technical	expertise	and	their	own	personal	vision	of	the	future?...	it	is	driven	
by	whoever	is	putting	the	money	in’.	 	By	suggesting	that	mainstream	ELSI	research	around	NIPD	 fails	 to	 attend	 to	 broader	 contextual	 factors,	 and	 by	 echoing	 critical	 perspectives	explored	 elsewhere	 (Cunningham-Burley	 and	 Kerr	 1999,	 Evans	 2002),	 Lucy	 points	towards	the	foregrounding	of	institutionalised,	professionalised	bioethical	discourse,	and	the	corresponding	marginalisation	of	voices	that	sit	outside	the	mainstream	of	debate.				Parallel	concerns	were	very	strongly	articulated	by	Natalie,	a	consultant	clinical	geneticist	with	a	professional	background	in	paediatric	and	prenatal	care.	 	As	a	practicing	clinician	who	also	sat	on	a	number	of	advisory	committees	(working	in	both	genetic	medicine	and	prenatal	 care),	 although	 she	 currently	 had	 very	 little	 contact	 with	 NIPD	 testing	 in	 the	clinic,	Natalie	was	highly	knowledgeable	regarding	the	development	and	implementation	of	 NIPD	 in	 the	 UK.	 	 As	 I	 asked	 her	what	 her	 thoughts	were	 regarding	 ‘the	ELSI	 bit,	 the	
ethics,	 the	 legal	 and	 social	 stuff’	 she	 expressed	 frustration	 regarding	 the	 pervasive	presence	of	bioethical	discourse	within	the	discussion	of	NIPD	-	‘all	this	talk	about	ethics’	–	which,	she	felt,	was	narrow	in	focus	and	failed	to	attend	to	some	of	the	more	complex	and	challenging	practicalities	familiar	to	the	clinical	perspective:	‘sometimes	I	think	they	are	so	
kind	of,	off	the	page,	and	could	do	with	coming	to	sit	in	my	clinic,	you	know.		You	know,	and	
actually	see	what	it	is	like	to	look	someone	in	the	eyes	and	say	your	baby	is	dead’.		Elsewhere	Natalie	also	problematised	 the	narrowing	of	public	discourse	around	ethics,	particularly	within	the	work	that	had	been	conducted	to	date	with	 ‘stakeholders’	 in	the	discussion	of	NIPD’s	 implications,	 suggesting	 that	 a	 far	 broader	 range	 of	 voices	 ought	 to	 be	 given	 an	opportunity	to	contribute	to	the	debate:	‘I	would	love	to	see	a	piece	of	work	where	you	get,	
you	 know,	 old	 ladies	 of	 ninety	 and	 middle	 aged	 people	 who	 are	 working,	 and	 kids	 and	
teenagers	to	talk	about	–	what	does	it	mean?		…even	if	there	are	no	decisions	made,	some	of	
the	conversations	are	practiced,	for	society’.		Natalie	characterises	bioethical	debate	around	NIPD	 and	 prenatal	 testing	 -	 the	 ‘conversations’	 that	 she	 feels	 must	 be	 discussed	 and	
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practiced	 before	 the	 technology	 embeds	 within	 the	 clinic	 and	 everyday	 experiences	 of	pregnancy	-	as	one	that	holds	significant	implications	for	‘society’	at	large.		The	groups	she	identifies	here	(being	unlikely	to	be	placed	in	a	position	where	they	must	consider	testing	for	themselves)	are	explicitly	not	those	who	are	identified	as	key	‘stakeholders’	within	the	mainstream	public	discussion	of	prenatal	 testing.	 	By	 framing	 the	scope	of	 the	debate	 in	such	broad	and	inclusive	terms,	by	asking	to	include	the	voices	of	older	people,	children,	teenagers	 -	 people	 at	 the	 margins	 of	 human	 reproduction	 as	 it	 is	 typically	 framed	 and	discussed	 -	 she	 begins	 to	 shift	 the	 focus	 of	 discussion	 and	 debate	 away	 from	 questions	regarding	individual	decision	making,	autonomy	and	informed	consent,	identifying	issues	and	 concerns	 that	 are	 of	 significance	 to	 an	 inclusive,	 relational	 and	 interconnected	‘society’	 rather	 than	a	multitude	of	 ‘individuals’	whose	personhood	 lies,	 centrally,	 in	 the	capacity	for	choice	(Strathern	1992a,	p.144).		
	Rachel,	 a	 genetic	 counsellor	 specialising	 in	 the	 prenatal	 field,	 also	 suggested	 that	mainstream	 bioethical	 debate	 and	 discussion	 around	 NIPD,	 NIPT	 and	 prenatal	 testing	more	generally	ought	to	be	far	broader,	far	more	critical,	and	involve	‘society	as	a	whole’:	And	 I	 do	 wonder	 whether	 or	 not,	 is	 there	 a	 much	 more	 consumerist	attitude	 amongst	 testing	 in	 pregnancy?	 	 I	 don’t	 know,	 it’s	 for	 society	 to	have	 some	 of	 these	 conversations.	 	 And	 I	 think	 we	 need	 to	 have	 a	conversation	with	 these	women	who	 are,	 perhaps	 at	 high	 risk	 of	 having	babies	 with	 conditions,	 to	 say,	 well	 is	 this	 blood	 test	 going	 to	 be	 any	different	for	you	psychologically?	I	don’t	know.	
I	wonder-	what	appetite	 for	 information	do	you	 think	 there	 is	amongst	 the	
pregnant	population?	Yeah,	 because	 I	 think	 for	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 people	 who	 find	 they	 are	pregnant,	 and	whether	 it	 is	 unplanned	 or	 planned,	 you	 know,	 they	 don’t	actually	 set	 out	 to	 test	 their	 pregnancy.	 	 You	 know?	 	 I	 don’t	 think	 that’s-	and	 I	 do	 wonder	 whether	 society	 as	 a	 whole	 will	 actually	 judge,	 I	 think	women,	 and	 I	 do	 wonder	 if	 there	 will	 be	 a	 shift-	 well	 it	 wasn’t	interventional,	 you	 weren’t	 going	 to	 put	 your	 pregnancy	 at	 risk,	 so	 why	didn’t	 you	 have	 the	 test?	 	 Whereas	 I	 think,	 is	 there	 much	 more	 of	 an	understanding	or	there’s	much	more	sympathy	almost,	to	say-	if	someone	has	 an	 affected	 baby,	 because	 she	 said	well	 you	 know	 I	 couldn’t	 put	my	pregnancy	 at	 risk-	 is	 there	much	more	 sympathy	 and	 understanding	 for	that	position,	when	yes,	she	could	have	lost	a	healthy	baby?		Whereas	you	are	not	 going	 to	put	 the	pregnancy	 at	 risk	 from	 the	new	 technology,	 and	therefore,	why	didn’t	you	have	it?		So	is	there	going	to	be	less	tolerance	of	disability,	and	less	tolerance	of	not	testing?	I	don’t	know.	(Rachel,	genetic	counsellor)		Although	 Rachel	 happily	 adopts	 the	 language	 of	 mainstream	 bioethical	 discourse	throughout	the	rest	of	the	interview,	speaking	frequently	of	‘pre-test	counselling’,	‘informed	
decisions’	and	‘informed	choice’,	as	she	reflects	on	the	concerns	raised	through	the	possible	expansion	of	NIPD	and/or	NIPT	within	the	pregnant	population	at	large,	she	questions	the	
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responsibilisation	 of	 the	 women	 and	 families	 who	 become	 so	 routinely	 enrolled	 in	screening:	 ‘the	 vast	 majority	 of	 people	 who	 find	 they	 are	 pregnant,	 and	 whether	 it	 is	
unplanned	 or	 planned,	 you	 know,	 they	 don’t	 actually	 set	 out	 to	 test	 their	 pregnancy.	 You	
know?’.		Rachel	recognises	too	that	such	women	and	families	-	like	Rapp’s	‘moral	pioneers’	(Rapp	1999)	-	become	uniquely	charged	with	the	task	of	navigating	new	prenatal	testing	technologies,	and	she	explicitly	highlights	 the	power	 that	broader,	underlying	social	and	political	discourses	hold	in	shaping	the	context	within	which	reproductive	‘decisions’	and	‘choices’	regarding	prenatal	testing	must	be	made:	‘I	do	wonder	whether	society	as	a	whole	
will	 actually	 judge,	 I	 think	women,	 and	 I	 do	wonder	 if	 there	will	 be	 a	 shift-	well	 it	wasn’t	
interventional,	you	weren’t	going	to	put	your	pregnancy	at	risk,	so	why	didn’t	you	have	the	
test?’.	 	 She	 also	 points	 here	 towards	 the	 persistent	 division	 that	 is	 made	 between	 the	‘healthy’	and	the	‘disabled’,	suggesting	that	prenatal	testing	is	met	with	‘sympathy’	when	it	is	seen	to	protect	 ‘healthy’	babies,	and	suggesting	that	 the	possible	routinisation	of	NIPT	could	 lead	 to	 ‘less	 tolerance	 of	 disability’	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 corresponding	 de-valuation	 of	fetuses	and	babies	diagnosed	with	disability	or	disease.		By	suggesting	too	that	NIPT	may	garner	comparatively	less	sympathy	(because	the	safety	of	‘healthy’	fetuses	is	no	longer	a	concern),	 and	could	 in	 fact	 lead	 to	 ‘less	tolerance	of	not	testing’,	 Lucy	points	 towards	 the	influence	 of	 powerful	 and	 pervasive	 social	 and	 cultural	 norms	 on	 the	 shaping	 of	reproductive	 ‘choice’.	 	By	suggesting	here	that	-	as	a	result	of	NIPD’s	 ‘non-invasiveness’	-	women	may	be	under	increased	pressure	to	accept	testing,	and	to	avoid	the	birth	of	a	baby	with	 Down’s	 syndrome	 (or	 any	 of	 the	 other	 conditions	 that	 non-invasive	diagnosis/screening	 may	 come	 to	 test	 for),	 Rachel	 paints	 a	 picture	 of	 a	 world	 where	women	confront	a	situation	where	access	to	an	increased	range	of	prenatal	testing	options	confers	 less,	 and	 not	more,	 real	 choice.	 	 Here,	 Rachel	 echoes	 arguments	 previously	 put	forth	 by	 Strathern	 –	 that	 within	 the	 context	 of	 modern	 reproductive	 technologies	 ‘one	
might	perceive	choice	as,	in	fact,	lack	of	choice’	(Strathern	1992a,	p.166).		Examining	within	this	 work	 the	 impact	 reproductive	 technologies’	 on	 contemporary	 understandings	 of	kinship,	 Strathern	 points	 towards	 the	 way	 in	 which	 contemporary	 western	 culture	conceptualises	 modern	 personhood	 –	 ‘the	 epitome	 of	 individualism’	 -	 as	 being	fundamentally	constituted	by	a	capacity	for	rational,	autonomous	choice:		Of	all	 the	 interpretations	of	 the	person	 that	could	have	been	selected,	we	are	 presented	 with	 an	 individual	 subject	 or	 agent	 who	 knows	 how	 to	deploy	 resources	 of	 the	 incomes	 at	 his	 or	 her	 disposal	 and	 whose	personhood	lies	in	the	capacity	for	choice	(Strathern	1992a,	p.153)		Strathern	 proceeds	 to	 show	 how,	 despite	 the	 seeming	 proliferation	 in	 ‘choice’	 that	 new	technologies	 (and	 new	 consumer	 goods)	 bring	 as	 they	 operate	 within	 a	 capitalist,	 free	
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market	and	competitively-driven	cultural	context,	the	range	of	concrete,	lived	choices	that	such	technologies	can	in	fact	offer,	is	severely	limited:	Choices	appear	exercised	when	they	are	exercised	 in	certain	well-defined	‘choice-making	 zones…	 The	 difference	 between	 choice	 and	 no-choice	conceals	the	extent	to	which,	insofar	as	styles	come	from	a	limited	range	of	acceptable	commercial	alternatives,	one	might	perceive	choice	itself	as,	 in	fact,	lack	of	choice.	(Strathern	1992a,	p163-6)		This	problematic	 framing	of	choice	–	so	clearly	highlighted	by	Rachel	 -	 reappears	within	the	data	gathered	here,	 and	 is	explored	 in	more	depth	within	 the	next	 chapter,	 as	 those	whose	professional	 identities	are	more	 closely	and	explicitly	 tied	 to	 the	politics	of	NIPD	explore	questions	regarding	‘choice’	and	responsibility.				Returning	to	Rachel’s	account	 	 -	whereas	previously	 the	 figure	of	 the	 ‘healthy	baby’	may	have	 acted	 as	 a	protective	mechanism,	 allowing	women	 to	 ‘choose	not	 to	 choose’	 (Kelly	2009)	testing	-	with	the	arrival	of	NIPD	and	NIPT	the	‘healthy	baby’	may	be	viewed	as	no	longer	under	threat,	no	longer	holding	the	power	to	(morally)	legitimate	women’s	non-use	of	 testing.	 	 Experts	 elsewhere	 acknowledged	 that,	 even	 if	 women	 choose	 not	 to	 use	NIPD/NIPT	within	the	context	of	prenatal	screening	programmes,	they	may	be	placed	in	a	position	where	they	must	navigate	as	many	(if	not	more)	ethical	dilemmas	as	they	would	if	they	were	to	accept	testing:	I	mean	you	still	may	need	to	do	all	the	things	you	need	to	do	now	but	NIPD	gives	you	an	opportunity	to	extend	the	range	of	things	that	you	can	look	for	and	the	advice	that-	the	support	you	can	give	to	pregnant	women	and	their	partners,	 if	 you	 find	 that	 there	 are	 issues	 the	 that	might	 call	 for	 difficult	decisions.		And	of	course,	that-	that	raises	all	sorts	of	issues	not	just	along	ethical	 lines,	 and	 they	 may	 not	 all-	 the	 issues	 are	 not	 all,	 as	 it	 were	unidirectional.		If	you	could	do	something	and	you	choose	not	to,	then	that	equally	has	ethical	issues	that	are	raised,	ethical	consequences.	(Rob,	patient	support	and	policy)		What	these	accounts	make	clear	is	that	the	issues	raised	by	the	possible	mainstreaming	of	NIPT	as	a	screening	test	are	complex	–	they	are	in	no	way	‘unidirectional’	–	especially	for	the	women	 charged	with	 the	 responsibility	 of	making	 ‘difficult	decisions’	 and	 navigating	the	‘ethical	issues’	and	‘ethical	consequences’	that	the	offer	alone	of	NIPT	might	raise.		These	‘critical	 users’	 show	 how	 women	 become	 enrolled	 within	 morally,	 psychologically,	 and	socially	 complex	 situations	 from	 the	 very	 point	 at	 which	 testing	 becomes	 available	 –	whether	they	in	fact	‘choose’	to	make	use	of	these	new	technologies	or	not	seems	to	hold	little	 weight	 –	 as	 NIPD	 and	 NIPT	 tests	 become	 increasingly	 routine	 and	 increasingly	
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normal	those	who	 ‘choose	not	to	choose’	will	become	as	 ‘responsibilised’	within	this	on-going	project	of	prenatal	screening	as	those	who	don’t:	The	quest	for	the	'perfect	child'	means	that	any	flaws	perceived	in	children	are	viewed	as	 targets	 for	 intervention,	preferably	 to	be	prevented	before	they	 are	 even	 able	 to	 manifest	 themselves.	 Parents	 -	 and	 particularly	mothers	 -	 are	 charged	with	 the	primary	 responsibility	 of	maximizing	 the	potential	of	their	children.	(Lupton	1999,	p.68)		Erica	was	a	consultant	clinical	geneticist	who,	 throughout	most	of	 the	 interview	process	presented	an	account	of	NIPD	that	was	broadly	supportive	of	the	technology.		Towards	the	close	of	the	interview,	however,	Erica’s	perspective	suddenly	shifted,	and	she	expressed	a	highly	critical	understanding	of	how	technologies	and	programmes	of	prenatal	screening	come	to	be	shaped:		I	think	it’s	really	exiting.		And	I	think	there	are	lots	and	lots	of	benefits	for	individual	 families	 who	 have-	 you	 know,	 sort	 of	 clinical	 genetics	 type	families.		And	I	think	in	the	general	population,	you	know,	it	is	clearly	going	to	happen.		And	what	we	need	to	think	about	is	how	we	do	that	in	the,	way	that	does	less	harm,	or	least	harm,	to	you	know-	not	just	to	unborn	babies	and	the	fact	that	some	may	get	terminated	by	couples	who	might	otherwise	want,	but	also	for	how	those	couples	then	feel.		You	know,	with	the	whole	regret	 thing,	 and	 termination,	 and	do	 they	 feel	 that	 actually	 they	made	 a	decision	 in	 a	 rush.	 	 And	 people	 have	 said,	 just	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 standard	screening,	 that	 they	didn’t	 really	 think	 through	screening,	 they	get	a	high	risk,	 they	 feel	 like	 they	 are	 on	 a	 rollercoaster	 of	 having	 an	 amnio,	 then	getting	results.		And	that	could	happen	very,	very	easily	with	this,	without	enough	thought.	 	And	 lead	to	a	 lot	of	psychological	harm	to	couples.	 	So	 I	think	we	need	to	think	that	through,	and	it	not	just	purely	be	an	economic	thing.		Which	I	think	is	a	lot	of	what	is	behind	Down’s	screening,	that	if	we	can	avoid	the	birth	of	a	child	with	Down’s	syndrome	we’ll	save	a	whole	lot	of	 money	 on	 their	 medical	 and	 educational	 support.	 	 And	 I	 think	 that’s	probably	 why	 we’ve	 got	 Down’s	 screening	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 	 And	 yes	there’s	 clearly	 some	 benefits	 for	 couples	 who	 don’t	 want	 a	 child	 with	Down’s.		But	I	think	we	need	to	be	careful	with	this	that	we	remember	the	people	in	it	involved	as	well.	(Erica,	consultant	clinical	geneticist)		Here,	 Erica	 suggests	 that	 the	 practice	 of	 prenatal	 screening	 has	 been	 constructed,	 to	 a	significant	degree,	in	order	to	satisfy	economic	(and	political)	ends,	rather	than	in	order	to	fulfil	 any	 pressing	 clinical	 need	 or	 ‘consumer’	 demand:	 ‘So	 I	 think	we	need	 to	 think	 that	
through,	and	it	not	just	purely	be	an	economic	thing.		Which	I	think	is	a	lot	of	what	is	behind	
Down’s	screening,	that	if	we	can	avoid	the	birth	of	a	child	with	Down’s	syndrome	we’ll	save	a	
whole	 lot	of	money	on	 their	medical	and	educational	 support.	 	And	 I	 think	 that’s	probably	
why	we’ve	got	Down’s	screening	in	the	first	place’.		With	the	interview	taking	place	against	the	 backdrop	 of	 government	 austerity	 (an	 issue	 that	 was	 frequently	 raised	 by	 expert	
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participants),	the	practical	implications	of	which	have	been	repeatedly	and	directly	aimed	towards	 state-sponsored	 health	 and	 social	 care	 services	 (Roberts,	 Marshall	 et	 al.	 2012,	Black	 2013,	 Pownall	 2013),	 Erica	 recognises	 the	 profound	 influence	 of	 economic	 and	political	policies	and	pressures	 in	 the	shaping	of	screening	programmes,	and,	ultimately,	populations.				
I	don't	want	a	world	where	we	make	choices	about	who	lives	and	dies:	dissenting	
voices	and	the	politics	of	NIPD/prenatal	screening.			Many	of	the	strongest,	most	dissenting	and	most	politicised	voices	came	from	those	whose	experiences	 (professional	 and	 personal)	 of	 prenatal	 testing	 had	 not	 directly	 involved	NIPD.	 	Accounts	provided	by	 these	 ‘outsiders’	 -	 those	whose	everyday	experiences	were	not	tied	to	specific	encounters	with	the	technology	-	confronted	the	broader	moral,	social	and	 political	 implications	 of	 NIPD	 and	 NIPT	 directly,	 and	 rather	 than	 aligning	 with	 the	mainstream	bioethical	framing	of	the	debate,	they	appealed	to	alternative	discourses	such	as	 those	 offered	 by	 the	 disability	 rights	 critique	 (Parens	 and	 Asch	 2000,	 Shakespeare	2006)	 and	 critical	 examinations	 of	 ‘backdoor	 eugenics’	 (Duster	 1990).	 	 Interviews	with	mothers	 recruited	 through	 non-clinical	 spaces	 (mother	 and	 baby	 groups)	 and	 experts	working	within	the	broad	field	of	prenatal	care	(but	without	regular	experience	of	NIPD	or	NIPT)	 in	 particular	 generated	 very	 clear,	 robust	 discussions	 of	 the	 more	 contentious	issues	raised,	not	only	by	NIPD	and	NIPT,	but	by	prenatal	testing	(and	associated	practices	of	screening,	diagnosis	and	abortion)	more	generally.			Martha	was	a	mum	to	two	young	boys,	recruited	as	a	participant	on	this	study	through	a	mother-and-baby	group.	 	She	was	working	part-time	as	a	writer,	and	had	a	professional	background	in	academic	research.		She	very	quickly	identified	herself	as	being	a	selective,	critical	user	of	prenatal	 care,	explaining	 that	 she	 (and	her	partner)	had	been	resolute	 in	their	 decision	not	 to	use	 any	of	 the	prenatal	 tests	 that	 had	been	offered	 to	 them	during	pregnancy.		Firmly	locating	herself	outside	the	systems	of	screening	and	diagnosis	within	which	so	many	women	become	routinely	enrolled,	and	having	very	actively	explored	her	thoughts	and	feelings	in	this	regard,	she	extended	this	position	out	as	she	explored	NIPD,	finally	 presenting	 a	 carefully-thought,	 dissenting	 and	 highly	 critical	 account	 of	 the	potential	moral	and	social	impact	of	non-invasive	testing.				The	decision	not	 to	undergo	any	 testing	was	made	during	both	of	Martha’s	pregnancies,	despite	 her	 being	 ‘slightly	 more	 anxious	 about	 the	 second	 pregnancy’	 because,	 as	 she	explained,	 she	 had	 experienced	 a	miscarriage	 just	 after	 the	 first.	 	 She	 had	 been	 offered	maternal	serum	screening	and	ultrasound	testing	as	is	routine	within	NHS	based	prenatal	
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care	 (see	 appendix	 one	 for	 detail),	 and	 her	 particular	 experience	 of	 prenatal	 care	 also	included	 a	 direct	 offer	 of	 diagnostic	 testing	 –	 she	 had	been	 living	 in	Norway	during	 the	first	 seven	months	 of	 her	 first	 pregnancy,	where,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 her	 age	 (Martha	was	36	years	 old	 during	 her	 first	 pregnancy,	 and	 would	 have	 been	 classed	 as	 an	 ‘elderly	
primigravida’55)	 she	 had	 been	 routinely	 placed	 into	 a	 ‘high	 risk’	 category	 and	 offered	amniocentesis	without	 undergoing	 any	prior	 screening.	 	 As	 she	 explained	 the	 reasoning	process	 that	 lay	 behind	 her	 decision	 not	 to	 test,	Martha	 explicitly	 linked	 the	 practice	 of	prenatal	 screening	 with	 selective	 abortion	 and	 the	 associated	 ‘dilemmas’	 and	 decisions	that	an	acceptance	of	 testing	would	bring:	 ‘if	there	was	a	problem	we	wouldn’t	want	to	be	
having	 to	 make	 a	 choice’.	 	 She	 explained	 that	 despite	 very	 consciously	 adopting	 this	position	 towards	 testing	 she	 and	 her	 partner	 had	 accepted	 multiple	 ultrasound	 scans	throughout	 both	 pregnancies:	 ‘I	 had	 all	 my	 scans	 here	 –	 and	 I	 had	 extra	 scans	 as	 well	
because	I	had	a	thyroid	condition,	so	they	were	just	keeping	an	extra	check	on	how	he	was	
growing’.		Reflecting	on	this,	Martha	began	to	identify	the	presence	of	routine	systems	and	processes,	 the	 intense	normalisation	of	which,	 she	 felt,	 had	 led	her	 to	divide	ultrasound	scanning	away	from	other,	seemingly	less	benign,	prenatal	tests:		In	 my	 head	 I	 had	 always	 very	 much	 drawn	 that	 line	 of,	 I	 don't	 want	additional	testing	at	all-	I	don't	want	Down's	testing.	 	And	um,	I	was	quite	happy	to	go	with	the	scan.		And	now	I've	been	thinking	about	it,	it's	an	odd	line	to	draw.		Because	actually	the	scans	are	testing	as	well,	but	I	think	they	are	presented	to	you	in	a	different	way.		They	are	presented	as-	it's	almost	your	chance	to	see	your	baby,	and	 it's-	you	forget	 that	actually	what	they	are	doing	 is	checking	the	health	of	 the	 fetus.	 	And,	you	know.	 	So	you	are	partaking	in	a	test,	you	just	don't	know	it.	(Martha,	mother	with	experience	of	routine	testing)		Martha	is	struck	here	by	her	(when	examined	in	the	light	of	decisions	made	around	other	testing	 options)	 comparatively	 uncritical	 acceptance	 of	 ultrasound	 testing,	 and	 her	acceptance,	by	implication,	of	the	selective	choices	and	decisions	that	accompany	any	kind	of	prenatal	testing	that	 ‘is	checking	the	health	of	the	fetus’–	decisions	and	choices	she	and	her	 partner	 had	 specifically	 sought	 to	 avoid	 via	 their	 rejection	 of	 other,	more	 obviously	health	 and	 disease-focused,	 testing	 options.	 	 She	 maintains	 her	 distance	 from	 such	selective	 practices,	 however,	 by	 rejecting	 the	 notion	 that	 she	 (or	 her	 partner)	 bears	individual	responsibility	for	testing,	and	by	emphasising	the	normalising	influence	that	the	systematic	routinisation	of	ultrasound	testing	within	prenatal	care	had	on	her	particular	experience:	 ‘you	are	partaking	in	a	test,	you	just	don’t	know	it’.	 	Martha’s	claim	that	 it	was																																									 																						55	The	term	‘elderly	primigravida’	is	used	clinically	to	describe	women	at	or	over	35	years	of	age	at	the	 time	 of	 their	 first	 pregnancy:	 (Morrison,	 I.	 (1975).	 "The	 elderly	 primigravida."	 Am	 J	 Obstet	Gynecol	121(4):	465-470.)	
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not	her	or	her	partner,	 but	 ‘they’,	 (health	professionals)	who	had	been	 interested	 in	 the	health	 of	 the	 fetus,	 and	 ‘they’	 who	 had	 presented	 the	 test	 in	 a	 way	 that	 constructs	ultrasound	 examination	 as	 normal,	 routine	 and	 explicitly	 social	 (‘your	 chance	 to	 see	 the	
baby’)		again	underlines	her	assertion	that	responsibility	for	the	implications	of	testing	is	not	prescribed	to	individual	women	or	parents,	but	is	located	elsewhere.				Martha’s	act	of	ascribing	moral	responsibility	to	routine	practices,	processes	and	systems,	rather	than	individuals,	 lies	in	direct	contrast	to	many	of	the	accounts	provided	by	those	closer	to	the	technology,	those	who	repeatedly	mobilise	mainstream	bioethical	discourse	around	 ‘individual	 reproductive	 choice’,	 ‘patient	 autonomy’	 and	 ‘informed	 decision	making’	 –	 discourses	 that	 privilege	 the	 value	 of	 ‘choice’	 and	 autonomous	 control	 over	reproductive	 decision	 making,	 and	 locate	 responsibility	 at	 the	 individual,	 and	 not	 the	social	 (or	 political)	 level.	 	 Martha’s	 explicitly	 critical	 account	 of	 the	 routinisation	 and	normalisation	of	testing	is	also	supported	by	much	of	the	empirical	sociological	work	that	has	been	conducted	around	everyday	experiences	of	ultrasound.		Studies	have	shown	how	routine	examinations	perform	multiple	clinical	and	social	functions,	with	ultrasound	tests	operating,	 simultaneously,	 as	 tools	 for	 screening	 and	 diagnosis,	 as	 instruments	 of	psychological	 reassurance,	 and	 as	 sources	 of	 pleasure,	 fun	 and	 entertainment	 (Mitchell	2001,	p.123).	 	Studies	of	more	recently-emergent	 ‘4D’	ultrasound	scans	have	also	shown	how	 such	 tests	 -	 marketed	 explicitly	 as	 tools	 for	 promoting	 maternal-fetal	 ‘bonding’	(Roberts	 2012)	 -	 further	highlight	 and	 intensify	 the	 tensions	 that	 already	 exist	 between	the	 multiple	 clinical	 and	 non-clinical	 functions	 ultrasound	 achieves,	 with	 professionals	being	 required	 to	 ‘perform	 serious	 emotional	 labour	 to	 balance	 the	 delicate	 tension	 of	
offering	 expertise	 and	medically-based	 reassurance	 with	 providing	 a	 joyful	 experience	 for	
parents	as	consumers’	(Thomas	2015b,	p.1).			Martha	had	no	direct	experience	of	NIPD,	and	had	heard	about	the	technology	for	the	first	time	as	a	result	of	being	contacted	about	this	study.	 	She	explained	that	she	had	read	the	information	 sheet	provided	 to	potential	participants	 (which	 contained	a	basic	outline	of	the	 technology	 along	with	 current	 and	 possible	 future	 applications	 –	 see	 appendix	 five)	but	 that	 this	 had	 been	 ‘a	 long	 time	 ago’,	 and	 in	 order	 to	 bring	 the	 technology	 to	 the	forefront	of	the	conversation,	and	to	shift	 the	focus	towards	NIPD	in	particular,	 I	offered	Martha	the	three	vignettes	(see	appendix	nine),	all	of	which	she	read	through	in	a	single	sitting.	 	 Pausing	 to	 consider	 the	 scenarios	 outlined,	 Martha	 proceeded	 to	 very	 clearly	articulate	her	position	regarding	the	wider	politics	of	NIPD,	and	prenatal	testing.		Taking	a	broad	view	of	the	technologies	and	practices	at	hand,	Martha	identified	a	range	of	issues	that	she	perceived	 to	be	central	 to	 the	shaping	of	experiences	with	prenatal	 testing,	and	
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she	 extended	 her	 critical	 gaze	 out,	 highlighting	 the	 problematic	 moral	 and	 political	implications	of	population-wide	screening:	I	 think	 it-	 it	 is	 really	 complicated,	 for	 people	 who	 have	 had	 a	 previous	disorder	in	a	child,	that	level	of	anxiety	is	really	high,	and	that's	not	a	nice	way	 to	 go	 through	 a	 pregnancy.	 	 So	 I	 can	 totally	 see	 how	 having	 testing	would	help	that.		I	think	my	main	concern	is	that	it	just	does	open	the	door	to	choices,	about	who	lives	and	who	dies.		For	me.		I	know	that	people	can	feel	 like,	oh	 it's	 just	 a	 fetus,	 and	until	 it's	born	 it's	not	a	 real	person-	and	that	is	the	case	for	me.		I'm	just	not	sure	that	we-	I'm	not	sure	I	want	to	live	in	a	society	where	we	don't	have	variety…	 	and	 it's	kind	of	all	based	on	a	sense	of	Down's	particularly.	 	Which	is	obviously	what	gets	the	most	kind	of,	 understanding,	 because	 the	 testing	 has	 been	 around	 for	 so	 long,	 for	that…	there's	this	idea	that	Down's	children	are	happy	children,	and	that's	largely	true-	but	there's	also	the	children	for	whom-	they	have	a	multitude	of	other	conditions	that	go	along	with	it,	and	that's	a	difficult	thing	to	deal	with.	You	know,	and-	so	it	is	hard.	I	don't	know.	My	kind	of	root	feeling	is	I	don't	want	a	world	where	we	make	choices	about	who	lives	and	dies.	But	it's	not-	it	is	not	that	simple.	(Martha,	mother	with	experience	of	routine	prenatal	testing)		Approaching	NIPD	technology	as	an	outsider,	Martha	spoke	 from	a	perspective	 that	was	free	from	any	need	or	desire	to	focus	on	a	particular	lived	experience,	or	a	specific	testing	context.		In	contrast	to	the	patients	and	‘high	risk’	mothers	interviewed	-	whose	accounts	of	 testing	 were	 so	 closely	 tied	 to	 encounters	 with	 serious	 genetic	 disease,	 personal	experience	of	abortion,	or	a	strong	desire	 for	(diagnostic)	certainty	-	Martha	was	able	to	shift	 the	 focus	of	discussion	away	from	the	practicalities	of	 testing	(and	the	comparative	advantages	 and	 disadvantages	 of	 NIPD	 and	 other	 testing	 technologies),	 identifying	 and	examining	a	much	broader	set	of	concerns.	 	Martha’s	bold	and	highly	critical	response	to	NIPD	 is	directed	very	clearly	 towards	some	of	 the	most	contentious	 issues	raised	within	the	discussion	of	prenatal	 testing	at	 large:	 twice	within	 this	brief	moment	 she	describes	how	 the	widespread	 and	 routine	 application	 of	 prenatal	 testing	 creates	 a	 system	which	leads	directly	towards	ethically,	socially	and	politically	profound	decisions:	 ‘choices	about	
who	lives	and	dies’.	 	As	she	examines	prenatal	testing	in	more	general	terms,	Martha	once	again	 shifts	 the	 locus	 of	moral	 responsibility	 away	 from	 individual	 parents,	 ascribing	 it	instead	to	a	more	generalised	‘we’	of	‘the	world’.		Suggesting	here	that	Down’s	syndrome	in	particular	has	become	a	central	 focus	of	routine	prenatal	screening	programmes,	as	well	as	new	prenatal	technologies,	largely	because	 ‘the	testing	has	been	around	for	so	long’,	she	again	highlights	the	 idea	that	 it	 is	 the	systems	of	routinised,	normalised	clinical	practice,	(and	with	the	larger	structures	that	govern	and	regulate	them)	rather	than	the	needs	and	desires	 of	 parents,	 that	 have	 a	most	 profound	 influence	 on	 the	 shaping	 of	 reproductive	choice.				
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Within	this	brief	account	then,	and	prompted	by	a	reflection	on	NIPD’	s	potential	 impact	on	prenatal	screening,	diagnosis,	and	pregnancy,	Martha	raises	for	discussion	issues	that	have,	 within	 a	 range	 of	 ethnographic	 and	 sociological	 examinations,	 been	 identified	 as	central	 to	 the	 politics	 of	 prenatal	 testing.	 	 These	 include:	 the	 presence	 of	 competing	definitions	of	‘normal’	and	‘abnormal’	fetuses	and	babies	(Vassy	2005,	Williams	2006),	the	limited	 capacity	 that	 genetic	 prenatal	 testing	 and	 diagnosis	 possesses	 to	 inform	 (Alper	1996,	 Cooper,	 Krawczak	 et	 al.	 2013,	 Thomas	 2015b)	 –	 or	 the	 incompleteness	 of	 the	
phenotype-genotype	 relation	 (Latimer	 2013,	 p.204)	 -	 long-standing	 debates	 around	 fetal	personhood	(Thomson	1971,	Tooley	1983,	Purdy	1990),	and	the	potential	eugenic	power	of	prenatal	screening	(Duster	1990,	Rothman	1994,	Clarke	1997,	Rapp	1999,	Parens	and	Asch	 2000,	 Franklin	 and	 Roberts	 2006,	 Shakespeare	 2006).	 	 Although	 she	 very	 clearly	adopts	an	approach	that	is	critical	and	dissenting,	Martha	recognises	that	the	experiences	and	consequences	of	prenatal	testing	are	multiple	and	diverse	–	 ‘it	is	really	complex…	it	is	
not	that	simple’	–	acknowledging,	for	instance,	that	the	potential	relief	of	anxiety	that	may	be	achieved	through	early	diagnosis	is	of	significant	value	within	pregnancies	at	high	risk	of	 serious	 genetic	 disease:	 ‘it	 is	 really	 complicated,	 for	 people	 who	 have	 had	 a	 previous	
disorder	in	a	child,	that	level	of	anxiety	is	really	high,	and	that's	not	a	nice	way	to	go	through	
a	pregnancy’.			
	Recognising	 that	 prenatal	 testing	 for	 Down’s	 syndrome	 in	 particular	 has	 become	normalised	through	long-standing	and	widespread	use	-	it's	kind	of	all	based	on	a	sense	of	
Down's	particularly.		Which	is	obviously	what	gets	the	most	kind	of,	understanding,	because	
the	 testing	has	been	around	 for	 so	 long’	 -	 Martha	 also	 reflects	 on	 the	 problematic	 issues	raised	 when	 testing	 programmes	 provide	 diagnoses	 for	 conditions	 (like	 Down’s	syndrome)	which	exist	on	a	spectrum	-	where	the	resulting	phenotype	-	the	way	in	which	a	 disease	 or	 condition	 manifests	 in	 the	 bodies	 and	 lives	 of	 those	 involved	 -	 can	 be	incredibly	 varied:	 ‘there's	 this	 idea	 that	 Down's	 children	 are	 happy	 children,	 and	 that's	
largely	 true-	 but	 there's	 also	 the	 children	 for	 whom-	 they	 have	 a	 multitude	 of	 other	
conditions	that	go	along	with	it,	and	that's	a	difficult	thing	to	deal	with’.		Elsewhere,	Martha	touches	 upon	 the	 contentious	 and	 problematic	 politics	 of	 abortion	 (see	 chapter	 five	 for	further	discussion),	 raising	questions	around	the	selective	power	of	prenatal	 testing	and	how	this	intersects	with	questions	regarding	fetal	personhood:	‘my	main	concern	is	that	it	
just	does	open	the	door	to	choices,	about	who	lives	and	dies.		For	me.		I	know	that	people	can	
feel	 like,	oh	it’s	 just	a	fetus,	and	until	 it’s	born	it’s	not	a	real	person-	that’s	the	case	for	me’.		Presenting	a	highly	critical	account	of	prenatal	screening	programmes,	envisioned	here	as	holding	 the	 power	 to	 shape	 populations	 and	 to	 determine	 ‘who	 lives	 and	 who	 dies’,	 as	public	 health	 strategies	 that	 contribute	 to	 the	 construction	 of	 ‘a	 society	where	we	 don't	
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have	 variety’	via	 selective	 processes	 of	 testing,	 diagnosis	 and	 abortion,	 which	 construct	boundaries	between	the	‘normal’	and	the	‘abnormal’,	she	simultaneously	supports	the	idea	that	-	when	examined	on	an	individual	basis	-	the	‘person’	being	tested	is	‘just	a	fetus…	until	
it’s	born	it’s	not	a	real	person’.	 	Attending	 to	both	 the	problematic	 (bio)political	power	of	systematic	programmes	of	selective	abortion,	and	the	limited	capacity	for	personhood	that	a	 fetus	might	possess	 (along	with	 the	contrastingly	 rich	personhood	a	mother	or	parent	holds),	Martha’s	 account	highlights	 the	both	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 issues	 raised	 and	 the	profound	 difficulty	 that	 is	 faced	when	 attempting	 to	 ameliorate	 two	 closely	 related	 but	contrasting	 critical	 perspectives.	 	 On	 one	 hand	Martha	wishes	 to	 recognise	 the	 value	 of	individual	 freedom	 and	 preserve	 individual	women’s	 rights	 to	genuine	 choice	 regarding	their	pregnancies	and	their	bodies,	and	on	the	other	she	recognises	the	profound	level	of	influence	that	larger	social	and	political	structures	have	on	the	shaping	(and	restriction)	of	‘choice’	as	 it	 is	experienced	and	situated	–	as	 it	becomes	translated	-	within	and	through	routine	prenatal	testing	programmes	and	technologies.		These	issues	and	tensions	existed	at	the	core	of	the	discussion	of	NIPD,	NIPT	and	practices	of	prenatal	testing	gathered	here,	and	they	are	explored	 in	greater	depth	within	the	next	chapter,	as	accounts	provided	by	those	most	closely	implicated	in	the	politics	of	prenatal	testing	are	critically	examined.				As	a	dissenting	and	critical	voice	positioned	outside	 the	mainstream	discussion	of	NIPD,	Martha	 is	 able	 to	 very	 clearly	 articulate	many	 of	 the	more	 contentious	 and	 problematic	issues	raised	within	 the	discussion	of	NIPD,	NIPT	and	practices	of	prenatal	 testing	more	generally.	 	 Although	 Martha’s	 account	 was	 perhaps	 one	 of	 the	 boldest,	 several	 other	mothers,	again	positioned	as	 ‘outsiders’	 (and	having	also	chosen	not	 to	make	use	of	any	prenatal	 testing)	 presented	 similarly	 critical	 perspectives.	 	 Jess,	 a	 mother	 of	 two,	 had	chosen	not	 to	 accept	 any	 screening	during	pregnancy.	 	With	 her	 personal	 experience	 of	pregnancy	 and	motherhood	no	 longer	 so	 closely	 caught	up	within	 the	politics	 of	 testing	(she	had	decided	not	 to	have	 any	more	 children	 after	 experiencing	 two	difficult	 births),	she	 too	 confronted	 the	 more	 contentious	 issues	 raised	 directly,	 explicitly	 and	 directly	linking,	for	instance,	prenatal	screening	with	abortion:	I	didn't	want	to	have	to	make	the	decision	of	potentially	aborting	a	baby…	so	we	would	 rather	 not	 be	 put	 in	 the	 position	where	we	would	 have	 to	make	a	choice…	It	might	sound	kind	of,	I	don't	know,	irresponsible	in	some	way?	 	But	 I	 just	 didn't	 want	 it-	 because	 then	 you	 are	 into	 abortion	questions.			(Jess,	mother	with	experience	of	routine	prenatal	testing)		Jess	 hints	 here	 towards	 feeling	 some	degree	 of	moral	 responsibility	 connected	with	 her	experiences	of	(not)	testing	–	suggesting	that	by	refusing	testing	and	‘risking’	the	birth	of	a	child	 with	 a	 disease	 or	 condition	 that	 she	 had	 been	 provided	 with	 the	 (free,	 easy	 and	
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routine)	 opportunity	 to	 test	 for,	 the	 morality	 of	 her	 decisions	 may	 be	 subject	 to	 some	scrutiny	or	judgment:	‘It	might	sound	kind	of,	I	don't	know,	irresponsible	in	some	way?’.		Jess	also	 explained	how	she	and	her	husband	 felt	 that	 the	 approach	 they	had	 taken	 towards	unspoken,	 contentious	 issues	 involved	 in	 testing	 –	 abortion	 and	 risk	 of	 fetal	 loss,	 the	abrupt	 ending	 of	 a	 wanted	 pregnancy	 –	 had	 been	 received	 as	 being	 unusually,	 or	unexpectedly	 direct,	 and	 she	 highlighted	 in	 particular	 their	 unusual	 status	 here	 as	dissenting,	critical	users	of	prenatal	care:		So	they	offered	us	blood	tests	and	stuff	for	it,	but	we	said	no,	because-	well	because	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 if	 you	 find	 out	 you	 are	 at	 risk	 you	 then	 have	 to	decide	on	whether	you	want	to	do	the	invasive	test.	
And	how	did	they	respond	when	you	said	you	didn't	want	the	test?	I	 think	 they	were-	 I	 think	 they	didn't	 really	 care,	 they	didn't	 react	 in	 any	particular	way.	Except	 for	when	 [Jess’	husband]	was	 saying,	well	 actually	you	are	possibly	killing	the	baby,	they	got	a	bit-	[Husband,	speaking	in	the	background]	They	got	a	bit	pissed	off	really-	They	got	a	bit	pissed	off	by	that.		Yeah	I	think	the	fact	that	he	sort	of,	put	it	so	bluntly.	 	But	that's	what	it	is.	 	You	know,	there's	no	point	sugar-coating	it.		Because	that	is	essentially-	that	is	the	risk.			(Jess,	mother	with	experience	of	routine	prenatal	testing,	accompanied	by	her	husband)		Elsewhere,	 Frankie,	 who	was	 pregnant	with	 her	 second	 child	 at	 the	 point	 of	 interview,	presented	 another	 nuanced,	 critical	 account	 of	 how	 she	 felt	 the	 routine	 application	 of	NIPD	may	impact	on	experiences	of	pregnancy.	 	Discussing	her	response	to	vignette	two,	which	 described	 the	 possible	 introduction	 of	 NIPD	 into	 routine	 screening,	 and	 its	 use	alongside	 current	 testing	 (see	 appendix	 nine),	 Frankie	 reflected	 in	 particular	 on	 the	stigmatisation	of	Down’s	syndrome,	as	well	as	disability	more	generally,	that	she	felt	was	very	closely	aligned	with	practices	of	prenatal	testing:		[Frankie	starts	talking	to	me	after	reading	through	vignette	two]	If	it	was	just	a	routine	thing	that	everybody	had	I	probably	wouldn’t	think	twice,	 I’d	 just	 have	 it	 done	 because	 it’s	 part	 of	what	 you	 have	 done-	 like	there’s	a	 lot	of	 things	 that	you	have	done	that	you	don’t	even	realise	 that	you	don’t	have	to	do.		A	lot	of	the	time	you	have	to-	or	you	are	made	to	feel	like	you	have	to	have	stuff	done,	but	you	don’t	have	to	have	anything	done	do	you?		So	I	probably	would	just	go	along	with	it,	but	I	don’t	think-	if	I	was	given	 a	 choice	 to	 have	 it,	 maybe	 on	 the	 first	 one	 yes,	 but	 on	 this	 one	 I	wouldn’t,	no,	I	wouldn’t.	
If	you	got	a	positive	result	from	a	test	like	that,	it	would	be	very	likely	that-		It	would	have	Down’s	syndrome.	
Yes,	 and	you	would	get	 the	 result	at	around	13	weeks,	 rather	 than	 later	 in	
pregnancy.		How	do	you	think-	
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I	 think	 there	 would	 be	 loads	 of-	 I	 think	 it	 would	 scare	 a	 lot	 of	 people.	Sometimes	knowing	 too	much	 isn’t	 a	good	 thing.	 	 It	might	panic	mothers	into	 thinking-	 like	 for	 some	 people	 that	might	 be	 the	worst	 thing	 in	 the	world.		Especially	if	it’s	your	first	kid	and	you	don’t	know	what’s	coming-	I	don’t	know.	But,	I	suppose	it’s	a	hard	one	that.		It’s	a	hard	one.		I	think,	for	me,	 I’d	 just	 get	 on	 with	 it	 and	 I’d	 wait	 and	 see.	 But	 I	 know	 it	 would	probably	scare	a	lot	of	people.		But	then,	how	many	weeks	can	you	have	an	abortion?		So	would	it	scare	people	into	that	maybe?		I	think	so,	probably.		Yeah	I	think	that’s	a	bit	sad,	cos	I	think,	especially	with	Down’s	syndrome-	if	it	was	something	really,	if	it	was	like	a	genetic	disease	that	is	really,	really	bad	for	you	and	you	know	it’s	going	to	hurt	you,	or	hurt	your	kid,	and	they	are	 not	 going	 to	 have	 a	 long	 life	 and	 they	 are	 not	 going	 to	 have	 a	 good	quality	of	life	I	can	understand	that,	but	Down’s	syndrome	is	such	a	broad-	like	 I	 said,	 it’s	 a	broad	 spectrum.	By	giving	a	 label	Down’s	 syndrome	you	make	 people	 sound	 like	 they	 are	 like	 a	 lesser	 person-	 our	 society	 looks	upon	them	as	if	they	are	a	lesser	person,	when	actually	they’re	not,	they’re	just	 exactly	 the	 same	 as	 us,	 just	 as	 happy,	 just	 as	 nice.	 	 They’re	 not	 even	separate-	 like,	 it	 makes	 it	 sound	 like	 it	 is	 us	 and	 them,	 doesn’t	 it,	 when	actually	we	are	just	all	people.	So	actually,	I	think	it’s	a	bit,	a	bit	of	a	scare–	not	a	scare	tactic,	but	it’s	a	grey	area	isn’t	it.		But	then	that’s	the	way	society	looks	at	things	really	and	not	the	way-	yeah	that’s	they	way	we	as	a	society	looks	at	disability	and	things	like	that.	I	suppose	people	should	be	given	the	option	 really,	 if	 it’s	 there,	 but	 then	 you	 might	 get	 irrational	 decisions	because	of	that	option,	I	don’t	know.		You	might	save	a	lot	of	people	a	lot	of	heartache.	 	 I	 don’t	 know	 it’s	 a	 grey	 area,	 it’s	 a-	 you	 could	 go	 round	 and	round	with	it	forever	and	a	day	I	reckon.	(Frankie,	mother	with	experience	of	routine	prenatal	testing)		Frankie	begins	by	acknowledging	that	she	has	been	subject	to	a	range	of	 ‘routine’	 testing	processes	 during	 pregnancy,	 and	 that,	 particularly	 within	 the	 context	 of	 first-time	experiences	of	pregnancy,	she	felt	that	she	had	been	positioned	in	a	way	which	meant	that	she	‘wouldn’t	think	twice’	–	with	the	routinisation	and	normalisation	of	testing	preventing	her	 from	 ‘realising’	 that	 the	 many	 routine	 tests	 she	 was	 offered	 were	 intended	 to	 be	experienced	 as	 choices	 –	 ‘there’s	 a	 lot	 of	 things	 that	 you	 have	 done	 that	 you	 don’t	 even	
realise	that	you	don’t	have	to	do.		A	lot	of	the	time	you	have	to-	or	you	are	made	to	feel	like	
you	have	to	have	stuff	done,	but	you	don’t	have	to	have	anything	done	do	you?’.		Having	very	clearly	articulated	a	vision	of	thoroughly-routinised	prenatal	care	(and	the	corresponding	lack	of	 agency	 that	 is	 ascribed	 to	pregnant	women),	 Frankie	proceeds	 to	 claim	 that	 this	routinised,	 normalised	 approach	 to	 prenatal	 testing	 contributes	 significantly	 to	 the	broader	 cultural	 stigmatisation	 of	 disease	 and	 disorder.	 	 She	 suggests	 that	 the	 way	 in	which	prenatal	testing	is	constructed	and	practiced	both	reflects,	and	is	symptomatic	of,	a	deeply	 problematic	 approach	 towards	 disability	 that,	 she	 feels,	 is	 taken	 by	 ‘society’	 at	large.	 	 Here,	 Frankie	 points	 towards	 processes	 of	 classification	 and	 division	 that,	 when	aligned	with	powerful	biomedical	discourses	and	the	routinisation	of	practices	crucial	 to	prenatal	testing	–	screening,	diagnosis,	disease	and	disorder	–	result	in	the	stratification	of	society	along	 lines	 constituted	by	 conceptions	of	 ‘normal’	 and	 ‘abnormal’,	 ‘diseased’	 and	
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‘healthy’.	 	These	processes,	she	suggests,	define	those	with	disability	or	disease	as	‘other’	and	separate	them	away	from	‘society’:	‘by	giving	a	label	Down’s	syndrome	you	make	people	
sound	 like	 they	are	 like	a	 lesser	person…	They’re	not	even	separate-	 like,	 it	makes	 it	 sound	
like	it	is	us	and	them,	doesn’t	it,	when	actually	we	are	just	all	people…yeah	that’s	they	way	we	
as	 a	 society	 looks	 at	 disability’.	 	 Imagining	 a	 future	 where	 NIPD	 is	 similarly	 routine	 to	current	 screening	 tests	 (prompted	by	her	 reading	of	 the	vignettes),	Frankie	also	reflects	on	 the	 specific	 conditions	 under	 which	 this	 problematic	 approach	 to	 disease,	 and	 this	process	 of	 categorising	 fetuses,	 babies,	 and	 persons	 as	 ‘normal	 or	 ‘abnormal’,	 may	 be	further	 re-constructed	 and	 re-forged	 via	 a	 more	 widespread	 normalisation	 of	 prenatal	testing	and	selective	abortion:	I	think	it	would	scare	a	lot	of	people…	It	might	panic	mothers	
into	 thinking-	 like	 for	 some	 people	 that	might	 be	 the	worst	 thing	 in	 the	world…	 I	 know	 it	
would	probably	scare	a	lot	of	people.		But	then,	how	many	weeks	can	you	have	an	abortion?	
So	would	it	scare	people	into	that	maybe?	
	A	 minority	 of	 expert	 interviewees	 also	 provided	 highly	 dissenting,	 critical	 accounts	 of	NIPD.	 	Focussing	 in	on	broader	moral	and	political	 concerns,	 these	accounts	again	came	from	 those	 who	 could	 be	 identified	 as	 ‘outsiders’	 within	 the	 mainstream	 discussion	 of	NIPD.	 	 Although	 they	 had	 been	 recruited	 through	 a	 process	 of	 snowball	 sampling,	with	recommendations	to	contact	specific	individuals	coming	from	persons	closely	involved	in	the	development	and	implementation	of	NIPD	in	the	UK,	their	work	did	not	(at	the	time	of	interview)	 involve	 regular	 encounters	 with	 NIPD	 or	 NIPT.	 	 Rather,	 these	 were	professionals	 whose	 everyday	 work	 involved	 providing	 support	 and	 information	regarding	 prenatal	 testing	 in	 general,	 to	 both	 parents	 and	 healthcare	 professionals.		Despite	their	lack	of	direct	experience	with	NIPD,	they	were	highly	informed	with	regard	the	 field	 in	 general,	 and	 expressed	much	 interest	 in	 the	 future	 of	NIPD	 and	 its	 possible	impact	on	prenatal	care.		
	Jack	 worked	 as	 a	 regional	 manager	 for	 a	 large	 national	 (UK-wide)	 charity,	 providing	support	to	people,	and	families,	diagnosed	with	a	genetic	condition.		The	charity	provided	much	 support	 to	 people	 affected	 by	 Down’s	 syndrome	 in	 particular,	 and	 having	 been	established	 for	more	 than	 thirty	 years,	 as	 Jack	 explained,	 their	work	was	 informed	by	 a	very	close	contextual	understanding	of	 issues	that	the	Down’s	syndrome	community	had	faced	in	the	past	(such	as	mass	institutionalisation,	and	the	challenge	of	securing	access	to	mainstream	 education).	 	 As	we	 began	 the	 interview	 and	 I	 asked	 Jack	 to	 describe	 to	me	what	his	work	entailed,	he	explained	that	the	task	of	dealing	with	questions	and	concerns	raised	in	connection	with	prenatal	testing	was,	he	felt,	peripheral	to	the	main	aims	of	the	organisation:	‘prenatal	screening	and	early	years	is	just	a	small	part	of	what	we	do’.		Despite	
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adopting	a	somewhat	distanced	perspective	on	prenatal	testing	from	the	outset,	he	quickly	acknowledged	 that	 the	 prenatal	 area	 was	 one	 of	 the	 most	 politically	 contentious	 and	challenging	 areas	 of	 his	work,	 and	 he	went	 on	 to	 express	 a	 high	 level	 of	 interest	 in	 the	issues	and	concerns	that	he	felt	NIPD,	and	other	testing	technologies,	raised:	‘the	hot	topic	
really,	has	always	been	prenatal	 screening.	 I	mean	 I	have	worked	here	 for	16	years,	 it	was	
when	 I	 started,	and	you	know-	 last	week,	again	 it	was	headline	news’.	 	 Although	 prenatal	testing	was	of	clear	significance	within	Jack’s	professional	life,	and	although	he	had	a	long	career	 in	 the	 field,	 it	 became	 clear	 during	 the	 course	 of	 the	 interview	 that	 Jack	 had	 no	knowledge	of	NIPD	prior	 to	his	 involvement	 in	 this	study,	and	 that	his	understanding	of	the	 technology	 remained	 vague.	 	 Although	 I	 explained	 some	 background	 to	 NIPD	technology	 in	 response	 to	 confusion	 regarding	 particular	 testing	 methods,	 the	particularities	 of	 NIPD,	 and	 the	 practical	 issues	 that	 so	many	 other	 expert	 interviewees	focused	in	on	(such	as	test	accuracy,	earliness,	lack	of	risk)	prompted	very	little	discussion	from	Jack.		Rather,	he	spoke	of	NIPD	tests	as	if	they	were	equivalent	to,	or	at	least	existed	within	the	same	broad	category	as	the	well-established	and	routine	prenatal	tests	that	he	was	already	familiar	with	(ultrasound	scanning	and	amniocentesis).		The	particularities	of	technology	 and	 clinical	 practice	 were	 of	 tangential	 concern	 to	 Jack:	 it	 was	 the	 broader	aims,	 objectives	 and	 consequences	 of	 testing,	 along	 with	 the	 moral	 and	 political	implications,	 that	 Jack	 proceeded	 to	 explore.	 	 Adopting	 this	more	 explicitly	 socially	 and	politically	focused	approach,	Jack	presented	as	a	carefully	measured,	but	clear	and	highly	critical	 voice	 within	 the	 discussion	 of	 NIPD.	 	 As	 he	 approached	 the	 issue	 of	 routine	prenatal	screening	programmes,	and	how	the	contentious	issues	they	raise	might	intersect	with	his	work,	Jack	took	a	path	of	careful	and	deliberate	neutrality:	And	 as	 an	 organisation	 we	 are	 very	 clear	 about	 providing	 accurate	information,	and	we	would	be	pro-choice.		We	wouldn't	fall	into	one	camp	or	the	other,	that	prenatal	screening	is	a	good	thing	or	a	bad	thing,	 it	 just	exists,	 and	we	want	 to	make	 sure	 that	 people	make	 the	 best	 choices	 for	them…	we	provide	advice	and	support	regardless	of	what	decision	women	make.	(Jack,	patient	support)		Jack’s	position	here	seems	emphatically	neutral,	informed	perhaps	by	a	need	or	desire	to	mirror	 the	 public	 position	 of	 his	 employer:	 he	 is	 sticking	 to	 ‘the	 script’	 of	 his	 own	professional	 discourse	 (Goffman	 1956,	Morgan	 and	Krone	 2001).	 	 However,	 by	 framing	the	project	of	prenatal	screening	in	explicit	moral	terms,	and	by	discussing	the	possibility	that	screening	could	be	considered	 ‘a	good	thing	or	a	bad	thing’,	Jack	provides	an	account	that	is,	especially	when	held	in	comparison	with	many	other	expert	interviewees,	critical,	direct	and	politically	engaged.		Like	Martha,	Jess	and	Frankie,	as	a	relative	‘outsider’	whose	daily	work	is	not	bound	up	in	the	moral	and	political	complexities,	and	consequences,	of	
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prenatal	 screening	directly,	 Jack	 is	willing	 to	openly	problematise	 issues	of	moral,	 social	and	 political	 concern.	 	 Reflecting,	 for	 instance,	 on	 the	 difficulty	 with	 which	 women	negotiate	 the	 decisions	 prenatal	 testing	 requires	 of	 them,	 he	 points	 towards	 the	 great	degree	of	emotional	labour	that	is	involved:		The	really	nice	quote	from	a	parent-	and	I'll	get	it	wrong	now,	it's	-	lifelong	messages	 are	 taken	 from	sensitive	words	 spoken	at	 a	difficult	 time…	she	said,	you	will	carry	that	information	around	with	you,	throughout	your	life	really,	 and	 you'll	 never	forget…	 you	 will	 remember	 every	 detail	of,	 you	know,	the	pattern	on	the	tie	of	the	guy	that	gave	you	the	information,	or	the	song	 that	 was	 playing	 on	 the	 way	 home,	 or	 whatever.	 	So	 it's	 not	 to	 be	melodramatic,	 and	 say	 oh,	 it’s	 a	 matter	 of	 life	 and	 death,	but	ultimately	there	are	not	many	more	fundamentally	important	decisions	that	people	make.		(Jack,	patient	support)	
	Drawing	from	accounts	of	personal	experience	that	he	has	encountered	during	the	course	of	 his	 career,	 Jack	 clearly	 points	 towards	 the	 high	moral	 stakes	 that	 are	 raised	 through	encounters	 with	 prenatal	 testing:	 ‘there	 are	 not	 many	 more	 fundamentally	 important	
decisions’.	 	 Focusing	 in	on	 contextualised,	 complex,	 lived	experiences	of	prenatal	 testing,	Jack	 also	highlights	 the	profound	moral,	 emotional	 and	psychological	 consequences	 that	prenatal	testing,	as	it	is	produced	and	reproduced	as	routine	and	normal	within	the	clinic,	raises	 within	 the	 lives	 of	 the	 women	 and	 families	 faced	 with	 the	 task	 of	 negotiating	diagnoses	 and	 their	 aftermath	 -	 the	 relational	 consequences	 of	 testing:	 ‘you	 will	
carry	that	information	around	with	you,	throughout	your	life	really,	and	you'll	never	forget’.		Elsewhere,	Jack	extends	his	critical	gaze	further,	bringing	the	broader	politics	of	prenatal	testing	into	sharper	focus:	And	there’s	the	other	side,	you	know	you	might	get	a	parent	who	can’t	get	speech	 and	 language	 therapy	 for	 their	 child	 with	 Down’s	 syndrome	 and	who	has	been	fighting	for	years,	and	thinks-	they	see	all	this	funding	going	into	generate	new	technologies	that	may	or	may	not	become	mainstream,	just	 to	 identify	 and	 avoid	 babies	 with	 Down’s	 syndrome	 being	 born.		Wouldn’t	it	be	better	if	some	of	that	was	being	put	into	supporting	children	with	Down’s	syndrome	who	were	already	here?	(Jack,	patient	support)		Significantly,	 Jack	describes	prenatal	testing	as	a	project	that,	at	 its	core,	aims	 ‘to	identify	
and	avoid	babies	with	Down’s	syndrome	being	born’.		For	Jack	then,	prenatal	screening	is	a	problematic	 top-down	process,	driven	by	a	concerted	effort	 -	 ‘all	this	funding’		-	to	shape	populations	along	narrow	and	biomedically-defined	 lines.	 	This,	he	 suggests,	 is	 achieved	directly	 through	 the	 repeated	 application	 of	 prenatal	 testing	 technologies	 (like	 NIPD)	within	 the	 pregnant	 population	 at	 large.	 	 Shifting	 his	 gaze	 away	 from	 the	 issues	 raised	within	 individual	 encounters	 with	 prenatal	 testing,	 Jack	 acknowledges	 the	 acute	 moral	
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concerns	 that	 population-wide	 testing	 systems	 administered	 and	 governed	 by	 larger	political	 structures	 and	 economic	 forces	 –	 screening	 programmes	 that	 focus	 on	 specific	disease	 such	 as	 Down’s	 syndrome	 –	 may	 generate.	 	 Elsewhere,	 he	 makes	 this	 position	more	 explicit,	 suggesting	 that	 as	 an	 ‘outsider’	 within	 the	 debate	 on	 prenatal	 testing,	 he	(together	with	the	organisation	he	works	for)	is	able	to	voice	a	‘counterargument’:	And	I	think	[our	organisation]	then,	through	the	parents	we	work	with,	can	voice	 that	 counterargument-	 not	 all	 people	will	 want	 these	 tests,	 people	may	 want	 the	 tests	 in	 order	 to	 prepare	 themselves	 and	 not	 in	 order	 to	terminate,	and	having	[something	like]	Down’s	syndrome	is	not	some	great	tragedy.		If	 ever	 there	 was	 a	genetic	 test	 that	 could	 very	accurately	test	 for	something	 like	 autism,	 imagine	 the	 impact	that	 would	 have?	 	And	 the	debate	that	we	would	have	about	whether	people	would	opt	to	have	those	tests	or	not.	 	You	know-	 it’s	because	we	know	that	Down’s	Syndrome	is	a	genetic	condition,	and	it's	chromosome	21,	and	that	there	are	these	genes	we	can	test	for,	 it's	become	an	established	part	of	the	antenatal	screening	programme.	 	And	 most	 people	know,	who	 are	 pregnant,	 they	 know	 they	will	 be	 offered	 tests.	 	For	 some	 of	 the	 other	 things,	 they	 may	 be	more	surprised	that	they	can	offer	tests.		But	Down’s	Syndrome	is	the	one-	people	know	these	tests	have	been	around	for	20,	30	years.	(Jack,	patient	support)			Jack	is	one	of	the	few	expert	interviewees	who	very	explicitly	levels	his	criticism	towards	the	aims	and	objectives	of	prenatal	testing	(and	particularly	screening)	as	a	whole.		NIPD,	for	him,	enters	into	the	field	as	just	another	testing	technology,	no	more	or	less	disruptive	than	any	particular	test	that	has	come	before.		Informed	by	the	perspectives	of	the	parents	and	 families	 that	 he	 works	 with,	 Jack	 moves	 the	 discussion	 beyond	 the	 specifics	 of	technology,	towards	broader	economic	and	political	questions	and	concerns.		Jack,	Martha	and	 Frankie’s	 detachment	 from	 the	 specifics	 of	 NIPD	 technology,	 coupled	 with	 their	distance	 from	 the	 institutionalised	 and	 professionalised	 discourses	 of	 ‘risk’,	 ‘accuracy,’	‘informed	consent’	and	‘reproductive	choice’	that	are	so	bound	up	within	the	mainstream	discussion	 of	 prenatal	 testing,	 allows	 for	 a	 broader	 and	 more	 explicitly	 political	perspective	to	be	adopted,	a	position	that	in	turn	allows	them	to	identify	and	explore	the	presence	of	difficult	and	contentious	issues	–	or		‘hot’	entanglements	-	that	despite	efforts	to	contain	and	defuse,	remain	present	within	the	discussion	at	hand.			
Summary		I	begin	this	chapter	by	revisiting	the	central	points	of	chapters	four	and	five,	showing	how	the	dividing	practices	that	participants	engage	here	in	become	multiple:	efforts	are	made	
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to	 divide	NIPD	 from	NIPT,	 and	 the	 practice	 of	 screening	 is	 divided	 from	 the	 practice	 of	(‘selective’	or	 ‘therapeutic’)	 abortion.	 	 I	 introduce	 the	Strathern/Callon’s	 concept	of	 ‘hot’	entanglements,	 and	 proceed	 to	 explain	 how	 ‘ELSI’	 work	 has	 risen	 up	 alongside	developments	in	the	‘new	genetics’.		Drawing	from	critical	accounts	of	bioethics,	I	describe	how	processes	of	institutionalisation	and	professionalisation	have	led	to	the	containment	of	 ‘hot’	 issues,	 particularly	with	 regards	 emergent	 reproductive	 genetic	 technologies.	 	 	 I	describe	 how	more	 critical	 accounts	 of	 prenatal	 testing	 remain	marginalised	within	 the	mainstream	 bioethical	 and	 public	 discussion,	 and	 I	 show	 how	 a	 similar	 pattern	 of	development	has	been	emerging	during	the	early	stages	of	discussion	and	debate	around	NIPD.				I	then	proceed	to	examine	how	interviewees	approached	the	social	and	ethical	aspects	of	the	technology,	highlighting	first	the	perspectives	of	‘insiders’	–	those	whose	professional	identities	are	most	 closely	aligned	with	NIPD	–	who	recognise	but	 immediately	 ‘contain’	moral	 dilemmas	 and	 ‘hot’	 entanglements,	 appealing	 directly	 to	 the	 power	 and	persuasiveness	 of	 mainstream	 bioethical	 discourse	 and	 talk	 of	 ‘informed	 consent’	 and	reproductive	choice’.		I	then	approach	the	examination	of	‘critical	user’	accounts,	showing	how	 those	 with	 experience	 of	 NIPD	 (but	 whose	 work	 is	 not	 closely	 bound	 to	 the	technology)	begin	to	problematise	the	technology	more	openly,	criticising	in	particular	the	shift	towards	screening,	and	adopting	a	critical	perspective	on	the	ELSI	debate,	asking	that	a	 broader	 range	 of	 voices	 to	 be	 included.	 	 These	 ‘critical	 users’	 point	 towards	 the	limitations	of	 the	technology,	 focusing	 in	on	what	 little	genuine	 ‘choice’	NIPD	(and	other	testing	 technologies)	 offers	 pregnant	 patients,	 and	 they	 reflect	 critically	 on	 the	construction	of	prenatal	screening	programmes,	 framing	 testing	 technologies	as	political	and	cultural,	and	not	simply	clinical,	tools.		Finally,	 I	 highlight	 the	 accounts	 of	 ‘outsiders’	 –	 those	who	 have	 no	 direct	 experience	 of	NIPD,	 but	 who	 have	 significant	 experience	with	 prenatal	 testing	 –	 explaining	 how	 they	approach	 the	 technology	with	 a	 particularly	 high	 level	 of	 critical	 reflection.	 	 Once	 again	these	 ‘outsiders’	point	 towards	 the	perceived	 limitations	of	 the	 technology’s	 ‘usefulness’	(as	a	direct	result	of	its	dependence	on	and	entanglement	with	abortion),	and	they	extend	their	 criticism	 further,	 drawing	 directly	 from	 more	 critical	 disability	 rights	 and	constructionist	 discourses	 as	 they	 claim	 that	 the	 technology	 contributes	 to	 both	 the	stigmatisation	 of	 Down’s	 syndrome	 (and	 disease	 and	 disorder	more	 generally),	 and	 the	stratification	 and	 division	 of	 society	 into	 the	 ‘normal’	 and	 the	 ‘abnormal’,	 the	 ‘diseased’	and	 the	 ‘healthy’.	 	 Characterising	 screening	 as	 a	 concerted	 biopolitical	 effort	 to	 shape	populations	 in	 accordance	 with	 such	 divisions	 and	 boundaries,	 they	 highlight	 the	 high	
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moral	 stakes	 inherent	 within	 the	 discussion	 of	 NIPD	 and	 prenatal	 testing,	 and	 engage	directly	with	the	most	difficult	and	contentious	–	the	‘hottest’	issues	that	are	raised.			Within	 the	next	chapter	 I	examine	how	those	most	directly	 implicated	and	bound	 to	 the	politics	 of	 NIPD	 and	 prenatal	 testing	 –	 those	 involved	 in	 the	 administration	 and	governance	 of	 testing	 –	 approach	 the	 technology,	 identify	 issues	 of	 concern,	 and	 make	efforts	to	contain	and	defuse	debate.	
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Chapter	Seven.		NIPT,	Public	Health	and	the	Biopolitics	of	Choice			
Introduction		This	 chapter	 explores	 the	 significant	 cultural,	 political	 and	 biopolitical	 implications	 of	NIPD,	 and	 particularly	 NIPT’s	emergence	 into	 both	 the	 clinic	 and	 the	 broader	 arena	 of	public	 health.	 	 Drawing	 centrally	 from	 interviews	 with	 a	 small	 number	 of	 study	participants	 whose	 professional	 lives	 were	 directly	 implicated	 in	 the	 design	 and	governance	 of	 prenatal	 testing	 services	 I	 show	how	 the	moves	 and	 processes	 that	 have	been	identified	as	crucial	to	a	critical	understanding	of	NIPD/T	within	previous	chapters	–	the	 collapsing	of	 the	boundary	between	 screening	and	diagnosis,	 the	move	 towards	and	closeness	 with	 ‘selective’	 or	 ‘therapeutic’	 abortion,	 the	 widespread	 identification	 and	problematisation	of	ethical	and	social	 issues	and	concerns	–	are	navigated	by	individuals	responsible	for	directing	and	managing	public	health	screening	programmes	-	those	most	explicitly	implicated	in	the	politics	of	prenatal	testing.		It	is	within	these	moments,	as	this	small	 group	 of	 experts	 discuss	 proliferating	 concerns	 and	multiple	 perspectives,	 within	the	 context	 of	 a	 contentious	 and	 rapidly-changing	 field,	 that	 the	 potential	 biopolitical	power	of	non-invasive	testing	(and	its	deployment	within	routine	systems	and	processes)	starts	to	become	clear	–	NIPD	and	NIPT,	together	with	the	practices	they	around	bound	up	in,	 begin	 to	 manifest	 as	 political	 as	 well	 as	 clinical	 tools.	 	 Where	 the	 previous	 chapter	points	 towards	 the	 presence	 and	 dominance	 of	 institutionalised,	 professionalised	bioethical	discourse	within	both	the	public	discussion	of	NIPD/T	and	within	many	of	the	expert	 ‘insider’	 accounts	 gathered	 here,	 this	 chapter	 examines	 critically	 what	 such	discourse	 is	 being	 employed	 to	 do	 -	 looking	 closely	 at	 what	 is	 being	 achieved	 through	persistent	 and	 repeated	 recourse	 to	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 autonomy,	 informed	 consent	 and,	particularly,	 individual	 choice.	 	 Picking	 up	 on	 how	 reproductive	 ‘choices’	 are	 presented,	and	acknowledging	that	the	repeated	mobilisation	of	autonomy	and	individual	choice	may	serve	as	‘as	a	sword	to	compel	some	decisions	and	a	shield	to	avoid	responsibility	for	others’	(Bosk	1992,	p.xxiii),	I	show	how	the	various	groups	who	encounter	NIPD/T	technology	(or	who	are	imagined	to	do	so	in	the	future)	–	women,	patients	and	professionals	–	come	to	be	variously	 responsibilised	 and	 de-responsibilised.	 	 As	 public	 health	 experts	 direct	 the	framing	of	responsibility	in	particular	ways	–	actively	mobilising	discourses	that	implicate	individual	parents	(and	particularly	mothers),	and	distancing	from	contrasting	discourses	that	highlight	the	influence	of	institutions	and	political	structures	with	social,	cultural	and	(bio)political	power,	they	point	(implicitly)	towards	the	presence	of	‘hot’	entanglements	-	
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most	 centrally	 ‘the	vexed	question	of	new	eugenic	possibilities’	(Latimer	2013,	p.153)	that	remain	 in	 the	 background	 of	many	 discussions	 regarding	 ‘public	health	genetics’	(Clarke	1997,	 p.120).	 	 The	 accounts	 examined	 here	 show	 how,	 despite	 efforts	 to	 contain	 and	defuse	more	contentious	elements	of	 the	debate	around	NIPD	and	other	prenatal	 testing	technologies,	 (see	 chapter	 six),	 issues	 and	 concerns	 of	 ‘profound	 consequence’	 (Clarke	1997,	 p.122)	 remain,	 surfacing	 as	 a	 source	 of	 much	 debate,	 concern	 and	 anxiety,	particularly	for	those	most	closely	implicated	in	the	politics	of	prenatal	testing.		
NIPT	and	public	health:	mainstreaming	and	politicisation		 What	we	are	dealing	with	 in	 this	new	 technology	of	power	 is	not	 exactly	society	nor	is	it	the	individual-as-body.		It	is	a	new	body,	a	multiple	body,	a	body	with	so	many	heads	 that,	while	 they	may	not	be	 infinite	 in	number,	cannot	necessarily	be	counted.		Biopolitics	deals	with	the	population,	with	the	population	as	a	political	problem,	as	a	problem	that	is	at	once	scientific	and	political,	as	a	biological	problem	and	as	power’s	problem	(Foucault	1976,	p.66)		The	 accounts	 examined	 here	 were	 generated	 at	 a	 very	 particular	 moment	 –	 when	 the	normalisation	and	routinisation	of	NIPT	for	Down’s	syndrome	(at	least),	via	some	level	of	incorporation	 into	established	NHS	prenatal	screening	programmes,	was	emerging	as	an	increasingly	likely	outcome	of	development,	and	was	becoming	a	key	topic	of	discussion.		NIPD	 technology,	 previously	 confined	 to	 ‘specialist’	 clinical	 services	 such	 as	 clinical	genetics,	fetal	medicine	and	haemophilia	care	was,	as	a	result	of	these	changes,	becoming	increasingly	relevant	within	the	 field	of	public	health.	 	This	shifting	 in	perspective,	away	from	 NIPD	 and	 targeted	 diagnostic	 testing,	 and	 towards	 NIPT	 and	 population-wide	screening	 –	 towards	 the	 application	 of	 near-diagnostic	 testing	 within	 whole	 pregnant	populations,	a	Foucauldian	 ‘multiple	body,	a	body	with	so	many	heads	that,	while	they	may	
not	 be	 infinite	 in	 number,	 cannot	 necessarily	 be	 counted’	 –	brought	 the	 broader	 political,	cultural	and	biopolitical	scope	of	the	technology	into	increasingly	sharp	focus,	and	as	this	shifting	 occurred,	 for	 those	 charged	 with	 the	 task	 of	 designing	 and	 governing	 prenatal	testing	 services,	 NIPT	 became	 disruptive	 –	 transformed	 into	 a	 source	 of	 professional	anxiety	and	concern,	 it	became	a	 ‘problem’	 to	be	managed.	 	 In	order	 to	understand	why	NIPT	was	experienced	as	so	problematic	here,	it	is	useful	to	first	examine	the	way	in	which	public	 health,	 and	 prenatal	 screening	 particularly	 has	 been	 discussed	within	 the	 critical	literature	to	date.		The	 field	 of	 social	medicine	 or	 ‘public	 health’	 has	 been	 the	 subject	 of	much	 sociological	interest	and	critique.	 	 It	has	emerged,	along	with	other	medico-political	 institutions	such	
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as	the	hospital	and	the	asylum	(Latimer	2013,	p.25	)	as	a	key	site	within	the	critical	study	of	 medicine	 as	 biopolitics	 (Foucault	 2000a,	 Foucault	 2000b).	 	 Latimer,	 drawing	 on	Foucault,	 demonstrates	 how	 public	 health	 (along	 with	 associated	 technologies	 such	 as	immunisation	and	screening)	may	be	characterised	as	an	explicitly	biopolitical	practice	–	a	‘particular	alignment	of	medicine	and	public	policy’	which,	as	 it	draws	upon	 the	power	of	medical	practice	and	knowledge,	legitimates	forms	of	population	surveillance	that	‘extend	
far	beyond	the	medical	gaze’	 (Latimer	2013,	p.25	 -	26).	 	Elsewhere,	Ginsburg	and	Rapp	 -	within	their	1991	study	exploring	the	‘Politics	of	Reproduction’	(Ginsburg	and	Rapp	1991)	published	 as	 both	 artificial	 reproductive	 technologies	 and	 prenatal	 testing	 technologies	were	 beginning	 to	 proliferate	 -	 highlight	 the	 biopolitical	 power	 that	 prenatal	 screening	programmes	 in	 particular	 possess:	 as	 ‘methods	 of	 social	 surveillance	 and	 regulation	 of	
reproductive	practices’	which	hold	the	power	to	determine	directly	the	kinds	of	diseases,	pregnancies,	fetuses	and	babies	that	are	made	appropriate	subjects	of	screening,	diagnosis	and	potential	 ‘disposal’	 (Latimer	2007b,	p.121,	Thomas	2014,	p.211),	 they	 contribute	 to	the	growth	of	 ‘ideologies	and	policies	explicitly	linking	economic	development	to	population	
control’.	 	 Ginsburg	 and	 Rapp	 also	 recognise	 here	 the	 way	 in	 which	 technologies	 and	practices	of	prenatal	screening	and	reproductive	care	are	most	commonly	framed	by	those	directing	 their	 design	 and	 governance	 (despite	 their	 broader	 cultural	 significance	 and	biopolitical	 scope):	 in	 ‘liberal-individualist’	 terms,	 as	 ‘choice-enhancing’	 technologies	(Ginsburg	 and	 Rapp	 1991,	 p.314-5)	 presented	 as	 means	 to	 facilitate	 individual,	autonomous	 decision-making	 and	 extend	 personal	 (and	 not	 political)	 control	 over	reproduction.	 	The	situating	of	population-wide	prenatal	 testing	programmes	within	 the	political	 realm	 of	 public	 health	 attracts	 renewed	 criticism	 as	 the	 persistent	 and	widespread	 routinisation	 and	 normalisation	 of	 prenatal	 testing	 is	 noted	 alongside.		Gammeltoft	 and	 Wahlberg,	 within	 their	 comprehensive	 anthropological	 review	 of	selective	 reproductive	 technologies	 explain	 how,	 ‘despite	 the	 rhetorical	 emphasis	on	 self-
determination’,	once	 prenatal	 testing	 technologies	 and	 practices	 are	 situated	 within	 the	broader	context	of	public	health	and	routine	 screening,	 the	kinds	of	 ‘choices’	 that	are	 in	fact	offered	to	 individual	parents	may	be	viewed	as	highly	constrained	and	 limited	–	 the	decisions	that	parents	and	women	make	regarding	testing	are	‘far	from	free’:	The	 increasing	 availability	 of	 SRTs	 (selective	 reproductive	 technologies)	has	 made	 them	 all	 but	 obligatory	 points	 of	 passage	 on	 the	 road	 to	parenthood,	 as	 pregnancy	 surveillance	 has	 become	 a	 routine	 part	 of	prenatal	care.		Consequently,	choices	are,	more	often	than	not,	experienced	as	obligations,	whether	to	family	members,	communities,	or	the	state.	(Gammeltoft	and	Wahlberg	2014,	p.211)			A	 number	 of	 critics	 have	 emphasised	 the	 transformative	 effect	 that	 the	 routinisation	 of	prenatal	diagnosis,	 has	had	on	 contemporary	experiences	of	pregnancy	 (Rothman	1994,	
	 155	
Rapp	1999),	with	Clarke	emphasising	the	‘burden	of	responsibility’	that	the	simple	offer	of	testing	 presents	 to	 women	 who	 experience	 pregnancy	 from	 within	 cultures	 where	systems	of	screening	and	diagnosis	are	firmly	established:	The	 fact	 that	 prenatal	 diagnostic	 tests	 are	 available	 imposes	 a	 burden	 of	responsibility	 on	 every	 couple	 embarking	 on	 a	 pregnancy,	 whether	 at	increased	or	standard	risk	of	having	a	child	with	a	serious	problem…	the	existence	of	 such	 tests	 leads	not	only	 to	 the	burden	of	 responsibility	 and	the	sense	of	obligation	 to	undergo	 testing,	but	 leads	 to	other	members	of	society	to	a	sense	of	the	mother	being	to	blame	for	the	birth	of	a	child	with	a	‘preventable’	condition	such	as	Down’s	syndrome.	(Clarke	1997,	p.123)			The	simultaneous	situating	of	prenatal	 testing	within	routinised,	normalised	population-wide	 screening	 programmes	 –	 viewed	 within	 much	 of	 the	 critical	 literature	 as	 a	Foucauldian	mechanism	of	control,	a	‘form	of	social	organisation	by	which	social	order	and	
conformity	 are	maintained	 by	 voluntary	means’	 (Lupton	 1994,	 p.111)	 and	which,	 having	become	so	deeply	embedded	within	 ‘routine’	and	 ‘normal’	experiences	of	pregnancy,	are	‘ever	more	immanent	to	the	social	field…	distributed	throughout	the	brains	and	the	bodies	of	
the	citizens…	and	increasingly	interiorized	within	the	subjects	themselves’	(Hardt	and	Negri	2013,	 p.216)	 –	 along	 with	 the	 persistent	 framing	 of	 prenatal	 screening	 as	 facilitating	autonomous,	individual	 ‘choice’,	has	been	exposed	as	deeply	problematic	by	a	number	of	critics	(Lippman	1991,	Duden	1993,	Rothman	1994,	Lupton	1999,	William,	Alderson	et	al.	2002,	 McLaughlin	 2003).	 	 Reflecting	 on	 the	 incongruities	 present	 within	 a	 system	 that	simultaneously	deploys	a	‘public	health’	model	which	presents	prenatal	diagnosis	as	a	way	of	 mitigating	 harm	 by	 ‘reducing	 the	 frequency	 of	 selected	 birth	 defects’,	 alongside	 a	‘reproductive	 autonomy’	 model	 that	 presents	 the	 same	 practice	 as	 a	 ‘means	 of	 giving	
women	 information	 to	 expand	 their	 reproductive	 choices’,	 Lippmann	 deconstructs	 the	‘internal	 tensions’	 and	 ‘contradictory	 constructions’	 that	 are	 generated	 by	 reproductive	public	health	as	practiced	through	screening,	diagnosis	and	selective	abortion,	identifying	three	competing	perspectives:	1)	as	an	assembly	line	approach	to	the	products	of	conception,	separating	out	those	products	we	wish	to	develop	from	those	we	wish	to	discontinue.	2)	 as	 a	 way	 to	 give	 women	 control	 over	 their	 pregnancies,	 respecting	(increasing)	their	autonomy	to	choose	the	kinds	of	children	they	will	bear	or	3)	as	a	means	of	reassuring	women	that	enhances	their	experiences	of	pregnancy.		(Lippman	1991,	p.22)		The	public	health	experts	interviewed	here	then,	were	situated	within	a	professional	field	that	brought	with	 it	distinct,	 and	 significant,	 challenges,	having	1)	been	 subject	 to	much	dissenting	and	critical	engagement	regarding	the	cultural,	social	and	political	meaning	of	
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screening	 and	 2)	 having	 been	 identified	 as	 a	 location	 within	 which	 complex	 and	contradictory	 accounts	 are	 repeatedly	 voiced.	 	 The	 prenatal	 context	 invites	 significant	critical	 discourse	 –	 as	 a	 location	where	 the	 personal,	moral	 and	 political	 stakes	 are	 set	particularly	 high	 –	 a	 space	 where,	 as	 Jack	 explained	 previously	 (see	 chapter	 six),	
‘ultimately	there	are	not	many	more	 fundamentally	 important	decisions	that	people	make’.			Prenatal	 public	 health	 is	 a	 space	 where	 the	 consequences	 that	 individual	 patients	 or	consumers	may	 face	 are	 particularly	 acute	 –	within	 other	 screening	 programmes	 (adult	cancer	 screening,	 for	 instance)	 false	 positives	 may	 lead	 to	 unnecessary	 treatment	 or	testing	 (Elmore,	 Barton	 et	 al.	 1998,	 Brewer,	 Salz	 et	 al.	 2007),	 and	 false	 negatives	 may	entail	misplaced	reassurance	and	late	or	missed	diagnoses	(Jepson,	Hewison	et	al.	2007).		Whereas	neither	of	these	outcomes	are	ideal,	as	they	may	both	eventually	lead	to	difficult	decisions	 regarding	 ‘life	 and	 death’,	 within	 prenatal	 public	 health,	 (because	 screening	must	operate	within	the	context	of	 the	 ‘therapeutic	gap’)	errors	are	experienced	as	even	more	problematic:	false	positives	may	lead	to	the	demise	of	wanted,	‘healthy’	pregnancies	and	false	negatives	may	lead	to	missed	diagnoses	of	conditions	for	which	comprehensive	population-wide	 screening	 programmes	 have	 been	 set	 up	 to	 detect	 in	 the	 first	 place.		Although	 the	 accounts	 that	 public	 health	 experts	 provide	 here	 seem,	 at	 times,	 less	 than	sympathetic	towards	the	perspective	of	individuals	experiencing	the	most	difficult	aspects	of	testing,	with	their	work	being	the	subject	of	much	(and	highly	contentious)	debate,	they	approached	 the	 discussion	 of	 NIPT	 technology	 and	 its	 move	 towards	 screening	 from	within	an	exceptionally	difficult	professional	position.			
The	mainstreaming	of	NIPT:	media	coverage		The	 challenges	 faced	 by	 those	 implicated	 in	 the	 growing	 need	 for	 regulation	 and	governance	around	NIPD	and	NIPT	-	the	explicit	politicisation	of	the	technology	as	well	as	the	debate	 that	surrounds	 it	–	have,	 in	recent	months,	become	 increasingly	public	as	UK	media	 coverage	of	NIPT	particularly	 gained	 significant	momentum.	 	 In	 June	of	2015	 the	RAPID	project	reported	preliminary	results	from	their	evaluation	programme	for	Down’s	syndrome	screening	using	NIPT	(the	NIPT	for	Aneuploidy	Evaluation	Study’56)	and	it	was	as	a	result	of	 this	that	NIPT	testing	was,	 for	the	first	time,	raised	as	a	topic	of	discussion	
																																								 																						56	The	‘NIPT	for	Aneuploidy	Evaluation	Study’,	due	to	be	completed	by	the	end	of	March	2016,	aims	to	validate	NIPT	technology	and	evaluate	a	range	of	aspects	regarding	the	implementation	of	NIPT	(for	Down’s	syndrome)	within	the	NHS.	 	As	was	explained	by	expert	 interviewees	 involved	 in	UK	NIPD	research,	this	project	was	intended	to	build	directly	on	the	work	of	the	RAPID	study,	and	was	at	the	planning	stage	when	fieldwork	was	being	conducted.	(Strathern,	M.	(1992b).	Reproducing	the	
future	 :	 essays	 on	 anthropology,	 kinship	 and	 the	 new	 reproductive	 technologies.	 Manchester,	
Manchester	University	Press.)	
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within	 national	 news	 headlines,	 attracting	 significant	 coverage	 with	 both	 the	 tabloid	(MacFarlane	 2015)	 and	 broadsheet	 (Knapton	 2015,	 Lay	 2015,	 Ratcliffe	 2015,	 Cooper	2015a,	 Cooper	 2015b)	 press.	 	 The	 following	 excerpt	 represents	 a	 full	 transcript	 of	 BBC	Radio	4’s	headline	report	on	NIPT,	broadcast	on	the	Morning	of	June	6th:		 Newsreader:	 The	 NHS	 could	 soon	 offer	 more	 accurate	 screening	 for	Down's	 syndrome,	 which	 would	 reduce	 the	 number	 of	 babies	 facing	 the	risk	 of	 miscarriage	 from	 more	invasive	 tests.	 	Doctors	 at	 Great	 Ormond	Street	hospital	have	piloted	the	blood	test,	which	is	99%	accurate.	They	say	it	 cuts	 the	number	of	women	requiring	an	amniocentesis,	during	which	a	needle	is	inserted	into	the	women,	by	80%.	 	Professor	Lyn	Chitty	who	led	the	research	hopes	that	the	National	Screening	Committee	will	recommend	its	widespread	use.	Lyn	Chitty,	principle	 investigator,	RAPID	project:	 	Because	 it's	much	safer	and	more	women	will	take	up	NIPT	as	opposed	to	invasive	testing,	we	have	picked	 out	 more	 babies	 with	 Down's	 syndrome	 in	 that	 cohort,	 than	 we	would	do	otherwise,	whilst	 significantly	 reducing	 the	number	of	 invasive	tests	 used.	 	So	 it's	 much	 safer	 for	 parents,	 there's	 a	 far	 lower	 risk	 of	miscarriage.	(BBC	Radio	4,	News	Headlines,	Sunday	6th	June	2015,	6am)		As	 the	 newsreader	 introduces	 the	 technology,	 the	 objective	 of	 NIPT	 and	 its	 proposed	implementation	 into	 NHS	 prenatal	 screening	 programmes	 is	 most	 clearly	 identified	 as	being	about	avoiding	risk	of	harm	to	healthy	fetuses	and	babies:	the	introduction	of	NIPT	into	screening	 ‘would	reduce	the	number	of	babies	facing	the	risk	of	miscarriage	from	more	
invasive	tests’.	 	This	statement	frames	the	remainder	of	the	report,	with	avoidance	of	risk	becoming	 the	 central	 issue	 at	 hand	 (and	 with	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 ‘at-risk’	 and	 healthy	pregnancy/fetus/baby	 in	particular	working	as	a	persuasive	device);	NIPT’s	high	rate	of	accuracy	 is	 emphasised	 and	 the	 contrasting	 risk	 of	 harm	 and	 discomfort	 that	amniocentesis	brings	is	highlighted.		The	report	proceeds	then	to	suggest	that	NIPT	is	able	to	provide	 a	 solution	 to	 this	 problem	of	 risk	 -	 ‘it	cuts	the	number	of	women	requiring	an	
amniocentesis,	 during	 which	 a	 needle	 is	 inserted	 into	 the	 abdomen,	 by	 80%’.	 	 That	 this	particular	 framing	 appears	 is	 unsurprising	 given	 the	 centrality	 of	 risk	 discourse	within	contemporary	discussions	of	pregnancy	and	prenatal	testing	(Lippman	1991,	p.30,	Lupton	1999,	 p.61)	 in	 general,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 prevalence	 of	 risk-talk	 within	 the	 literature	addressing	 the	 possible	 use	 of	 NIPT	 within	 screening	 programmes	 more	 specifically	(Jackson,	Dever	et	al.	2013,	Fairbrother,	 Johnson	et	al.	2013b,	de	 Jong,	Maya	et	al.	2015,	Larion,	Warsof	et	al.	2015,	Li,	Wang	et	al.	2015).	 	As	risk-talk	is	foregrounded	within	the	discussion	 of	 NIPT	 and	 its	 possible	 extension	 into	 population-wide	 screening,	 the	‘riskiness’	of	pregnancy	is	made	tangible	and	calculable,	and	may	be	presented,	therefore	as	 governable	 –	 an	 appropriate	 object	 of	 medical	 and	 biopolitical	 surveillance	 (Lupton	
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1999,	 p.63).	 	 The	 discourse	 of	 risk,	 as	 it	 is	 deployed	 here,	 also	 achieves	 specific	 and	significant	biopolitical	ends.		Particular	risks	–	the	risk	of	harm	to	healthy	fetuses,	the	risk	of	failing	to	‘pick	out’	babies	with	Down’s	syndrome	-	are	brought	into	being	as	problems	which	 require	 action	 (Lupton	 1999,	 p.63),	 which	may	 then	 in	 turn	 serve	 to	 strengthen	moves	 made	 towards	 implementing	 the	 widespread	 application	 of	 this	 technology.	 	 If	pregnancies	 can	 be	 framed	 as	 inherently	 ‘at	 risk’	 if	 they	 are	 to	 be	managed	 via	 routine	testing	 technologies	 such	 as	 amniocentesis,	 and	 if	 these	 same	 pregnancies	 may	 be	presented	 as	 being	 far	 less	 ‘at	 risk’	 if	 they	 were	 to	 be	 managed	 via	 NIPT,	 then	 the	technology’s	 widespread	 application	 within	 the	 existing	 populations	 where	 prenatal	testing	 has	 become	 thoroughly	 normalised	 –	 its	 biopolitical	 extension	 and	 application	 -	appears	 increasingly	 justifiable.	 As	 mentioned	 previously,	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 at-risk	 and	healthy	pregnancy/baby/fetus	is	also	doing	work	here	–	acting	as	a	persuasive	device	that	underlines	the	constructed	‘need’	(Lippman	1991)	for	prenatal	testing,	its	mobilisation	as	a	symbol	of	vulnerability	and	hope	(Duden	1993,	p.9)	and	its	presence	pointing	towards	the	high	stakes	that	are	involved	in	the	kinds	of	‘choices’	that	prenatal	screening	imposes	-	the	survival	and	continuation,	or	not,	of	‘healthy’,	‘wanted’	pregnancies/babies/fetuses.			Whilst	 comments	made	 by	 the	 RAPID	 project’s	 principle	 investigator	 Lyn	 Chitty,	 which	follow	 the	 brief	 news	 report,	 echo	 this	 emphasis	 on	 risk	 -	 ‘it's	 much	 safer	 for	 parents,	
there's	a	far	lower	risk	of	miscarriage’	–	competing	discourses	are	simultaneously	brought	into	play,	as	it	 is	suggested	here	that	enhanced	safety	is	not	the	sole	factor	to	inform	the	development	of	NIPT	screening.	 	Rather,	Chitty	highlights	very	 clearly	 the	 fact	 that,	 as	 a	result	of	NIPT’s	success	within	 the	validation	study,	 the	proportion	of	Down’s	syndrome	diagnoses	 made	 via	 screening	 had	 increased	 (Chitty	 2015b):	 ‘we	 have	 picked	 out	 more	
babies	with	Down's	syndrome	in	that	cohort,	than	we	would	do	otherwise’.	 	Another	 figure	emerges	 here:	 that	 of	 the	 pregnancy/fetus/baby	 diagnosed	 with	 Down’s	 syndrome.		Whereas	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 healthy	 pregnancy/fetus/baby	 had	 been	 positioned	 as	something	 vulnerable,	 something	 to	 be	 protected	 from	 the	 ‘risk’	 of	 invasive	 testing	 and	miscarriage	 (by	 NIPT),	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 pregnancy/fetus/baby	 with	 Down’s	 syndrome	emerges	 as	 something	 entirely	 different:	 an	 object	 or	 event	 to	 be	 avoided,	 to	 be	 ‘picked	
out’,	diagnosed	 and	 identified	 as	 potentially	 disposable	 (Latimer	 2007b,	 p.121,	 Thomas	2014,	p.211).		Media	coverage	elsewhere	repeats	these	claims,	with	newspapers	reporting	that	 NIPT	 would	 increase	 the	 detection	 of	 ‘affected	 babies’	 and	 lead	 to	 a	 reduction	 in	miscarriages	and	the	loss	of	‘unaffected	babies’	(Knapton	2015,	Ratcliffe	2015).			This	 brief	 report	 presents	 limited	 opportunity,	 of	 course,	 for	 those	 involved	 in	 NIPD	research	to	engage	in	any	kind	of	detailed	discussion	on	the	implications	of	NIPT’s	entry	
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into	 routine,	 population-wide	 screening.	 	 The	 way	 in	 which	 testing	 is	 framed	 here	however,	points	towards	the	persistent	and	problematic	presence	of	underlying	tensions	within	 the	 discussion	 at	 large,	 with	 only	 a	 select	 range	 of	 potential	 ‘outcomes’	 being	foregrounded	 and	 made	 explicit.	 	 The	 preservation	 of	 healthy/unaffected	 pregnancies,	fetuses	and	babies	is	presented	as	a	key	advantage	of	testing,	with	the	figure	of	the	healthy	pregnancy/fetus/baby	doing	 significant	work	–	 enabling	 the	 technology	 to	be	 framed	 in	terms	 of	 reducing	 risk	 and	 saving	 ‘healthy’	 lives.	 	 Whilst	 more	 socially	 and	 politically	contentious	 outcomes	 –	 the	 systematic	 identification	 or	 ‘picking	 out’	 of	pregnancies/fetuses/babies	 with	 Down’s	 syndrome	 for	 instance	 –	 remain	 marginalised	here,	they	can	be	made	visible;	tensions,	contentious	issues	and	‘hot’	entanglements	may	be	seen	to	exist	just	beneath	the	surface	of	this	most	public	discussion.		What	is	also	made	explicit	 within	 the	 report	 is	 the	 technology’s	 clear	 potential	 for	 ‘widespread	 use’	 –	 its	application	 and	 routinisation	 within	 the	 pregnant	 population	 at	 large,	 and	 this	 move	brings	 the	 concerns	 and	 questions	 raised	 into	 particularly	 sharper	 focus	 -	 as	 the	‘mainstreaming’	 of	 NIPT	 moves	 closer,	 and	 as	 the	 biopolitical	 scope	 of	 the	 technology	becomes	correspondingly	clear,	discussions	around	possible	‘outcomes’	and	‘implications’	involve	 greater	 reflection	 on	 the	 technology’s	 social	 and	 political	 power.	 	 Whilst	 these	tensions	may	be	only	faintly	present	within	the	media	reporting	of	NIPT,	their	underlying	presence	 greatly	 informed	 the	 context	 from	 within	 which	 public	 health	 experts	approached	 the	 technology.	 	 As	NIPD/T	 testing,	 along	with	 the	 problematic	 ‘issues’	 and	‘concerns’	 that	 are	 carried	 along	 with	 them	 –	 entanglement	 with	 abortion,	 the	‘mainstreaming’	 of	 diagnosis,	 and	 critical	 reflections	 on	 the	 biopolitical	 shaping	 of	screening	 -	 become	 increasingly	 public,	 and	 increasingly	 politicised,	 they	 present	 as	problematic	 for	 those	 charged	 with	 the	 task	 of	 ‘managing’	 the	 technology	 and	 its	implications.			
The	politics	of	public	health	and	NIPT:	distancing	from	the	‘fallout’		The	analysis	presented	here	focuses	largely	on	two	expert	interviews:	accounts	provided	by	 Jonathan	 and	 Linda,	 both	 of	 whom	were	 public	 health	 professionals	 involved	 in	 the	management	and	design	of	prenatal	screening	programmes	in	the	UK.	They	each	worked	in	 the	 broad	 field	 of	 public	 health,	 and	 although	 they	 had	 different	 professional	backgrounds	 (Linda	 had	 worked	 as	 a	 midwife	 before	 taking	 up	 her	 current	 role,	 and	Jonathan	 had	 trained	 and	 worked	 in	 business	 management),	 they	 adopted	 somewhat	similar	positions	regarding	NIPD/T	technology	and	its	implications	for	prenatal	screening.		Jonathan	described	himself	as	a	‘programme	manager’	whose	work	had	a	broad	remit	–	at	the	time	of	interview	he	had	very	recently	taken	up	a	new	role	and	was	in	the	process	of	
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‘settling	in’	after	moving	across	from	a	related	department.		At	the	outset	of	the	interview,	as	 I	 asked	him	 to	 explain	what	 the	 role	of	public	health/screening	programme	manager	might	entail,	Jonathan	illustrated	both	the	complexity	and	the	opacity	of	the	bureaucratic	systems	and	processes	that	he	regarded	as	being	central	to	his	daily	work:		
So	you	are	part	of	a	screening	committee?	Um,	no.		Well	what’s	happening	now	is	we	are	actually	part	of	Public	Health	England	which	is	a	civil	service	department.		All	public	health-	I’m	not	sure	how	much	 you	 know	 about	 the	 reorganisation,	 but	 public	 health	 is	 split,	they’ve	 abolished	 strategic	 health	 authorities	 and	 [inaudible]	 in	 England,	we’ve	now	got	a	body	called	NHS	England	which	is	a	commissioning	board-	they	 run	 the	NHS	commissioning	board,	 commission	 services	 in	 the	NHS,	sometimes	 centrally,	 and	 sometimes	 by	 devolving	 down	 to	 CCG’s 57 ,	commissioning	 groups,	 yeah?	 	 Sort	 of	 GP’s,	 locally.	 	 And	 we	 have	 Public	Health	 England,	 where	 most	 of	 the	 main	 public	 health-	 this	 is	 all	 about	setting	 policy,	 being	 central	 to	 health	 in	 England,	 so	 there	 are	 different	branches	there	to	do	with	all	sort	of	aspects	of	public	health.		But	the	OCT	public	 health	 departments	 moved	 into	 local	 authority,	 so	 local	 authority	now	 has	 responsibility.	 	 So	 the	 directors	 of	 public	 health	 are	 there,	 and	they	 are	 looking	 at	 the	 needs	 of	 their	 communities,	 and	 how	 to	 improve	public	 health	 across	 health	 and	 local	 authority	 processes.	 	Within	 Public	Health	England	there	are	different	divisions,	and	prenatal	sits	in	the	Health	and	Wellbeing	 division,	 and	 there	 are	NHS	 screening	 programmes-	 there	are	 screening	 programme	 clusters.	 	 There’s	 fetal	 anomaly	 screening,	newborn	 hearing	 screening,	 and	 newborn	 infant	 examination	 in	 the	 one	cluster,	and	then,	sickle	cell	and	thal58,	newborn	bloodspot,	and	infectious	diseases	 in	 pregnancy	 screening	 in	 another.	 	 So	 they	make	 up	 the	 fetal-maternal	child	health	screening,	plus	adult…	So	prenatal	cross-references,	particularly	with	newborn,	because	 there’s	an	exam	crossover.	 	And	 then	they	would	report	to	the	director	of	programmes,	and	they	go	to	the	Fetal	Maternal	Child	Health	Committee,	so	policy	decisions	go	there,	to	be	signed	off.	 	 And	 if	 they	 agree	 and	 recommend,	 sign	 off,	 they	 go	 to	 the	 National	Screening	 Committee,	 who	 sign	 off	 on	 them	 in	 that.	 The	 UK	 National	Screening	 Committee	 is	 responsible	 for	 advising	 the	 four	 secretaries	 of	state	in	the	UK,	on	policy	for	population	screening	programmes.		So	there’s,	there’s	 the	non-cancer	branch,	 there’s	 the	cancer	branch,	so	NSC	do	both.		And	so	that’s	how	it	all	feeds	in,	so	we	would	then	provide	advice	to	them	about	the	recommendations	for	policy,	and	if	they	decide	to	go	ahead	with	policy,	in	England	then,	programme	managers	always	have	a	remit	to,	um,	put	the	standards	together	that	will	then	go-	and	a	specification	for	service	provision-	 which	 will	 then	 go	 to	 a	 National	 Commissioning	 Board	 to																																									 																						57	CCG’s	 here	 refers	 to	 ‘clinical	 commissioning	 groups’:	 ‘groups	 of	 General	 Practices	 that	 work	
together	to	plan	and	design	local	health	services	in	England.	They	do	this	by	'commissioning'	or	buying	
health	and	care	 services’.	 	Hill,	M.,	 D.	Wright,	 R.	 Daley,	 C.	 Lewis,	 F.	McKay,	 S.	Mason,	 N.	 Lench,	 A.	Howarth,	C.	Boustred,	K.	Lo,	V.	Plagnol,	K.	 Spencer,	 J.	 Fisher,	M.	Kroese,	 S.	Morris	 and	L.	 S.	Chitty	(2014b).	 "Evaluation	 of	 non-invasive	 prenatal	 testing	 (NIPT)	 for	 aneuploidy	 in	 an	NHS	 setting:	 a	reliable	accurate	prenatal	non-invasive	diagnosis	(RAPID)	protocol."	BMC	Pregnancy	Childbirth	14:	229.	58	‘thal’	refers	here	to	β-thalassemia	-	one	of	the	most	common	single	gene	disorders	found	in	the	general	population.		It	is	a	blood	clotting	disorder	which	is	characterised	by	an	inability	or	reduced	capacity	to	produce	the	β-globin	protein	(Birmingham	and	South	Central	NHS.	(2015).	"What	are	
clinical	commisioning	groups?"			Retrieved	20/09/2015,	from	
http://bhamsouthcentralccg.nhs.uk/what-are-ccgs.)	
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commission	from.		And	then	we	have	a	Policy	Assurance	Branch	that	would	assure	 that	 those	 services	 are	 being	 delivered,	 according	 to	 compliance	with	 the	 standards	 in	 the	 NHS.	 	 So	 that’s	 sort	 of	 how	 it	 all	 fits	 together.		Does	that	make	sense?	(Jonathan,	policy	maker)		The	 explicitly	 political	 character	 of	 contemporary	 public	 health	 practice	 is	 illustrated	 in	great	detail	here.		Jonathan	situates	his	work	within	a	complex	hierarchical	structure	made	up	 of	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 bodies,	 operating	 across	 a	 variety	 of	 levels	 –	 civil	 service	departments,	 national	 boards	 and	 committees,	 internal	 ‘branches’	 and	 ‘groups’,	 local	authorities,	 secretaries	 of	 state	 -	 and	 he	 explains	 how	 his	 work	 both	 ‘feeds	 into’	 and	depends	 upon	 various	 ‘signing	 off’	 processes	 which	 involve	 collaboration	 with	 these	various	 institutions,	 bodies	 and	 structures.	 	 Jonathan’s	 characterisation	 of	 his	 daily	professional	work	stands	in	great	contrast	to	the	kinds	of	descriptions	provided	by	experts	elsewhere,	where	political	 issues	and	concerns,	 if	 they	surfaced	at	all,	were	discussed	 in	terms	of	background	context	–	it	was	only	within	accounts	provided	by	policy	makers	that	the	political	was	foregrounded,	and	made	a	key	locus	of	professional	responsibility.	 	The	backdrop	 of	 NHS	 reorganisation	 and	 restructuring	 –	 the	 ‘splitting’	 and	 ‘abolition’	 of	previous	bodies	and	the	introduction	of	new	‘commissioning’	procedures	within	the	NHS	–	greatly	 informs	 Jonathan’s	 account	 of	 what	 contemporary	 public	 health	 work	 and	 the	governance	of	prenatal	screening	involves,	and	there	is	very	little	talk	(other	than	mention	of	an	‘exam	crossover’)	of	how	this	political	work	translates	either	practically	or	clinically.		It	has	been	suggested	that,	given	the	power	and	 influence	that	 larger	political	structures	have	upon	the	contemporary	practice	of	public	health,	and	given	the	current	instability	in	public	health	 funding,	 that	 those	 involved	 in	 the	design	and	governance	of	public	health	programmes	 should	 ‘hone	 their	 political	 skills’	 and	 ‘familiarize	 themselves	 with	 the	
economic	 and	 political	 arguments	 that	 are	 raging	 all	 around	 them’	 (Hunter	 2010).		Jonathan’s	clear	 identification	with	 the	more	obviously	political	aspects	of	his	work	may	point	 towards	 the	 relevance	 of	 such	 perspectives	 within	 public	 health	 work	 and	 the	various	 organisational	 and	 administrative	 tasks	 that	 he	 and	 Linda	 were	 charged	 with	managing.				Although	 the	 political	 perspective	 very	 clearly	 takes	 centre-stage	 within	 Jonathan’s	account	of	the	public	health	profession,	a	number	of	underlying	health-orientated	values	were,	 however,	 identified	 alongside:	 screening	 is	 characterised	 as	 a	 practice	 that	 is	motivated	by	a	desire	to	satisfy	the	‘needs	of	communities’,	the	ultimate	aim	of	which	lies	in	‘improving	 health’.	 	 And	 although	 the	 kind	 of	 talk	 that	 Jonathan	 engages	 in	 here	 is	somewhat	opaque,	involving	repeated	reference	to	concepts	or	objects	that	require	some	kind	 of	 expertise	 to	 clearly	 understand	 (‘OCT’s’,	 ‘CCG’s’,	 ‘sickle	 cell	 and	 thal’,	 ‘newborn	
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bloodspot’),	 he	 simultaneously	 attempts	 to	 frame	 public	 health	 programmes	 as	 being	focused	on	the	‘needs’	of	populations,	built	from	the	ground-up,	based	around	some	kind	of	clinical	or	population-based	demand	and	need	rather	than	the	application	of	a	‘top-down’	(biopolitical,	 Foucauldian)	 effort	 to	 shape,	 control	 and	 govern	 populations.	 	 Jonathan’s	account	 of	 public	 health	 work	 then,	 suggesting	 that	 it	 is	 built	 to	 satisfy	 (and	 not	 to	construct)	 public	 ‘need’,	 quite	 clearly	 sits	 in	 direct	 contrast	 with	 the	 kinds	 of	understandings	articulated	by	critics	elsewhere.			As	 conversations	 turned	 towards	 the	practicalities	 and	 intricacies	 of	 prenatal	 screening,	NIPD	 and	 NIPT,	 both	 Linda	 and	 Jonathan	 began	 to	 quite	 clearly	 engage	 in	 processes	 of	division	and	categorisation	–	or	boundary	work	–	making	concerted	effort	to	delineate	the	limits	of	 their	 responsibilities	 as	public	health	professionals	 (as	well	 as	 the	 limits	of	 the	screening	 programmes	 that	 they	 worked	 within).	 	 The	 issue	 of	 ‘incidental	 findings’	 in	particular	 –	 both	 in	 relation	 to	 current	 prenatal	 screening	 practices	 and	 the	 potential	introduction	of	NIPT	screening	–	was	identified	as	problematic,	repeatedly	surfacing	as	a	source	of	anxiety	and	concern:		You	 have	 these	major	 incidental	 findings	 from	 T2159	screening,	 we	 don’t	have	 a	 T13	 and	 T18	 screening	 in	 the	 first	 trimester60,	 but	 we	 have	incidental	 findings…	 the	 combined	 screen	 is	 not	 a	 screen	 for	 neural	 tube	defects.	 	You	will	get	a	high	AFP61	but	it’s	an	incidental	finding.	 	We	don’t-	this	 is	one	of	the	problems	with	the	combined	test,	because	it	gives	you	a	lot	of	information	we	don’t	screen	for.	(Jonathan,	policy	maker)	
There	are	pieces	of	 information	 that	are	not	picked	up	by	NIPD,	 things	 like	
the	neural	tube	defects-	Yeah,	 except	 that	 you	 know,	 our	 screening	 in	 the	 UK,	 for	 neural	 tube	defects	 is	 a	 scan.	 	 You	 know,	 we	 do	 not-	 the	 combined	 screen	 is	 not	 a	screen	 for	 neural	 tube	 defects.	 	 You	 will	 get	 a	 high	 AFP,	 but	 it’s	 an	incidental	finding,	ok?	(Linda,	policy	maker)																																										 																						59	‘T21’	 here	 refers	 to	 ‘trisomy	 21’	 a	 term	 that	 is	 used	 interchangeably	with	 ‘Down’s	 syndrome’.		Similarly,	 ‘T13’	 refers	 to	 Trisomy	 13/Patau	 syndrome	 and	 ‘T18’	 refers	 to	 Trisomy	 18/Edwards	syndrome.		60	At	the	time	of	interview	screening	for	Patau	syndrome	and	Edwards	syndrome	formed	part	of	the	second	 trimester	 scan.	 	 Shortly	 afterwards	 (July	 2014)	 the	 National	 Screening	 Committee	recommended	 that	 screening	 for	 Patau’s	 and	 Edwards	 form	 part	 of	 the	 first	 trimester	 scan.	 	 Di	Naro,	 E.,	 F.	 Ghezzi,	 A.	 Vitucci,	N.	 Tannoia,	D.	 Campanale,	 V.	D'Addario,	W.	Holzgreve	 and	 S.	Hahn	(2000).	"Prenatal	diagnosis	of	beta-thalassaemia	using	fetal	erythroblasts	enriched	from	maternal	blood	by	a	novel	gradient."	Molecular	Human	Reproduction	6:	571-574.	61	α-fetoprotein	 (AFP)	 screening	 forms	 part	 of	 the	 Maternal	 serum	 screening	 ‘quad	 test’,	 and	measurements	 of	 α-fetoprotein	 are	 used	 to	 identify	 the	 presence	 of	 trisomy	 or	 spina	 bifida.	 (UK	National	Screening	Comittee	(2014).	First	trimester	combined	screening	for	T13	and	T18.	London.)	
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The	presence	of	unexpected	or	unwanted	‘incidental	findings’–	clinically-relevant	findings	that	reach	beyond	the	original	aims	of	testing,	and	which	provide	unsought	and	unwanted	information	 (Clarke	 2014,	 p.17)	 –	 are	 presented	 as	 problematic	 by	 both	 Jonathan	 and	Linda.	 	 As	 screening	 tests	 produce	 information	 beyond	 their	 remit	 -	 as	 they	 burst	 their	boundaries	and	their	frames	–	they	become	an	increasing	source	of	concern,	and	anxieties	are	 raised:	 ‘this	 is	one	of	the	problems	with	the	combined	test,	because	it	gives	you	a	lot	of	
information	 we	 don’t	 screen	 for’.	 	 Responding	 to	 such	 disruptions,	 efforts	 are	 made	 to	distance	 from	 entanglement	 with	 any	 difficult	 implications	 this	 ‘extra’	 information	may	bring,	 with	 Linda	 and	 Jonathan	 stressing	 what	 they	 perceive	 to	 be	 the	 limits	 of	 their	responsibilities	regarding	the	results	of	such	testing,	and	pointing	towards	the	presence	of	clearly	delineated	boundaries	that	have	been	incorporated	into	the	design	of	the	screening	programmes	that	they	govern62.		As	 conversations	 turned	 towards	 NIPD	 and	 NIPT	 in	 particular,	 anxieties	 began	 to	proliferate,	 with	 both	 Linda	 and	 Jonathan	 emphasising	 the	 distance	 they	 felt	 existed	between	 their	current	professional	practice	and	any	responsibility	 that	might	eventually	be	attributed	to	them	regarding	the	governance	and	regulation	of	NIPT:	We	are	not	specifically	looking	at	it	in	an	official	way,	but	we	are	aware	of	it…	 we	 are	 not	 directly	 operationally	 involved	 but	 clearly	 we	 are	 in	dialogue	with	RAPID…	we	have	 to	be	clear	 that	 this	 is	something	 that	we	can	 make	 work	 operationally,	 in	 the	 NHS	 structured	 maternity	 service	system…	we	are	more	concerned	about	how,	when	the	test	has	got	 there,	how	we	are	going	to	make	this	work	operationally,	in	the	way	that	services	are	configured	on	the	ground.	(Jonathan,	policy	maker)		NIPT	 is	presented	as	a	 tangential	 concern	here,	 something	 Jonathan,	 in	his	 capacity	as	a	screening	 programme	manager	 is	 ‘aware	 of’,	 but	 not	 ‘directly	 operationally	 involved’	 in.		Although	he	speaks	of	engaging	in	‘dialogue’	with	those	developing	the	tests,	the	stability	of	 current	 systems	 and	 practices,	 and	 not	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 new	 technology,	 is	prioritised	 here	 –	 ‘we	 have	 to	 be	 clear	 that	 this	 is	 something	 that	 we	 can	 make	 work	
operationally,	in	the	NHS	structured	maternity	service	system…		we	are	more	concerned…		in	
the	way	services	operate	on	the	ground’.	 	Efforts	made	 to	maintain	 some	kind	of	distance	from	 NIPT	 persisted	 throughout	 the	 interviews	 with	 both	 Linda	 and	 Jonathan,	 and	 it	became	 increasingly	 clear	 that	 the	 potential	 ‘mainstreaming’	 of	 NIPT	 within	 whole	
																																								 																						62	The	Fetal	Anomaly	Screening	Programme	publishes	a	 ‘standards’	document	on	an	annual	basis,	within	 which	 the	 remit	 and	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 programme	 are	 set	 out:	 FASP	 (2015).	 Fetal	
Anomaly	Screening	Programme:	Standards	2015-16.	London,	Crown	Copyright.	.	
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pregnant	 populations	 was	 being	 experienced	 and	 envisaged	 here	 as	 disruptive	 and	problematic:	I	don’t	think	we	are	there	yet,	I	don’t	think	it’s	quite	cut	the	mustard	yet…	it’s	just	too	expensive,	it	would	not	be	cost	effective	for	us	to	introduce	it	to	the	NHS,	it	just	wouldn’t.	 	When	we’ve	actually	got	a	current	test	which	is	hitting	detections	of	around	the	late	80’s	to	90’s63,	for	a	pretty	low,	around	2.5	or	less	FPR64.		So	when	you	take	into	account	the	incomplete	assays	and	everything	 else,	 actually	 at	 the	moment,	 it’s	 not	 so	 great.	 	 If	 it	was	 really	doing	 what	 it	 said	 and	 it	 was	 99	 for	 0.165,	 well	 that	 would	 be	 a	 big	improvement.	 	 But	 it’s	 not	 really,	 that’s	 the	way	 they	 are	 presenting	 it…	The	reality	 from	an	NSC	perspective	 is,	 I	guess,	 if	 the	case	came	forwards	and	 said	 we	 are	 looking-	 we	 have	 a	 screening	 test	 for	 T21,	 should	 we	implement	 it?	 We	 would	 probably	 say,	 no,	 actually	 it	 doesn’t	 meet	 the	evidence.	So	we	are	dealing	with	a	very	difficult	programme	where	we	are	trying	to	manage	something	which	is,	unmanageable	in	a	sense.	(Jonathan,	policy	maker)			As	Jonathan	adopts	a	sceptical	approach	towards	claims	that	NIPT	is	able	to	produce	test	results	 that	 are	 significantly	more	accurate	 than	maternal	 serum	screening	 (MSS)	–	 ‘if	 it	
was	really	doing	what	it	said…	that	would	be	a	big	improvement…	but	it’s	not	really,	that’s	
the	way	they	are	presenting	it’	–	his	account	of	NIPT’s	accuracy,	and	its	corresponding	level	of	 usefulness,	 stands	 in	 profound	 contrast	 with	 many	 of	 the	 accounts	 highlighted	previously	 (see	 chapter	 four).	 	 Within	 the	 majority	 of	 interviewee	 accounts	 exploring	questions	 regarding	 NIPD	 and	 NIPT’s	 accuracy,	 non-invasive	 testing	 was	 positioned	 as	being	appropriate	for	comparison	with	‘gold	standard’	diagnostic-level	testing	as	achieved	through	amniocentesis	or	CVS	(and	was	characterised	as	being	clinically	useful	to	at	least	some	 degree	 even	within	 the	most	 critical	 and	 dissenting	 accounts).	 	 Here,	 by	 contrast,	NIPT	 is	compared	relatively	unfavourably	with	maternal	serum	screening	(MSS)	–	a	 test	that	produces	results	that	are	notably	less	than	100%	accurate66.		For	Jonathan	then,	NIPT	is	a	test	that	is	lacking	utility	–	‘it	doesn’t	meet	the	evidence’	-	it	is	‘unmanageable’	-	it	is	not	yet	useful.		The	contrast	that	lies	between	Jonathan’s	account	of	NIPT’s	usefulness	and	the	accounts	 provided	 by	 experts	 elsewhere	 may	 relate	 to	 the	 considerably	 different	professional	 context	 that	 he	must	 approach	 the	 test	 from	within:	 the	 views,	 values	 and	beliefs	 of	 the	 professional	 community	 (here,	 the	 public	 health	 community)	 that	 he	 is																																									 																						63	Jonathan	is	referring	here	to	the	accuracy	(sensitivity	and	specificity)	of	current	screening	tests.	The	figures	quoted	-	‘late	80’s	to	90’s’	-	refers	to	the	percentage	of	diagnoses	detected.	64	Referring	here	to	the	‘false	positive	rate’	of	current	screening	tests	-	the	percentage	of	diagnoses	not	detected.		65	If	NIPT	were	99%	accurate	with	a	0.1%	false	positive	rate.		66 	Serum	 screening	 has	 been	 shown	 to	 identify	 approximately	 85%	 of	 Down’s	 syndrome	pregnancies	in	a	‘low	risk’	pregnant	population,	with	a	2.7	%	false	positive	rate.		(Marteau,	T.	M.,	J.	Slack,	J.	Kidd	and	R.	W.	Shaw	(1992).	"Presenting	a	routine	screening	test	in	antenatal	care:	practice	observed."	 Public	 Health	 106(2):	 131-141,	 Gardner,	 R.,	 G.	 Sutherland	 and	 L.	 Shaffer	 (2012).	Chromosome	abnormalities	and	genetic	counseling.	Oxford	;	New	York,	Oxford	University	Press.)	
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located	within	shapes	how	‘useful’	the	test	proves	to	be	(Hedgecoe	2008).		The	focus	here	is	 on	 NIPT’s	 implementation	 within	 population-wide	 screening	 programmes,	 a	 context	that	far	removed	from	the	discreet	use	of	NIPD	and	NIPT	testing	within	the	clinic,	and	is	significantly	 distanced	 from	 individual,	 personalised,	 contextualised	 experiences	 of	pregnancy	 and	 parenthood:	 ‘for	 public	 health,	 the	 utilitarian	 perspective	 rules’	 (Lupton	1994,	 p.32).	 	 NIPT,	 for	 Jonathan	 has	 not	 ‘quite	 cut	 the	mustard’	despite	 claims	 to	 near-diagnostic	accuracy	because	the	processes	that	allow	for	implementation	within	screening	programmes	–	the	processes	that	relate	back	to	the	complex	political	landscape	Jonathan	situated	his	work	(and	significant	professional	responsibilities)	within	-	demand	‘evidence’	–	evidence	robust	enough	not	simply	to	justify	the	discreet	use	of	NIPD	within	individual,	‘high-risk’	pregnancies	(which	are	already	routinely	subject	 to	diagnostic	 testing),	but	 to	justify	 the	 use	 of	 NIPT	within	 screening	 programmes	 that	 reach	 out	 to	whole	 pregnant	populations	 (who,	 if	 this	 were	 to	 occur,	 would	 be	 routinely	 accessing	 near-diagnostic	information	for	the	first	time).				If	the	‘mainstreaming’	of	NIPT	through	application	within	screening	programmes	leads	to	the	explicit	politicisation	of	the	technology	and	the	resurfacing	of	‘hot’	entanglements	then	the	stakes	are	set	particularly	high	for	experts	such	as	Jonathan	and	Linda,	whose	work	is	most	 closely	 tied	 to	 the	public	 and	political	 shaping	of	 the	 technology,	 and	who	may	be	most	 likely	 to	 be	 ascribed	 responsibility	 for	 what	 Linda	 terms	 the	 possible	 ‘fallout’	 of	screening:		We	are	 looking	at	a	whole	population	of	women	here.	 	We	are	 looking	at	600,000	women	a	year,	 just	 in	England.	 	Like	with	NIPT,	 these	things	run	away	with	 themselves	because	people	don’t	 see	 the	 fallout.	 	And	actually	that’s	our	job	as	a	public	health	body,	to	say	actually,	on	a	whole	population	basis	what	does	this	mean?	(Linda,	policy	maker)		The	weight	of	professional	responsibility	 that	managing	the	 introduction	of	NIPT	testing	within	 whole	 populations	might	 entail	 -	 ‘600,000	women	 a	 year,	 just	 in	 England’	 -	 leads	both	 Jonathan	 and	 Linda	 to	 seek	 distance	 from	 NIPT,	 and	 to	 highlight	 the	 problematic	issues	 that	 those	 already	 responsible	 for	 large-scale	 prenatal	 screening	 programmes	currently	 face.	 	Linda,	 for	 instance,	describes	how	she	 is	 responsible	 for	recognising	and	identifying	 substantial	 concerns	 that	 ‘people	 don’t	 see’	 and	 that	 may	 hold	 significant	meaning	for	 ‘our	population’	at	 large,	explaining	how	she	feels	part	of	her	role	 is	 to	slow	down	 the	pace	of	 technological	development	–	 she	 is	 there	 to	prevent	new	 technologies	such	 as	 NIPT	 from	 ‘running	 away	 with	 themselves’	 and	 disrupting	 current	 practice.		Jonathan	also	pushes	away	from	professional	entanglement	with	NIPT,	presenting	a	vision	of	the	technology’s	future	development	that	is	temporally	as	well	as	practically	distanced	
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from	 his	 daily	 work,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 full	 development	 and	 implementation	 of	 NIPT	screening	is,	he	feels,	likely	take	place	over	a	timespan	of	at	least	a	decade:		So	 I	 think	we	will	 probably	 see	 it	 replacing	 combined	as	 a	 screening	 test	perhaps,	within	about	five	six	years	time	maybe,	with	a	view	to	becoming	diagnostic,	in	another	five	years	time	or	so.		Hopefully	I’ll	be	moving	on	in	my	career	then	(laughs).		I	might	just	have	to	think	about	that	before	I	go.	(Jonathan,	policy	maker)		NIPT’s	characterisation	as	a	disruptive,	problematic	technology,	and	a	source	of	unwanted	professional	responsibility	is	once	again	highlighted	both	by	Jonathan’s	expression	of	hope	that	he	would	(personally)	be	able	to	avoid	having	to	 ‘think	about’	 introducing	NIPT	into	population-wide	screening	programmes:	 ‘hopefully	I’ll	be	moving	on	in	my	career	then’.	 	 It	became	 increasingly	 clear	 that	 the	 multitude	 of	 ethical	 and	 social	 issues	 raised	 within	discussions	of	prenatal	screening	(within	both	the	literature	and	the	participant	accounts	examined	 here	 -	 see	 chapter	 six)	 impacted	 significantly	 on	 the	way	 in	which	 Linda	 and	Jonathan	 approached	 NIPT.	 	 Each	 of	 them	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 persistent	 public	discussion	 of	 contentious,	 ‘controversial	 and	 sensitive’	 issues	 presented	 as	 a	 significant	challenge	within	 the	context	of	 their	work,	 and	expanding	on	 this,	Linda	explained	how,	particularly	 if	 she	(or	other	members	of	her	professional	group)	were	required	to	speak	publically	about	prenatal	screening,	she	faced	the	acutely	difficult	task	of	1)	attending	to	multiple	and	competing	perspectives,	 and	2)	publically	navigating	 the	complexities	of	 (a	polarised,	politicised)	debate:		It’s	such	a	major,	major	controversial	and	sensitive	 issue.	 	You	have	to	be	really	careful	what	you	say	at	a	national	level	based	on	this,	because	people	find	it	so	difficult.	 	We	have	these	two	extremes,	pro-	and	anti-screening	 ,	because	of	the	controversy	in	the	mainstream.	(Linda,	policy	maker)		Linda	 emphasised	 the	 polarisation	 of	 debates	 around	 prenatal	 screening,	 especially	 as	discussed	with	regards	testing	for	Down’s	syndrome	elsewhere	-	‘The	difficulty	with	T21	is,	
its	has	always	very	much	been	an	issue	of-	it’s	a	choice	and	society	has	a	bias,	a	completely	
polar	 view	 doesn’t	 it’	 -	 and	 as	 she	 discussed	 the	 debate	 in	 this	 way,	 she	 not	 only	emphasised	a	sense	of	distance	between	the	‘public	health’	perspective	and	any	discussion	of	the	more	difficult	of	contentious	‘issues’,	she	also	began	to	locate	overall	responsibility	for	 the	 more	 problematic	 aspects	 of	 the	 debate	 elsewhere	 –	 in	 this	 instance,	 within	‘society’	at	large:	‘society	has	a	bias,	a	completely	polar	view’.			
The	rhetoric	of	choice	and	the	responsibilisation	of	others			
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As	both	Linda	and	Jonathan	distanced	themselves	from	any	professional	accountability	for	the	 broader	 cultural,	 social	 and	 political	 implications	 of	 screening,	 they	 began	 to	 very	clearly	 locate	 this	 responsibility	 elsewhere.	 	 This	 was	 achieved,	 largely,	 by	 repeated	reference	 to	 the	 centrality	 of	 ‘choice’:	 women,	 figured	 as	 autonomous,	 rational	 (and	demanding)	 agents	 were	 presented	 as	 holding	 the	 power	 (and	 responsibility)	 to	 shape	experiences	of	 testing,	primarily	 through	 the	exercise	of	 ‘informed	decision	making’	 and	‘informed	choice’.			Raising	 for	 discussion	 the	 recent	 unofficial	UK	parliamentary	 inquiry	 that	was	held	 into	‘abortion	on	grounds	of	fetal	disability’	(and	which	recommended	either	severely	 limiting	or	 completely	 preventing	 access	 to	 abortion	 for	 fetal	 abnormality	 -	 see	 chapter	 five	 for	further	 discussion),	 Linda	 very	 clearly	 identified,	 divided	 and	 categorised	 (in	 explicitly	‘rational’	terms)	several	different	types	of	‘choice’	–	There	has	just	recently	been	this	parliamentary	enquiry	thing	hasn’t	there.			And	you	know,	I	find	that	quite	concerning.		That	people	would	actually	try	and	make	women-	you	know,	influence	it	in	that	way.		Because	I	think	you	can	 have	 a	 personal	 choice,	 and	 you	 can	 have	 a	 professional	 choice,	 and	you	 can	 have	 a	 societal	 choice,	 and	 I	 think	 we	 are	 perfectly	 capable	 of	rationalising	those	into	separate	compartments.	(Linda,	policy	maker)		Linda	delineates	a	clear	boundary	between	the	kinds	of	‘professional	choices’	that	she	feels	her	public	health	work	requires,	and	any	of	the	‘societal’	or	‘personal’	choices	that	may	be	implicated	 in	 the	 surrounding	 debate.	 	 Building	 upon	 this	 separate	 framing	 of	‘professional’,	‘societal’	and	‘personal’	choices,	Linda	began	to	locate	responsibility	for	both	the	 construction	 of	 choice,	 and	 the	 potential	 outcomes	 that	 such	 ‘choices’	 might	 bring	accordingly.	 	 Firstly,	 and	 most	 clearly,	 responsibility	 for	 the	 kinds	 of	 decisions	 that	prenatal	 testing	 requires	were	 levelled	at	 the	parents,	 and	most	 specifically	 the	women,	who	‘chose’	to	make	use	of	prenatal	screening	programmes:		It’s	 this	 whole	 issue	 of	 how	 we	 view	 disability	 in	 society	 I	 guess,	 but	ultimately,	 women	 have	 a	 choice...	 So	 you	 have	 the	 whole-	 it’s	 not	 just	about	 me,	 my	 child,	 our	 lives,	 how	 this	 affects	 my	 current	 children,	 my	future	children,	my	marriage	and	relationships,	how	that	then	impacts	on	society	if	all	this	breaks	down,	and	all	the	rest	of	it.		It’s	not	only	about	all	of	that,	it’s	about	the	fact	that	if	you’ve	got	the	whole	of-	every	single	person	in	 the	 UK	 that	 has	 a	 disability,	 we	 might	 be	 able	 to	 achieve	 something	positive	or	not,	on	your	head.		You	have	to	make	that	one	decision.		Which	is	I	think	incredibly	hard,	for	women.	(Linda,	policy	maker)		
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Although	Linda	expresses	sympathy	here	for	the	 ‘incredibly	hard’	decisions	she	feels	that	women	face	as	they	engage	in	‘choice’	around	prenatal	screening	-	decisions	that	not	only	require	women	 to	 consider	 how	 their	 choice	might	 impact	 on	 themselves,	 their	 current	and	future	children,	their	partnerships	and	family	life,	and	society	at	large,	but	must	also	take	 into	 consideration	 larger	 questions	 about	 ‘how	 we	 view	 disability	 in	 society’	 –	 she	explicitly	 locates	 responsibility	 for	 such	 decisions	 on	 ‘the	 heads’	 of	 individual	 women:	
‘ultimately	women	have	a	choice…	you	have	to	make	that	one	decision’.	 	 	 Jonathan	 echoes	this	 perspective	 on	 choice,	 highlighting	 the	 responsibility	 that	 he	 feels	 women	 in	particular	hold	–	‘this	is	not	about	us,	this	is	about	society	and	women	and	their	choices,	and	
I	think	absolutely	there	has	to	be	a	choice’	–	 identifying	 ‘choice’	 as	a	matter	of	 concern	 to	‘women’	and	‘society’,	presenting	it	as	explicitly	not	a	matter	that	directly	implicates	those	involved	in	the	design	and	management	of	screening:	‘this	is	not	about	us’.		Both	Linda	and	Jonathan	 clearly	 present	 screening	 as	 a	 personal,	 and	 not	 a	 political	 project,	 and	 any	professional	entanglement	with	 the	specificities	of	 choice	and	prenatal	 testing	–	and	 the	implications	and	responsibilities	that	such	choices	and	decisions	might	bring	–	is	actively	avoided.			Efforts	to	distance	away	from	professional	responsibility	(and	to	ascribe	responsibility	to	individual	 parents	 and	 mothers)	 became	 particularly	 acute	 as	 some	 of	 the	 more	contentious	 and	 problematic	 aspects	 of	 screening	 were	 discussed.	 	 As	 Linda	 further	explored	conversations	around	abortion	after	prenatal	diagnosis,	 asking	whether	NIPT’s	potential	 to	allow	 for	earlier	diagnosis	 could	 (or	 should)	allow	women	access	 to	greater	choice	 regarding	 abortion	 method,	 and,	 therefore,	 allow	 for	 greater	 access	 to	 earlier	‘surgical67 ’	 abortion	 services,	 her	 sympathetic	 approach	 towards	 the	 positioning	 of	individual	women	within	screening	programmes	seemed	to	fade.		Rather,	she	rejects	calls	that	had	been	made	 for	a	 service	design	 that	would	prioritise	women’s	access	 to	earlier	abortion	(or	allow	for	this	kind	of	abortion	method	to	be	offered),	stating	that	‘women	are	
going	to	have	to	deal	with	it	emotionally	whether	they	see	a	fetus	of	whether	they	don’t’,	and	suggesting	 that	 the	 ‘difficult	 emotional	 experiences’	 that	 the	 established	 system	 of	screening,	 diagnosis	 and	 abortion	 entails	were	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 an	 unavoidable	 and	acceptable,	if	somewhat	‘difficult’,	outcome:	
																																								 																						67	‘Surgical’	abortion	refers	to	a	type	of	abortion	method	that	is	carried	surgically,	utilising	vacuum	aspiration/suction.	 	This	 type	of	abortion	 is	 typically	carried	out	between	10	and	13	weeks	 from	conception,	and	is	carried	out	under	general	anaesthesia.		It	is	the	most	common	from	of	abortion	employed	 within	 the	 UK.	 	 Ashok,	 P.	W.,	 A.	 Kidd,	 G.	M.	M.	 Flett,	 A.	 Fitzmaurice,	W.	 Graham	 and	 A.	
Templeton	(2002).	"A	randomized	comparison	of	medical	abortion	and	surgical	vacuum	aspiration	at	
10–13	weeks	gestation."	Human	Reproduction	17(1):	92-98.	
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[support	groups]	would	be-	would	be	absolutely	convinced	that	we	need	to	do	 these	 things	 earlier	 in	 pregnancy,	 so	 that	women	don’t	 have	 to	 suffer	the	potential	of	a	later	abortion-	and	actually	some	women	are	grateful	for	a	 later	 termination	 or	 a	 spontaneous	 abortion,	 because	 they	 potentially	have	a	fetus	they	can	grieve	for…	this	is	actually	a	significant	event	in	life,	I	don’t	 know	 what’s	 right	 or	 wrong,	 and	 I	 don’t	 think	 there	 is	 a	 right	 or	wrong	answer	to	that.		But	I	think	it	would	be	quite,	quite	arrogant	of	us	to	say	this	is	how	we	should	be,	and	we	should	always	do	this	earlier,	earlier,	earlier,	 earlier,	 earlier,	 so	 that	 women	 don’t	 have	 to	 deal	 with	 that.		Because	women	are	going	to	have	to	deal	with	it	emotionally	whether	they	see	a	 fetus	of	whether	 they	don’t,	 you	know…	this	 is	 the	 trouble	you	see,	with	clinicians,	with	clinical	care,	with	prenatal	screening	for	whatever	it	is	for,	 you	 know.	 	Women	 have	 very	 difficult	 emotional	 decisions	 to	make,	and	you	know,	that’s	what	we	find	difficult	as	a	society	 isn’t	 it,	 to	take	on	board.	 	That	actually	you	have	to	make	a	decision	that	might	not	give	you	an	outcome	you	expect	to	have.	 	And	I	think	there	is	very	much	in	society	this	view	that	we-	that	every	pregnancy	should	have	a	good	outcome,	and	that	 we	 should	 be	 advanced	 enough	 to	 make	 sure	 they	 have	 a	 good	outcome,	 and	 clearly	we	are	not.	 	And	we	are	never	going	 to	be,	 are	we?		It’s	quite	difficult	isn’t	it?	Quite	a	difficult	process.	(Linda,	policy	maker)		Abortion	is	framed	here	in	explicit	moral	terms	–	an	event	that	prompts	an	examination	of	what	kinds	of	choices	may	be	‘right	or	wrong’.		Whereas	individual	women	are	very	clearly	attributed	 responsibility	here	 for	dealing	with	difficult,	morally	 loaded	decisions	around	abortion	–	‘women	are	going	to	have	to	deal	with	it	emotionally…	women	have	very	difficult	
emotional	decisions	to	make’	-	it	is	‘society’	at	large	(and	not	the	individuals	and	institutions	directly	implicated	in	the	design	and	management	of	screening)	that,	Linda	suggests	ought	to	be	dealing	with	the	moral	‘fallout’	of	screening,	and	ought	to	‘take	on	board’	problematic	questions	and	concerns	(although	Linda	also	attributes	some	degree	of	responsibility	here	to	 clinicians:	 this	 is	 the	 trouble	 you	 see,	 with	 clinicians,	 with	 clinical	 care,	 with	 prenatal	
screening).	 	As	Linda	 further	explored	and	accounted	 for	 the	moral	 ‘fallout’	 of	 screening,	her	 account	 was,	 increasingly,	 characterised	 by	 a	 sense	 of	 frustration	 regarding	 the	‘difficult’	 position	 she	 found	herself	 in	when	discussing	 such	 issues,	 and	 it	 became	 clear	that	 the	 active	 responsibilisation	 of	 others	 –	 parents,	 women,	 clinicians	 and	 ‘society’	at	large	–	allowed	Linda	to	distance	herself	away	from	the	pressure,	stress	and	responsibility	that	her	professional	involvement	within	public	health	entailed:		People	want	absolutes,	don’t	they,	in	life.		Everybody	wants	absolutes.		The	commissioners	absolutely	want	to	be	telling	women	what	women	want	to	hear.	 	 And	women	 absolutely	want	 to	 know	what,	whether	 they’ve	 got	 a	baby	that	is	meeting	their	perception,	their	picture	of	what	they	want	their	baby	 to	 look	 like	 or	 not.	 	 We’ve	 become	 completely-	 in	 some	 senses	ridiculously,	risk-adverse	in	health…	and	people	can’t	seem	to	understand	that	 in	 the	 twenty-first	 century	 we	 haven’t	 got	 the	 technology	 to	 have	perfect	babies	every	time.		And	I	think	that’s	the	problem,	isn’t	it?		Women,	parents	want	absolutes,	and	we	can’t	deliver	them.		But	clinicians	want	to	do	their	very	best	to	deliver	them,	so	any	technology	that	potentially	says	I	
	 170	
can	 tell	 you	 this,	 is	moved	 on,	 before	we	 know	what	 the	 problems	 are…	People	are	very	impatient,	they	want	answers	now.		(Linda,	policy	maker)		Here,	Linda	extends	the	responsibilisation	of	women	much	further	–	women	are	figured	as	being	 not	 only	 responsible	 for	 making	 choices	 with	 regards	 their	 own	 experiences	 of	pregnancy,	 but	 responsible	 also	 (collectively)	 for	 inciting	 a	 general	 public	 demand	 for	prenatal	 testing	and	screening	services	–	 ‘women	absolutely	want	to	know…	women	want	
absolutes’.	 	 The	 presence	 of	 this	 type	 of	 argument	 within	 much	 professional	 discourse	around	 prenatal	 screening	 has	 previously	 been	 identified:	 Vassy,	 in	 her	 account	 of	 how	prenatal	diagnosis	 ‘became	acceptable’	 in	France	(Vassy	2005),	explains	how,	as	prenatal	screening	 for	 Down’s	 syndrome	 was	 being	 implemented	 into	 routine	 prenatal	 care,	experts	 appealed	 directly	 to	 arguments	 that	 foregrounded	 the	 supposed	 ‘demands’	 and	‘expectations’	of	the	public:		Several	things	about	the	role	of	public	authorities	are	already	known…	it	is	argued	that	 there	are	often	strong	public	expectations	 for	 the	progress	of	biomedical	science…	When	a	new	technique	spreads	rapidly,	the	reason	is	that	 the	 public	 expected	 it,	was	 ready	 for	 it,	 and	wanted	 it…	 to	 promote	their	cause	they	produced	not	only	technical	data	about	the	tests	but	also	assertions	 about	 the	 social	 acceptability	 of	 the	 technique.	 	 One	 of	 their	main	arguments	was	that	pregnant	women	asked	for	the	tests.	(Vassy	2005,	p.246	-	247)		Linda	 suggests	 that	 the	 demands	 that	 ‘women’	 place	 on	 prenatal	 screening	 services	 are	particularly	acute	–	 for	Linda,	pregnant	women	are	not	only	seeking	perfection,	 they	are	demanding	 access	 to	 services	 that	 allow	 them	 to	 find	 out	whether	 their	 (unreasonable)	perceptions	are	being	met:	‘people	can’t	seem	to	understand	that	in	the	twenty-first	century	
we	 haven’t	 got	 the	 technology	 to	 have	 perfect	 babies	 every	 time.	 	 And	 I	 think	 that’s	 the	
problem,	 isn’t	 it?’.	 	 Alongside	 the	 responsibilisation	 of	 women	 here	 comes	 a	 persistent	emphasis	on	the	demands	that	Linda	perceives	groups	located	outside	the	boundaries	of	the	public	health	profession	–	 ‘everybody’,	 ‘commissioners’,	 ‘clinicians’,	 ‘people’	 –	place	on	public	health	services,	as	well	as	the	‘problems’	she	feels	are	generated	alongside.		Women	particularly	then,	become	implicated	in	the	persistent	routinisation	and	normalisation	of	prenatal	testing:	it	is	they,	and	not	the	developers,	funders	and	administrators	of	prenatal	testing,	that	are	presented	as	holding	the	power	to	shape	and	influence	the	way	in	which	tests	come	to	be	used	and	distributed	amongst	the	population.		Women	and	clinicians	are	also	 attributed	 responsibility	 here	 for	 the	 rapid	 (and	 seemingly	 inappropriate)	introduction	of	new	testing	technologies	such	as	NIPT:	any	technology	that	potentially	says	
I	 can	 tell	 you	 this,	 is	moved	 on,	 before	we	 know	what	 the	 problems	 are….	 People	 are	 very	
impatient,	 they	want	answers	now’.	 	Once	 again,	 any	 power	 that	 funders	 and	 developers	
	 171	
may	hold	is	masked,	and	it	is	the	populations	that	use	testing	technologies,	and	not	those	who	research,	design,	implement	and	market	them,	who	are	figured	as	holding	significant	(bio)power.	 	 Further	 emphasising	 the	 perceived	 public	 demands	 for	 risk-free	 (‘we’ve	
become	 completely-	 in	 some	 senses	 ridiculously,	 risk-adverse’),	 ‘perfect’	 pregnancies	 that	Linda	 feels	 are	 generated	by	 ‘people’,	 ‘society’,	 and	particularly	 ‘women’,	 Linda	 is	 able	 to	locate	 primary	 responsibility	 for	 the	most	 difficult	 and	 contentious	 aspects	 of	 screening	within	 the	 populations	 that	 public	 health	 serves,	 and	 not	 within	 the	 design	 and	management	 of	 public	 health	 technologies	 (such	 as	 the	 screening	 programmes	 she	administers)	 themselves.	 	Whereas	critical	 studies	point	 towards	 the	profound	 influence	that	 political	 bodies	 and	 institutions	 have	 on	 the	 shaping	 of	 women’s	 reproductive	experiences,	 here	 it	 is	 women,	 primarily,	 that	 are	 viewed	 as	 being	 responsible	 for	constructing	 the	 ‘need’	 (Lippman	 1991)	 for	 prenatal	 testing.	 	 Linda	 (and	 Jonathan’s)	account	of	screening	–		presented	here	as	a	system	that	responsibilises	women,	identifies	them	 as	 the	 primary	 source	 of	 demand	 and	 expectation	 regarding	 prenatal	 testing,	 and	implicates	 them	 in	 the	 on-going	 routinisation	 and	 normalisation	 of	 testing	 –	 provides	much	support	to	those	that	claim	prenatal	testing	operates	as	an	extension	of	Foucauldian	biopower.		Masking	more	explicitly	political	contributions	that	are	made	to	the	design	and	governance	 of	 prenatal	 testing,	 screening	 is	 understood	 here	 as	 a	 system	 that	 is	‘distributed	 throughout	 the	 brains	 and	 the	 bodies	 of	 the	 citizens’	 (Hardt	 and	 Negri	 2013,	p.216),	a	 successful	example	of	 the	 ‘voluntary	servitude	of	individuals’	 (Agamben	1998)	–	and	 a	 clear	 location	 for	 the	 indirect	 but	 influential	 exercise	 of	 the	 ‘highest	 functions’	 of	biopower:	A	 form	 of	 power	 that	 regulates	 social	 life	 from	 its	 interior,	 following	 it,	interpreting	it,	absorbing	it,	and	rearticulating	it…	The	highest	function	of	this	power	is	to	invest	life	through	and	through,	and	its	primary	task	is	to	administer	 life.	 	 Biopower	 thus	 refers	 to	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 what	 is	directly	at	stake	in	power	is	the	production	and	reproduction	of	life	itself.	(Hardt	and	Negri	2013,	p.216)		
Prenatal	testing:	where	choice	might	cease	to	be	enablement		The	discourse	that	Linda	and	Jonathan	drew	from	here	–	characterised	by	repeated	talk	of	the	 autonomous,	 rational,	 individualised	 capacity	 for	 choice	 -	 has	 been	 identified	 as	central	to	a	critical	understanding	of	contemporary	(Western)	personhood	(and	is	greatly	present	within	mainstream	bioethical	discourse	–	see	chapter	six).	 	Strathern,	within	her	examination	of	modern	constructions	of	kinship	and	family,	points	towards	the	centrality	of	choice	within	common	understandings	of	what	it	is	to	be	the	‘epitome	of	individualism’	(Strathern	1992a,	p.153)	-	an	‘Active	citizen	of	the	late	twentieth	century’	(and	beyond):	
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Of	all	 the	 interpretations	of	 the	person	 that	could	have	been	selected,	we	are	 presented	 with	 an	 individual	 subject	 or	 agent	 who	 knows	 how	 to	deploy	 resources	 of	 the	 incomes	 at	 his	 or	 her	 disposal	 and	 whose	personhood	lies	in	the	capacity	for	choice	(Strathern	1992a,	p.153)		Strathern	 not	 only	 establishes	 how	 ‘choice’	 has	 become	 the	 dominant	 framework	 from	within	which	modern	social	life	is	examined	and	understood,	she	also	argues	that,	despite	such	ubiquity,	the	availability	of	‘choice’	can	act	as	a	destabilising,	rather	than	empowering	concept:	The	producer	manufactures	according	 to	 the	consumer’s	choices,	and	 the	consumer	 purchases	 according	 to	 the	 choices	 the	manufacturer	 lays	 out.		Choice	 has	 become	 the	 privileged	 vantage	 from	 which	 to	 measure	 all	action.		Yet	choice	is	by	definition	destabilising,	for	it	operates	as	much	on	whim	as	on	judgment.		That	at	least	is	the	cultural	vision.		Consumers	and	producers	 live	 alike	 by	 one	 another’s	 choices.	 	 In	 fact,	we	 could	 say	 that	producers	 turn	 out	 the	 embodied	 choices	 of	 their	 customers,	 and	consumers	choose	among	the	embodied	choices	of	those	who	provide	the	services.	 	One	glimpses	 a	world	 full	 of	 persons	 embodying	 the	 choices	of	others….	The	absurdity	offers	the	real	glimpse	of	a	situation	where	choice	may	cease	to	be	enablement.			(Strathern	2002)		Approaching	 choice	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 her	 broad	 and	 inclusive	 ‘cultural	 vision’	of	social	life,	Strathern	makes	explicit	the	extent	to	which	the	context	-	the	social	and	cultural	framing	of	‘choice’	–	influences	the	degree	of	freedom	within	which	an	individual	may	act.	Elsewhere,	 and	 with	 specific	 reference	 to	 how	 individualised,	 rationalised	 framings	 of	choice	operate	within	the	field	of	prenatal	genetics,	Latimer	picks	up	on	the	centrality	(and	insufficiency)	 of	 choice-discourse,	 as	 she:	 ‘troubles	 simple	 stories	 about	 autonomous	 and	
informed	choice,	particularly	reproductive	choice,	as	icons	of	contemporary	versions	of	what	
it	is	to	be	fully	human’	(Latimer	2013,	p.213).	 	Strathern	too,	 ‘troubles’	simplistic	accounts	of	autonomous	and	 informed	choice	 in	 this	way,	pointing	 towards	 the	paradoxical	effect	that	the	proliferation	of	‘choice’	on	a	‘massive	scale’	(in	the	form	of	a	multitude	of	different	‘styles’,	 presented	within	 restricted	 ‘choice	making	zones’)	has	had	within	 contemporary,	Western,	consumer-led	culture,	and	highlighting	the	corresponding	lack	of	real	choice	that	choice-laden	areas	such	as	the	consumer	goods	market	offers.			The	massive	scale	of	the	 industry	which	has	created	choice-making	zones	as	 against	 the	 relative	 paucity	 of	 ‘styles’	 available’…	 The	 difference	between	 choice	 and	 no-choice	 conceals	 the	 extent	 to	 which,	 insofar	 as	styles	 come	 from	 a	 limited	 range	 of	 acceptable	 commercial	 alternatives,	one	might	perceive	choice	itself	as,	in	fact,	lack	of	choice	(Strathern	1992a,	p.166)		
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Strathern	is	suggesting	here	then,	that	pervasive	recourse	to	talk	of	choice	-	the	ubiquity	of	choice-discourse	 –	 as	 it	 is	 set	 alongside	 a	 persistent	 focus	 on	 the	 value	 of	 persons	 as	individual,	 autonomous	 decision-makers,	 acts	 to	 conceal	 the	 fact	 that,	 when	 many	contemporary	‘choices’	are	critically	examined,	very	few	options,	very	few	real	choices	are	offered:	 choice	 may,	 paradoxically,	 manifest	 as	 ‘no-choice’	 and	 may	 ‘cease	 to	 be	
enablement’.			An	 understanding	 of	 the	 profound	 limitations	 of	 ‘choice’	 as	 figured	 through	 prenatal	testing	 (a	 framing	 that	 fails	 to	 be	 articulated	within	 accounts	 provided	 by	 public	 health	experts)	came	to	the	fore	within	the	contextualised,	situated	accounts	of	NIPT	provided	by	parents	and	patients.		As	women	accounted	for	their	decision	making	(or	possible	decision	making)	 regarding	 NIPT,	 they	 drew	 from	 both	 mainstream,	 unproblematic	 accounts	 of	choice	 as	 well	 as	 more	 critical	 framings	 of	 what	 kind	 of	 options	 such	 ‘choices’,	 in	 fact,	might	 bring.	 	 Jamie,	 who	 had	 purchased	 NIPT	 testing	 for	 ‘reassurance’	 (and	 who	 had	received	a	‘screen-negative’	result)	had	been	amongst	the	earliest	users	of	NIPT	in	the	UK,	having	sought	testing	 in	 late	2013.	 	As	 I	asked	her	how	she	had	come	to	 learn	about	the	test,	she	explained	that	she	had	first	heard	about	NIPT	from	a	midwife	friend,	and	had	then	sought	out	information	(she	had	‘researched	the	test’)	via	the	Internet:		It	 was	 a	 friend	 of	 mine,	 an	 NHS	 midwife-	 she	 had	 heard	 about	 it,	 and	funnily	enough	she’s	fallen	pregnant	now	and	is	going	for	the	Nifty	test.	 	I	do	 think	 there	 is	 a	 very	 large	 percentage	 of	 people	 out	 there	 that	 don’t	know	about	it.		I	think	if	you	do	your	homework,	and	you	Google	it,	and	you	are	 on	 the	 internet	 though...	 And	 obviously	 knowledge	 is	 wonderful	nowadays,	and	everything	is	at	your	fingertips.		There	is	nothing	that	isn’t	readily	available	to	you,	you	just	have	to	look	and	find	it.		With	the	internet,	with	books	and	everything,	there	is	everything	to	learn	really,	isn’t	there?	(Jamie,	private	NIPT	patient)		Jamie	 very	 clearly	models	 the	 role	 of	 an	 informed,	 autonomous,	 responsibilised	 patient	(and	mother),	responding	positively	to	the	significant	volume	of	information	that	had	been	made	 available	 to	 her	 regarding	 NIPT,	 prior	 to	 the	 testing	 taking	 place.	 	 Elsewhere,	however,	 as	 I	 asked	 Jamie	 about	 why	 she	 had	 sought	 out	 NIPT,	 and	 what	 kind	 of	understanding	 she	 had	 regarding	 the	 diseases	 and	 conditions	 that	 the	 test	 may	 have	reported	back	on68,	she	placed	far	less	emphasis	on	the	value	of	being	‘informed’,	and	was	much	more	passive	in	her	acceptance	of	testing:			
																																								 																						68	When	Jamie	used	the	Nifty	test,	 the	conditions	tested	for	were	Down’s	syndrome	(Trisomy	21),	Edwards	syndrome	(trisomy	18)	and	Patau’s	syndrome	(trisomy	13).		Fetal	sex	was	also	reported	if	requested.		The	range	of	conditions	that	may	be	tested	for	through	Nifty	has	since	expended	–	see	appendix	two	for	further	detail.		
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-And	did	you	know	much	about	the	specific	conditions	they	were	testing	for?	Not	really.	 	I	mean	there	were	three,	you	may	even	need	to	remind	me	on	that.		They	are	not	sort	of	common	to	me,	if	you	were	to	mention	what	they	were	 I	would	probably	go	yeah,	 that’s	 right,	 that’s	what	 it	was.	 	But	 they	don’t	spring	to	mind,	if	you	like.		It	was	more-	the	issue	for	me	was	Down’s,	Down’s	syndrome.		Not	the	other	illnesses,	not	the	other	things	involved…	They	gave	me	 literature,	 there	was	 lots	 of	 information,	 lots	 of	 hand-outs,	which	I	felt	was	really	reassuring.	(Jamie,	private	NIPT	patient)		Although	 Jamie	 had	 been	 quite	 clearly	 enrolled	 into	 the	 clinic	 then,	 as	 an	 ‘informed	and	
knowledgeable	 consumer’	 (Latimer	 2013,	 p.14),	 having	 clearly	 emphasised	 the	 large	volume	 of	 information	 that	 had	 both	 been	 made	 directly	 available	 to	 her	 through	 the	clinic,	 and	 had	 been	 sought	 out	 independently,	 the	 translation	 of	 knowledge	 regarding	significant	aspects	of	NIPT	testing	–	the	conditions	that	her	pregnancy	had	been	tested	for	-	 had	 been	 only	 selectively	 achieved.	 	Whereas	much	 emphasis	was	 placed	 on	 ‘knowing	
about’	 the	 test	 and	 ‘getting	 information’,	 the	 specific	 diseases	 and	 disorders	 tested	 for	were	positioned	very	much	 in	 the	background	and	made	 ‘symbolically	invisible’	(Thomas	2014,	 p.176).	 	 For	 Jamie	 then,	 although	 she	 presents	 as	 a	 motivated,	 autonomous,	 and	informed	 consumer	 of	 NIPT,	 and	 although	 she	 seemed	 to	 receive	 a	 high	 standard	 of	information	in	the	form	of	‘pre-test	counselling’	in	the	clinic	(elsewhere	she	told	me	how	both	the	midwife	and	consultant	had	spent	much	time	with	her	going	through	the	details	of	 testing:	 ‘the	 lovely	 thing	 was	 it	 was	 all	 explained	 to	 me	 very,	 very	 clearly.	 	 So	 I	 knew	
exactly	what	was	going	on	and	what	the	outcome	was	going	to	be’),	the	degree	to	which	she	became	genuinely	‘informed’	was	limited.		Jamie’s	lack	of	clarity	regarding	the	test	did	not	seem	to	be	guided	by	any	failing	on	the	part	of	the	provider	to	obtain	‘informed	consent’	–	the	value	of	knowledge	regarding	the	specificities	of	disease	and	disorder	is	marginalised	here,	with	Jamie	placing	a	greater	emphasis	on	the	technology,	practice	and	experience	of	testing	 itself.	 	The	choices	 that	 Jamie	made	regarding	NIPT	were	not	greatly	 informed,	 it	seems,	by	a	rational	and	autonomous	process	of	decision	making	–	rather,	they	were	built	around	a	vague	and	unspecific	understanding	of,	disease	and	disorder	that	remained	even	after	 ‘pre-test	 counselling’	 had	 taken	 place.	 	 The	 persistent	 presentation	 of	 women	 as	autonomous,	individual	consumers	and	‘choice-makers’	becomes	quite	clearly	insufficient	then,	as	we	see	that	 the	very	process	of	receiving	 information	(however	 ‘nondirective’	 it	may	be)	-	the	process	of	becoming	informed	-	entails	some	kind	of	local	translation	within	relational,	 complex	 experiences	 of	 pregnancy,	 which	 are	 guided	 and	 shaped	 by	 both	personal	inclinations	and	established	cultural	norms:			This	positivism	instantiates	Euro-Americans’	commitment	to	the	idea	that	expert	 knowledge,	 derived	 from	 the	 application	 of	 technological	 and	scientific	 approaches	 to	 uncovering	 and	 revealing	 provides	 people	 with	
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objective	 knowledge	 as	 a	 firm	 foundation	 for	 making	 decisions.	 	 In	addition,	 a	 relation	 between	 being	 ‘informed’	 is	 being	 put	 into	 play	alongside	 the	 stress	 on	 autonomy	 and	 freedom	 of	 choice.	 This	 emphasis	de-socialises	 ‘decision,’	 and	 decouples	 information	 as	 merely	 means	 to	ends:	as	if	choices	can	simply	be	informed	yet	autonomous.		(Latimer	2007a,	p.15)		Strathern’s	suggestion	that	‘choice	might	cease	to	be	enablement’	speaks	very	clearly	to	the	way	 in	 which	 Martha,	 a	 mum	 who	 had	 refused	 all	 offers	 of	 prenatal	 testing	 during	pregnancy	 (and	 who	 had	 no	 direct	 experience	 of	 NIPD	 or	 NIPT),	 speaks	 of	 ‘choice’	 in	connection	 with	 testing.	 	 Reflected	 on	 what	 she	 felt	 were	 the	 limitations	 of	 NIPT,	 as	 it	functioned	within	the	context	of	the	‘therapeutic	gap’,	she	pointed	towards	the	emptiness	of	the	choices	that	NIPT	testing	might	present:	I	 think	 for	 me,	 with	 that	 test,	 it's	 the	 same	 choice.	 That	 I	 don't	 want	 to	make,	 I	 just	 don't	want	 to	make.	 	 I'll	 just	 deal	with	whatever	 comes	 and	then,	that's	the	child	we	have	and	that's	it,	I	think.		But	there	is	an	element	of	 naivety	 in	 that	 thinking	 you	 know,	 if	 we	 have	 a	 Down's	 child	we	will	manage.		But	you	don't	know	if	you	will	manage	and	you	don't	know	if	you	will	cope.	 	But	 it's	 the	same.	 	 It's	a	 test	 that	allows	you	either	to	have	[an	abortion,	or	not69]	(Martha,	mother	with	experience	of	routine	prenatal	testing)		For	Martha	then,	NIPT	remains	significantly	limited	because	it	allows	for	only	one	kind	of	choice	to	be	made:	‘with	that	test,	it's	the	same	choice.	That	I	don't	want	to	make,	I	just	don't	
want	 to	make…	 	 It's	a	 test	 that	allows	you	either	 to	have	[an	 abortion,	 or	 not]’.	 	 Not	 only	does	she	 illustrate	 the	 lack	of	 real	options	 that	 testing	presents,	 she	also	points	 towards	the	inadequacy	of	genetic	diagnosis	as	a	form	of	information	that	might	help	guide	testing	(and	abortion)	decisions	as	they	are	experienced	within	the	complex	context	of	family	life.		Explaining	here	how	she	would	remain	at	a	loss	as	to	understand	exactly	how	any	future	child	diagnosed	with	Down’s	syndrome	may	become	part	of	her	family	–	‘you	don’t	know	if	
you	will	manage	and	you	don’t	know	if	you	will	cope’	–	she	echoes	 the	explanations	of	 the	difficulties	 of	 screening	 for	Down’s	 syndrome	 that	were	provided	by	 experts	 elsewhere.		Rachel,	 a	 genetic	 counsellor,	 explained	 that,	 despite	 Down’s	 syndrome	 being	 one	 of	 the	most	tested-for	and	publically	‘visible’	congenital	diseases,	when	a	diagnosis	is	made	it	is	very	often	approached	with	the	kind	of	uncertainty	that	Martha	envisages	it	might:	It	is	really	surprising	for	the	public,	if	they	come	and	see	us	and	they’ve	got	a	little	baby	with	Down’s	syndrome	and	you	know,	this	is	a	condition	that																																									 																						69	Once	 again,	 as	 the	 topic	 of	 abortion	 was	 approached,	 any	 kind	 of	 clear	 articulation	 became	difficult	(see	chapter	five	for	further	discussion).		Although	Martha	avoided	direct	talk	of	‘abortion’	and	cut	herself	off	mid-sentence,	it	was	made	clear	within	the	broader	context	of	the	conversation	here	that	she	was	referring	to	abortion.			
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has	 been	 well	 understood	 form	 a	 genetics	 point	 of	 view,	 as	 far	 as	 its	diagnosis	goes,	you	know,	 for	decades.	 	And	they,	 they	will	come	through	the	door	and	say-	on	the	spectrum,	where	is	my	baby	going	to	be?		And	we	say,	well	I	don’t	know.			So	I	think	that	is	a	huge	surprise.	(Martha,	mother	with	experience	of	routine	prenatal	testing)		Because	 Down’s	 syndrome	 ‘occupies	 a	 difficult	 position	 since	 it	 is	 enacted	 as	 ‘compatible	
with	 life’	 yet	 can	be	 offered	as	 a	 legal	 reason	 for	 termination’	 (Thomas	 2014,	 p.219),	 the	kinds	of	choices	that	routine	prenatal	screening	tests	present,	once	they	are	understood	as	being	 exercised	 and	 navigated	 within	 the	 context	 of	 a	 broader	 set	 of	 cultural	understandings,	 and	 the	 complexities	 of	 family	 life,	 are	 problematic,	 and	 far	 from	straightforward.	 	 This	 re-casting	 of	 ‘choice’	 –	 as	 complex,	 situated,	 and	 problematic	 –	makes	 it	ever	more	difficult	 to	envisage	 the	narrow	 framing	of	 choice	as	 ‘informed’,	 and	the	persistent	responsibilisation	of	individual	women,	as	being	appropriate	and	sufficient	within	the	ongoing	(and,	through	the	possible	application	of	NIPT,	intensified)	discussion	of	prenatal	screening.				
Decisions,	choices	and	responsibilities	in	context	
	It	was	within	 accounts	provided	by	mothers	who	had	used	NIPD	within	pregnancies	 ‘at	risk’	 of	 serious	 genetic	 disease	 where	 the	 difficulties	 involved	 in	 decisions	 regarding	prenatal	testing	were	most	clearly	articulated,	and	where	a	picture	of	‘choice’	as	complex,	situated	and	contextualised	(and	not	rational,	autonomous	or	individualised)	most	clearly	emerged.		All	of	the	mothers	that	I	interviewed	after	using	NIPT	for	Down’s	syndrome	had	received	 a	 ‘screen	 negative’	 results,	 and	 so	 had	 only	 imagined,	 and	 not	 experienced	 the	more	difficult	decisions	and	choices	that	testing	might	bring	to	pregnancy.		NIPD	patients,	in	contrast,	confronted	reproductive	‘choice’	directly,	and	although	their	experiences	were	(primarily)	 approached	 from	 within	 the	 context	 of	 specialist	 prenatal	 care	 (and	 not	routine	screening),	as	 they	 illuminated	the	problems	implicated	 in	the	task	of	navigating	testing	 within	 the	 context	 of	 family	 life,	 they	 presented	 accounts	 which	 were	 highly	relevant	to	an	understanding	of	how	people	(not	populations)	experience	and	understand	prenatal	testing.			Joan	had	used	NIPD	in	her	most	recent	pregnancy,	because	her	son	(who	was	in	his	early	twenties)	 had	 been	 diagnosed	 with	 a	 severe	 form	 of	 haemophilia,	 and	 she	 had	 been	diagnosed	as	a	 ‘carrier’.	 	Reflecting	back	upon	 the	difficulties	 she	and	her	 son	had	 faced	during	 his	 early	 years	 (he	 had	 been	 diagnosed	 ‘out	 of	 the	 blue’	after	 having	 repeatedly	suffered	from	major	haematomas	and	prolonged	bleeding,	over	the	course	of	a	number	of	
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years),	Joan	explained	how	she	had	felt	her	reproductive	choices	in	subsequent	years	had	been	limited	by	this	difficult	family	experience:		I	was	relieved,	not	that	I	wasn’t	having	a	boy	but	that	I	wasn’t	going	to	have	a	boy	with	haemophilia.		Because	having	seen,	um,	my	son	go	through	what	he	had	been	through	in	his	early	years	and	how	hard	things	were	for	him.		It	was	hard.		And	even	though	now	he	is	healthy,	and	well,	his	early	years	were	 pretty	miserable....	 So	 it	was	 quite-	 it	was	 really	 traumatic	 for	 him,	and	for	me.	 	But	obviously	more	for	him,	he	was	a	baby.	 	So	when	we	got	back	it	did-	it	affected	our	decision	to	have	more	children	really.		And	that’s	why	we	waited	so	long-	what	six,	seven	years?		It’s	not	that	we	didn’t	want	to	have	more,	we	did.	 	But	I	guess	he	took	up	all	 the,	not	the	time.	 	But	 it	seemed	like	a	really	big	decision	to	have	another	baby.		Because	if	it	was	a	boy,	was	it	going	to	be	a	haemophiliac?	 	How	were	we	going	to	cope	with	that?		(Joan,	NHS	NIPD	patient)		Discreet	 experiences	 of	 pregnancy,	 and	 prenatal	 testing	 then,	 were	 informed	 by	 events	(and	 knowledges	 acquired	 through	 these)	 that	 had	 occurred	 decades	 beforehand.		Elsewhere,	Cara,	who	had	used	NIPD	for	fetal	sex	(and	had	experienced	abortion	after	fetal	abnormality)	explained	how	the	broader	context	of	her	 life	 impacted	significantly	on	the	kinds	of	reproductive	decisions	and	choices	she	felt	that	she	was	able	to	make.	 	Both	her	brother	and	her	young	child	had	been	suddenly,	and	within	a	short	time	frame,	diagnosed	with	 serious	disease	–	her	brother	with	a	 rare	genetic	disease	 (which	 is	what	 led	 to	 the	offer	of	NIPD	testing	during	pregnancy)	and	her	daughter	with	a	rare	form	of	cancer.			So	 I	did	 all	 of	her-	 you	know	she’s	never	had	a	 jar	of	 anything,	 it	was	all	home	cooked	blended	organic	stuff,	which	is	why	it	was	such	a	shock	when	she	 was	 diagnosed.	 	 Up	 to	 her	 first	 birthday	 she	 was	 absolutely	 fine	 no	issues,	and	um-	I	think	just	after	her	first	birthday	I	was	really,	ridiculously	broody,	much	more	than	I	had	been	before	having	her	really,	and	I	sort	of	said	yeah	I	really	wanted	to	have	a	second	one.		And	I	dunno,	it	all	just	kind	of	 [long	pause]	 all	went	 a	 bit	wrong	 really,	with	my	brother-	 but	 I	 guess	that	you	know,	 it’s	very	difficult	because	there	have	been	so	many	things.		There	is	a	bit	of	a	story	behind	each	of	them.	(Cara,	NHS	NIPD	patient)		The	experiences	of	both	her	brother	and	her	daughter	–	the	 ‘story	behind	each	of	them’	–	contributed	 very	 directly	 to	 the	 shaping	 of	 Cara’s	 later	 decision	 making	 regarding	abortion:	‘you	know	in	my	situation	I	had	a	brother	on	a	timescale,	a	daughter	that	had	just	
come	 out	 of	 chemotherapy,	 and	 not	 knowing-	 and	 just,	 there’s	 a	 point	 at	 which	 it’s	 just	
overload’.	 	 Again,	 it	 was	 the	 presence	 of	 broader	 contextual	 factors,	 and	 not	 simply	 a	rational,	 individualised	 understanding	 of	 the	 consequences	 that	 a	 difficult	 pregnancy	might	 bring,	 that	 guided	 Cara’s	 decision	 making	 here.	 	 Acting	 less	 as	 an	 autonomous	individual,	 and	more	perhaps	as	a	mother	and	a	 sister,	 the	 interconnectedness	of	 family	
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life	 was	 positioned	 centrally	 within	 Cara’s	 approach	 to	 the	 choices	 presented	 to	 her	through	prenatal	testing.				Finally,	 Jodie	 presented	 an	 account	 of	 ‘risky’	 pregnancy	 that	 also	 spoke	 very	 directly	 to	questions	 concerning	 the	 routinisation	 of	 prenatal	 screening,	 and	 the	 expectation	 that	women	 will	 make	 ‘informed’	 and	 ‘rational’	 choices.	 	 Jodie	 had	 a	 son	 with	 severe	haemophilia,	 had	 been	 identified	 as	 a	 carrier,	 and	 had	 used	 NIPD	 within	 a	 subsequent	pregnancy	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 fetal	 sex.	 	 The	 baby	 had	 been	 identified	 as	male	 through	NIPD,	and	so	Jodie	planned	on	having	an	amniocentesis	to	identify	whether	the	baby	had	haemophilia	–	if	the	baby	was	diagnosed	then	arrangements	could	be	made	in	advance	for	the	birth	to	be	managed	at	a	specialist	care	centre	(Jodie	lived	several	hundred	miles	away	from	the	nearest	specialist	clinic):	With	the	pregnancy	with	him,	the	obstetrician	kept	pushing	me	to	have	my	amnio	early.	 	And	I	said	I'm	having	my	amnio	to	see	where	I'm	having	my	baby,	and	she	went	but,	what	if	he	has	got	down's	Syndrome?		I	said	I	don't	care,	but	she	kept	pushing	and	pushing	and	pushing	me	to	have	this	amnio	at	12	weeks	in	case	it	had	Down's	syndrome,	and	I	said	no,	because-	I	said	you	wouldn't	test	me	until	my	20	week	one	anyway	for	Down’s	Syndrome,	I'm	not	going	to	make	a	decision	now	just	because	you	are	now	saying	it's	available	to	me	because	I	have	another	child	with	another	condition.		I	said	I'll	get	what	I'm	given,	if	he's	got	Down	Syndrome	and	Haemophilia	I'll	get	on	with	it.	You	know	I'm	not-	but	then	obviously	not	everyone	is	like	that	and	they	wouldn't	would	they.	
Do	you	think	you	would	feel	differently	if	there	was	an	early	test?	I	think	if	I	had	like	that	obstetrician-	her	attitude	was	to	terminate,	if	it	was.	And	I	 think,	 for	me	I	wouldn't	do	 it,	but	 I	could	see	a	 lot	of	people	would	start	 to	 over-analyse,	 so	 I	 think	maybe	 it's	 not	 a	 good	 thing.	 Especially	 if	you	have	already	got	three	or	four	kids	or	if	you	are	a	single	teenage	mum,	you	can	see	why	maybe,	yeah.		(Jodie,	NHS	NIPD	patient)		Whereas	 Jodie’s	 obstetrician	 approached	 the	 testing	 rationally	 –	 identifying	 it	 as	 a	potential	 opportunity	 to	 provide	 (cost	 and	 time-effective)	 diagnostic	 testing	 for	 Down’s	syndrome	 as	 well	 as	 haemophilia,	 Jodie	 approached	 testing	 from	 a	 position	 that	emphasised	 the	value	of	minimising	 the	 risk	 to	her	pregnancy	 (an	earlier	amniocentesis	would	have	brought	with	it	a	risk	of	miscarriage,	a	later	one	would	have	brought	the	lesser	risk	of	early	 labour).	 	The	reported	actions	of	her	physician,	being	quite	clearly	directive	(even	 coercive),	 stand	 in	 great	 contrast	 to	 the	 mainstream	 approach	 that	 is	 adopted	towards	both	screening	and	diagnostic	testing,	which	emphasises	the	value	of	autonomous	choice	and	 informed	consent	–	and	as	much	as	a	 framing	of	choice	as	 informed,	rational	and	 individualised	may	be	 insufficiently	adequate	 to	capture	the	 full,	 lived	complexity	of	women	and	parent’s	decisions	regarding	prenatal	testing,	this	account	clearly	shows	that	
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even	this	minimal,	narrow	emphasis	on	individual	choice	and	informed	consent	is	of	value	(being	sufficient,	perhaps	to	guard	against	this	kind	of	coercive	treatment).		This	example	also	highlights	 the	power	 that	 the	dominant	 framing	of	disease	and	disorder,	as	enacted	through	 prenatal	 testing,	 holds:	 pregnancies/fetuses/babies	 diagnosed	 with	 disease	 or	disorder	are	figured	very	clearly	by	Martha’s	physician	as	outcomes	to	be	avoided	–	made	potentially,	 (almost	 inevitably	 here),	 disposable.	 	 When	 broader	 social,	 cultural	 and	personal	perspectives	on	testing	are	taken	into	account	then,	and	when	the	way	in	which	certain	knowledges	are	foregrounded	and	others	are	marginalised	is	examined,	it	becomes	clear	 that	 ‘choices’	 and	 decisions	 are	 not	made	 rationally	 and	 independently,	 but	 come	situated	within	far	richer,	and	far	more	complex	contexts:	 ‘viewing	needs	and	demands	as	
cultural	 creations	within	a	 social	 context	 leads	 to	doubts	 that	assumptions	of	 “free	choice”	
with	respect	to	the	actual	use	of	prenatal	diagnosis	are	appropriate	(Lippman	1991,	p.32).		
Summary		Within	 this	 chapter	 I	 show	 how,	 as	 NIPD	 and	 NIPT	 move	 ever-closer	 to	 the	 field	 of	prenatal	screening,	explicit	entanglement	with	biopolitical	concerns	–	inherent	to	the	field	of	public	health	–	becomes	unavoidable.		I	explain	how	the	biopolitical	site	of	reproductive	screening	has	been	subject	to	much	criticism,	with	the	repeated	mobilisation	of	‘informed	choice’	 emerging	 as	 a	 phenomenon	 of	 significant	 problematisation	within	 the	 literature	(and	within	accounts	generated	here).		With	their	professional	identities	being	shaped	by	this	difficult	and	contested	context,	I	show	how	public	health	professionals	face	significant	challenges	as	they	administer	and	govern	prenatal	screening	programmes	particularly.			Analysing	the	media	reporting	of	NIPT,	I	show	how	talk	of	riskiness	is	foregrounded	–	with	the	effect	that	the	technology	becomes	a	legitimate	object	for	population	surveillance,	and	its	biopolitical	extension	is	achieved.	I	show	how	underlying	discourses	–	concerning	the	selective	shaping	of	populations	–	are	also	present	within	such	accounts.		And	moving	on	to	 analyse	 participant	 accounts,	 I	 show	 how	 public	 health	 professionals	 respond	 to	 the	problematic	 ‘mainstreaming’	 of	NIPT	by	 seeking	 distance,	 emphasising	 the	 test’s	 lack	 of	utility,	and	–	responsiblising	others	through	the	rhetoric	of	‘informed	choice’	–	distancing	themselves	from	professional	entanglement	with	contentious	issues	and	concerns.				Finally,	I	show	how	NIPD	emerges	as	a	biopolitical	tool	–	holding	the	power	to	contribute	to	 the	 practice	 of	 population-wide	 screening,	 and	 the	 corresponding	 shaping	 of	populations.	 	 I	 problematise	 the	 framing	 of	 women	 as	 autonomous,	 individual,	 rational	(and	 responsible)	 choice-makers,	 showing	 how	 a	 cultural	 framing	 of	 choice	 –	 which	
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recognises	 the	 power	 of	 governing	 bodies	 and	 institutions	 –	 allows	 for	 a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	how	the	technology	may	be	approached.	 	 I	highlight	 the	significance	of	the	 relational	 over	 the	 rational	within	mothers’	 lived	 accounts	 of	 pregnancy	 and	 testing	particularly,	 and	 I	 point	 towards	 the	 profound	 difficulty	 with	 which	 the	 needs	 of	(abstracted)	 whole	 populations	 and	 the	 (situated	 and	 contextualised)	 perspectives	 of	multiple	persons	may	come	to	be	integrated.		
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Chapter	Eight.		Discussion		This	 chapter	provides	an	overview	of	 the	 thesis,	 tracing	 the	 critical	points	 raised	within	each	 chapter,	 identifying	 issues	 that	may	 be	 of	 concern	within	 the	 future	 discussion	 of	NIPD,	and	addressing	some	of	the	more	critical	questions	that	this	work	raises.		
Summary	of	the	thesis	
	Within	 the	 preceding	 chapters	 I	 draw	 upon	 Foucauldian	 concepts	 of	 ‘problematisation’,	‘dividing	practices’	and	‘biopolitics’,	and	I	approach	the	examination	of	NIPD	-	as	it	comes	to	 be	 discussed	 within	 and	 across	 participant	 accounts,	 as	 well	 as	 differently-situated	textual	 and	 visual	 data	 –	 analytically	 and	 critically,	 identifying	 specific	 and	 repeated	moments	 of	 problematisation,	 objectification	 and	 ordering.	 	 Drawing	 from	 Douglas,	 I	attend	to	marginalised	and	dissenting	accounts	particularly,	and	drawing	from	Latour	and	Latimer,	I	make	use	of	the	concepts	of	‘enrolment’,	‘translation’	and	‘alignment’	to	examine	the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 trajectory	 of	 NIPD	 technology	 is	 being	 shaped,	 divided	 and	categorised.	 	 Finally,	 drawing	 from	 Strathern,	 I	 approach	 the	 discussion	 from	 a	 critical	perspective	that	recognises	and	problematises	the	persistent	foregrounding	of	the	rational	over	the	relational,	and	the	cultural	dominance	of	an	approach	to	personhood	that	values	individuality	and	autonomy	over	social	and	cultural	relations.		Within	 chapter	 two	 I	 track	 the	 trajectory	 of	 NIPD	 from	 the	 earliest	 stages	 of	 its	development	 to	 the	 present,	 identifying	 the	 locations	 within	 which	 the	 technology	 has	come	 to	 be	 enrolled	 and	 translated	 –	 a	 variety	 of	 routine,	 established	 programmes	 of	prenatal	 screening	and	diagnosis	 -	 and	exploring	 the	way	 in	which	 testing	has	begun	 to	sediment	in	the	clinic.		Reviewing	the	relevant	literature	from	within	(primarily)	the	fields	of	 medical	 sociology	 and	 anthropology,	 bioethics	 and	 science	 and	 technology	 studies,	 I	show	how	prenatal	testing	generally,	and	NIPD	specifically,	arise	as	sources	of	significant	problematisation,	 and	 I	 trace	 the	 contours	 of	 debate,	 pointing	 towards	 gaps	 in	 the	literature.	 	 Approaching	 the	 history	 and	 trajectory	 of	 NIPD	 technology	 critically,	 and	examining	 its	 emergence	 and	 translation	within	 both	 the	 clinic	 and	 the	market,	 I	 show	how	 NIPD’s	 on-going	 development	 is	 being	 guided	 by	 a	 particular	 (and	 powerful)	alignment	of	 healthcare,	 bioscience	 and	 capital.	 	Within	 chapter	 three	 I	 explain	how	 the	study	 was	 designed	 and	 conducted,	 reflecting	 on	 some	 of	 the	 practical	 and	 ethical	challenges	raised	during	fieldwork,	and	explicating	the	process	of	data	analysis	 in	detail:	showing	particularly	how	data	situated	across	different	registers	were	brought	together,	
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and	how	they	were	analysed	utilising	a	 ‘grounded’	approach	that	gives	rise	 to	 the	 ‘thick’	descriptions	presented	and	examined	within	chapters	four	to	seven			Within	chapter	four	I	show	how	NIPD,	as	it	is	enrolled	within	a	number	of	clinical	spaces,	and	as	it	is	translated	within	a	range	of	different	contexts,	becomes	subject	to	substantive	dividing	 practices	 (Foucault	 1982):	 examining	 the	 technology	 at	 a	 ‘pre-naturalisation’	stage,	participants	actively	sort,	categorise	and	classify	(Bowker	and	Star	1999)	emergent	NIPD	tests	and	associated	practices.	 	Reflecting	on	 the	 ‘splitting’	of	NIPD	 into	 two	major	streams	 –	 NIPD/diagnosis	 and	 NIPT/testing	 –	 I	 show	 how	 participants	 account	 for	 the	reasons	that	lie	behind	such	processes,	exploring	how	NIPD	‘troubles’	existing	boundaries	between	 practices	 of	 screening	 and	 practices	 of	 diagnosis	 –	 classifications	 which	 are	central	 to	 the	stability	of	 ‘routine’	and	 ‘normal’	approaches	towards	prenatal	 testing.	 	As	the	contingency	of	established	boundaries	is	explored,	dissenting	participants	‘dispose’	of	the	emergent	(and	disruptive)	technology	by	drawing	upon	discourses	of	accuracy,	and	by	mobilising	talk	of	numbers	-	appearing	here	as	potent	political	and	cultural	agents	(Verran	2013)	 -	 in	 order	 to	 deny	 the	 usefulness	 of	 this	 new	 technology	 and	maintain	 space	 for	clinical	judgment	(Latimer	2013).	 	In	contrast,	participants	more	closely	aligned	with	the	technology	 highlight	 the	 power	 of	 emergent	 NIPD	 tests,	 denying	 the	 need	 for	 complete	accuracy	 and	 -	 drawing	parallels	between	NIPD	and	established,	 trusted	 technologies	of	diagnosis	-	reinterpreting	the	category	of	‘diagnosis’	to	further	allow	for	NIPD’s	successful	enrolment	 and	 translation	 within	 the	 clinic.	 	 I	 show	 how	 clinicians	 and	 patients	 alike	respond	 to	 the	promise	of	NIPD’s	accuracy	and	clarity	–	with	clinicians	emphasising	 the	test’s	 capacity	 to	 provide	 almost-complete	 ‘reassurance’,	 and	 private	 NIPT	 patients	responding	 similarly	 –	 with	 the	 end	 result	 that	 the	 emergence	 of	 non-invasive	 testing	represents	a	significant	moment	in	the	development	of	prenatal	testing,	as	powerful	near-diagnostic	testing	becomes	applicable	(and	available)	for	use	in	‘low	risk’	populations	for	the	first	time.			In	chapter	five	I	show	how	the	theme	of	abortion	appeared	and	re-appeared	as	an	issue	of	concern	 within	 much	 of	 the	 data	 gathered	 here	 –	 with	 talk	 of	 abortion	 being	 present	within	 almost	 every	 fieldwork	 interview	 conducted.	 	 I	 show	 how	 discourse	 around	abortion	and	prenatal	testing,	although	ubiquitous	here,	 is	experienced	as	fundamentally	problematic:	 the	majority	of	participants	struggled	 to	approach	the	 issue	directly,	 failing	to	 find	 the	 language	with	which	 to	describe	 their	experiences	with	or	understandings	of	abortion,	and	highlighting	 the	politicised	and	stigmatised	character	of	 the	contemporary	abortion	debate.		Recognising	that	this	‘problematic’	issue	nevertheless	lies	at	the	heart	of	the	 discussion	 of	 NIPD	 (and	 other	 prenatal	 testing	 technologies)	 –	 as	 emergent	 non-
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invasive	 tests	 and	 those	 who	 encounter	 them	 are	 charged	 with	 the	 task	 of	 operating	within	the	‘therapeutic	gap’	–	I	draw	from	Taussig’s	concept	of	the	‘public	secret’,	showing	how	 abortion	 functions	 here,	 and	 within	 the	 discussion	 at	 large,	 as	 something	 that	 ‘is	
widely	 known	but	 can	not	be	articulated’.	 	 I	 show	 how	 the	 secrecy	 and	 ‘silencing’	 of	 the	abortion	experience	brings	with	 it	 a	 sense	of	 stigma,	which	extends	out	 into	 the	 lives	of	both	 patients	 and	 professionals,	 and	 which	 contributes	 to	 the	 construction	 and	 re-construction	of	abortion	as	 ‘public	secret’,	 leaving	those	who	encounter	abortion	directly	in	 a	 position	 where	 they	 feel	 unable	 to	 discuss	 their	 thoughts,	 feelings	 and	 concerns	openly,	and	without	judgment.			In	chapter	six	I	explain	how,	in	response	to	the	blurring	and	destabilisation	of	established	boundaries,	 problematic	 issues	 of	 significant	 ‘ethical’	 and	 ‘social’	 concern	 –	 ‘hot’	entanglements	 such	 as	 disability	 rights	 and	 the	 systematic	 application	 of	 ‘selective’	 or	‘therapeutic’	abortion		-	are	identified	as	being	as	central	to	the	discussion	of	NIPD,	within	both	 the	 data	 here,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 more	 ‘public’	 and	 ‘mainstream’	 discussion	 of	 the	technology	 at	 large.	 	 I	 show	 how	 mainstream	 bioethical	 discourse	 has	 dominated	 the	public	discussion	of	prenatal	 testing	and	NIPD,	as	public	debates	have	been	guided	by	a	highly	professionalised	and	institutionalised	approach	towards	the	examination	of	‘ethical	and	social	 issues’,	which	makes	concerted	effort	 to	contain	and	defuse	 the	more	difficult	and	 contentious	 issues	 raised.	 	 I	 proceed	 to	 highlight,	 however,	 how	 the	 majority	 of	participants	 approached	 the	 technology	 critically,	 problematising	 the	 tests	 and	 actively	debating	 the	 emergence	 and	 translation	 of	 NIPD	 and	 NIPT	 within	 the	 field	 of	 prenatal	testing.				I	 move	 on	 to	 explain	 how	 dominant,	 institutionalised	 forms	 of	 bioethical	 discourse	 are	mobilised	by	 ‘insiders’	particularly	–	 those	most	 closely	aligned	with	NIPD	–	 in	order	 to	contain	 and	 defuse	 ‘hot’	 issues,	 and	 I	 point	 towards	 the	 relative	 ‘thinness’	 of	 such	strategies,	 that	depend	on	 the	circulation	and	re-circulation	of	 institutionalised	concepts	such	as	autonomy,	informed	consent	and	individual	choice.	 	Proceeding	then	to	highlight	accounts	provided	by	 ‘critical	users’	 –	 those	with	experience	of	 the	 technology,	but	who	are	less	closely	aligned	-	I	show	how	significant	ambiguity	regarding	the	ethical	and	social	issues	 raised	 by	 NIPD	 remains,	 with	 participants	 pointing	 critically	 towards;	 the	marginalisation	 of	 voices	 outside	 the	 mainstream,	 the	 profound	 (and	 inappropriate)	influence	that	commercial	testing	providers	and	developers	possess,	the	responsibilisation	of	women	rather	than	more	powerful	administrative	and	political	agents,	the	limitation	of	reproductive	 ‘choice’	 and	 the	 shaping	of	 screening	programmes	 to	 satisfy	 economic	 and	political	ends.		
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	Concluding	 chapter	 six,	 I	 show	 how	 ‘outsiders’	 -	 those	 furthest	 from	 the	 mainstream	discussion	and	who	are	 least	closely	aligned	with	the	technology	-	present	highly	critical	and	 dissenting	 accounts,	 not	 only	 of	 NIPD	 and	 NIPT,	 but	 of	 prenatal	 testing	 more	generally.	 	These	‘outsiders’	are	able	to	extend	their	criticism	out,	drawing	on	alternative	discourses	and	identifying	the	re-emergence	and	intensification	of	highly	contentious,	‘hot’	issues	such	as	the	stigmatisation	and	discrimination	of	those	with	disease	or	disability,	the	stratification	 of	 society	 along	medically	 and	 genetically	 defined	 lines,	 the	 profound	 and	pervasive	 routinisation	 and	 normalisation	 of	 screening,	 and	 the	 exercise	 of	 significant	(bio)political	 power	 through	 prenatal	 screening,	 selective	 abortion,	 and	 the	 resulting	shaping	of	populations.	
	Within	chapter	seven	I	explore	accounts	provided	by	those	most	directly	implicated	in	the	politics	of	prenatal	testing.		I	show	how,	as	NIPT	screening	tests	have	not	only	proliferated	within	 the	 commercial	 sphere,	 but	 have	 increasingly	 entered	 into	 the	 discussion	 (and	conduct)	 of	 established,	 routine	 systems	 and	 practices	 of	 prenatal	 screening	 in	 the	 UK,	non-invasive	prenatal	 testing	technologies	have	become	a	matter	 for	discussion	not	only	within	specialist	locations	such	as	clinical	genetics	and	fetal	medicine,	but	also	now	within	the	broader	field	of	public	health.		The	bringing	together	of	public	health	and	NIPT,	both	of	which	have	been	identified	as	locations	for	critical	discussion	and	debate,	raises	significant	anxieties	and	concerns,	most	clearly	within	the	public	health	profession	itself	–	the	space	within	which	responsibility	for	the	more	contentious	and	difficult	aspects	of	screening	is	likely	 to	 be	 most	 publically	 located.	 	 Responding	 to	 this,	 public	 health	 experts	 firstly	establish	a	sense	of	distance	between	their	professional	responsibilities	and	the	disruptive	and	problematic	arrival	of	NIPT	(which	threatens	significant	 ‘fallout’),	and	secondly	they	begin	to	responsibilise	others	–	‘society’,	 ‘clinicians’,	 ‘people’	and	most	centrally	‘women’.		The	specific	way	in	which	women	come	to	be	responsibilised	is	through	their	framing	as	individual,	 autonomous,	 rational	 consumers,	 their	 personhood	 constituted	 through	 their	capacity	 for	 ‘choice’.	 	 Critical	 understandings	 of	 choice,	 however,	 are	 employed	 here	 to	show	how	 inadequate	a	 framing	 this	 is	–	particularly	within	 the	complex,	 lived,	 situated	contexts	women	and	parents	approach	testing	from	within.			As	prenatal	testing	is	shown	to	be	experienced	and	understood	not	 in	rational,	 individualised	terms,	but	as	a	practice	that	 is	 shaped	 by	 broader	 social,	 cultural	 and	 personal	 understandings	 of	 what	 testing	means,	and	that	is	so	thoroughly	routinised	and	normalised	that	it	comes	to	be	‘distributed	throughout	 the	brains	and	bodies’	of	women	and	 their	 families	–	 technologies	of	 testing	emerge	as	not	simply	clinical	tools,	but	biopolitical	mechanisms	of	control.			
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Study	limitations			Although	 this	 study	 addresses	 a	 clear	 gap	 in	 knowledge,	 providing	 insight	 into	 early	professional	 and	 personal	 experiences	 of	 NIPD	 and	 NIPT	 in	 the	 UK,	 it	 is	 unable	 to	comprehensively	address	all	issues	of	interest	and	concern	within	the	field	at	large.		Here,	I	 outline	 some	of	 the	 limitations	of	 the	 study,	 and	point	 towards	alternative	approaches	that	may	have	been	taken	to	the	overall	design	and	conduct.	 	Firstly,	my	own	positioning	in	relation	to	the	field	may	have	led	to	some	degree	of	bias	within	the	data	produced.		As	explained	within	chapter	 three,	as	a	 female	researcher	speaking	 in	 the	majority	of	 cases	with	 other	 women,	 I	 may	 have	 elicited	 particularly	 emotionally-engaged	 and	 ‘open’	accounts	from	research	participants	during	the	course	of	fieldwork	interviews.		Whilst	this	presented	a	valuable	opportunity	 to	produce	and	examine	particularly	 rich	and	detailed	accounts	of	experiences	with	NIPD	and	NIPT,	the	overall	character	of	the	final	dataset	may	have	been	influenced	by	such	considerations,	and	it	ought	to	be	recognised	–	particularly	as	I	was	the	sole	researcher	engaged	in	data	collection	for	the	project	–	that	if	a	different	researcher	were	to	have	conducted	the	fieldwork,	alternative	accounts	of	NIPD	and	NIPT	may	have	been	produced.		It	ought	also	be	recognised,	however,	that	the	fact	that	I	was	of	the	 same	 gender	 (at	 least)	 as	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 research	 participants	 engaged	 in	 the	project	 did	 not	 entail	 that	 I	 approached	 key	 questions	 and	 concerns	 from	 any	 kind	 of	shared	perspective.		I	have	no	direct	personal	experience	of	pregnancy,	prenatal	testing	or	parenthood,	and	as	such	my	own	personal	experience	is	very	clearly	divergent	to	that	of	many	participants	interviewed	here.		Secondly,	although	I	engage	in	a	practice	of	examining	and	cross	checking	textual	material	and	 relevant	 documentation	 alongside	 the	 analysis	 of	 interviewee	 accounts,	 the	 data	gathered	 and	 examined	 here	 is	 not	 explicitly	 ethnographic	 in	 the	 traditional	 sense.		Possible	 fieldwork	 locations	 that	 would	 enable	 the	 direct	 observation	 of	 NIPT	 testing	(private	prenatal	 clinics)	became	available	only	 towards	 the	end	of	 the	 fieldwork	phase,	and	subsequent	to	a	large	volume	of	fieldwork	data	having	already	been	gathered:	it	was	decided	therefore	that	the	conduct	of	observational	fieldwork	lay	very	clearly	beyond	the	remit	of	the	current	study.		I	therefore	present	no	observational	data,	and	I	am	unable	to	examine	 and	 cross-check	 the	 themes	 raised	 according	 what	 was	 occurring	 within	 the	clinic.		Being	unable	to	shed	light	on	what	might	have	been	observed	as	NIPT	entered	into	the	 daily	 life	 of	 the	 clinic,	 I	 can	 relate	 my	 findings	 only	 to	 participants’	 reported	experiences,	 and	 not	 what	 occurred	 ‘on	 the	 ground’.	 	 Because	 the	 development	 and	implementation	of	 the	 technology	has	been	both	rapid	and	sustained	since	 the	outset	of	this	 study	 however,	 the	 generation	 of	 such	 data	 would	 be	 a	 highly	 feasible	 option	 for	future	research.		Studies	which	produce	and	examine	observational	and	ethnographic	data	
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addressing	the	use	of	NIPD	and	NIPT	in	the	clinic	would	supplement	the	work	presented	here,	 and	 would	 be	 highly	 valuable	 within	 the	 on-going	 critical	 discussion	 of	 the	technology,	as	well	as	the	discussion	of	prenatal	testing	and	diagnosis	at	large.				Finally,	 the	 particular	 approach	 taken	 within	 this	 thesis	 –	 	 which	 foregrounds	 the	discussion	of	 processes	 of	 problematisation,	 division,	 categorisation,	 and	 classification	 –	does	 not	 represent	 the	 only	 possible	 path	 that	 may	 have	 been	 taken	 towards	 the	examination	of	the	data	produced.		A	more	explicitly	feminist	approach,	foregrounding	the	work	of	feminist	technoscience	for	example	–	‘inspired	by	social	constructionist	approaches	
to	gender,	sex,	intersectionalities,	society,	science	and	technology’	(Åsberg	and	Lykke	2010,	p.299)	-	could	have	been	adopted,	and	this	may	have	been	particularly	useful	when	teasing	out	the	full	 implications	of	women’s	accounts	of	NIPD	and	NIPT	technology	as	presented	here.	 	Alternatively,	 a	 strategy	 that	employed	a	 rigorous	actor-network-theory	approach	(Latour	 2005)	 could	 have	 been	 designed,	 to	 specifically	 enable	 the	 close	 and	 sustained	tracking	 of	 NIPD	 and	 NIPT	 testing	 technologies,	 as	 they	 appear	 as	 very	 particular	objects/actors.		Such	an	approach	may	have	enabled	particularly	close	attention	to	be	paid	to	the	concept	of	‘agency’	(Law	1992),	helping	to	shed	light	on	the	ways	in	which	various	actors	 –	 such	 as	 commercial	 companies,	women,	 health	 professionals,	 political	 bodies	 –	were	 acting	 as	 ‘drivers’	 and	 contributing	 to	 the	 shaping	 of	 this	 emergent	 technology.		Again,	such	alternative	approaches	may	be	taken	up	within	 future	examinations	of	NIPD	and	 NIPT,	 leading	 to	 perspectives	 that	 may	 both	 challenge	 and	 complement	 the	 work	presented	here.			
The	future	of	critical	discussion		A	number	of	issues	relevant	to	the	possible	future	trajectory	of	NIPD	and	NIPT	are	not	yet	discussed	at	great	length	within	the	literature,	and	have	not	been	placed	centrally	within	this	thesis	(as	they	focus	on	recent	developments,	or	issues	that	were	of	limited	relevance	to	 the	data	gathered	here).	 	 Issues	regarding	 the	socio-economic	background	of	patients	and	 parents,	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 such	 factors	 on	 experiences	with	 and	 understandings	 of	these	emergent	tests	–	whilst	not	explored	here	-	have	been	identified	as	relevant	to	the	discussion	of	prenatal	screening	more	generally,	as	well	as	 the	 ‘uptake’	of	screening	and	the	subsequent	rate	of	abortion:	Socioeconomic	 inequalities	 exist	 in	 the	 antenatal	 detection	 of	 [Down’s	syndrome],	and	subsequent	termination	rates	are	much	higher	for	[Down’s	syndrome]	 than	other	 anomalies.	Termination	 rates	 for	 all	 anomalies	 are	lower	 in	more	deprived	areas	 leading	 to	wide	socioeconomic	 inequalities	in	 live	 born	 infants	 with	 a	 congenital	 anomaly,	 particularly	 [Down’s	syndrome],	and	subsequent	neonatal	mortality.		
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(Budd,	Draper	et	al.	2015)		There	is	very	little	discussion	within	the	literature	of	why	these	rates	differ,	and	a	critical	examination	 of	 differing	 cultural	 conceptions	 of	 testing,	 disease	 and	 abortion,	 as	 they	might	 appear	 across	 different	 socio-economic	 groups,	 would	 be	 valuable,	 as	 it	 has	previously	been	shown	that	 ‘substantial	social	and	cultural	inequalities	exist	in	knowledge	
about	testing’	(Green,	Hewison	et	al.	2004).		Demographic	information	on	participants	was	not	 systematically	 gathered	 here,	 but	was	 informally	 noted	 as	 it	 arose	 –	 and	whilst	 the	socio-economic	background	of	NHS	NIPD	patients	and	parents	recruited	through	mother	and	 baby	 groups	 varied	 widely,	 the	 small	 number	 of	 private	 NIPT	 patients	 that	 were	interviewed	had	a	number	of	features	in	common,	with	each	of	them	being	professionals	in	 full-time	work,	 and	 all	 of	 them	having	 had	 previous	 experience	 of	 private	 healthcare	services.	 	 A	 larger	 study	 of	 NIPT	 testing’s	 emergence	 into	 the	 private	 clinic	 may	 more	clearly	identify	and	explain	the	emergence	of	such	patterns.				Recent	 ‘advances’	 in	 testing	 have	 led	 to	 the	 ‘incidental’	 detection	 of	 maternal	 cancer	diagnoses	 (Hughes	2015,	Newson	and	Carter	2015,	Romero	and	Mahoney	2015,	 Sample	2015,	Bianchi,	Chudova	et	al.	2015a),	and	although	such	occurrences	are	being	discussed	within	the	clinical	and	bioethical	literature,	little	evidence	on	how	women	might	respond	to	such	information	currently	exists.		With	widespread	increases	in	the	average	maternal	age	occurring	within	many	countries	worldwide	(Loane,	Morris	et	al.	2013),	coupled	with	the	fact	that	the	risk	of	a	cancer	diagnosis	increases	with	age	(Office	for	National	Statistics,	2015),	 the	 cultural	 relevance	 of	 such	 diagnoses	 may	 come	 to	 be	 increasingly	 acute:	 an	examination	of	patient	perspectives	regarding	questions	of	maternal	diagnosis	(as	a	result	of	fetal	testing)	may	therefore	be	valuable.		Other	recent	and	successful	advances	in	gene-editing	 technologies	 (CRISPR-Cas9 70 )	 promise	 to	 introduce	 a	 new	 era	 of	 genetic	intervention.		Such	technologies	have	already	been	applied	to	human	fetal	tissue	(acquired	through	 IVF),	 and	 the	 ethical	 issues	 associated	with	 such	 practices	 are	 being	 discussed	(UNESCO	International	Bioethics	Committee	2015).	 	Given	the	historical	centrality	of	the	‘therapeutic	gap’	within	prenatal	testing,	coupled	with	increasing	experience	of	(genomic)	diagnoses,	 it	may	be	useful	to	align	the	discussion	of	emergent	gene-editing	technologies	with	the	on-going	debate	and	discussion	of	NIPD	and	practices	of	prenatal	testing.				
																																								 																						70	CRS\ISPR-Cas9	is	a	new	technique	of	genome	editing	using	a	bacterial	system,	offering	the	 possibility	 of	 inserting,	 removing	 and	 correcting	 DNA	 with	 relative	 simplicity	 and	efficiency	(UNESCO	International	Bioethics	Committee,	2015)	
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Problematisations,	questions	and	concerns		This	thesis	demonstrates	how	NIPD,	examined	as	an	emergent	prenatal	testing	technology	that	is	being	enrolled	and	translated	within	and	across	a	broad	range	of	spaces,	comes	to	be	understood	not	simply	as	a	benign	extension	of	everyday,	routine	and	normal	prenatal	testing	 technologies	 and	 practices	 -	 but	 is	 deeply	 problematised	 –	 and	 it	 shows	 how	 it	emerges	 (finally)	 as	 a	 powerful	 biopolitical	 tool.	 	 It	 explains	 how	 NIPD’s	 emergence	 is	examined	 and	 contested	 -	 even	 by	 those	 most	 closely	 ‘aligned’	 with	 the	 technology’s	development	 -	 and	 it	 shows	 how	 issues	 and	 concerns	 of	 moral,	 political	 and	 cultural	significance	 are	 consistently	 raised	 for	 discussion	 by	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 actors.	 	 The	substantive	dividing,	sorting	and	classification	practices	identified	and	examined	here	not	only	lead	to	the	sorting	and	selective	‘disposal’	of	specific	NIPD	tests,	they	also	lead	to	the	containment,	 defusion	 and	 ‘disposal’	 of	 the	more	 disruptive	 and	 problematic	 discourses	and	conversations	 that	are	exercised,	 together	with	more	openly	critical	 accounts	of	 the	cultural	 construction	 (and	 meaning)	 of	 prenatal	 testing.	 	 Within	 the	 remainder	 of	 this	chapter	I	identify	and	discuss	how	some	of	the	more	problematic	and	contentious	aspects	of	the	discussion	at	large	are	managed,	contained	and	disposed	within	the	mainstream	and	public	discussion,	and	I	suggest	alternative	discourses	that	may	be	employed	in	order	to	broaden	 the	 debate,	 and	 to	 allow	 for	 the	 inclusion	 of	 a	 wider	 range	 of	 voices,	 and	 the	production	of	a	richer	account	of	NIPD’s	emergence	and	translation.			
The	disposal	of	abortion		Firstly,	 conversations	 around	 abortion	 –	 emerging	 here	 as	 fundamental	 to	 experiences	with	and	understandings	of	NIPD	and	prenatal	 testing	–	are	silenced	and	disposed.	 	The	division	 of	 NIPD	 and	 NIPT,	 the	 corresponding	 division	 of	 diagnosis	 and	 screening,	 and	efforts	made	 to	maintain	 the	 separation	 of	 ‘selective’	 or	 ‘therapeutic’	 abortion	 practices	away	 from	 the	 field	 of	 public	 health	 (as	 exercised	 through	 prenatal	 screening	programmes)	 as	 it	 faces	 ‘troubled’	 boundaries,	 each	 lead	 to	 the	 clear	 and	 persistent	disengagement	 with	 conversations	 around	 abortion	 and	 NIPD.	 	 I	 have	 shown	 how	abortion	is	approached	and	framed	–	by	participants	here	and	within	the	public	discussion	of	 NIPD	 technology	 (and	 other	 prenatal	 tests)	 at	 large	 -	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 ‘public	 secret’,	something	 that	 lies	beneath	 the	surface	of	debate	but	which	 is	not,	or	cannot,	be	openly	spoken	 of.	 	 The	 consequences	 of	 this	 ‘silencing’	 are	 multiple:	 firstly,	 NIPD	may	 be	 less	problematically	 aligned	 with	 the	 practice	 of	 screening	 (as	 it	 does	 not	 give	 rise	 to	 a	problematic	examination	of	 the	 ‘hot’	abortion	debate),	and	 it	may,	 therefore,	continue	to	enrol	within	routinised,	normalised	testing	spaces.		Secondly,	however,	the	clear	practical	and	 social	 advantages	 that	NIPD	 could	offer	 to	 (some	of	 the	most	 vulnerable)	patients	 -	
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access	to	earlier,	and	therefore	less	‘public’,	and	potentially	less	‘traumatic’	experiences	of	abortion	 for	 the	 small	number	of	women	who	receive	a	prenatal	a	diagnosis	 -	 are	made	marginal,	 as	 issues	 concerning	 test	 accuracy	 and	 cost	 effectiveness	 continue	 to	 be	foregrounded	 within	 the	 discussion	 of	 NIPT’s	 on-going	 implementation	 (Freeman	 et	 al.	2015	 -	 forthcoming).	 	 Although	 evidence	 regarding	 the	 particular	 effects	 of	 abortion	method	 -	 surgical	 or	medical	 -	 on	women’s	 subsequent	 health	 and	wellbeing	 is	 lacking	(Statham	2002),	the	fact	that	‘women	place	a	high	value	on	the	provision	of	choice	of	method	
of	termination’	(Howie,	Henshaw	et	 al.	 1997)	has	been	very	 clearly	 identified.	 	Although	NIPD	may	present	 an	 opportunity	 to	 allow	women	 access	 to	 earlier	 abortion	 services	 if	they	feel	 it	presents	a	better	option	for	themselves	and	their	families	–	to	provide	a	rare	opportunity	for	genuine	choice	in	relation	to	the	conduct	of	prenatal	testing	–	the	issue	of	abortion	continues	to	be	disposed,	with	the	result	that:	If	 NIPT	 is	 added	 to	 the	 current	 NHS	 screening	 test	 repertoire	 as	 a	contingent	test,	this	would,	however,	mean	some	women	will	undergo	four	prenatal	 testing	 procedures	 before	 receiving	 a	 definitive	 diagnosis:	 a	nuchal	fold	scan	and	a	blood	test,	a	NIPT	test	if	the	result	is	higher	than	the	cut-off	risk,	and	a	subsequent	 invasive	test	 if	 they	receive	a	positive	NIPT	result.	For	some	women,	termination	of	pregnancy	may	actually	take	place	at	 a	 later	 stage	 in	 the	 pregnancy	 than	 with	 current	 screening	 protocols.	Will	women	feel	as	favourably	towards	NIPT	once	it	is	situated	within	this	proposed	 pathway?	 The	 psychological	 burden	 of	 these	multiple	 tests	 for	pregnant	women	and	their	partners	is	unknown.	(Bryant	2014,	p.2)		Many	of	the	expert	accounts	presented	here	suggest	too	that	the	‘implementation’	of	NIPD	would	be	managed	in	such	a	way	that	disturbance	to	current	practice	would	be	minimised,	with	the	technology’s	trajectory	being	shaped	around	the	demands	of	established	clinical	practices	 and	 structures,	 rather	 than	 the	 ‘needs’	 of	 this	 small	 group	 of	 women.	 	 The	consequences	of	such	a	move,	coupled	with	the	persistent	silencing	of	abortion,	may	entail	that	 issues	 relevant	 to	 the	experiences	of	 these	most	vulnerable	women	 -	 the	 ‘high	 risk’	patients	whose	(disordered)	pregnancies	are	in	fact	the	focus	of	screening	and	diagnosis	programmes	–	remain	marginalised,	and	their	interests	unsupported.				If	NIPT	screening	were	to	be	introduced	population-wide	then	not	only	will	the	screening	service	be	improved	to	such	an	extent	that	a	greater	number	of	women	will	face	decisions	regarding	abortion,	but	all	pregnant	women	will	be	positioned	 far	closer	 to	 (stigmatised	and	 silenced)	 conversations	 around	 abortion	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 offer	 of	 screening	 alone.		With	such	developments	taking	place	within	a	broader	cultural	context	where	the	strong	connection	 between	 diagnosis	 and	 abortion	 is	 rarely	 made	 public,	 and	 where	conversations	 around	 the	 connection	between	 screening,	 public	health	 and	abortion	are	
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exponentially	 more	 ‘difficult’,	 the	 social	 and	 cultural	 shaping	 of	 women’s	 reproductive	‘choice’	 is	 likely	 to	 remain	 undiscussed,	 and	 the	 corresponding	 responsibilisation	 of	individual	 women	 is	 likely	 to	 continue.	 	 It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 the	 relational	complexity	 of	 ‘selective’	 or	 ‘therapeutic’	 abortion	 experiences,	 combined	with	paucity	of	bioethical	 discourse	 and	 the	 silencing	 of	 debate,	 entails	 that	 a	 new	 kind	 of	 discourse	 is	urgently	required	–	one	which	 ‘requires	an	ethic	of	listening	that	is	willing	to	bear	witness	
to	the	chaos’:	The	shift	 in	clinical	ethics	towards	a	narrative	based	practice	may	initiate	the	opening	of	a	cultural	space	where	chaos	narratives	may	be	more	fully	appreciated	and	heard.		Bioethics	must	not	shy	away	from	the	silences	and	must	continue	to	be	aware	of	how	the	nature	of	 its	discourse	sets	certain	agendas	before	its	content	is	processed.		Neat	and	tidy	abstract	conclusions	often	 leave	 us	 ill	 equipped	 for	 moral	 engagement	 at	 the	 level	 of	 lived	experience.		(Thachuk	2007,	p.514)		The	accounts	provided	here	by	NIPD	patients	particularly	show	how	central	such	 ‘chaos	narratives’	are	to	their	lived	experiences	of	abortion.	 	The	account	of	testing	provided	by	Abi,	 who	 recalls	 the	 complexities	 of	 a	 particularly	 problematic	 and	 contested	 abortion	experience,	 highlights	 the	 difficulty	 with	 which	 such	 experiences	 currently	 come	 to	 be	managed	both	in	the	clinic	and	within	the	context	of	an	on-going	family	life:	So	Dylan	was	put	to	sleep	on	the	Wednesday,	and	then	I	hadn’t	listened	or	absorbed	 anything	 so	 didn’t	 realise	 I	 would	 have	 to	 go	 back	 into	 the	hospital	on	the	Saturday	to	deliver	him.		So	Friday	I’m	in	the	park	with	my	daughter	 [Abi	becomes	very	upset],	 just	 like,	 keeping	 things	 normal.	 	 And	looking	back,	 I	don’t	know	how	I	did	 it.	 	 I	um-	what	happened	next?	 	Um,	had	 the	 funeral,	 life	 carried	 on.	 	 I	 went	 onto	 antidepressants	 a	 little	 bit,	didn’t	want	to	because	I’ve	got	ME.		And	before	I	was	diagnosed	with	that	I	spent	18	months	on	Prozac,	and	nobody	did	anything	other	than	put	me	on	them.	
So	you	weren’t	given	much	 information	on	what	was	going	 to	happen	with	
the	termination?	It	 could	be	 that	 I	 just	 shut	 it	 out,	 and	 that	 I	 just	 refused,	 you	know	 I	 just	handed	 the	phone	over	and	 refused	 to	 listen.	 	Because,	 you	know,	 to	me,	she	was	being	very	blasé	about	killing	my	child.	And	you	know,	I	know	it’s	the	 whole	 procedure	 but	 having	 to	 get	 somebody	 to	 sign	 it	 off	 before	 it	happens	is	just,	it	just	felt	wrong.		And	I	know	it’s	only	to	cover	their	own	back,	but	to	be	fair	what	was	I	meant	to	do?		I	thought	I	was	going	to	take	a	tablet	and	it	would	all	be	done.	 	That’s	what	I	thought.	 	I	didn’t	realise	we	would	see	him	on	the	monitor,	the	monitor	would	be	turned	away	from	us,	I	would	be	 injected,	 and	 then	 turn	up.	 	 I	 think	 the	anti-D	made	 it	harder,	because	we	had	to	bumble	around	the	hospital	waiting	until	my	body	was	at	a	right	time	from	having	he	procedure	to	checking	my	blood	levels,	that	was	a	hard	bit.		But	turning	up	at	the	hospital	and	everyone	knew	why	you	were	there,	and	they	were	trying	to	talk	to	you.		It	was	just.			(Abi,	NIPD	NHS	patient)	
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	Abi’s	account	renders	the	difficulties	that	may	be	involved	in	the	contemporary	‘selective’	or	 ‘therapeutic’	 abortion	 experience	 tangible	 –	 the	 vagueness	with	which	 the	procedure	was	approached,	 the	 rationalisation	and	 legalised	 framing	of	Abi’s	decision,	 the	 sense	of	stigma	 she	 felt	 had	 surrounded	 her	 experience,	 the	 sense	 of	 inevitability	 and	 lack	 of	‘choice’	 that	Abi	reports	–	providing	support	 for	the	claim	that,	as	a	result	of	silence	and	stigma,	 ‘women	 are	 socially	 isolated,	 their	 experiences	 kept	 secret,	 their	 grief	
disenfranchised’	 (Thachuk	 2007,	 p.512).	 	 Although	 Abi’s	 abortion	 experience	 occurred	after	amniocentesis	and	not	NIPD,	such	accounts	are	essential	to	the	understanding	of	how	fundamentally	problematic	–	especially	if	testing	does	not	come	to	be	positioned	earlier	in	pregnancy	 –	 the	 ‘selective’	 or	 ‘therapeutic’	 abortion	 experience	may	 be.	 	 Although	 such	issues	may	be	faced	by	a	minority	of	women	–	with	most	experiencing	 ‘reassurance’	and	not	 on-going	 ‘risk’	 once	 their	 testing	 is	 complete	 -	 they	 are,	 nevertheless,	 a	 direct	consequence	of	prenatal	screening	and	diagnosis	programmes:			Prenatal	 care	programmes,	not	 an	openness	 towards	 abortion,	 transform	her	 body	 into	 a	 field	 of	 operations	 for	 technocratic	 and	 bureaucratic	interventions.		And	it	is	of	course	not	only	the	pregnant	woman	but	also	the	fruit	 of	 her	 belly	 that	 is	 affected	 by	 being	 discussed	 in	 the	 context	 of	probabilities	 and	 risks	 which,	 strictly	 speaking,	 make	 sense	 only	 for	groups;	her	unborn	is	transformed	into	the	crumb	of	a	population.		(Duden	1993,	p.28)		
The	disposal	of	‘hot’	entanglements		The	 topic	 of	 abortion	 is	 not	 the	 only	 one	 ‘disposed’	 of	 within	 the	 discussion	 of	 NIPD.		Within	 the	 public,	 ‘mainstream’	 discussion	 of	 NIPD’s	 development,	 and	 despite	 the	presence	of	dissenting	accounts,	the	more	difficult	and	contentious	issues	that	participants	here,	for	instance,	so	clearly	raise	-	the	stigmatisation	of	those	with	disability,	the	shaping	of	populations	though	the	systematic	application	of	selective	abortion,	the	stratification	of	society	and	its	division	into	categories	of	‘normal’	and	‘abnormal,	‘sick’	and	‘healthy’	–	are	explicitly	not	foregrounded.		Rather,	it	is	talk	of	informed	consent,	reproductive	choice	and	individual	autonomy	that	is	made	central	to	the	discussion	of	‘ethical’	or	‘social’	concerns,	and	more	directly	critical	perspectives	remain	marginalised.		This	thesis	highlights	a	broad	range	of	 critical	and	dissenting	voices	which	are	 relevant	 to	 the	discussion	of	NIPD,	and	which	may	otherwise	(typically)	be	positioned	at	the	margins	of	debate,	as	those	aligned	with	 the	 technology	and	 its	 associated	practices	 are	given	 the	 strongest	 voice.	 	Drawing	upon	 (powerful)	 mainstream	 bioethical	 discourse,	 the	 public	 debate	 on	 NIPD	responsibilises	 ‘individual’	women	and	parents,	and	 fails	 to	reflect	on	 the	broader	social	
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and	cultural	shaping	of	 the	 technology,	and	 its	enrolment	and	translation	within	routine	clinical	practice:	Without	 a	 doubt,	 prenatal	 diagnosis	 has	 (re)defined	 the	 grounds	 for	abortion	 –	who	 is	 justified	 in	 having	 a	 pregnancy	 terminated	 and	why	 –	and	 is	 a	 clear	 expression	 of	 social	 control…	 prenatal	 diagnosis	 is	 thus	revealed	as	a	biopolitical	as	well	as	a	biomedical	activity.	an	abortion	may	only	 become	 “legal”	 in	 some	 countries	 if	 the	 fetus	 has	 some	 recognized	disorder,	 and	 the	 justifying	 disorder	 becomes	 “recognisable”	 because	geneticists	decide	to	screen	for	it	(Lippman	1991,	p.	34)		As	Lucy	(genetic	counsellor)	suggests	-	see	page	131	-	the	rise	of	NIPD	could	function	as	an	opportunity	 to	 reflect	 critically,	 not	 simply	 on	 the	 technology	 itself,	 but	 on	 the	 broader	cultural	 construction	 of	 screening	 and	 diagnosis.	 	 Given	 the	 wealth	 and	 depth	 of	 the	critical	 commentary	 that	 has	 been	 produced	 as	 reproductive	 technologies	 have	 been	enrolled	within	 the	clinic	and	have	been	 translated	within	 the	 lives	of	pregnant	patients	the	critical	discussion	of	NIPD	has	a	rich	resource	of	debate	and	discussion	to	draw	from.			More	 critical	 accounts	 of	 NIPD’s	 development	 –	 which	 highlight	 the	 lack	 of	 public	discussion	concerning	the	more	difficult	and	contentious	issues	identified	by	participants	here	-	have	started	to	appear,	with	Newson	(Newson	2014)	 for	 instance	questioning	not	only	 the	 practical	 implications	 of	 NIPD’s	 emergence	 within	 prenatal	 screening	 and	diagnosis,	 but	 critically	 examining	 the	 construction	 of	 such	 practices,	 suggesting	 for	instance	 that	 ‘we	 must	 not	 use	 screening	 as	 an	 excuse	 for	 withdrawing	 practical	 or	
psychological	 support	 for	people	who	choose	 to	 continue	a	pregnancy	 that	will	 lead	 to	 the	
birth	 of	 a	 child	 with	 a	 genetic	 or	 congenital	 condition’,	 and	 pointing	 towards	 the	significance	of	 the	relational	as	well	as	 the	rational:	 ‘we	need	to	appreciate	that	although	
these	decisions	are	made	by	women	and	couples	based	on	their	individual	values,	the	social	
context	 in	which	 they	are	made	 is	also	 important’.	 	Critical	 perspectives	 on	 the	 project	 of	prenatal	screening	have	been	described	previously,	with	Clarke	for	instance	examining	the	thinness	 of	 public	 debate	 around	 Down’s	 syndrome	 screening	 particularly.	 	 Pointing	towards	 the	 presence	 –	 and	 containment	 -	 of	 ‘bold’	 and	 critical	 dissenting	 perspectives,	Clarke	explains	how	the	examination	of	‘hot’	entanglements	has	been	purposively	avoided,	with	 the	 result	 that	 screening	 –	 operating	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 ‘therapeutic	 gap’	 –	leads	inevitably	towards	the	(uncritical)	routinisation	of	abortion:	[The	 critical	 examination	 of	 screening]	 has	 not	 happened	 –	 society	 has	baulked	 at	 this	 discussion,	 and	 has	 never	 debated	 these	 issues	 openly…	there	 is	 no	 consensus	 that	 terminating	 affected	 pregnancies	 is	 the	 most	appropriate	 response	 to	 the	 challenge	 of	Down’s	 syndrome	 and	 that	 this	view	 should	be	promoted	publically	 through	 the	National	Health	 Service.		The	debate	has	scarcely	even	started,	despite	some	bold	attempts.	
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(Clarke	1997,	p.128)		The	 unavoidable	 entanglement	 of	 screening,	 public	 health	 and	 selective	 abortion	 places	great	pressure	on	a	system	that	(primarily)	manages	the	ethical	and	social	implications	of	testing	 via	 a	 framework	 that	 emphasises	 only	 the	 individual	 and	 not	 the	 political	 or	cultural	 shaping	 of	 choice.	 	 As	 the	 ‘structural	 directiveness’	 (Clarke	 1997)	 of	 prenatal	screening	programmes	becomes	 increasingly	clear,	 the	responsibilisation	of	women,	and	not	 the	 institutions,	 individuals	 and	 broader	 political	 processes	 that	 direct	 and	 govern	screening	systems,	appears	as	entirely	at	odds	with	any	kind	of	critical	understanding	of	the	way	in	which	choices	and	experiences	come	to	be	shaped:	Given	the	way	in	which	health	professionals	influence	both	public	attitudes	to	genetic	disease	and	the	reproductive	decisions	of	individual	women,	it	is	disingenuous	 of	 clinicians	 to	 claim	 they	 are	 simply	 making	 available	services	 that	 the	 public	 manifestly	 wants	 to	 utilize.	 	 In	 fact,	 they	 are	frequently	 generating	 the	 ‘needs’	 that	 they	 claim	 to	 meet,	 and	 they	 are	choosing	 to	 find	a	 ‘solution’	 to	 this	 ‘need’	 rather	 than	 to	other	needs	 that	might	 be	 just	 as	 urgent	 and	 rather	 more	 amenable	 to	 simple,	 benign	interventions.	(Clarke	1997)			Prenatal	 screening,	 as	 a	 practice	 that	 has	 come	 to	 be	 thoroughly	 routinised	 and	normalised	 -	 ‘distributed	 throughout	 the	brains	and	 the	bodies	of	 the	 citizens’	 (Hardt	 and	Negri	 2013,	 p.216)	 	 -	 has	 been	 shown	 to	 be	 a	 key	 location	 for	 the	 exercise	 of	 biopower	
‘regulating	 social	 life	 from	 its	 interior,	 following	 it,	 interpreting	 it,	 absorbing	 it,	 and	
rearticulating	 it’,	 rather	 than	 any	 kind	 of	 explicitly	 political,	 transparent,	 accountable	system	 of	 administration	 and	 governance.	 	 It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 the	 consistent	promotion	of	 ‘informed	choice’	as	the	chief	purpose	and	benefit	of	prenatal	screening	is	a	key	way	in	which	the	process	at	large,	and	the	professional	lives	of	those	involved,	may	be	distanced	from	entanglement	with	debates	around	‘hot’	issues	such	as	disability	rights	and	eugenics	 (William,	 Alderson	 et	 al.	 2002,	 as	 cited	 in,	 Wilkinson	 2015,	 p.26).	 	 And	 it	 is	perhaps	for	this	reason	–	because	of	the	clear	presence	of	‘hot’	entanglements	such	as	‘the	
vexed	 question	 of	 new	 eugenic	 possibilities’	 (Latimer	 2013,	 p.153)	 –	 that	 those	 whose	professional	 identities	 are	 so	 closely	 aligned	 with	 the	 politics	 of	 prenatal	 testing	(understandably)	 seek	 to	 distance	 themselves	 from	 more	 critical	 questions	 regarding	prenatal	screening	and	the	explicit	shaping	of	populations	(via	a	process	of	identification	and	‘disposal’	before	birth).		Although	the	accounts	provided	by	public	health	experts	here	presented,	 at	 times,	 as	 less	 than	 sympathetic	 towards	 the	 kinds	 of	 difficult	 experiences	that	 were	 so	 richly	 illustrated	 by	 those	who	 had	 used	 NIPD,	 the	 task	 of	 harmonising	 a	population-wide	public	health	perspective	on	NIPT	and	screening,	with	an	understanding	
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of	the	contextualised,	situated,	complex	and	difficult	experiences	that	people	encountering	NIPT	testing	may	face,	is	unlikely	to	emerge	as	anything	other	than	profoundly	difficult.				Elsewhere,	 as	 they	 critically	 (and	 empirically)	 examine	 the	 provision	 of	 genetic	counselling	as	practiced	in	connection	with	NIPD,	presenting	‘a	challenge	to	the	status	quo’,	Farrelly	 and	 Cho	 (Farrelly,	 Cho	 et	 al.	 2012)	 provide	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 there	 is	 a	persistent	lack	of	conversation	around	disability	within	the	emerging	context	of	NIPD	(and	NIPT)	counselling.	 	Suggesting	that	these	conversations	too,	become	disposed,	they	point	towards	the	problematic	implications	that	such	an	approach	entails,	particularly	as	testing	becomes	more	widespread,	and	more	routine:	Many	genetic	counselors	are	not	engaging	in	comprehensive	conversations	about	 disability	 with	 their	 clients	 Soon,	 non-invasive	 prenatal	 diagnosis	will	be	offered	at	an	affordable	cost	early	in	pregnancy,	making	diagnostic	results	available	to	clients	on	a	far	broader	basis,	and	making	these	issues	salient	 for	 a	 larger	 population	 of	 clients.	 The	 noninvasive	 nature	 of	 such	testing	 may	 mean	 that	 the	 informed	 consent	 process	 is	 reduced	 even	beyond	its	current	state.	(Farrelly,	Cho	et	al.	2012,	p.823)		Conversations	around	abortion,	disability,	and	the	social	and	cultural	shaping	of	selective	reproduction	are	undeniably	problematic.		The	issues	and	concerns	raised	however	–	the	‘hot’	 entanglements	 –	 that	 are	 generated	 as	 a	 result	 of	 such	 conversations,	 may	 only	become	more	acute	as	the	scope	of	NIPD	technology	continues	to	expand:	While	 [Down’s	 syndrome]	may	 be	 the	 first	 genetic	 condition	 that	 can	 be	definitively	 diagnosed	 in	 the	 first	 trimester	 on	 a	 population	 basis,	 others	will	undoubtedly	 follow.	Countries	and	 their	people	will	be	 challenged	 to	answer:	what	forms	of	genetic	variation	are	valuable?	(Skotko	2009,	p.825)		Driven	by	profit	 and	powerful	 technology,	 several	biotech	 companies	 are	expanding	 popular	 prenatal	 screening	 tests.	 In	 addition	 to	 looking	 for	Down	syndrome,	 they	are	starting	 to	check	 for	smaller	breaks	and	errors	along	a	baby’s	23	sets	of	chromosomes	that	can	also	cause	severe,	 if	rare,	birth	defects.	In	brochures	aimed	at	expectant	mothers,	Sequenom	bills	its	expanded	 test	 as	 the	 “only	 prenatal	 blood	 test	 that	 analyzes	 every	chromosome	 of	 your	 developing	 baby.”…	 Bigger	 is	 sold	 as	 better.	 	 The	companies	are	driving	this,	not	patients	and	not	providers.	(Regaldo	2015)		Private	NIPT	tests	now	available	for	purchase	within	the	UK	offer	to	provide	results	on	a	wide	range	of	conditions	(see	appendix	two)	that	would	otherwise	have	only	been	made	available	through	specialist	clinical	genetics	services,	and	only	after	patients	had	received	
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comprehensive	pre-test	counselling.		The	conditions	that	have	come	to	be	tested	for	vary	widely	 in	severity	and	phenotype:	some	of	the	conditions	tested	for	through	commercial	NIPT	 tests,	 such	 as	 trisomy	 16,	 are	 ‘uniformly	 lethal’	 (Petracchi,	 Igarzabal	 et	 al.	 2009),	whereas	others,	such	as	‘triple	X’,	are	far	more	benign,	producing	symptoms	that	would	be	difficult	 to	 recognise	 as	 being	 life-threatening:	 ‘delayed	 language	 development…	
accelerated	 growth…	 IQ	 levels	 20	 points	 below	 that	 of	 controls…	 low	 self	 esteem’	 (Otter,	Schrander-Stumpel	 et	 al.	 2009).	 	 Emerging	 private	 testing	 services	 such	 as	 Sequenom’s	MaterniT	 GENOME	 (see	 fig.	 four,	 page	 25)	 test	 are	 marketed	 under	 the	 banner	 of	providing	as	much	information	as	possible	 	 -	by	analysing	 ‘every	chromosome’	 -	and	with	on-going	 and	 parallel	 advances	 in	 sequencing	 technologies	 taking	 place	 alongside,	 such	testing	is	likely	only	to	become	lest	costly,	and	the	marketing	more	prolific.	 	The	breadth	and	 depth	 of	 the	 genetic	 information	 that	 may	 be	 generated	 through	 the	 use	 of	 these	‘advanced’	NIPD	tests	holds	 the	potential	 to	bring	significant	practical,	 social	and	ethical	challenges:	Terminations	 may	 be	 triggered	 by	 uncertainties	 of	 interpretation	 of	 the	genome	sequence;	we	have	already	considered	such	[variants	of	unknown	significance]	 and	 [incidental	 findings]	 but	 these	 may	 now	 influence	practice	 in	 a	 way	 that	 would	 disturb	 many	 professionals,	 especially	 as	society	is	only	beginning	to	adjust	to	the	uncertainties	of	interpretation	of	genomic	 information.	 Basing	 serious	 and	 irreversible	 decisions	 on	 such	provisional	 interpretations,	 which	 are	 so	 liable	 to	 shift	 in	 significance,	could	lead	patients	to	make	decisions	that	they	later	bitterly	regret.	(Clarke	2014,	p.27)		 Given	that	the	sequencing	of	the	genome	in	many	cases	only	enables	one	to	determine	the	probability	of	developing	an	illness,	a	difficulty	arises:	how	to	establish	an	accurate	relation	between	the	gravity	of	the	foreseen	illness	and	the	probability	of	it	appearing?	Must	a	weak	probability	of	developing	an	 illness	 later	be	 considered	 as	 a	major	or	 a	minor	 risk?	Access	 to	 such	tests,	 especially	 if	 they	 are	 not	 correctly	 interpreted,	 is	 anxiogenic;	 how	will	parents	 live	with	 the	knowledge	 that	 the	 child	has	 the	probability	of	developing	a	serious	illness	that	may	never	develop?	(UNESCO	International	Bioethics	Committee	2015)		Once	 again,	 the	 ‘irreversible	 decisions’	 that	 such	 testing	 would	 impose	 are	 likely	 to	 be	ascribed	to	women,	as	it	is	the	individual	‘consumers’	and	‘patients’	who	become	charged	with	 the	 task	of	navigating	 these	 complex	and	uncertain	 emerging	 technologies	 –	which	produce	information	that	‘can	often	not	be	predicted	in	advance	[and]	can	only	be	explained	
with	 hindsight	 that	 may	 not	 emerge	 for	 some	 years	 into	 the	 future’	 (Clarke	 2014,	 p.27).			Significant	 increases	 in	 the	range	and	number	of	diagnoses	 that	are	made	 through	NIPD	may	 lead	 to	 further	 divisions	 being	made	 between	 the	 ‘normal’	 and	 the	 ‘abnormal,	 the	‘sick’	 and	 the	 ‘healthy’.	 	 Within	 her	 critical	 examination	 of	 the	 dysmorphology	 clinic,	
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Latimer	shows	that	the	category	of	‘normal’	is	becoming	less	and	less	inclusive	in	the	wake	of	proliferating	diagnoses,	and	is	undeniably	therefore,	shrinking:		We	 might	 think	 these	 syndromes	 may	 simply	 represent	 difference	 –	difference	 in	 one	 set	 of	 children	 and	 their	 parents	 from	 another…	What	emerges	however	is	how	the	genetics	of	normal	human	development	relies	on	 this	mapping	 of	 deviations	 in	 growth	 and	 form,	with	 the	 observation	and	description	of	congenital	abnormality.	So	much	so,	that	what	seems	to	be	 evident	 is	 that	 it	 is	 the	 normal	 that	 is	 itself	 shrinking.	 So	 that,	 as	 one	geneticist	put	it	to	me:	from	his	perspective,	we	all	have	a	syndrome.	(Latimer	2013,	p.xvi)		Within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 dysmorphology	 clinic	 parents	 are	 faced	 with	 the	 ongoing	struggle	 to	 manage	 the	 emergence	 of	 diagnosis	 and	 disease	 –	 within	 a	 space	 where	counselling	 ‘acts	 as	 [the	 only]	 form	 of	 intervention’	 (Latimer	 2013,	 p.204)	 –	 and	 where	clinical	 practices	 and	 processes	 of	 ‘deferral	 and	 undecidability’	 dominate.	 	 Within	 the	context	of	non-invasive	prenatal	testing,	parents	and	particularly	mothers	are	faced	with	similar	 ‘uncertainties	 in	 interpretation’	 (Clarke	 2014)	 around	 the	 meaning	 of	 genetic	diagnosis,	but	they	are,	by	contrast,	offered	a	more	problematic	form	of	intervention:	the	‘choice’	of	whether	to	end	the	pregnancy	through	abortion,	or	to	continue	in	the	presence		of	diagnosis.		Additionally,	whereas	the	practice	of	dysmorphology	occurs	within	specialist	clinical	 spaces,	 and	 is	 guided	by	 the	expertise	of	 clinical	 geneticists,	 the	practice	of	non-invasive	 testing	 may	 not	 be	 confined	 to	 the	 practice	 of	 clinical	 specialties.	 	 Although	private	prenatal	testing	services	for	Down’s	syndrome	may	currently	be	accompanied	by	thorough	pre-test	counselling	(the	accounts	provided	by	NIPT	patients	 interviewed	here	suggested	 that	 the	 information	 received	 prior	 to	 testing	 was	 significantly	 more	comprehensive	 than	 that	 which	 they	 received	within	 the	 NHS),	 the	 future	 trajectory	 of	testing	 is	 being	 very	 actively	 shaped	 by	 commercial	 companies	 and	 laboratories	positioned	 at	 a	 great	 distance	 from	 the	 lived,	 relational	 experiences	 of	 pregnancy	 that	their	tests	–	their	products	-	come	to	affect.				Operating	within	the	context	of	the	therapeutic	gap,	such	‘enhanced’	non-invasive	testing	opportunities,	 when	 examined	 critically,	 may	 be	 seen	 to	 provide	 very	 little	 hope	 of	bringing	 real	 ‘choice’.	 Strathern	 explains	 how	 the	 absurdity	 of	 the	 circular	 relationship	between	 consumer	 demand	 and	 commercial	 manufacturing	 ‘offers	 the	 real	 glimpse	 of	 a	
situation	where	choice	might	cease	to	be	enablement’	(Strathern	1992b,	p.36),	showing	how	the	proliferation	of	commercially-generated	options,	framed	in	terms	of	‘choice’	and	which	ought	 therefore	 to	 imply	some	kind	of	 freedom,	 in	 fact	produces	a	world	where	genuine	‘choice’	 is	 heavily	 restricted,	 as	manufacturers	 pre-determine	what	 kind	 of	 ‘choices’	 are	made	available,	according	to	their	expectation	of	consumer	demand.		Within	the	context	of	
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rapidly-expanding	 commercial	 NIPD	 testing,	 Strathern’s	 suggestion	 that	 prolific	commercialisation	 and	 marketisation	 leads	 to	 a	 ‘a	 world	 full	 of	 persons	 embodying	 the	
choices	 of	 others’	 -	 particularly	 when	 examined	 alongside	 Latimer’s	 ‘shrinking’	 of	 the	normal	-	hints	towards	the	possibility	that	women’s	future	reproductive	‘choice’	may	come	to	 be	 shaped,	 primarily,	 not	 by	 those	 with	 expertise	 in	 clinical	 genetics	 or	 genetic	counselling,	 or	 by	 those	whose	 bodies	 and	 lives	 are	 so	 closely	 bound	 to	 experiences	 of	testing,	but	by	 those	who	hold	 (and	wield)	 the	 (bio)power	 that	 is	being	generated	here,	through	a	strong	alignment	of	healthcare,	bioscience	and	capital,	as	exercised	within	the	rapid	and	on-going	development	and	translation	of	NIPD.	 	
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Appendix	One.		NHS	Antenatal	Care	Timeline		FASP	 (2015).	 Antenatal	 and	 Newborn	 Screening	 Timeline	 -	 optimum	 times	 for	 testing.	 London,	 Crown	 Copyright.	 	 Available	 at:	http://cpd.screening.nhs.uk/timeline		
	
	 223	
Appendix	Two.		Commercial	NIPT	Provision	in	the	UK.	
	Table	 shows	 commercial	 NIPT	 tests	 currently	 known	 to	 be	 available	 to	 purchase	 in	 the	 UK.	 	 Conditions	 listed	 in	 grey	 are	 not	currently	tested	for	within	the	remit	of	the	UK	National	Screening	Committee’s	Fetal	Anomaly	Screening	Programme	(FASP).		
Brand	 name	
of	test	
	
Conditions	 tested	 for	 (information	 correct	 as	 of	
08/06/15)	
Name	of	developer	 Location	of	developer	
	
Harmony™	 Fetal	sex	
Down’s	syndrome	(Trisomy	21)	
Edwards’	syndrome	(Trisomy	18)	
Patau’s	syndrome	(Trisomy	13)	
	
Ariosa	 Diagnostics,	 Inc.	 (acquired	
by	Roche/Hoffman-La	Roche	 Inc.,	
January	2015)	
	
California,	USA	
Panorama™	 Fetal	sex	
Down’s	syndrome	(Trisomy	21)	
Edwards’	syndrome	(Trisomy	18)	
Patau’s	syndrome	(Trisomy	13)	
	
Triploidy	
Monosomy	X	(Turner	syndrome)	
Karyotype	XYY/Jacobs	syndrome	
Klinefelter	syndrome	(47XXY)	
Trisomy	X	(triple	X	syndrome)	
22q	deletion	syndrome	(DiGeorge)	
15q	(Prader-Willi/Angelman	syndromes)	
1p36	deletion	syndrome	
5p	deletion	syndrome	(Cri-du-chat	syndrome)	
	
Natera,	 Inc.	 (formerly	 gene	
security	network)	
California,	USA	
MaterniT21	
Plus™		
Fetal	sex	
Down’s	syndrome	(Trisomy	21)	
Edwards’	syndrome	(Trisomy	18)	
Patau’s	syndrome	(Trisomy	13)	
	
Monosomy	X	(Turner	syndrome)	
Sequenom,	Inc.	 California,	USA	
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22q	deletion	syndrome	(DiGeorge)	
5p	deletion	syndrome	(Cri-du-chat	syndrome)	
15q	(Prader-Willi/Angelman	syndromes)	
1p36	deletion	syndrome	
4p	(Wolf-Hirschhorn	syndrome)	
8q	(Langer-Giedion	syndrome)	
11q	(Jacobsen	syndrome)	
Trisomy	16	
Trisomy	22	
	
Verifi™	 Fetal	sex	
Down’s	syndrome	(Trisomy	21)	
Edwards’	syndrome	(Trisomy	18)	
Patau’s	syndrome	(Trisomy	13)	
	
Monosomy	X	(Turner	syndrome)	
Trisomy	X	(triple	X	syndrome)	
Klinefelter	syndrome	(47XXY)	
Karyotype	XYY/Jacobs	syndrome	
	
Verinata	 Health	 (acquired	 by	
Illumina	Inc.	in	February	2013).	
California,	USA	
NIFTY™	
	
	
	
Fetal	sex	
Down’s	syndrome	(Trisomy	21)	
Edwards’	syndrome	(Trisomy	18)	
Patau’s	syndrome	(Trisomy	13)	
	
Monosomy	X	(Turner	syndrome)	
Klinefelter	syndrome	(47XXY)	
5p	deletion	syndrome	(Cri-du-chat	syndrome)	
1p36	deletion	syndrome	
Trisomy	X	(triple	X	syndrome)	
Karyotype	XYY/Jacobs	syndrome	
2q33.1	deletion	syndrome	(Glass	syndrome)	
	
BGI	Diagnosis	Co.,	Ltd.	 Shenzhen,	China	
	
	
	
	
	
Genesis	
Serenity®	
Fetal	sex	
Down’s	syndrome	(Trisomy	21)	
Genesis	Genetics	 Nottingham,	UK.	
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NIPT	 Edwards’	syndrome	(Trisomy	18)	
Patau’s	syndrome	(Trisomy	13)	
	
Monosomy	X	(Turner	syndrome)	
XXX	(Triple	X)	
XXY	(Klinefelter	syndrome)	
XYY	(Jacobs	syndrome)	
	
The	 IONA®	
test	
Fetal	sex	
Down’s	syndrome	(Trisomy	21)	
Edwards’	syndrome	(Trisomy	18)	
Patau’s	syndrome	(Trisomy	13)	
	
Premaitha	Health,	Plc.	 Manchester,	UK.	
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Appendix	Three.		NIPD	Tests	Currently	Approved	for	Diagnostic	use	by	the	UK	Genetic	Testing	Network	(UKGTN).		
Genetic	condition	or	trait	
tested	for	
Further	information	on	condition/trait	(from	the	Online	
Mendelian	Inheritance	in	Man®/OMIM	database)	
UK	laboratories	
offering	test	
Date	of	UKGTN	
approval	
	
Apert	syndrome	 Congenital	 disorder,	 resulting	 in	 malformations	 of	 the	
skull,	 hands	 and	 feet.	 	 Varying	 degrees	 of	 intellectual	
disability/developmental	 delay	 associated.	 Estimated	 to	
occur	in	1	in	160,000	births.			
	
London	North	East	RGC	
GOSH	
September	2014	
Cystic	Fibrosis		 Condition	 of	 varying	 severity,	 disrupts	 function	 of	 the	
pancreas,	 intestinal	 glands,	 biliary	 tree,	 bronchial	 glands	
and	sweat	glands.		Infertility	occurs	in	males	and	females.		
Birth	 incidence	 varies	 greatly	 amongst	 different	
populations.	
	
London	North	East	RGC	
GOSH	
September	2014	
Fetal	 sexing	 for	 Congenital	
Adrenal	 Hyperplasia	 (CAH)	
and	 other	 X-linked	
conditions.	
CAH:	 in	 female	 newborns	 external	 genitalia	 are	
masculinised,	 gonads	 and	 internal	 genitalia	 are	 normal.	
Untreated	males	and	females	may	manifest	rapid	growth,	
penile	or	clitoral	enlargement	and	short	stature.		Estimates	
of	 birth	 incidence	 vary	 significantly.		
	
• Birmingham	
RGC	Bristol	RGC	
• Manchester	
RGC	
• Salisbury	RGC	
• London	North	
East	RGC	GOSH	
• 	
March	2011		
FGFR3-Related	 Skeletal	
Dysplasias	 (Achondroplasia,	
Hypochondroplasia,	
Muenke	 Syndrome,	
Thanatophoric	 Dysplasia	
Type	 I	 and	 Thanatophoric	
Dysplasia	type	II)	
• Achondroplasia:		most	frequent	form	of	short-limb	
dwarfism.		
• Hypochondroplasia:	form	of	short-limb	dwarfism,	
milder	than	Achondroplasia.	
• Muenke	syndrome:	variable	phenotype	that	can	
range	from	no	detectable	clinical	manifestations	
to	complex	findings	
London	North	East	RGC	
GOSH	
September	2013	
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	 • Thanatophoric	dysplasia	I	and	II:	severe	short-limb	
dwarfism	syndrome	that	is	usually	lethal,	with	
patients	dying	in	the	first	hours	of	life.		
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Appendix	Four.		Participant	Consent	Form				
CONSENT FORM VERSION 2.0.  15/02/13.   
PARTICIPANT NUMBER FOR THIS STUDY: 	
Consent Form 
 
Title of Project: Women’s reasoning on emerging non invasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD) 
technologies.  Name of Researcher: Heather Strange 
 
Please initial the boxes on the right hand side. 	
1) I confirm that I have read and understand the information                                                                   
sheet dated.................... (version............)  for the above study.   	
2) I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am 																																																																							
free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason. 	
3) I agree to the interview being tape recorded but my name will                                                            
not be used. 	
4) I understand that what I say may be quoted in publications                                                            
about this study, but my name would not be used and I agree                         
that such quotations can be used. 	
5) I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
_________________        ________________        _________________	
          Name                             Date                            Signature 		
A WELSH LANGUAGE VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE MADE ON REQUEST 
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Appendix	Five.		Participant	Information	Sheet	(Patients/Parents)	
	
	Letter 	of 	 invitat ion 	
PhD	 project:	 Women’s	 reasoning	 on	 non-invasive	 prenatal	diagnosis	technologies		Dear	Madam/Sir	I	would	like	to	invite	you	to	take	part	in	a	research	study.		Before	you	decide,	you	need	to	understand	what	 research	 is	 being	 done,	 and	what	 your	 participation	would	 involve.	 	 I	would	 be	 very	 grateful	 if	 you	 could	 take	 the	 time	 to	 carefully	 read	 the	 following	information.		This	should	take	around	30	minutes.	Part	1	of	the	Participant	Information	Sheet	tells	you	the	purpose	of	this	study	and	exactly	what	will	happen	if	you	take	part.	 	Part	2	gives	you	more	detailed	information	about	the	conduct	of	the	study.		Because	this	study	involves	talking	about	a	new	technology,	I	have	also	included	a	section	that	explains	this	called	‘Introducing	NIPD’.		You	do	not	have	to	read	this	information,	but	if	you	would	like	to	take	part	in	the	study,	you	may	find	this	interesting.	If	 you	 would	 like	 any	 further	 information,	 or	 if	 you	 have	 any	 questions,	 please	 do	 not	hesitate	to	contact	me.		I	will	do	my	best	to	answer	any	questions	or	concerns.	A	Welsh	language	version	of	this	information	sheet	can	be	provided	upon	request.	Yours	Sincerely,		Heather	Strange	PhD	Student	Tel:	07872927092	Email:	strangehr1@cardiff.ac.uk	
	
	 230	
Part ic ipant 	 Information	Sheet 	Part 	one 	
What	is	the	purpose	of	this	study?		This	study	is	interested	in	what	a	range	of	people	think	about	new	non	invasive	prenatal	diagnosis	 (NIPD)	 technology.	 	 NIPD	 is	 a	 new	 kind	 of	 prenatal	 testing	 technology	 that	 is	currently	 used	 for	 limited	 medical	 purposes.	 	 Scientists	 and	 clinicians	 are	 working	 on	developing	 this	 technology	 further,	 so	 that	 it	 may	 become	 available	 a	 wider	 range	 of	purposes,	and	many	 think	 that	NIPD	will	 change	 the	routine	care	of	pregnant	women	 in	the	future.		For	this	reason,	I	am	interested	in	speaking	to	people	who	have	experience	of	NIPD	 testing,	 as	well	 as	 people	who	have	 experience	 of	 routine	 prenatal	 testing.	 	 These	people	might	be	patients,	 they	might	be	parents,	or	 they	might	be	clinicians.	 	 If	 they	are	parents	 or	 patients	 they	might	 have	 accepted	 and	 used	 prenatal	 testing,	 or	 they	might	have	decided	not	to	use	prenatal	testing.	 	I	would	like	to	talk	to	all	of	these	people	about	their	experiences	of	prenatal	testing,	and	their	thoughts	on	what	using	NIPD	testing	might	mean.		I	would	like	to	speak	to	a	wide	range	of	people	because	many	different	people	will	be	 involved	 with	 using	 NIPD,	 in	 lots	 of	 different	 ways.	 	 I	 would	 like	 to	 explore	 these	questions	 now,	 before	 NIPD	 is	 introduced	 widely,	 so	 a	 picture	 can	 be	 built	 up	 of	 what	people	think	about	NIPD	tests.	
Why	have	I	been	invited	to	take	part?	
	You	have	been	invited	to	take	part	because	you	have	some	experience	of	NIPD	or	routine	prenatal	testing	during	pregnancy.		You	may	have	had	experience	as	a	patient	or	a	parent.		You	may	have	accepted	and	used	prenatal	 testing,	or	you	may	have	been	offered	 testing	during	 pregnancy	 and	 decided	 not	 to	 use	 it.	 	 I	 would	 like	 to	 talk	 to	 you	 about	 your	experiences,	and	your	thoughts	on	NIPD.			
Do	I	have	to	take	part?	
	It	 is	 up	 to	 you	 to	 decide	 whether	 you	 would	 like	 to	 take	 part	 in	 this	 study.	 	 I	 will	 not	discuss	 what	 you	 say	 or	 whether	 or	 not	 you	 participate	 with	 anyone	 outside	 of	 the	research	team.		If	you	decide	to	take	part	but	change	your	mind	at	any	time,	even	during	the	interview,	you	are	free	to	leave	the	study	without	having	to	give	any	reason.	
What	will	happen	to	me	if	I	take	part?	
	If	you	agree	to	take	part	I	will	contact	you	and	ask	you	to	agree	to	an	interview,	which	will	be	 arranged	 to	 take	 place	 at	 a	 time	 and	 place	 that	 is	 most	 convenient	 to	 you.	 	 The	interview	can	take	place	in	your	own	home,	or	it	can	take	place	somewhere	else	that	you	suggest.	 	I	can	assist	with	making	a	space	available	for	interview,	if	this	helps.	 	If	you	are	happy	to	take	part	in	an	interview	I	will	send	you	confirmation	of	the	date,	time	and	place	
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in	the	post,	along	with	a	‘consent	form’	which	you	can	read	before	coming	to	the	interview.		Before	the	interview	I	will	make	sure	you	have	understood	the	information	that	you	have	been	given	about	the	study,	I	will	give	you	the	opportunity	to	ask	any	questions,	and	I	will	ask	you	to	sign	the	consent	form.		This	form	will	record	your	understanding	of	the	study,	and	your	willingness	to	take	part.		The	interview	is	expected	to	last	for	about	an	hour,	and	with	your	permission	I	would	like	to	audio	record	what	you	say,	so	that	I	can	make	sure	I	have	accurately	captured	all	information.	Over	the	course	of	the	interview	I	will	ask	you	about	your	experiences	of	prenatal	testing.		I	would	also	like	to	ask	you	about	your	thoughts	on	NIPD,	whether	you	have	experience	of	the	technology	or	not.		Before	talking	about	NIPD,	I	will	give	you	some	information	in	the	form	of	 short	written	 scenarios	 or	 ‘vignettes’.	 	 The	 scenarios	will	 give	 examples	 of	 how	NIPD	might	be	used	in	future.	 	With	your	permission	I	will	also	collect	some	background	information	such	as	your	age,	gender,	marital	status,	ethnicity,	and	previous	employment.	I	will	also	ask	if	you	have	a	partner	that	you	think	may	be	interested	in	taking	part	in	the	project.		This	does	not	mean	you	have	to	discuss	the	project	with	your	partner:	it	would	be	entirely	 up	 to	 you	whether	 you	 speak	 to	 them	 about	 the	 research,	 or	whether	 you	 ask	them	to	think	about	taking	part.		If	you	would	like	to	ask	your	partner	about	taking	part,	I	will	provide	you	with	an	additional	copy	of	the	information	pack	to	for	you	to	pass	on	to	them.	 	 Partners	who	would	 like	 to	 take	part	will	 go	 through	 the	 same	 steps	 as	 you	did,	contacting	the	researcher	 if	 they	would	 like	to	participate,	arranging	a	date	and	time	for	interview,	and	signing	a	consent	form.		Like	you,	they	would	be	free	to	leave	the	study	at	any	time	without	giving	any	reason.	 	All	interviews	will	be	carried	out	individually,	and	I	will	not	discuss	during	interview	anything	that	any	you	or	any	other	previous	participants	have	said.	I	 would	 like	 to	 reassure	 you	 that	 any	 information	 collected	 about	 you	 will	 be	 strictly	confidential.	 	 Your	 name	 or	 any	 other	 information	which	 could	 identify	 you	will	 not	 be	associated	with	anything	you	tell	me.		Once	the	interview	is	over	I	will	type	out	what	has	been	said	word	for	word	but	your	name	will	not	be	used	and	you	will	not	be	identifiable	in	any	written	report.	You	 do	 not	 have	 to	 answer	 any	 questions	 you	 do	 not	 wish	 to	 and	 you	 may	 stop	 the	interview	at	any	time	without	giving	a	reason.		
My	 partner	 has	 just	 taken	 part	 in	 your	 study:	 why	 have	 they	 given	 me	 this	
information	pack?	
	I	would	like	to	include	the	partners	of	women	who	have	had	experience	of	NIPD	or	routine	testing	in	this	study	because,	as	parents	or	close	family	members,	they	will	often	be	very	involved	in	the	discussion	and	use	of	prenatal	tests.		Because	it	is	difficult	for	me	to	contact	partners	directly,	I	will	be	asking	participants	to	speak	to	their	partners	about	the	project,	if	they	think	they	might	also	be	interested	in	taking	part.		This	method	of	contacting	people	is	used	when	the	groups	that	researchers	would	like	to	speak	to	are	very	small	or	difficult	to	 reach,	 and	 is	 sometimes	 called	 ‘snowball	 sampling‘	 (this	 is	 because	 the	 number	 of	
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people	 available	 to	 speak	 to	 slowly	 grows,	 like	 a	 snowball,	 as	 information	 on	 the	 study	spreads	by	word-of-mouth).		All	interviews	will	be	carried	out	individually,	and	I	will	not	discuss	 during	 interview	 anything	 that	 any	 other	 previous	 participants,	 including	 your	partner,	have	said.	
What	are	the	possible	disadvantages	and	risks	of	taking	part?	
	Taking	part	in	the	interview	will	take	up	about	an	hour	of	your	time.		During	the	interview,	you	will	be	sharing	memories	of	past	experiences,	and	you	will	be	describing	thoughts	and	feelings.	 	 Talking	 about	 pregnancy,	 and	 especially	 prenatal	 testing,	 could	 raise	 sensitive	personal	issues	and	you	could	feel	distressed	or	upset	by	this.	
What	are	the	possible	benefits	of	taking	part?	
	Individual	 study	 participants	 will	 not	 directly	 benefit	 in	 any	 practical	 way	 from	 this	research.		It	is	hoped	that	this	study	will	help	benefit	other	people,	who	may	have	to	make	decisions	about	NIPD	in	the	future.		It	will	do	this	by	painting	a	picture	of	the	interests	and	concerns	raised	by	the	patients,	parents	and	clinicians	who	participate.	
What	will	happen	if	I	don’t	want	to	carry	on	with	the	study?	
	If	you	do	not	want	to	participate	 in	the	study	you	do	not	need	to	contact	me	or	read	the	additional	information	included	in	this	pack,	if	you	do	not	want	to.		During	the	interview,	you	 do	 not	 have	 to	 answer	 any	 questions	 you	 do	 not	 wish	 to,	 and	 you	 may	 stop	 the	interview	at	any	time	without	giving	a	reason.								
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		Part ic ipant 	 Information	Sheet 	Part 	 two 	
Will	my	taking	part	in	this	study	be	kept	confidential?	
	Yes,	 all	 information	 will	 be	 completely	 confidential.	 	 If	 you	 are	 an	 NHS	 patient,	 no-one	involved	 in	 your	 care	 will	 be	 told	 that	 you	 have	 agreed	 to	 take	 part	 in	 the	 study	 and	nothing	that	you	say	will	be	reported	back	to	anyone	involved	in	your	care.	An	 important	 exception	 to	 this	 rule	 concerns	 cases	 where	 serious	 medical	 or	 legal	information	 is	 disclosed	 by	 participants	 during	 the	 course	 of	 the	 research.	 	 If	 serious	information	 is	 disclosed,	 the	 researcher	 has	 a	 legal	 and	moral	 obligation	 to	 report	 this	information.	Several	 practical	 steps	will	 be	 taken	 to	 ensure	 that	 your	 privacy	 is	maintained	 and	 the	confidentiality	of	your	information	is	protected:	• During	the	interview	I	will	ask	your	permission	to	audio	record	what	is	said.		I	will	not	use	your	name	during	the	interview.		Once	the	interview	is	over,	I	will	type	out	what	has	been	said	from	the	recording	and	the	recording	will	then	be	erased.	Your	name,	along	with	any	other	information	which	might	identify	you,	will	not	be	included	in	the	typed	information.		What	is	said	during	the	interview	will	be	completely	anonymous,	and	this	is	the	only	information	that	will	be	used	in	the	study.		There	will	be	no	way	in	which	you	will	be	able	to	identified.		• If	you	are	not	happy	for	me	to	audio	record	the	interview,	I	will	take	written	notes	as	the	interview	goes	along,	and	I	will	type	this	information	up	when	the	interview	is	over.		These	notes	will	use	the	same	system	for	protecting	your	anonymity:	I	will	not	use	your	name,	and	no	information	that	might	identify	you	will	be	included	in	the	typed	up	information.		• When	I	have	typed	what	you	have	told	me,	I	will	study	this	information	and	compare	this	with	what	other	people	tell	me.	I	can	then	identify	common	areas	of	interest	or	concern.	The	typed	information	will	then	be	kept	in	a	locked	filing	cabinet	accessible	only	to	the	researcher	for	a	period	of	ten	years.	The	computers	on	which	the	typed	information	is	stored	will	be	password	protected	and	only	accessible	by	the	researcher.		• Your	signed	consent	form,	which	contains	your	name	will	be	kept	in	another	locked	filing	cabinet	which	will	only	be	accessible	to	the	researcher.		
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	• Direct	quotations	from	you	may	be	used	as	I	write	up	the	results	of	this	research.		Only	your	words	will	be	used	and	no	personal	or	identifiable	information	about	you	will	be	included	in	any	written	documents.	
What	will	happen	to	the	results	of	the	research	study?		
	The	results	of	this	study	will	be	used	to	help	prepare	the	researcher’s	PhD	thesis.		This	will	be	 examined	 by	 professional	 academics	 from	 Cardiff	 University	 and	 another	 UK	University,	before	a	decision	is	made	about	whether	a	PhD	will	awarded.				The	results	from	the	study	will	then	be	published	in	national	and	international	academic	and	professional	journals.		
Who	is	organising	and	funding	the	research?	
	This	 study	 is	 funded	 by	 the	Welsh	 Government’s	 National	 Institute	 for	 Social	 Care	 and	Health	Research	(NISCHR),	who	awarded	a	full	time	studentship	to	support	this	work,	and	it	is	sponsored	by	Cardiff	University.	
Who	has	reviewed	the	study?	
	This	study	received	an	independent	scientific	review	from	NISCHR	before	the	studentship	was	 awarded.	 	 In	 addition,	 all	 research	 that	 involves	 the	 NHS	 is	 looked	 at	 by	 an	independent	 group	 of	 people,	 called	 a	 Research	 Ethics	 Committee	 (REC)	 who	 work	 to	protect	participants’	 safety,	 rights,	wellbeing	and	dignity.	 	This	 study	has	been	reviewed	and	given	favourable	opinion	by	South	East	Wales	Research	Ethics	Committee.	
Further	information	and	contact	details	
	If	you	would	like	more	information	about	the	study	or	if	there	is	anything	that	is	not	clear,	please	do	not	hesitate	to	contact	the	researcher,	Heather	Strange	on	07872927092	(during	working	hours)	or	strangehr1@cardiff.ac.uk.	
What	if	I	have	concerns	during	my	participation?	
	If	you	are	worried	or	unhappy	about	any	aspect	of	this	study	or	your	participation	at	any	time,	 you	 should	 speak	 to	 the	 researcher	 (Heather	 Strange)	 who	 will	 do	 her	 best	 to	address	 your	 concerns,	 or	 answer	 your	 questions.	 	 If	 you	 remain	 unhappy	 and	wish	 to	complain	 formally	 you	 can	 do	 this	 by	 contacting	 the	 Cardiff	 University	 Research	Governance	team	on	02920	879130	(Mr	Chris	Shaw,	Research	Governance	Coordinator).		If	you	participate	in	this	study	as	an	NHS	patient	you	are	also	free	to	use	the	normal	NHS	complaints	procedure	(further	details	can	be	found	on	your	hospital	or	trust’s	website).	
What	should	I	do	now?	
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If	you	would	like	to	take	part	please	complete	the	details	on	the	following	page	and	return	it	to	me	in	the	stamp-addressed	envelope.	 	I	will	then	contact	you	and	arrange	a	suitable	time	and	place	for	the	interview	to	take	place.	
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		Reply 	s l ip 	
I	 am	 interested	 in	 taking	 part	 in	 this	 study	 and	 give	 permission	 for	 my	 contact	
details	to	be	used	by	the	researcher.			Signed:_________________________________________________________________________________________			Name	(printed):________________________________________________________________________________________		Address:________________________________________________________________________________________	________________________________________________________________________________________________	________________________________________________________________________________________________	________________________________________________________________________________________________		Telephone	number:_________________________________________________________________________________________		Email	address:________________________________________________________________________________________	
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	Introducing 	NIPD 	
What	is	prenatal	testing?	
	Prenatal	testing	is	an	important	part	of	the	medical	care	that	is	offered	to	women	during	pregnancy.	 	 It	 is	 not	 compulsory	 to	 use	 prenatal	 testing	 during	 pregnancy,	 although	 all	women	 are	 offered	 some	 tests	 if	 they	 are	 under	 NHS	 care.	 Prenatal	 tests	 can	 provide	information	about	the	health	of	the	fetus	(the	baby	developing	inside	the	mother’s	womb).		They	do	 this	by	 either	 looking	at	 the	mother’s	blood,	 or	by	 looking	more	directly	 at	 the	fetus	itself.	Some	 prenatal	 tests	 are	 routinely	 offered	 to	 all	 pregnant	women,	 and	 some	 are	 offered	only	to	women	who’s	pregnancies	are	at	high	risk	of	certain	medical	complications.	 	The	tests	that	are	offered	to	all	women	are	called	screening	tests:	they	do	not	give	yes	or	no	answers,	but	they	do	give	women	a	result	that	tells	them	if	they	are	at	high	or	low	risk	of	carrying	a	baby	with	certain	health	problems.	 	These	tests	use	technologies	that	are	non	
invasive	which	means	that	they	do	not	risk	harming	the	fetus.		The	technologies	used	for	screening	 are	 ultrasound	 scanning	 and	 blood	 testing.	 	 The	 groups	 of	 diseases	 or	characteristics	 that	 are	 commonly	 tested	 for	 during	 prenatal	 screening	 are:	 Down’s	syndrome	 and	 other	 fetal	 anomalies;	 Sickle	 Cell	 and	 Thalassaemia;	 infectious	 diseases	such	as	Syphilis,	Hepatitis,	HIV	and	Rubella.	The	tests	that	are	offered	to	women	who’s	pregnancies	are	at	high	risk	of	certain	medical	complications	 are	 called	 diagnostic	 tests.	 	 The	 medical	 names	 of	 these	 tests	 are	“Amniocentesis”	 and	 “Chorionic	 Villus	 Sampling”	 (CVS).	 	 These	 tests	 give	 very	 accurate	answers	about	whether	 the	 fetus	has	certain	health	problems.	 	Diagnostic	results	can	be	used	 to	 decide	 about	 the	 future	 of	 a	 pregnancy.	 	 If	 a	 result	 indicates	 that	 the	 fetus	 has	health	problems	then,	for	serious	diseases,	termination	of	pregnancy	is	an	option.	 	These	tests	 are	 invasive,	meaning	 that	 by	 using	 them	during	 pregnancy,	 there	 is	 some	 risk	 of	harm	 to	 the	 fetus.	 	 There	 is	 a	 risk	 of	 between	 about	 1%	 and	 2%	 that	 a	 pregnancy	will	miscarry	if	these	invasive	tests	are	used.		This	is	because	these	tests	look	at	the	fetus	more	directly.		They	involve	using	a	needle	to	take	samples	of	the	fluid	or	tissue	that	surrounds	the	fetus	as	it	develops.		These	samples	contain	genetic	information	(DNA)	from	the	fetus.	This	genetic	material	can	be	tested	to	see	whether	the	fetus	has	certain	genetic	diseases	or	characteristics.	 	These	 tests	 are	 carried	out	 at	 a	 later	 stage	 in	pregnancy	 than	 screening	tests.		
What	is	NIPD?	
	NIPD	is	a	new	kind	of	prenatal	test	that	is	very	accurate,	non	invasive	and	can	be	carried	
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out	during	the	early	stages	of	pregnancy	(from	seven	weeks).		NIPD	testing	involves	taking	a	sample	of	the	mother's	blood	and	then	looking	at	it	for	information	about	the	health	of	the	 fetus.	 	 NIPD	 works	 because	 there	 is	 a	 small	 amount	 of	 DNA	 from	 the	 fetus	 that	 is	present	 in	 the	 mother's	 blood	 during	 pregnancy.	 	 It	 is	 this	 DNA	 that	 can	 provide	 very	accurate	 information	about	the	health	and	development	of	 the	fetus.	 	NIPD	tests	are	at	a	very	 early	 stage	 of	 development	 and	 are	 not	 currently	 offered	 to	 all	 women	 as	 part	 of	routine	medical	care.	By	looking	at	this	DNA	we	can	tell	if	the	fetus	is	male	or	female.		It	is	expected	that	in	the	future	 we	 will	 be	 able	 to	 find	 out	 more	 information	 about	 the	 fetus	 using	 NIPD	 tests,	finding	 out	 for	 instance	 whether	 the	 fetus	 has	 certain	 genetic	 diseases	 such	 as	 Down's	syndrome.		
Why	is	NIPD	used?	
	Currently,	NIPD	is	only	offered	to	women	who	are	at	risk					of	 carrying	 certain	 “sex-linked”	 diseases.	 	 Some	 women	 know	 because	 of	 their	 family	history	that,	if	they	are	carrying	a	boy,	there	is	a	chance	that	the	fetus	may	be	affected	by	a	sex-linked	 disease	 that	 is	 present	 in	 the	 family.	 	 These	women	 are	 offered	 special	 care	during	their	pregnancy	by	specialist	clinics.		By	using	NIPD	testing	these	“at	risk”	women	can	find	out	whether	the	fetus	they	are	carrying	is	a	boy	or	a	girl.		NIPD	is	especially	useful	because	 it	 allows	 them	 to	 find	 this	 information	 out	 non-invasively	 (using	 only	 a	 blood	test),	at	an	early	stage	of	pregnancy,	and	without	risking	the	health	of	the	fetus.		If	the	fetus	is	found	to	be	female	it	cannot	be	affected	by	the	sex-linked	disease	and	the	pregnancy	can	be	 managed	 as	 any	 normal	 pregnancy	 would	 be.	 	 If	 the	 fetus	 is	 male	 then	 it	 could	 be	affected	 by	 the	 sex-linked	 disease,	 and	 the	 pregnancy	 can	 continue	 to	 be	 managed	 by	specialists	with	expert	knowledge	of	how	this	might	change	the	pregnancy,	plans	for	birth,	and	the	baby's	future	health.			NIPD	 is	also	routinely	used	 to	 identify	 the	blood	 type	of	 the	 fetus,	 in	women	who	are	at	risk	of	developing	a	disease	called	Haemolytic	Disease	of	the	Fetus	and	Newborn	(HDFN),	during	 their	 pregnancy.	 	 NIPD	 testing	 of	 the	 fetal	 blood	 type	 allows	 doctors	 to	 decide	whether	 the	 pregnant	 woman	 will	 need	 to	 take	 certain	 drug	 treatments,	 which	 can	prevent	HDFN	from	occurring.		
What	is	going	to	happen	in	future?	
	The	 development	 of	 NIPD	 technology	 is	 ongoing,	 and	 although	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 say	exactly	what	will	happen,	certain	areas	of	development	are	 likely	 to	be	 important	 in	 the	future.		
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Down’s	syndrome	testing	The	next	 stage	of	development	 in	NIPD	 technology,	 that	 is	 likely	 to	become	part	of	NHS	prenatal	care	services	in	future,	involves	testing	for	Down’s	syndrome.		Currently,	several	different	NIPD	tests	for	Down’s	Syndrome	are	being	tested	in	the	UK.		In	the	United	States,	several	companies	have	already	made	NIPD	tests	for	Down’s	Syndrome	available.		Current	NIPD	tests	for	Down’s	Syndrome	are	very	accurate,	but	none	are	100%	accurate.		For	this	reason,	they	can	only	currently	be	used	as	an	“advanced	screening	test”	that	gives	women	a	very	good	idea	of	whether	their	baby	has	Down’s	syndrome,	but	does	not	give	a	definite	yes	or	no	answer.	It	 is	expected	that	NIPD	tests	for	Down’s	syndrome	will	eventually	be	100%	accurate.	 	 If	this	happens	then	NIPD	tests	could	replace	current	 invasive	tests	 that	are	used	to	give	a	definite	diagnosis.	 	This	means	that	 ‘high	risk’	women	would	no	longer	have	to	risk	their	pregnancy	to	get	a	definite	answer	about	whether	their	baby	has	Down’s	syndrome.		Also,	because	NIPD	is	a	simple	blood	test,	it	could	be	used	to	replace	current	screening	tests	too.		This	 would	mean	 that	 all	 women	would	 get	 a	 definite	 yes	 or	 no	 answer	 about	 Down’s	syndrome,	not	just	‘high	risk’	women.	
Testing	for	other	genetic	diseases	and	non-medical	traits	More	 developments	 in	 NIPD	 technology	 are	 expected	 to	 happen	 in	 the	 future,	 but	scientists	 are	more	 cautious	 about	 this,	 and	most	 agree	 that	 it	 will	 take	many	 years	 to	develop	advanced	tests.		It	is	thought	that	future	developments	could	lead	to	a			very	wide	range	of	NIPD	 tests	 being	made	 available.	 	 Because	NIPD	 involves	 the	 testing	of	 genetic	material	 (DNA)	 from	 the	 fetus,	 and	 because	 all	 of	 the	 fetus’	 genetic	 information	 (the	“whole	fetal	genome”)	has	been	found	in	maternal	blood,	it	is	hoped	that	it	will	be	possible	for	NIPD	to	give	doctors	and	parents	a	lot	of	information	about	the	fetus.	 	It	 is	hoped	for	instance	 that	 serious	 genetic	 diseases	 such	 as	 Huntington’s	 Disease	 and	 Cystic	 Fibrosis	could	be	tested	for	using	NIPD.		Tests	for	less	serious	diseases	such	as	Haemophilia	could	also	 be	made	 available,	 and	 some	 people	 think	 that	 tests	 could	 also	 be	 developed	 for	 a	range	 of	 genetic	 “traits”	 that	 are	 not	 commonly	 linked	 to	 disease,	 such	 as	 height,	 eye	colour,	or	hair	colour.	
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Appendix	Six.		Participant	Information	Sheet	(Experts/Professionals)	
		Letter	of	invitation		
PhD	project:	Women’s	reasoning	on	non-invasive	prenatal	diagnosis	technologies		Dear	Madam/Sir		I	would	 like	 to	 invite	you	 to	 take	part	 in	a	 research	study.	 	This	Participant	 Information	Sheet	explains	what	research	is	being	done,	and	what	your	participation	would	involve.		I	would	be	very	grateful	if	you	could	take	the	time	to	read	the	following	information.		This	should	take	around	30	minutes.		Part	1	 tells	you	 the	purpose	of	 this	 study	and	exactly	what	will	happen	 if	you	 take	part.		Part	2	gives	you	more	detailed	information	about	the	conduct	of	the	study.			Because	this	study	involves	talking	about	a	technology	that	you	may	not	be	familiar	with,	I	have	also	included	a	section	that	explains	this	technology,	‘Introducing	NIPD’.		You	do	not	have	 to	 read	 this	 information,	 but	 if	 you	 would	 like	 to	 take	 part	 you	 may	 find	 this	interesting.		If	 you	 would	 like	 any	 further	 information,	 or	 if	 you	 have	 any	 questions,	 please	 do	 not	hesitate	to	contact	me.		I	will	do	my	best	to	answer	any	questions	or	concerns.		A	Welsh	language	version	of	this	information	sheet	can	be	provided	upon	request.		Yours	Sincerely,		Heather	Strange	PhD	Student	Tel:	07872927092	Email:	strangehr1@cardiff.ac.uk			
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Participant	Information	Sheet	Part	one	
	
What	is	the	purpose	of	this	study?	
	This	study	is	interested	in	what	a	range	of	people	think	about	new	non	invasive	prenatal	diagnosis	 (NIPD)	 technology.	 	 NIPD	 is	 a	 new	 kind	 of	 prenatal	 testing	 technology	 that	 is	currently	 used	 for	 limited	medical	 purposes.	 	 A	 number	 of	 scientists	 and	 clinicians	 are	working	on	developing	 this	 technology	 further,	 so	 that	 it	may	become	available	 a	wider	range	 of	 purposes,	 and	many	 think	 that	 NIPD	will	 change	 the	 routine	 care	 of	 pregnant	women	in	the	future.	 	I	am	interested	in	speaking	to	patients,	parents	and	clinicians	who	have	 experience	 of	 NIPD	 testing,	 or	who	 have	 experience	 of	 routine	 prenatal	 testing.	 	 I	would	 like	 to	 speak	 to	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 people	 about	 their	 thoughts	 and	 experiences	because	it	is	likely	that	many	different	types	of	service	users	and	service	providers	would	be	involved	in	using	NIPD,	if	it	were	to	become	part	of	routine	prenatal	care.		I	would	like	to	explore	these	questions	now,	before	NIPD	is	introduced	widely,	so	a	picture	can	be	built	up	of	what		these	people	think	about	NIPD	tests.		
Why	have	I	been	invited	to	take	part?	
	You	have	been	invited	to	take	part	because	you	have	professional	experience	of	NIPD	or	routine	prenatal	testing.	 	I	would	like	to	talk	to	you	about	your	professional	experiences,	and	your	thoughts	on	NIPD.				
Do	I	have	to	take	part?	
	It	 is	 up	 to	 you	 to	 decide	 whether	 you	 would	 like	 to	 take	 part	 in	 this	 study.	 	 I	 will	 not	discuss	what	you	say	or	whether	or	not	you	participate	with	anyone	outside	the	research	team.	 	 If	 you	 decide	 to	 take	 part	 but	 change	 your	 mind	 at	 any	 time,	 even	 during	 the	interview,	you	are	free	to	leave	the	study	without	having	to	give	any	reason.		
What	will	happen	to	me	if	I	take	part?	
	If	you	agree	to	take	part	I	will	contact	you	and	ask	you	to	agree	to	an	interview,	which	will	be	arranged	to	take	place	at	a	time	and	place	that	is	most	convenient	to	you.		I	can	assist	with	making	a	space	available	for	interview.		If	you	are	happy	to	take	part	in	an	interview	I	will	 send	you	 confirmation	of	 the	date,	 time	and	place	 in	 the	post,	 along	with	a	 consent	form	which	you	can	read	before	coming	to	the	interview.		Before	the	interview	I	will	make	
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sure	you	have	understood	the	information	that	you	have	been	given	about	the	study,	I	will	give	you	the	opportunity	to	ask	any	questions,	and	I	will	ask	you	to	sign	the	consent	form.		This	form	will	record	your	understanding	of	the	study,	and	your	willingness	to	take	part.		The	interview	is	expected	to	last	for	about	an	hour,	and	with	your	permission	I	would	like	to	 audio	 record	 what	 you	 say,	 so	 that	 I	 can	 make	 sure	 I	 have	 accurately	 captured	 all	information.		Over	the	course	of	the	interview	I	will	ask	you	about	your	experiences	of	prenatal	testing.		I	would	also	like	to	ask	you	about	your	thoughts	on	NIPD,	whether	you	have	experience	of	the	technology	or	not.		Before	talking	about	NIPD,	I	will	provide	additional	information	in	the	form	of	short	written	scenarios	or	‘vignettes’.		The	scenarios	will	give	examples	of	how	NIPD	might	be	used	in	future.	 	With	your	permission	I	will	also	collect	some	background	information	such	as	your	age,	gender,	marital	status,	ethnicity,	and	previous	employment.	Any	information	collected	about	you	will	be	strictly	confidential.		Your	name	or	any	other	information	which	 could	 identify	 you	will	 not	 be	 associated	with	 anything	 you	 tell	 me.		Once	the	interview	is	over	I	will	transcribe	the	data,	but	your	name	will	not	be	used,	and	you	will	not	be	identifiable	in	any	written	report.		You	 do	 not	 have	 to	 answer	 any	 questions	 you	 do	 not	 wish	 to	 and	 you	 may	 stop	 the	interview	at	any	time	without	giving	a	reason.			
What	are	the	possible	disadvantages	and	risks	of	taking	part?	
	The	interview	will	take	up	about	an	hour	of	your	time.		During	the	interview,	you	will	be	sharing	memories	of	past	experiences,	 and	you	will	be	describing	 thoughts	and	 feelings.		This	process	could	raise	sensitive	issues	and	you	could	feel	distressed	or	upset	by	this.		
What	are	the	possible	benefits	of	taking	part?	
	Individual	 study	 participants	 will	 not	 directly	 benefit	 in	 any	 practical	 way	 from	 this	research.	 	 It	 is	 hoped	 that	 it	will	 help	benefit	 other	 service	users	 and	 service	providers,	who	may	have	 to	make	decisions	about	NIPD	 in	 the	 future.	 	 It	will	do	 this	by	painting	a	picture	 of	 the	 interests	 and	 concerns	 raised	 by	 the	 patients,	 parents	 and	 clinicians	who	participate.		
What	will	happen	if	I	don’t	want	to	carry	on	with	the	study?	
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If	you	do	not	want	to	participate	 in	the	study	you	do	not	need	to	contact	me	or	read	the	additional	information	included	in	this	pack,	if	you	do	not	want	to.		During	the	interview,	you	 do	 not	 have	 to	 answer	 any	 questions	 you	 do	 not	 wish	 to,	 and	 you	 may	 stop	 the	interview	at	any	time	without	giving	a	reason.	
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	Participant	Information	Sheet	Part	two		
Will	my	taking	part	in	this	study	be	kept	confidential?	
	Yes,	 all	 information	will	be	completely	 confidential.	 	An	 important	exception	 to	 this	 rule	concerns	 cases	 where	 serious	 medical	 or	 legal	 information	 is	 disclosed	 by	 participants	during	the	course	of	the	research.		If	serious	information	is	disclosed,	the	researcher	has	a	legal	and	moral	obligation	to	report	this	information.		Several	 practical	 steps	will	 be	 taken	 to	 ensure	 that	 your	 privacy	 is	maintained	 and	 the	confidentiality	of	your	information	is	protected:		 • During	the	interview	I	will	ask	your	permission	to	audio	record	what	is	said.		I	will	not	use	your	name	during	the	interview.		Once	the	interview	is	over,	I	will	type	out	what	has	been	said	from	the	recording	and	the	recording	will	then	be	erased.	Your	name,	along	with	any	other	information	which	might	identify	you,	will	not	be	included	in	the	typed	information.		What	is	said	during	the	interview	will	be	completely	anonymous,	and	this	is	the	only	information	that	will	be	used	in	the	study.		There	will	be	no	way	in	which	you	will	be	able	to	identified.		• If	you	are	not	happy	for	me	to	audio	record	the	interview,	I	will	take	written	notes	as	the	interview	goes	along,	and	I	will	type	this	information	up	when	the	interview	is	over.		These	notes	will	use	the	same	system	for	protecting	anonymity:	I	will	not	use	your	name,	and	no	information	that	might	identify	you	will	be	included	in	the	typed	up	information.		• When	I	have	typed	what	you	have	told	me,	I	will	study	this	information	and	compare	this	with	what	other	people	tell	me.	I	can	then	identify	common	areas	of	interest	or	concern.	The	typed	information	will	then	be	kept	in	a	locked	filing	cabinet	accessible	only	to	the	researcher	for	a	period	of	ten	years.	The	computers	on	which	the	typed	information	is	stored	will	be	password	protected	and	only	accessible	by	the	researcher.		• Your	signed	consent	form,	which	contains	your	name	will	be	kept	in	another	locked	filing	cabinet	which	will	only	be	accessible	to	the	researcher.	
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• Direct	quotations	from	you	may	be	used	as	I	write	up	the	results	of	this	research.		Only	your	words	will	be	used	and	no	personal	or	identifiable	information	about	you	will	be	included	in	any	written	documents.		
What	will	happen	to	the	results	of	the	research	study?		
	The	results	of	this	study	will	be	used	to	help	prepare	the	researcher’s	PhD	thesis.		This	will	be	 examined	 by	 professional	 academics	 from	 Cardiff	 University	 and	 another	 UK	University,	before	a	decision	is	made	about	whether	a	PhD	will	awarded.					The	results	from	the	study	will	then	be	published	in	national	and	international	academic	and	professional	journals.			
Who	is	organising	and	funding	the	research?	
	This	 study	 is	 funded	 by	 the	Welsh	 Government’s	 National	 Institute	 for	 Social	 Care	 and	Health	Research	(NISCHR),	who	awarded	a	full	time	studentship	to	support	this	work,	and	it	is	sponsored	by	Cardiff	University.		
Who	has	reviewed	the	study?	
	This	study	received	an	independent	scientific	review	from	NISCHR	before	the	studentship	was	 awarded.	 	 In	 addition,	 all	 research	 that	 involves	 the	 NHS	 is	 looked	 at	 by	 an	independent	 group	 of	 people,	 called	 a	 Research	 Ethics	 Committee	 (REC)	 who	 work	 to	protect	participants’	 safety,	 rights,	wellbeing	and	dignity.	 	This	 study	has	been	reviewed	and	given	favourable	opinion	by	South	East	Wales	Research	Ethics	Committee.		
Further	information	and	contact	details	
	If	you	would	like	more	information	about	the	study	or	if	there	is	anything	that	is	not	clear,	please	do	not	hesitate	to	contact	the	researcher,	Heather	Strange	on	07872927092	(during	working	hours)	or	strangehr1@cardiff.ac.uk.		
What	if	I	have	concerns	during	my	participation?	
	If	you	are	worried	or	unhappy	about	any	aspect	of	this	study	or	your	participation	at	any	time,	 you	 should	 speak	 to	 the	 researcher	 (Heather	 Strange)	 who	 will	 do	 her	 best	 to	
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address	 your	 concerns,	 or	 answer	 your	 questions.	 	 If	 you	 remain	 unhappy	 and	wish	 to	complain	 formally	 you	 can	 do	 this	 by	 contacting	 the	 Cardiff	 University	 Research	Governance	team	on	02920	879130	(Mr	Chris	Shaw,	Research	Governance	Coordinator).		
What	should	I	do	now?	
	If	you	would	like	to	take	part	please	complete	the	details	on	the	following	page	and	return	it	to	me	in	the	stamp-addressed	envelope.	 	I	will	then	contact	you	and	arrange	a	suitable	time	and	place	for	the	interview	to	take	place.		
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		Reply	slip			
I	am	interested	in	taking	part	in	this	study	and	give	permission	for	my	details	to	be	
given	to	the	researcher.			Signed:_______________________________________________________________________________________		Name	(printed):____________________________________________________________________________________		Address:_____________________________________________________________________________________	_______________________________________________________________________________________________	_______________________________________________________________________________________________	_______________________________________________________________________________________________		Telephone	number:_____________________________________________________________________________________		Email	address:_____________________________________________________________________________________		
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Appendix	Seven.		Interview	Schedule	for	Patients/Parents			
Interview	schedule	for	semi-structured	interviews:	service	users		
About	the	interviewee			ID	for	this	study:	Number	of	children:	Ages	of	children:	Gender:	Occupation:	Martial	status:	Highest	educational	level:		Date:		Time:			
Introduction			
Thank	you	for	agreeing	to	take	part	in	the	study	and	for	allowing	me	to	interview	you	today.											
Before	we	 speak	 about	 NIPD	 I	would	 like	 to	 ask	 you	 a	 few	 questions	 about	 you	 and	 your	
family.		
	PART	ONE	
	
Q1	(SELF	AND	FAMILY)	
	
• Can	you	tell	me	a	little	bit	about	yourself	and	you	family?	
	
• When	did	you	first	became	a	mum?		
• When	did	you	first	think	about	having	children?			
• How	many	children	do	you	have?		How	old	are	they?		
• 	Who	do	you	live	with	-	who	makes	up	your	family?				
• Do	you	go	out	to	work?		What	is	your	occupation?		
Q2	(EXPERIENCES	OF	PREGNANCY)		
• 	When	did	you	first	find	out	that	you	were	pregnant?			
(Who	did	you	speak	to?		How	did	family	and	friends	feel?)		
• How	did	you	feel	during	your	pregnancy?				
(How	did	you	feel	physically?	Did	you	have	many	ups	and	downs?		Did	your	feelings	change	
over	time?)		
• How	did	you	feel	after	pregnancy?		
Q3	(BEING	OFFERED	CURRENT	TESTING)	
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• Were	you	offered	only	routine	tests	during	pregnancy,	or	did	you	receive	any	special	prenatal	care?	
	
• What	do	you	remember	about	the	tests	that	were	offered	to	you	during	pregnancy?		
(Who	offered	you	the	tests?	 	How	did	they	tell	you	about	the	tests	-	did	they	explain	face	to	
face	or	give	you	written	information?)		
• How	did	you	feel	about	the	tests	at	this	point?		
(Did	you	understand	what	was	being	offered?		Did	you	have	many	questions?)			
• How	did	you	decide	whether	to	use	the	tests?		
(Who	did	you	 speak	 to?	 	Were	all	 of	 your	questions	answered?	Did	you	 look	 for	additional	
information?)		
Q4	(USING	CURRENT	TESTS)		
• Which	tests	did	you	use?		
• What	was	the	testing	process	like?			
(Who	looked	after	you?	Where	did	the	testing	take	place?)		
Q5	(AFTER	CURRENT	TESTS)		
• Did	your	feelings	about	the	tests	stay	the	same	throughout	the	pregnancy	(or	across	different	pregnancies)?		
• How	would	you	improve	the	tests	if	you	could?			PART	TWO	
	
Did	you	read	the	NIPD	info?		Brief	update.		
	
Before	we	look	at	scenarios	-	any	thoughts	on	NIPD?	
	
I’d	like	us	to	look	at	some	scenarios	that	we	can	use	to	think	about	how	NIPD	might	be	used.			
Q4	(EXPLORING	NIPD	SCENARIOS).		Look	at	scenarios	two	and	three.				
• Did	you	know	anything	about	this	kind	of	testing	before	today?		
• Do	you	think	you	would	use	NIPD	in	any	of	these	ways?			
(Why?	What	is	good	about	NIPD?	What	would	you	find	difficult	about	using	NIPD?)		
• In	what	circumstances	do	you	think	NIPD	should	be	used?		
(What	 should	 be	 tested	 for?	 DS	 only,	 fetal	 sex,	 small	 number	 of	 diseases,	 large	 number	 of	
diseases?)	
	
Look	at	scanario	one.		
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• Do	you	think	NIPD	should	be	made	available	on	the	NHS?				
(Why?	 What	 tests	 should	 be	 made	 available?	 Should	 people	 be	 allowed	 to	 buy	 the	 tests	
instead?	Should	people	be	allowed	to	use	the	tests	at	home?)		
• Do	you	think	most	pregnant	women	will	want	to	use	NIPD?		
(Why	would	women	use	NIPD?		Who	might	not	want	to	use	it?)	
	
• Do	you	think	the	media	will	be	interested	in	NIPD?		
Close	of	interview	
	Thanks	again	 for	 taking	part	 in	 the	 study.	 	Do	you	have	anything	else	you	would	 like	 to	add,	that	we	haven’t	covered	today?		
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Appendix	Eight.		Interview	Schedule	for	Experts/Professionals			Interview	schedule	for	semi-structured	interviews:	service	providers		About	the	interviewee:			ID	for	this	study:	Profession:		Date:		Time:			
Introduction			Thank	 you	 for	 agreeing	 to	 take	 part	 in	 the	 study	 and	 for	 allowing	me	 to	 interview	 you	today.			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Before	we	speak	about	NIPD	I	would	like	to	ask	you	about	your	professional	background.		
Q1	(CURRENT	ROLE)		
• Could	you	tell	me	about	your	work?		
• Who	else	do	you	work	with?		
Q2	(CAREER	PATH)		
• How	did	you	become	a…...?	
	
Q3	(CURRENT	NIPD	PATHWAY)		
• Could	you	explain	how	a	patient	would	typically	come	to	use	NIPD?		
• Where	does	the	testing	take	place?				(Who	else	is	involved	in	testing?		Who	takes	the	blood	samples?		Where	is	the	lab?		Who	reports	results	back	to	you?		Who	reports	results	to	patients?)	
	
Q4	(EXPERIENCES	OF	NIPD)		
• Do	any	particular	patient	experiences	of	NIPD	stand	out	for	you?				
• Do	any	very	good	outcomes	come	to	mind?			
• Have	you	come	across	any	when	problems	using	NIPD?		
Q5	(NIPD	INTO	CLINIC)		
• When	did	you	first	come	across	NIPD?		
• When	was	NIPD	first	used	in	your	clinic?			
Q6	(FUTURE	NIPD)			
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• Will	you	continue	to	use	NIPD?		
• How	could	NIPD	be	improved	for	your	work?		
• 	Where	else	do	you	think	NIPD	could	be	used?		
• 	How	do	you	think	NIPD	will	be	used	in	future?			(Do	 you	 think	 the	 range	 of	 applications	 will	 expand?	 Do	 you	 think	 NIPD	 will	 be	 used	outside	the	clinic?	Do	you	think	NIPD	will	be	used	for	non-medical	purposes?)		
	
Close	of	interview		Thanks	again	 for	 taking	part	 in	 the	 study.	 	Do	you	have	anything	else	you	would	 like	 to	add,	that	we	haven’t	covered	today?		
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Appendix	Nine.		Vignettes	
	
 Scenario	one:	NIPD	Down’s	Syndrome	testing	for	high	risk	women	only		If	a	woman	is	given	a	risk	of	carrying	a	baby	with	Down	Syndrome	of	1	in	1000	or	higher	after	using	NHS	screening	 tests,	 she	will	 then	be	offered	an	NIPD	test.	 	This	 test	 is	more	than	99%	accurate	and	if	it	comes	back	“positive”	then	it	is	highly	likely	that	the	baby	will	have	Down	Syndrome.	If	the	test	comes	back	positive	then	the	woman	will	be	offered	an	invasive	test	to	confirm	the	results.		
• The	routine	screening	tests	are	given	at	around	at	15	weeks	
• The	risk	of	miscarriage	from	an	invasive	test	is	around	1-2%	
• In	3-5%	of	women	NIPD	may	not	work	
• Currently,	only	women	who	are	given	a	risk	of	1	in	150	or	higher	are	offered	an	
invasive	test			 Scenario	two:	NIPD	Down’s	Syndrome	testing	for	all	women		In	 addition	 to	 all	 of	 the	 routine	 antenatal	 screening	 tests,	all	 pregnant	 women	will	 be	offered	an	NIPD	test	for	Down	Syndrome.		If	they	say	yes,	a	blood	sample	would	be	taken	during	their	12-week	appointment.		This	test	is	more	than	99%	accurate	and	if	it	comes	back	“positive”	then	it	is	highly	likely	that	the	baby	will	have	Down	Syndrome.		If	the	test	comes	back	positive	then	the	woman	will	be	offered	an	invasive	test	to	confirm	the	results.		
• Results	from	the	NIPD	test	will	be	given	after	5	working	days	
• Invasive	tests	can	be	used	from	15	weeks	
• The	risk	of	miscarriage	from	an	invasive	test	is	around	1-2%	
• In	3-5%	of	women	NIPD	may	not	work	
		 	Scenario	three:	private	testing	for	a	range	of	conditions		NIPD	tests	are	available	to	buy	through	private	clinics	and	they	cost	around	£500.		These	tests	can	be	used	from	10	weeks	of	pregnancy	and	are	more	 than	99%	accurate.	 	The	tests	 will	 give	 information	 on	 Down	 Syndrome,	 as	 well	 as	 several	 other	 more	 serious	trisomies	that	affect	babies	from	birth.		The	tests	will	also	give	women	three	more	options:		1. They	can	find	out	the	sex	of	their	baby		2. They	can	test	whether	the	baby	has	one	of	the	most	commonly	diagnosed	single	gene	disorders	(these	include	cystic	fibrosis,	Beta-thalassemia,	sickle	cell	disease,	spinal	muscular	atrophy	and	Huntington's	disease)		3. They	can	find	out	whether	the	baby	has	a	genetic	mutation	that	will	increase	their	risk	of	breast	and	ovarian	cancer	in	later	life	(BRCA	mutations).		
• They	can	choose	as	many	of	these	options	as	they	like	at	no	extra	cost.	
• Women	only	need	to	provide	one	blood	sample.	
• For	options	2	and	3,	the	baby’s	father	will	also	have	to	give	a	blood	sample.	
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Appendix	Ten.		Poster	Presentation.		Poster	 presentation,	 International	 Society	 of	 Prenatal	 Diagnosis	 19th	 International	Conference,	 Washington	 DC,	 USA,	 2015:	 Strange,	 H.	 (2015).	 "Patient	 and	 professional	
experiences	 with	 non	 invasive	 prenatal	 diagnosis	 (NIPD)	 and	 testing	 (NIPT):	 Social	 and	
ethical	issues	raised."	Prenatal	Diagnosis	35:	27	-	109.				
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Appendix	Eleven.	REC-approved	Project	Protocol	(Version	2.1,	17/06/13)		Women’s	 Situated	 Reasoning	 on	 Emerging	 Non-Invasive	 Prenatal	Diagnosis	Technologies	(NIPD)		
Student	/	Chief	Investigator	(CI)			
Heather	Strange	Cardiff	 University	 School	 of	 Social	 Sciences	 ESRC	 Centre	 for	 the	 Economic	 and	 Social	Aspects	of	Genomics	(Cesagen)	Telephone:	07872927092	Email	StrangeHR1@Cardiff.ac.uk		
Academic	supervisors		
Professor	Adam	Hedgecoe	Cesagen	Associate	Director	Cardiff	 University	 School	 of	 Social	 Sciences	 ESRC	 Centre	 for	 the	 Economic	 and	 Social	Aspects	of	Genomics	(Cesagen)	Email:	HedgecoeAM@Cardiff.ac.uk	
	
Professor	Ruth	Chadwick	Distinguished	Research	Professor	and	Director	of	Cesagen	Cardiff	 University	 School	 of	 Social	 Sciences	 ESRC	 Centre	 for	 the	 Economic	 and	 Social	Aspects	of	Genomics	(Cesagen)	Email	ChadwickR1@Cardiff.ac.uk		
Clinical	Supervisor		
Dr	Andrea	Edwards	Lead	Genetic	Counsellor	All	Wales	Medical	Genetic	Service	Telephone	contact:	Reanne	Reffell,	Directorate	Team	Support	Secretary:	02920	74390	Email	Andrea.Edwards@wales.nhs.uk			 	
Study	Sponsor	
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Cardiff	University		
Funding		
National	 Institute	 for	 Social	 Care	 and	 Health	 Research	 (NISCHR),	 Welsh	
Government.			
Table	of	Contents				Acronyms	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 3	1.	Project	overview	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 4	2.	Lay	Summary	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 6	3.	Research	Outline	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 8	3.1	Introduction	and	background	to	the	study		 	 	 	 	 8	3.2		Study	aim	and	objectives	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 15	3.3	Timetable	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 16	3.4	Rationale	for	timetable	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 17	3.5	Plan	of	investigation,	site	selection	and	Recruitment	strategies	 	 	 18	3.6	Methods	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 29	3.7	Ethical	considerations	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 31	3.8	Involvement	of	stakeholders	 	 	 	 	 	 	 33	3.9	Expertise	of	the	research	team	 	 	 	 	 	 	 34	3.10	Study	outcome	and	dissemination	 	 	 	 	 	 35	References	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 36		 					
Acronyms		ART	-	Artificial	Reproductive	Technology	Cff-DNA	-	Cell	Free	Fetal	DNA	CI	-	Chief	Investigator	(student)	CVS	-	Chorionic	Villus	Sampling	DTC	-	Direct	To	Consumer	ESRC	-	Economic	and	Social	Research	Council	HDFN	-	Haemolytic	Disease	of	the	Fetus	or	Newborn	HD	-	Huntington’s	Disease	
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IVF	-	In	Vitro	Fertilisation	MSS	-	Maternal	Serum	Screening	NHS	-	National	Health	Service		NIHR	-	National	Institute	for	Health	Research	NISCHR	-	National	Institute	for	Social	Care	and	Health	Research	(Welsh	Government)	NIPD	-	Non	Invasive	Prenatal	Diagnosis	NT	-	Nuchal	Translucency		PGD	-	Preimplantation	Genetic	Diagnosis	PIS	-	Participant	Information	Sheet	PND	-	Prenatal	Diagnosis	PNS	-	Prenatal	Screening	RAPID	-	Reliable	and	Accurate	Prenatal	non	Invasive	Diagnosis	T21	-	Trisomy	21	(Down	Syndrome)				
1.	Project	overview		Non	 invasive	 prenatal	 diagnosis	 (NIPD)	 is	 a	 new	 type	 of	 non-invasive,	 early,	 and	 highly	accurate	 prenatal	 genetic	 testing	 technology.	 	 It	 is	 currently	 used	within	 the	 NHS	 for	 a	limited	 number	 of	 clinical	 applications,	 but	 developments	 are	 ongoing,	 and	 there	 is	speculation	over	possible	future	applications.		Much	of	the	current	scientific	and	clinical	research	on	NIPD	focuses	upon	developing	tests	for	 certain	 chromosomal	 disorders,	 including	 Down’s	 syndrome	 (Papageorgiou	 et	 al,	2012).		The	aim	here	is	to	produce	robust	tests	that	can	either	supplement	or	replace	the	prenatal	 testing	 technologies	 that	are	currently	used	within	specialist	prenatal	diagnosis	services	 provided	 to	 ‘at	 risk’	 women,	 as	 well	 as	 those	 used	 within	 population-wide	screening	programmes	that	are	offered	to	all	pregnant	women	under	NHS	care	(and	also	those	 cared	 for	 privately	 and	 publicly	 in	 many	 other	 countries	 worldwide)	 (Benn	 et	 al	2012).		Continued	 developments	 in	 NIPD	 technology	 could	 result	 in	 early,	 non-invasive,	 highly	accurate	prenatal	genetic	tests	being	made	available	as	part	of	NHS	prenatal	screening	and	diagnosis	programmes.	 	Whilst	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 such	 tests	will	 present	 significant	 clinical	advantages	over	current	testing	technologies,	they	are	also	likely	to	simultaneously	raise	social,	ethical	and	practical	advantages,	disadvantages,	issues	and	concerns.				
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This	 qualitative	 study	 will	 explore	 in	 detail	 the	 social	 significance	 of	 NIPD,	 focusing	centrally	 upon	 the	meaning	 and	 value	 of	 NIPD	 as	 discussed	 by	 those	 service	 users	 and	service	 providers	 who	 are,	 or	 who	 are	 likely	 to	 be,	 required	 to	 personally	 and	professionally	 engage	with	 this	 emerging	 technology.	 	 The	discussion	of	 this	 technology	will	be	 situated	within	 the	ongoing	academic	exploration	of	prenatal	genetic	 testing,	 the	emergence	of	new	medical	technologies,	and	their	translation	into	clinical	practice.		This	 study	will	 gather	 data	 via	 analysis	 of	 semi-structured	qualitative	 interviews	with	 a	broad	range	of	 service	users	and	service	providers,	 exploring	 in	detail	 their	experiences	with,	and	situated	responses	 to,	NIPD	testing	 technology.	 	Recognising	 the	value	of	 lived	experience,	 this	 study	 will	 focus	 on	 a	 number	 of	 issues	 of	 relevance	 to	 the	 needs	 and	interests	 of	 service	 users	 and	 providers;	 exploring	 the	 value	 that	 NIPD	 holds	 for	individuals	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 own	 lives,	 their	 role	 within	 their	 families,	 or	 their	professional	 roles	 within	 clinical	 teams;	 highlighting	 the	 practical,	 social	 and	 ethical	concerns	that	are	raised	by	experiences	with	and	responses	to	NIPD;	examining	the	way	in	which	personal	and	professional	encounters	with	rapidly	emerging	and	changing	prenatal	testing	technologies	are	negotiated.		Recognising	 that	 new	 reproductive	 technologies	 such	 as	 NIPD	 simultaneously	 help	 to	shape	new	social,	clinical	and	scientific	worlds,	this	study	also	aims	to	help	map	the	broad	impact	 of	 this	 emerging	 technology.	 	 Framed	 against	 the	wider	 context	 of	NHS	prenatal	care	services,	central	to	which	are	the	routine	clinical	pathways	for	prenatal	screening	and	diagnosis,	this	study	will	also	produce	data	relevant	to	the	critical	examination	of	current	clinical	practice.			
2.	Lay	Summary		
What	we	know		Prenatal	screening	and	diagnosis	technologies	are	well-established	objects	of	sociological	research	 and	 a	 large	 body	 of	 literature	 has	 grown	 out	 of	 studies	 in	 this	 area.	Women’s	experiences	 with	 and	 responses	 to	 technologies	 such	 as	 ultrasound	 or	 amniocentesis,	which	 are	 routinely	 used	 in	 prenatal	 care,	 have	 been	 thoroughly	 explored.	 	 Relating	 to	NIPD,	a	huge	volume	of	clinical	and	scientific	literature	exists.		We	know	that	certain	NIPD	tests	have	been	quickly	and	successfully	translated	into	routine	clinical	practice.		We	also	know	 that	 the	 scope	of	NIPD	 testing	 is	 likely	 to	 expand	 in	 the	 future,	 and	 that	 this	may	have	a	direct	impact	on	both	routine	and	specialist	NHS	prenatal	care.	 	A	limited	body	of	
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social	 science	and	ethics	 literature	on	NIPD	has	been	published,	 some	of	which	explores	service	users’	experiences	of	NIPD,	and	some	of	which	prospectively	addresses	the	social,	practical	and	ethical	concerns	that	may	be	raised	by	this	technology.		
What	we	don’t	know		Although	some	social	science	studies	have	examined	NIPD	testing,	only	a	small	number	of	studies	have	been	conducted	to	date,	and	a	very	small	body	of	directly	related	 literature	currently	 exists.	 	Many	 questions	 remain	 around	whether	NIPD	will	 raise	 social,	 ethical	and	practical	issues	and	concerns,	what	these	might	be,	and	who	might	be	most	effected.			Given	 the	 rapid	development	 and	 success	 of	NIPD	 technology	 to	 date,	 it	 is	 important	 to		explore	 questions	 about	 both	 current	 and	 future	 uses	 of	 the	 technology,	 especially	 in	relation	to	the	perspectives	of	the	people	who	work	with	or	use	NIPD.		
What	the	researcher	will	do		The	 researcher	will	 conduct	 interviews	with	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 service	 users	 and	 service	providers,	who	have	different	experiences	of	NIPD	and	prenatal	 testing.	 	The	researcher	will	 ask	 participants	 about	 their	 experiences	 with	 NIPD,	 and/or	 their	 thoughts	 and	opinions	 on	NIPD.	 	 	 The	 researcher	will	 use	 the	data	 gathered	 from	 these	 interviews	 to	identify	 and	 explore	 the	 social,	 ethical	 and	 practical	 issues	 relevant	 to	 the	 discussion	 of	NIPD	technologies,	focusing	centrally	upon	the	interests	of	service	users	and	providers.		
How	service	users	and	service	providers	will	benefit		Individual	 study	 participants	 will	 not	 directly	 benefit	 in	 any	 practical	 way	 from	 this	research.	 	 Their	 participation	 will,	 however,	 help	 the	 researcher	 contribute	 to	 the	discussion	 of	 the	 ethical,	 social	 and	 practical	 issues	 raised	 by	 NIPD.	 	 Recognising	 the	particular	value	of	each	participants’	lived	experience,	this	project	will	highlight	areas	that	are	 of	 particular	 interest	 and	 concern	 to	 those	 who	 are	 engaged	 personally	 and	professionally	 with	 prenatal	 testing.	 Because	 issues	 around	 NIPD	 testing	 are	 being	explored	 in	 this	 way,	 at	 a	 time	 when	 NIPD	 is	 at	 an	 early	 stage	 of	 technological	development,	 it	 is	hoped	that	service	users	and	service	providers	who	work	with	or	use	NIPD	in	the	future	will	benefit	from	the	results	of	this	study.			
3.	Research	Outline	
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3.1	Introduction	and	background	to	the	study		
Scientific	background		The	clinical	practice	of	prenatal	screening,	(PNS)	and	prenatal	diagnosis	(PND)	are	central	to	 modern	 prenatal	 care.	 	 Routine	 PNS	 programmes	 allow	 for	 the	 population-wide	screening	of	a	small	number	of	common	diseases,	and	PND	testing	allows	for	the	targeted	diagnosis	of	a	wider	range	of	serious	diseases	in	certain	‘at-risk’	pregnancies.				Despite	 the	 successful	 routinisation	 of	many	 prenatal	 technologies,	 it	 is	 recognised	 that	improvements	 in	 efficiency	 and	 clinical	 utility	 could	 yet	 be	 made,	 and	 a	 drive	 toward	technological	 innovation	within	 PNS	 and	 PND	has	 remained	 ever	 present.	 	 The	 ongoing	search	 for	 improved	 technologies	 has	 led	 to	 the	 development	 of	 non	 invasive	 prenatal	diagnosis	(NIPD).		NIPD	 exploits	 the	 presence	 of	 cell	 free	 fetal	 DNA	 (Cff-DNA)	 in	 the	 maternal	 blood,	 the	presence	of	which	was	 first	reported	 in	1997	(Lo	et	al,	1997).	 	Cff-DNA	is	present	 in	 the	maternal	 blood	 throughout	 pregnancy.	 	 It	 enters	 the	 maternal	 bloodstream	 via	 the	placenta,	and	increases	in	amount	along	with	gestation.		It	is	also	rapidly	cleared	from	the	maternal	bloodstream	after	birth.		The	successful	application	of	NIPD	depends	upon	being	able	 to	 distinguish,	 isolate	 and	 extract	 Cff-DNA	 from	 an	 overwhelming	 background	 of	maternal	cell	free	DNA,	and	subsequently	being	able	to	subject	this	fetal	genetic	material	to	analysis.	 	Cff-DNA	is	reliably	identifiable	for	NIPD	testing	purposes	from	around	seven	weeks	gestation	(Devaney	et	al,	2011).				NIPD	 tests	 offer	 some	 major	 practical	 benefits	 when	 compared	 with	 current	 routine	prenatal	 testing	 technologies.	 	 Currently,	 NIPD	 is	 the	 only	 technology	 that	 promises	 to	combine	 the	 benefits	 of	 being	 a	 diagnostic	 test,	 that	 is	 also	 clinically	 non-invasive	(requiring	only	 a	 small	maternal	 blood	 sample),	 and	 is	 available	 to	use	within	 the	 early	stages	of	pregnancy	(the	first	trimester	or	first	12	weeks).		Currently,	 NIPD	 is	 routinely	 used	 within	 specialist	 prenatal	 care	 services,	 in	 order	 to	identify	fetal	sex	in	pregnancies	that	are	at	high-risk	of	X-chromosome	linked	(sex	linked)	disorders	 (Hill	 et	 al,	 2011).	 	 It	 has	 been	made	 available	 in	 the	 UK	 through	 the	 NHS	 for	these	purposes	since	2003.	 	The	integration	of	the	technology	into	this	particular	area	of	clinical	 practice	 has	 been	 successful	 to	 such	 an	 extent	 that	 NIPD	 for	 fetal	 sex	determination	 has	 become	 the	 most	 frequently	 requested	 molecular	 diagnostic	 test	
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currently	used	in	prenatal	medicine	(Raymond	et	al,	2010).		It	has	also	been	reported	that	NIPD	is	replacing	rather	than	supplementing	 invasive	testing	for	 fetal	sex	 in	some	cases:	during	a	three-year	audit	of	two	NHS	laboratories,	when	NIPD	for	fetal	sex	identification	was	used	for	clinical	purposes,	only	32.9%	of	women	went	on	to	have	an	invasive	test	(Hill	et	 al,	 2011).	 	 NIPD	 is	 also	 routinely	 used	 for	 identification	 of	 fetal	 rhesus	 status	 (blood	group)	status	in	certain	at-risk	pregnancies,	and	it	has	been	very	successful	in	improving	the	preventive	treatment	of	haemolytic	disease	of	the	fetus	and	newborn	(HDFN)	(Scheffer	et	al,	2011).		NIPD	Tests	for	Down	Syndrome/Trisomy	21	(T21)	remain	at	the	clinical-trial	stage	within	the	UK,	but	the	successful	development	and	application	of	such	tests	is	widely	regarded	as	the	next	major	step	that	will	be	taken	within	the	ongoing	development	of	NIPD	(Lo	et	al,	2012).	 	 Within	 the	 US,	 Hong	 Kong	 and	 China	 several	 companies	 are	 competitively	marketing	 NIPD	 tests	 for	 Down’s	 syndrome	 and	 other	 aneuploidies.	 	 These	 tests	 are	currently	used	as	advanced	screening	tests	only,	with	positive	results	requiring	follow	up	with	 invasive	 testing,	 but	 excellent	 results	 detailing	 very	 high	 levels	 of	 sensitivity	 and	specificity	have	recently	been	reported	(Palomaki	et	al,	2012,	Bianchi	et	al,	2012).	These	tests	are	currently	distributed	on	a	commercial	basis	via	a	number	of	prenatal	clinics.		NIPD	 tests	 for	 single	 gene	 disorders,	 whilst	 not	 currently	 being	 used	 in	 routine	 clinical	practice,	 are	being	 trialled	on	a	 research	basis	 for	a	handful	of	 conditions	 such	as	 sickle	cell	anaemia	and	Huntington’s	disease	(HD)	(Barrett	et	al,	2012,	Bustamante-Aragones	et	al,	2008).		It	is	expected	that	an	increasing	number	of	NIPD	tests	for	single	gene	disorders	will	be	available	in	the	future,	and	it	is	similarly	likely	that	tests	for	disease	susceptibility	variants	(such	as	breast	cancer	genes	-	BRCA	mutations)	will	also	be	made	available.		It	is	recognised	 that	 parallel	 developments	 in	 genome	 sequencing	 technologies	 may	 further	expand	 the	 scope	 of	 prenatal	 genetic	 testing,	 and	 that	 ‘the	 capacity	 to	 identify	 a	 broad	spectrum	of	genetic	traits	and	predispositions	will	be	concomitant	with	the	development	of	 prenatal	 diagnosis’	 (Benn	 et	 al,	 2009).	 	 Positive	 expectations	 have	 been	 further	reinforced	by	the	publication	of	data	that	confirms	that	DNA	from	the	entire	fetal	genome	can	be	found	in	the	maternal	blood	(Lo	et	al,	2010).		This	has	led	to	many	claims	that	NIPD	testing	 for	 conditions	 that	are	 clinically	 less	 severe,	 late	onset,	 or	non-medical	 in	nature	may	be	an	inevitable	result	of	continued	technological	progress,	and	it	has	been	suggested	that	 such	 advances	 could	 result	 in	 a	 move	 towards	 ‘personalized	 prenatal	 medicine’	(Bianchi,	 2012).	 	 NIPD	 testing	 is	 also	 rapidly	 gaining	momentum	 outside	 of	 the	 clinical	context:	 tests	 for	both	 fetal	sex	and	fetal	paternity	are	currently	available	on	a	direct-to-consumer	(DTC)	basis	from	several	online	companies	based	in	the	US.	
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	Support	for	the	on-going	development	and	use	of	NIPD	is	clearly	evident	within	the	UK:	an	influential	 expert	 working	 group	 report	 (Wright	 et	 al,	 2009)	 described	 the	 clinical	application	 of	 NIPD	 as	 ‘desirable’	 and	 recommended	 that	 the	 development	 of	 the	technology	should	be	fully	supported.		The	National	Institute	for	Health	Research	(NIHR)	provided	 funding	 for	 a	 five-year	 (2009-2014)	 national	 research	 programme	 on	 NIPD;	Reliable	Accurate	Prenatal	non-Invasive	Diagnosis	(RAPID	2015);	which	aims	to	‘improve	the	quality	of	NHS	prenatal	diagnostic	services	by	evaluating	early	non-invasive	prenatal	diagnosis’.	 	 The	 RAPID	 project	 is	 broad	 in	 scope	 and	 has	 delivered	 a	 large	 volume	 of	clinical	 data,	 as	 well	 as	 qualitative	 research	 on	 women’s	 experiences	 of	 NIPD,	 and	literature	that	addresses	the	ethics	of	NIPD.		It	is	important	to	recognise	that	NIPD	is	likely	to	enter	widespread	clinical	use	via	one	of	two	major	 paths.	 	NIPD	may	 come	 to	 replace	 or	 supplement	 the	 invasive	 testing	 that	 is	used	within	 specialist	 prenatal	 and	 clinical	 genetics	 services	 (PND	only	 path),	 or	 it	may	take	 this	 role,	 whilst	 also	 replacing	 or	 supplementing	 tests	 that	 are	 used	 in	 routine	population-wide	 prenatal	 screening	 programmes	 (PND	 plus	 PNS	 path).	 	 As	 explained	above,	NIPD	is	currently	used	within	the	UK	for	limited	PND	applications	only.		Given	the	degree	of	 interest	 that	exists	around	NIPD	 for	Down	Syndrome	however,	 and	given	 that	Down	Syndrome	 testing	 is	 a	 central	 component	 of	 routine	NHS	prenatal	 care	pathways,	questions	 about	 NIPD	 entering	 into	 both	 PNS	 and	 PND	 programmes	 remain	 equally	 as	important	here.		
Prenatal	screening	and	diagnosis:	social	science	literature		Prenatal	screening	and	diagnosis	technologies	are	well	established	objects	of	sociological	interest	 and	 research,	 and	 themes	 such	as	 reproductive	autonomy,	medical	paternalism,	genetic	determinism,	abortion	politics,	eugenics,	 female	embodiment,	equity	of	access	 to	healthcare	 and	 the	 rights	 of	 people	 with	 disabilities	 have	 emerged	 as	 being	 of	 central	concern.		Although	 they	 are	 amongst	 the	 most	 successfully	 routinised	 applications	 of	 Artificial	Reproductive	Technology	 (ART),	PNS	and	PND	 technologies	continue	 to	 raise	 significant	political,	economic	and	ethical	concerns	(Rapp,	1999).		The	phenomena	of	routinisation	is	of	 central	 interest	 within	 the	 literature:	 it	 has	 been	 recognised,	 for	 instance,	 that	 the	process	of	routinisation	itself	can	serve	to	obscure	many	issues	that	are	of	central	concern	within	prenatal	care	(Press	et	al,	1997).		Screening	and	diagnosis	technologies	have	been	
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characterised	as	cultural	objects	of	enormous	complexity	and	transformative	power,	and	the	concrete	and	embodied	experiences	of	women,	as	reported	within	key	empirical	texts	(Rapp,	1999;	Rothman,	1994)	have	served	to	highlight	the	impacts	of	routinisation.		Rapp	has	described	how,	as	they	negotiate	various	encounters	with	new	prenatal	technologies,	women	are	transformed	into	‘moral	pioneers’.	 	She	has	also	described	how,	as	a	result	of	routinisation,	 women’s	 acceptance	 of	 testing	 becomes	 normalised,	 and	 opportunities	 to	refuse	 testing	 are	 eroded,	 resulting	 in	 the	 broad	 social	 conceptualisation	 of	 prenatal	testing	as	an	appropriate	and	responsible	parental	action.		Rothman	has	described	how	the	success	of	prenatal	screening	technologies	is	built	upon	a	more	general	move	towards	an	increasing	commodification	of	life,	a	process	which	forces	women	to	confront	a	redefinition	of	motherhood,	and	question	the	nature	and	origin	of	the	modern	mother-child	bond	(Rothman,	1987).		Rothman	has	also	introduced	the	concept	of	the	‘tentative	pregnancy’	(Rothman,	1994),	capturing	the	particular	way	in	which	women	tend	 to	 delay	 or	 lessen	 the	 depth	 of	 social	 and	 and	 psychological	 engagement	 with	pregnancy,	 responding	 to	 their	 experiences	 of	 prenatal	 testing,	 with	 the	 time	 spent	waiting	for	results	being	particularly	significant.		Prenatal	 testing	has	been	 recognised	as	being	a	 socially	and	politically	 complex	practice	that	 simultaneously	 raises	 both	 eugenic	 and	 liberating	 agendas	 (Duster,	 1990).	 	 These	issues	 have	 been	 analysed	 in	 relation	 to	 critical	 discussions	 of	 disability	 rights	 and	reproductive	 rights	 (Shakespeare,	 1998).	 	 The	 ‘disability	 rights	 critique’	 problematises	prenatal	 testing,	 pointing	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 two	 major	 issues:	 it	 is	 claimed	 that,	 by	preventing	 the	 birth	 of	 fetuses	 with	 particular	 genetic	 ‘diseases’	 or	 ‘disorders’	 prenatal	screening	 programmes	 promote	 the	 eradication	 of	 certain	 social	 groups,	 and	 that	 the	value	 judgments	 inherent	within	 such	 practices	 also	 foster	 discrimination	 against	 those	living	with	disease,	disability	and	disorder.		Rothman	points	to	the	fact	that	the	provision	of	 screening,	 in	 combination	with	 genetic	 counselling,	 is	 a	 form	of	 fetal	 ‘quality	 control’	(Rothman,	1994)	 in	which	presumptions	about	 the	meaning	of	 genetic	health	are	made.		Rapp	also	highlights	the	explicitly	selective	nature	of	prenatal	testing	technologies	(Rapp,	1998),	and	Lippman	too	points	to	the	fact	that	the	primary	aim	of	testing	is	the	separation	of	those	fetuses	we	wish	to	allow	to	develop,	from	those	we	wish	to	discontinue	(Lippman,	1991).		The	argument	that	genetic	screening	promotes	social	injustice	has	been,	however,	characterised	as	being	particularly	complex	(Shakespeare,	2005),	and	it	is	recognised	that	screening	can	be	viewed	as	being	a	practice	that	facilitates	both	the	growth	of	individual	reproductive	freedom	and	large-scale	social	control.		
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The	 communication	 of	 information	 within	 prenatal	 testing	 is	 recognised	 as	 being	 a	complex	 	 and	 socially	 significant	process.	 	Whilst	 the	power	 inherent	within	 the	 clinical	portrayal	 of	 prenatal	 genetic	 test	 results	 has	 been	 highlighted,	 the	 subjective	 nature	 of	clinical	 descriptions	 of	 genetic	 diseases	 and	 disorders	 has	 been	 highlighted:	 ‘every	description	of	a	genetic	disorder	is	a	story	that	contains	a	message’	(Lippman	et	al,	1992).		Marteau	et	 al.	 describe	how	women	do	not	 act	 as	passive	 recipients	of	objective	 clinical	information	 (Marteau	 et	 al,	 1992),	 and,	 similarly,	 Lippman	 explains	 how	 during	 the	decision	 making	 process	 women	 tend	 to	 alter	 the	 persuasiveness	 of	 the	 biomedical	information	on	screening	that	is	provided	to	them,	weaving	it	with	their	own	instincts	and	beliefs	 in	order	to	create	a	particular	kind	of	 ‘embodied	knowledge’	(Lippman,	1999).	 	 It	also	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 that	 this	 style	 of	 moral	 reasoning	 that	 depends	 upon	 a	complex	 process	 that	 involves	 the	 personalisation	 of	 risk	 information,	 the	 reshaping	 of	statistics,	the	reinterpretation	of	the	concept	of	health	as	well	as	a	personal	interpretation	of	 counselling	 information	 on	 disease	 and	 disorder,	 tends	 to	 be	 shared	 by	 both	women	who	accept	and	refuse	testing	(Rapp,	1998).		
NIPD:	social	science	literature		As	 clinical	 and	 bioethical	 interest	 around	 NIPD	 has	 steadily	 grown,	 the	 need	 for	 social	science	research	has	been	explicitly	recognised,	and	a	small	number	of	empirical	studies	have	very	recently	begun	to	emerge.	 	Susan	Kelly	and	Hannah	Farrimond	have	published	two	qualitative	papers	as	a	result	of	a	recent	project	looking	at	lay	reasoning	around	NIPD.		This	 project	 set	 out	 to	 ask	 questions	 about	 how	 the	 public	 view	 emerging	NIPD	 testing	procedures,	and	what	preferences	regarding	the	clinical	use	of	future	NIPD	tests	might	be.		Four	distinct	public	‘viewpoints’	emerged	from	the	data:	NIPD	was	simultaneously	viewed	as:	 discrimination	 against	 the	 disabled;	 a	 positive	 clinical	 application;	 appropriate	 for	severe	disorders	only;	a	personal	choice.		Many	of	the	concerns	raised	within	the	data	echo	the	 critical	 discussion	of	NIPD	within	 the	bioethics	 literature,	 and	participant	 responses	that	 paralleled	 the	 disability	 rights	 critique	 were	 found	 to	 be	 particularly	 strong.	 	 The	identification	 of	 this	 perspective	 as	 dominant	 was	 held	 to	 be	 particularly	 important,	especially	given	that	these	kinds	of	critical	voices	‘are	often	marginalised	or	drowned	out	by	 more	 dominant	 clinical	 and	 medical	 discourses	 in	 debates	 about	 new	 genetic	technologies’	 (Farrimond	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 	 A	 general	 ‘consensus	 of	 concern’	 was	 also	identified	 as	being	present	 throughout	 the	data:	 every	participant,	 for	 instance,	 rejected	the	 idea	 of	 NIPD	 being	 made	 available	 outside	 traditional	 clinical	 pathways,	 on	 a	commercial	 or	direct-to	 consumer	basis	 (it	 is	worth	noting	here	 that	 the	 study	was	UK-based,	 and	 that	 this	may	have	had	 an	 impact	 on	 findings	 -	 similar	 questions	need	 to	 be	
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asked	of	the	US	public,	 for	example,	who	experience	prenatal	testing	from	within	a	more	commercially	oriented	system).		Zamerowski	 et	 al.	 published	 an	 early	 empirical	 study,	 asking	 how	 high-risk	 women	perceive	 NIPD-type	 testing	 (Zamerowski	 et	 al.,	 2001).	 	 Responding	 to	 a	 survey,	women	who	 were	 currently	 experiencing	 high-risk	 pregnancies,	 and	 who	 planned	 to	 have	 an	invasive	 test	(amniocentesis	or	CVS),	responded	favourably	 to	 the	technological	promise	of	NIPD:	‘only	half	of	the	women	would	seek	invasive	testing	after	a	normal	blood	test’.		In	a	 similar	 study,	 conducted	 with	 women	 undergoing	 routine	 fetal	 anomaly	 scans,	 and	female	medical	students,	Kooij	et	al.	produce	more	conflicted	results:	‘our	respondents	do	not	 agree	 about	making	 the	 test	 generally	 available:	 a	majority	 of	 the	 pregnant	women	support	a	general	availability	of	NIPD,	whereas	the	students	are	far	more	reluctant’	(Kooij	et	 al,	 2009).	 	 Some	 degree	 of	 consensus	 was	 reached	 regarding	 two	 issues	 here:	participants	 were	 highly	 critical	 of	 testing	 for	 late	 onset	 disease,	 and	 the	 also	 ‘clearly	rejected’	 identification	 of	 fetal	 sex	 in	 order	 to	 facilitate	 non-medical	 sex	 selection.		Describing	the	results	of	a	survey	of	women	in	their	third	trimester	of	pregnancy,	Tischler	et	 al.	 report	 that	most	women	show	an	 interest	 in	NIPD	 ‘primarily	because	of	 increased	safety	 for	 the	 fetus,	 although	 a	 significant	 minority	 are	 uninterested	 or	 ambivalent’	(Tischler	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 	 Another	 survey-based	 study	 (Sayres	 et	 al.	 2011),	 looking	 at	attitudes	toward	the	clinical	 implementation	of	NIPD	as	reported	by	obstetric	healthcare	providers	 in	 the	 US,	 also	 reported	 a	 widespread	 level	 of	 concern	 related	 to	 testing	 for	single	 gene	 disorders	 and	 non-medical	 sex	 selection.	 	 Very	 few	 respondents	 reported	 a	high	 level	 of	 knowledge	 of	 NIPD	 and	 a	 general	 	 level	 of	 uncertainty	 among	 obstetric	providers	 about	 the	 details	 of	 implementing	 NIPD	 testing	 prevailed.	 	 The	 study	 also	described	how	healthcare	providers	held	the	general	perception	that	patients	face	strong	social	pressure	to	accept	testing,	and	that	they	particularly	valued	the	role	of	counselling	within	prenatal	testing	services.					As	 part	 of	 the	 NIHR	 funded	 RAPID	 project,	 Celine	 Lewis	 has	 conducted	 qualitative	research	 on	 women’s	 responses	 to	 NIPD	 for	 fetal	 sex	 (publications	 forthcoming).	 	 This	research	 is	 particularly	 valuable	 as	 it	 presents	 information	 regarding	 women’s	 lived	experiences	of	NIPD.		Broadly	speaking,	participants	experiences	of	NIPD	were	reported	to	have	 been	 ‘overwhelmingly	 positive	 with	 words	 including	 “brilliant”,	 “exiting”	 and	“incredibly	 lucky”	 being	 use	 to	 summarise	 the	 overall	 experience’.	 	 Analysis	 of	 data	gathered	via	semi-structured	interviews	revealed	that,	regarding	the	possible	advantages	of	NIPD,	 four	major	 themes	could	be	 identified:	 safety;	ease	of	 testing;	 timing;	enhanced	decision	 making.	 	 Although	 the	 disadvantages	 of	 NIPD	 were	 felt	 to	 be	 ‘minor	 in	
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comparison’,	 four	 themes	 also	 emerged	 regarding	 these:	 miscarriage	 risk;	 increased	anxiety;	connection	to	a	potentially	‘unwanted’	fetus;	being	robbed	of	surprise	and	misuse	of	technology.			Some	of	the	interview	excerpts	revealed	the	inherent	tension	that,	at	times,	dominated	 women’s	 reported	 encounters	 with	 NIPD:	 “having	 that	 blood	 test	 is	 just	nothing,	 it’s	 like	 any	 of	 your	 other	 visits	 to	 hospital	 when	 you’re	 pregnant,	 it’s	 just	 the	results	 have	 such	 a	 big	 impact”.	 	 Here,	 as	 an	 explicitly	 non-invasive	 test,	 NIPD	 is	simultaneously	experienced	as	being	normal	and	routine	(‘just	nothing’)	whilst	also	being	a	potential	source	of	significant	information	(‘such	a	big	impact’).					
3.2		Study	aim	and	objectives			The	 central	 aim	 of	 this	 qualitative	 research	 project	 is	 to	 explore	 experiences	 of	 and	situated	 responses	 to	 current	 and	 emerging	 non	 invasive	 prenatal	 diagnosis	 (NIPD)	technologies.		
Specific	objectives	include:				•	 To	examine	 the	practical,	 ethical	and	social	 issues	 that	are	raised	by	experiences	with	current	NIPD	testing.		•	 To	explore	situated	responses	to	emerging	future	applications	of	NIPD	technology		•	 To	gain	an	understanding	of	how	service	users	and	service	providers	negotiate	the	complexities	of	engaging	with	an	emerging	technology			
3.3	Timetable		The	project	grant	runs	for	36	months	and	began	on	April	1st	2011.		The	timetable	below	provides	 detailed	 information	 on	 each	 of	 the	 planned	 research	 stages.	 	 Academic	supervision	meetings	 to	 be	 held	 regularly,	 throughout	 the	 project.	 	 It	 is	 envisaged	 that	some	time	will	be	taken	to	attend	relevant	conferences	and	workshops.			Stage	one:	April	2011-	March	2012		Literature	review		Drafting	of	ethical	approval/NHS	governance	documents	
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Confirmation	of	key	clinical	contacts		Stage	two:	April	2012	-	September	2012		Ethical	approval/NHS	governance	forms	prepared	and	submitted	Honorary	contract	obtained	Participants	recruited		Interviews	planned	and	piloted		Stage	three:	October	2012	-	March	2013		Interviews	carried	out	Data	analysis	(on-going)		Stage	four:	April	2013	-	September	2013		Structured	thematic	analysis	of	all	data		Stage	five:	October	2013	-	March	2014			Preparation	of	thesis	Applications	to	follow-up	grants	(to	support	dissemination	of	study	results)	Submission	of	thesis			
3.4	Rationale	for	timetable		The	 literature	 review	 will	 be	 broad	 and	 ongoing	 throughout	 the	 project:	 it	 will	 cover	relevant	publications	within	 the	social	 sciences,	 the	relevant	clinical	and	scientific	 fields,	as	well	as		media	outputs	(print	and	electronic).		Visits	to	key	clinical	contacts	will	be	made	in	 order	 to	 confirm	 and	 clarify	 plans	 for	 recruitment	 and	 research.	 	 Recruitment	 of	participants	 will	 commence	 once	 relevant	 ethical	 approval	 and	 R&D	 approval	 is	confirmed.	 	 Approximately	 thirty	 service	 users	 and	 ten	 service	 providers	 are	 to	 be	recruited	for	participation	in	the	study.				A	maximum	of	five	service	user	partners	will	also	be	 recruited.	 	 Interviews	 will	 be	 carried	 out	 at	 a	 time	 and	 place	 of	 the	 participants	choosing,	 and	 are	 expected	 to	 last	 between	 thirty	 and	 sixty	minutes.	 	 Data	 analysis	will	take	place	throughout	the	project,	however	an	intense	and	concentrated	period	of	analysis	will	follow	the	fieldwork	stage.	Writing	and	preparation	of	the	thesis	will	also	be	ongoing	
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throughout	 the	 project,	 however	 an	 intense	 period	 of	 structuring	 and	writing	 will	 take	place	during	the	final	months.			
3.5	Plan	of	investigation,	site	selection	and	Recruitment	strategies		
Participant	Cohort	and	sample	size		This	study	involves	the	recruitment	of	participants	from	a	number	of	different	groups:		Service	users		•	 NHS	patients	with	experience	of	NIPD	testing	•	 NHS	patients	with	experience	of	invasive	prenatal	testing	(Amniocentesis	or	CVS)	•	 Members	of	the	public	with	experience	of	routine	prenatal	screening	tests	•	 Private	patients	with	experience	of	NIPD	testing		Service	providers		•	 NHS	professionals	who	work	with	NIPD	testing	•	 NHS	professionals	who	work	with	current	prenatal	testing	(specialist/diagnostic	or	routine/screening)		NIPD	developers		•	 Persons	involved	in	the	clinical	and	commercial	development	of	NIPD	testing		Partners		•	 Partners	of	service	users,	recruited	through	a	process	of	“snowball	sampling”		Approximately	ten	participants	from	each	of	the	service	user	groups	will	be	recruited,	and	approximately	five	participants	from	each	of	the	service	provider	groups	will	be	recruited.		Following	 interviews	with	 service	users,	 a	maximum	of	 five	participant	partners	will	 be	recruited	through	a	process	of	“snowball	sampling”.			The	research	practice	of	“snowball	sampling”	involves	working	with	participants	who	are	willing	 and	 able	 to	 further	 identify	 additional	 potential	 participants	 that	 the	 researcher	
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may	 otherwise	 not	 be	 able	 to	 reach.	 	 This	 particular	 recruitment	 process	makes	 use	 of	participants’	own	networks	and	is	suitable	for	use	in	research	where	the	target	population	is	 particularly	 small	 or	 difficult	 to	 reach	 (Atkinson,	 2001).	 	 With	 regards	 this	 research	study,	those	participants	who	agree	to	help	the	CI	identify	additional	participants	will	be	asked	 to	 pass	 on	 a	 copy	 of	 the	 appropriate	 Participant	 Information	 Sheet	 to	 individuals	they	 think	 may	 be	 interested	 in	 taking	 part	 in	 the	 study.	 	 Any	 potential	 participants	identified	 in	 this	way	will	 then	go	 through	 the	same	recruitment	pathway	 that	has	been	designed	 for	 participants	 recruited	 through	 key	 clinical	 and	 non-clinical	 contacts.	 	 This	process	will	 be	 used	only	when	necessary,	 i.e.	when	 target	 populations	 are	 small	 (NIPD	developers)	or	difficult	to	access	(partners	of	service	users).		A	maximum	of	five	NIPD	developers	will	also	be	recruited,	initially	via	the	CI’s	professional	networks,	and	subsequently	via	a	process	of	snowball	sampling.	 	A	maximum	total	of	50	interviews	 will	 therefore	 be	 conducted.	 	 Given	 that	 only	 the	 CI	 will	 be	 responsible	 for	conducting,	transcribing	and	analysing	the	content	of	the	interviews,	this	is	believed	to	be	an	 appropriate	 and	 achievable	 sample.	 	 The	 study	 sample	 here	 is	 not	 intended	 to	 be	representative;	 the	 central	 aim	 here	 is	 to	 generate	 rich	 and	 deeply	 contextualised	 data,	using	in-depth	qualitative	interviews.		
Inclusion	and	exclusion	criteria		Potential	participants	will	be	selected	in	accordance	with	certain	inclusion	and	exclusion	criteria.		With	regards	the	following	criteria,	it	is	important	to	be	clear	about	a	number	of	points:	 participants’	 ‘direct	 personal	 experience’	 must	 relate	 to	 their	 own	 pregnancy;	potential	 participants	 who	 have	 both	 accepted	 and	 refused	 testing	 will	 be	 eligible	 for	inclusion	 in	 this	 study;	 relevant	 service	 providers	 are	 likely	 to	 include,	 but	 will	 not	 be	limited	 to:	 genetic	 counsellors,	 fetal	 medicine	 consultants	 and	 nurses,	 haemophilia	consultants	and	nurses,	midwives.		It	may	be	difficult	to	recruit	women	who	have	refused	testing	 in	 many	 cases,	 as	 the	 specific	 content	 of	 clinical	 databases	 varies,	 and	 contact	details	for	women	who	have	refused	testing	may	not	be	available.		Participants	will	be	included	if	they	are:		•	 Women	with	direct	personal	experience	of	NIPD.			•	 Women	with	direct	personal	experience	of	current	prenatal	testing,	either	routine	or	specialist/invasive	(Amniocentesis/CVS).		•	 Service	providers	with	direct	professional	experience	of	NIPD	
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•	 Service	providers	with	direct	professional	experience	of	current	prenatal	testing,	either	routine	or	specialist/invasive	(Amniocentesis/CVS)	•	 Professionals	with	experience	in	the	field	of	NIPD	development		•	 Partners	of	women	with	personal	experience	of	either	NIPD	or	current	prenatal	testing		Participants	will	be	excluded	if	they	are:		•	 Persons	unable	to	communicate	fluently	in	written	or	spoken	English.			•	 Persons	unable	to	provide	fully	informed	consent.		•	 Under	the	age	of	18.			It	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 research	 project	 to	 provide	 comprehensive	 translation	services	for	communication	in	languages	other	than	English.		Additionally,	because	of	the	in-depth	 nature	 of	 qualitative	 interviewing,	 it	 is	 felt	 that	 any	 use	 of	 verbal	 translation	services	would	undermine	participant	 confidentiality	 and	 reduce	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 data	generated.							As	 an	 exception	 to	 the	 above,	 to	 ensure	 that	 this	 research	 complies	 with	 the	 Welsh	Language	 Act,	 Welsh	 translations	 of	 the	 written	 information	 provided	 to	 potential	participants	 and	 participants	 (patient	 information	 sheets,	 consent	 forms)	 will	 be	 made	available	upon	request.	 	The	availability	of	this	service	to	participants	will	be	made	clear	within	the	Participant	Information	Sheets.		All	participants	will	 be	asked	 to	 sign	a	 consent	 form	prior	 to	 their	 recruitment	onto	 the	study,	and	the	CI	will	gain	additional	verbal	consent	immediately	prior	to	each	interview.		The	CI	will	remain	sensitive	to	any	participant	dissent	throughout	the	interview	process,	and	if	signs	of	distress	or	discomfort	become	evident	at	any	time,	the	researcher	will	check	that	 the	 participant	 is	 happy	 to	 continue.	 	 Participants	will	 be	 given	 the	 opportunity	 to	withdraw	from	the	study	at	any	point.		If	participants	choose	to	withdraw	from	the	study	they	will	be	given	the	option	of	having	all	data	that	has	been	collected	up	to	the	point	of	withdrawal	disregarded	and	destroyed.		The	CI	will	also	make	available	information	about	support	groups	and	clinical	services	 that	are	able	 to	provide	any	additional	support	 that	may	be	needed.		Relating	 directly	 to	 the	 discussion	 of	 reproductive	 choices	 and	 decisions,	 as	 well	 as	personal	 experiences	 of	 clinical	 encounters,	 all	 interviews	 may	 raise	 sensitive	 and	
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emotional	 issues.	 It	 is	 therefore	 felt	 to	 be	 appropriate	 those	 under	 the	 age	 of	 18	 are	excluded	from	participation	in	this	study.		Additional	exclusion	criteria	for	NHS	patients	with	experience	of	NIPD	or	invasive	testing,	and	their	partners		•	 All	 participants	 must	 have	 completed	 pregnancy	 at	 the	 time	 of	 initial	 contact.		These	participants	will	be	recruited	through	specialist	care	centres,	such	as	haemophilia	clinics	 or	 clinical	 genetics	 services.	 	 This	 group	 of	 women	will	 be	 excluded	 in	 order	 to	ensure	 that	 the	 particular	 content	 of	 this	 study	 will	 not	 disrupt	 the	 decision-making	process	with	regards	the	possibility	of	diagnostic	prenatal	 testing	or	any	other	specialist	prenatal	care.			Additional	exclusion	criteria	for	participants	with	experience	of	routine	testing,	and	their	partners	(non	NHS)		•	 All	 participants	 must	 be	 over	 30	 weeks	 gestation	 at	 the	 time	 of	 initial	 contact.		Women	 at	 earlier	 stages	 of	 pregnancy	 are	 excluded	 from	 the	 study	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	content	 of	 the	 interviews	 does	 not	 disrupt	 the	 decision-making	 process	 with	 regards	routine	prenatal	testing.			Separate	exclusion	criteria	for	participants	with	experience	of	using	NIPD	tests	for	Down’s	Syndrome,	and	their	partners	(non	NHS)		•	 All	participants	must	be	over	12	weeks	gestation	at	the	time	of	initial	contact.		All	women	must	have	 completed	 the	NIPD	 testing	process	 and	 received	 the	 results	 of	 their	NIPD	test	by	the	time	of	initial	contact.		At	the	time	of	writing,	the	NIPD	test	that	is	being	used	by	private	clinics	 in	the	UK	(the	Harmony	test)	provides	results	that	are	more	than	99%	 accurate.	 	 These	women	 are	 eligible	 for	 inclusion	 at	 an	 earlier	 stage	 of	 pregnancy	than	 other	 participants.	 	 It	 is	 felt	 that	 this	 is	 appropriate	 because	 they	 have	 received	results	 that	 are	 more	 accurate	 than	 the	 routine	 NHS	 tests	 which	 are	 used	 later	 in	pregnancy.	 	 It	 is	 felt	 therefore	 that	 the	 content	 of	 interviews	 will	 not	 be	 disruptive	 to	women	or	couples’	decision	making	regarding	routine	prenatal	testing.	
	
Site	selection	and	support	from	key	contacts		
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This	research	will	be	conducted	using	participants	recruited	from	several	clinical	and	non-clinical	sites	located	in	Wales	and	England.		Whilst	participant	selection	is	not	intended	to	be	 representative,	 the	demographic	 scope	of	 this	project	 is	not	 intended	 to	be	narrowly	focused,	and	recruitment	 from	a	multiple	of	 sites	 in	different	geographical	 locations	will	help	ensure	that	a	broadly	heterogenous	sample	is	generated.				The	 specific	 selection	 of	 clinical/NHS	 sites	will	 depend	 greatly	 on	 the	 assistance	 of	 key	clinical	contacts.		To	date,	several	key	clinical	contacts	have	been	identified	and	they	have	each	indicated	their	willingness	to	support	the	CI	 in	the	participant	recruitment	process.		It	is	expected	that	the	CI	will	also	identify	and	approach	clinical	contacts	in	other	centres.		Key	 clinical	 contacts	 have	 agreed	 to	 provide	 support	 for	 gaining	 access	 to	 NHS	patients/potential	participants	from	the	following	clinical	sites:					•	 All	Wales	Medical	Genetics	Service,	University	Hospital	Wales,	Cardiff	and	Vale	University	Health	Board	•	 Arthur	Bloom	Haemophilia	Centre,	University	Hospital	Wales,	Cardiff	and	Vale	University	Health	Board		•	 Peninsula	Clinical	Genetics	Service,	Heavitree	Hospital,	Royal	Devon	and	Exeter	NHS	Foundation	Trust		In	addition	to	this,	contacts	from	the	following	sites	have	agreed	to	provide	additional	support	if	participant	numbers	from	the	sites	above	are	low:		•	 Fetal	Medicine	Unit,	St	Michael's	Hospital,	University	Hospitals	Bristol	NHS	Foundation	Trust		Contacts	from	the	following	non-NHS	clinical	site	have	also	agreed	to	provide	support	for	participant/patient	recruitment:		•	 Innermost	Secrets	Clinic,	Ash	Tree	Private	Medical	Clinic,	Cardiff		As	 the	 level	 of	 NIPD	 and/or	 invasive	 diagnostic	 testing	 at	 each	 centre	 is	 limited,	 it	 is	expected	 that	 the	 CI	 will	 continue	 to	 identify	 and	 approach	 clinical	 contacts	 in	 other	centres,	in	order	to	ensure	that	sufficient	numbers	of	participants	are	available	for	contact	and	recruitment.		
	 275	
The	specific	selection	of	non-clinical	sites	will	again	depend	greatly	upon	the	assistance	of	key	contacts.	 	These	key	contacts	will	be	leaders/organisers	of	mother	and	baby/mother	and	toddler	groups.		To	date	the	CI	has	made	initial	contact	with	a	number	of	groups,	and		has	started	the	process	of	identifying	key	contacts.		Most	of	the	clinical	and	non-clinical	sites	identified	to	date	have	been	located	in	Wales,	as	it	is	from	within	Cardiff	University	networks	that	the	CI	has	approached	key	contacts.		The	lead	NHS	R&D	office	for	ethical	approval	purposes	will	be	located	in	Wales.		SSI	forms	will	be	 generated	 for	 each	 site,	 and	 amendments	 to	 the	 protocol	 will	 be	made	 if	 and	when	additional	sites	are	identified.		
	
Recruitment	strategies		The	recruitment	process	for	NHS	service	users,	described	in	detail	below,	will	serve	as	a	template	for	recruitment	of	all	participants	in	this	study.		Where	changes	are	made	to	this	process	 for	 the	 recruitment	 of	 other	 groups,	 these	 will	 be	 described	 in	 subsequent	sections.	 	 The	 study	 ‘information	 pack’	 will	 be	 identical	 in	 content	 for	 all	 potential	participants.	
	
Recruitment	of	NHS	service	users		Initial	contact	with	potential	participants	will	be	made	through	a	key	clinical	contact	who	has	agreed	with	the	CI	in	advance	to	act	as	a	gatekeeper	to	the	project.		At	least	one	clinical	gatekeeper	will	be	identified	at	each	study	site.		The	clinical	gatekeeper	will	either	already	be	directly	known	to	potential	participants,	or	they	will	be	part	of	the	clinical	team	that	is	directly	known	to	potential	participants.				The	clinical	gatekeeper	will	be	responsible	for	selecting	potential	participants	to	contact,	working	with	patient	databases	they	routinely	have	access	to	as	part	of	their	clinical	work,	and	in	accordance	with	this	study’s	inclusion	and	exclusion	criteria.		This	ensures	that	the	CI	 will	 not	 have	 access	 to	 any	 identifiable	 patient	 data	 without	 prior	 consent	 from	 the	participant.		Initial	 contact	 will	 be	 made	 through	 written	 invitation	 from	 the	 clinical	 gatekeeper	 on	behalf	of	 the	CI.	 	A	 study	 ‘information	pack’	 containing	an	 invitation	 letter,	 a	participant	information	sheet	(PIS),	a	reply	slip	and	stamped	addressed	envelope,	will	be	distributed	to	 potential	 participants	 by	 the	 clinical	 gatekeeper.	 	 The	 clinical	 gatekeeper	 will	 either	
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distribute	this	information	in	person,	or	they	will	send	the	information	to	the	participants’	home	address.			The	 invitation	 letter	 will	 briefly	 introduce	 the	 study,	 explain	 the	 contents	 of	 the	information	 pack,	 explain	 who	 is	 contacting	 them	 and	 why,	 and	 will	 provide	 contact	details	 (telephone,	 email	 and	postal)	 for	 the	CI.	 	The	participant	 information	 sheet	 (PIS)	will	outline	 in	detail,	using	clear	and	comprehensible	 language:	 the	aims	and	purpose	of	the	study;	why	 the	potential	participant	had	been	selected	 for	 inclusion;	explanations	of	exclusion	criteria;	practical	details	of	what	participation	would	entail;	details	of	potential	risks	 and	 benefits;	 details	 of	 the	 research	 funder	 and	 sponsor;	 information	 on	confidentiality;	details	of	the	participant’s	right	to	withdraw	from	the	study	at	any	point.	At	the	end	of	the	invitation	letter,	the	potential	participant	will	be	invited	to	contact	the	CI	(by	telephone,	postal	reply	slip	or	email)	if	they	are	interested	in	taking	part	in	the	study.		They	will	be	invited	to	ask	any	questions	they	might	have,	or	ask	for	clarification	on	any	of	the	information	covered	in	the	documents	they	received.		A	stamped,	addressed	envelope	will	be	included	with	the	invitation	letter	and	participants	will	be	asked	to	return	the	reply	slip,	and	completed	consent	form,	if	they	are	interested	in	taking	part.		Potential	 participants	 will	 be	 asked	 to	 complete	 and	 return	 (in	 a	 stamped,	 addressed	envelope)	a	reply	slip	if	they	are	interested	in	taking	part	in	the	study.		The	reply	slip	will	ask	the	participant	to	confirm	their	interest,	and	will	ask	for	a	phone	number	and/or	email	address	 with	 which	 the	 CI	 may	 contact	 the	 potential	 participant	 to	 make	 further	arrangements.				Upon	receipt	of	reply	slips,	the	CI	will	make	direct	contact	with	potential	participants	via	phone	or	email.		They	will	offer	to	answer	any	questions	that	the	potential	participant	may	have,	and	make	arrangements	 for	 interview	time,	date	and	 location.	The	participant	will	be	 free	 to	 choose	 a	 time	 and	 place	 that	 is	 most	 suitable	 to	 them,	 however,	 the	 CI	 will	ensure	 that	 a	 suitable	 interviewing	 space	 is	 available	 if	 required.	 	 The	 CI	 will	 finally	explain	 that	 the	 next	 stage	 of	 contact	 involves	 the	 posting	 of	 a	 consent	 form	 to	 the	potential	participant.				The	 consent	 form	will	 ask	 the	 potential	 participant	 to	 confirm	 in	writing	 the	 following:	that	they	have	read	and	understood	the	information	sheet,	that	they	understand	that	their	participation	 is	voluntary	and	 that	 they	are	under	no	obligation	 to	 the	gatekeeper	or	CI,	that	 they	 have	 the	 right	 to	 withdraw	 from	 the	 study	 at	 any	 time,	 that	 they	 agree	 to	interviews	 being	 audio	 recorded,	 that	 they	 agree	 to	 their	 anonymised	 quotes	 being	
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published,	and	that	they	agree	to	take	part	in	the	study.		It	will	again	be	made	clear	that,	if	potential	participants	have	any	questions	about	the	consent	form,	or	any	other	part	of	the	interview	process,	 they	will	be	 free	to	contact	the	CI.	 	Participants	will	be	encouraged	to	read	the	consent	form	prior	to	the	interview	taking	place,	and	to	bring	it	with	them	on	the	day	of	 the	 interview.	 	The	CI	will	however	ensure	 that	additional	 copies	of	 the	 form	are	available	on	the	day	of	the	interview,	for	those	who	choose	not	to	complete	the	forms	in	advance.	 	The	 final	 stage	of	 recruitment	will	 involve	 the	potential	participant	and	 the	CI	running	 through	 the	 consent	 form	 together,	 and	 the	 gaining	 of	 additional	 verbal	confirmation	of	consent	just	prior	to	the	interview	taking	place.		In	summary	then,	a	number	of	discreet	stages	make	up	the	overall	recruitment	process:		•	 Identification	of	potential	participants	by	clinical	gatekeeper	•	 Initial	contact	from	clinical	gatekeeper	(information	pack)	on	behalf	of	the	CI	•	 Receipt	of	reply	slips	from	those	interested	in	participating	•	 First	direct	contact	between	CI	and	potential	participant,	by	phone	or	email	(interview	arrangements	made)	•	 Second	direct	contact	between	CI	and	potential	participant	(consent	form	posted,	interview	arrangements	confirmed)	•	 Consent	form	reviewed	by	CI	and	potential	participant	prior	to	interview		Recruitment	of	women	with	experience	of	routine	prenatal	tests	(non	NHS)		Initial	 contact	with	 potential	 participants	will	 be	made	 through	 a	 key	 contact	who	have	agreed	with	 the	 CI	 in	 advance	 to	 act	 as	 a	 gatekeeper	 to	 the	 project.	 	 These	 non-clinical	gatekeepers	 will	 be	 leaders/coordinators	 of	 mother	 and	 baby	 groups,	 breastfeeding	groups,	 and	 other	 groups	 that	 work	 directly	 with	 pregnant	 women	 and	 mothers.	 	 The	gatekeepers	will	be	directly	known	to	the	potential	participants	via	these	networks.		The	gatekeeper	will	 be	 responsible	 for	 the	 initial	 identification	of	potential	participants.		In	 order	 to	 identify	 potential	 participants	 the	 gatekeeper	 will	 use	 networks	 that	 they	routinely	 access.	 	 These	 networks	 will	 take	 the	 form	 of	 parenting	 groups	 that	 meet	regularly.	 	 These	networks	may	 also	 include	online	parenting	 groups	who	 communicate	primarily	through	social	networks,	but	who	also	meet	regularly	in	person.			Initial	 contact	 with	 potential	 participants	 will	 be	 made	 by	 the	 gatekeeper,	 who	 will	informally	 	 introduce	 the	study	 in	person	on	a	one-to-one	or	group	basis,	or	via	written	
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communication	through	routinely	accessed	online	networks.		The	gatekeeper	will	explain	that	 information	 packs	will	 be	made	 available,	 to	 be	 collected	 in	 person	 during	 or	 after	group	meetings,	to	those	who	are	interested	in	finding	out	more	about	the	study.	 	The	CI	will	provide	 the	gatekeeper	with	multiple	copies	of	 information	packs,	and	 these	will	be	distributed	 by	 the	 gatekeeper,	 after	 initial	 interest	 from	 potential	 participants	 is	communicated.	 	 Information	packs	will	not	be	posted	out.	 	This	step	 is	 taken	 in	order	to	minimise	 the	 potential	 for	 breach	 of	 confidentiality	 or	 privacy,	 and	 in	 order	 to	 protect	potential	 participants’	 personal	 data	 (addresses	 and	 contact	 details).	 	 The	 recruitment	strategy	for	this	group	will	then	continue	as	outlined	previously.		An	 additional	 number	 of	 participants	 will	 be	 recruited	 via	 a	 process	 of	 “snowball	sampling”.	 	 	This	process	will	be	 initiated	by	asking	participants,	after	 the	completion	of	their	 interview,	whether	 they	would	be	willing	 to	 communicate	basic	 information	about	this	study	to	persons	known	to	them,	who	fit	the	same	inclusion	and	exclusion	criteria	as	themselves.		If	participants	are	willing	to	help	identify	additional	potential	participants	in	this	way,	the	CI	will	ask	them	to	pass	on	a	copy	of	the	appropriate	Participant	Information	Sheet	(via	post	or	email,	the	CI	will	provide	printed	copies	and	postage	when	required)	to	those	 individuals	 they	 think	 may	 be	 interested	 in	 taking	 part	 in	 the	 study.	 	 These	additional	potential	participants	will	then	enter	into	the	pathway	for	recruitment	that	has	already	been	established	and	is	outlined	in	detail	above.		
Recruitment	of	NHS	professionals	(groups	working	with	NIPD	and	routine	testing)		Identification	 of	 potential	 participants	 will	 be	 made	 by	 key	 clinical	 contacts	 who	 have	agreed	in	advance	to	act	as	a	gatekeeper	to	the	project,	and	who	will	also	be	assisting	with	the	 recruitment	 of	 NHS	 patients/service	 users.	 	 The	 CI	 will	 also	 identify	 a	 number	 of	potential	 participants	 already	 known	 to	 the	 CI	 through	 professional	 and	 academic	networks,	 and	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 study’s	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion	 criteria.		Gatekeepers	will	identify	potential	participants	using	their	own	professional	networks,	in	accordance	with	the	study’s	inclusion	and	exclusion	criteria.				Initial	 contact	 with	 potential	 participants	 will	 be	 made	 either	 in	 person,	 or	 via	email/phone	 contact.	 	 Potential	 participants	 will	 be	 briefly	 introduced	 to	 the	 aims,	objectives	and	methods	of	the	study	by	the	gatekeeper	or	the	CI	as	appropriate.	 	If	initial	interest	 is	 expressed,	 full	 information	 packs	 will	 be	 sent	 to	 each	 potential	 participants’	place	 of	 work.	 	 The	 recruitment	 strategy	 for	 this	 group	 will	 then	 continue	 as	 outlined	previously.	
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Recruitment	of	NIPD	developers		The	 CI	 will	 identify	 a	 small	 number	 of	 potential	 participants	 already	 known	 to	 the	 CI	through	 professional	 and	 academic	 networks,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 study’s	 exclusion	and	inclusion	criteria.			Initial	 contact	 will	 be	 made	 either	 in	 person	 or	 via	 email/phone	 contact.	 	 Potential	participants	will	be	briefly	introduced	to	the	aims,	objectives	and	methods	of	the	study	by	the	CI.		If	initial	interest	is	expressed,	full	information	packs	will	be	sent	to	each	potential	participants’	place	of	work.		The	recruitment	strategy	for	this	group	will	then	continue	as	outlined	previously.		An	 additional	 number	 of	 participants	 will	 be	 recruited	 via	 a	 process	 of	 “snowball	sampling”.	 	 	This	process	will	be	 initiated	by	asking	participants,	after	 the	completion	of	their	 interview,	whether	 they	would	be	willing	 to	 communicate	basic	 information	about	this	study	to	persons	known	to	them,	who	fit	the	same	inclusion	and	exclusion	criteria	as	themselves.		If	participants	are	willing	to	help	identify	additional	potential	participants	in	this	way,	the	CI	will	ask	them	to	pass	on	a	copy	of	the	appropriate	Participant	Information	Sheet	(via	post	or	email,	the	CI	will	provide	printed	copies	and	postage	when	required)	to	those	 individuals	 they	 think	 may	 be	 interested	 in	 taking	 part	 in	 the	 study.	 	 These	additional	potential	participants	will	then	enter	into	the	pathway	for	recruitment	that	has	already	been	established	and	is	outlined	in	detail	above.		
Recruitment	of	Partners		Partners	 of	 women	 with	 experience	 of	 NIPD	 or	 current	 prenatal	 testing	 will	 also	 be	recruited	 through	 a	 process	 of	 snowball	 sampling.	 	 If	 participants	 indicate	 during	 the	course	of	an	interview	that	they	are	in	a	relationship	with	a	person	they	have	parented	a	child	with,	 the	 CI	will	 ask,	 at	 the	 close	 of	 the	 interview,	whether	 the	 participant	would	consider	introducing	the	study	to	their	partner	as	a	potential	participant.		The	CI	will	have	copies	 of	 information	packs	 available	 for	 participants	who	 are	willing	 to	 approach	 their	partners	about	 the	 study.	 	The	CI	will	 also	make	 it	 clear	 that	 they	 can	be	 contacted	at	 a	later	 date,	 and	 that	 information	 packs	 can	 be	 supplied	 by	 post,	 if	 this	 approach	 is	preferable.	 	 The	 recruitment	 strategy	 for	 this	 group	 will	 then	 continue	 as	 outlined	previously.					
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It	is	recognised	here	that	any	discussion	of	personal	relationships,	however	minimal,	holds	the	 potential	 to	 raise	 sensitive	 issues.	 	 The	 recruitment	 method	 adopted	 here	 will	therefore	involve	a	significant	level	of	sensitivity	and	discretion	on	the	part	of	the	CI,	and	a	cautious	 approach	 to	 questions	 and	discussions	 involving	 personal	 relationships	will	 be	adopted	at	all	 times.	 	 It	 is	also	recognised,	however,	 that	 the	partners	of	women	making	decisions	 about	 prenatal	 testing	 are	 an	 important	 group	 to	 attempt	 to	 include	 in	 this	study,	and	their	 interests	and	concerns	are	regarded	as	highly	relevant.	 	This	group	may	be	‘hard	to	reach’	using	more	traditional	methods	of	recruitment,	as	they	are	likely	to	be	less	closely	involved	with	prenatal	care	services	and	mainstream	parenting	groups	(Steen	et	 al,	 2011,	 Lewis,	 2000).	 	 As	 a	 method	 designed	 to	 ‘provides	 a	 means	 of	 accessing	vulnerable	and	more	impenetrable	social	groupings’	(Atkinson,	2001),	snowball	sampling	has	been	selected	as	the	most	appropriate	approach	for	targeting	participation	from	this	group.			
3.6	Methods	
	
Literature	review		The	literature	review	for	this	project	will	necessarily	be	broad,	and	on-going.		Key	papers	of	clinical	and	scientific	relevance	will	be	identified,	and	activity	in	this	area	of	publication	will	be	regularly	monitored,	as	technological	changes	in	this	field	are	rapid	and	on-going.		Literature	 relevant	 to	 examination	 of	 the	 social,	 ethical	 and	 practical	 implications	 of	prenatal	 testing	will	be	 identified,	 and	a	particular	 focus	on	papers	 that	discuss	NIPD	 in	relation	to	such	matters	will	be	maintained.			
Interviews		All	 interviews	 conducted	 will	 be	 semi-structured,	 and	 will	 be	 broadly	 informed	 by	 a	narrative	 approach.	 	 This	 type	 of	 interview	 design	 allows	 for	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	participant/interviewee	 to	 be	 fully	 expressed,	 encouraging	 the	 use	 of	 his	 or	 her	 own	spontaneous	 language	 in	 the	narration	of	events	 (Jovchelovitch	et	al,	2000).	 	The	CI	will	prepare	a	list	of	question	topics	in	advance	of	undertaking	interviews,	and	this	list	will	act	as	a	rough	guide	to	the	broad	areas	of	discussion	to	be	covered	within	each	interview.		By	adopting	a	broadly	narrative	 interviewing	style,	 the	CI	ensures	that	participants	are	able	to	direct	the	course	of	the	interview	as	much	as	possible,	with	the	CI	having	minimal	input	into	the	structuring	of	the	interview,	beyond	the	broad	questions	identified	in	advance.		It	is	 envisaged	 that	 interviews	will	 last	 for	 approximately	 45	minutes,	 although	 no	 upper	
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limit	will	be	imposed.		Basic	demographic	details	for	each	participant	will	be	noted	during	the	 introduction	 stage	 of	 each	 interview.	 	 All	 interviews	will,	with	 permission,	 be	 audio	recorded,	and		subsequently	transcribed	by	the	CI.		
Vignettes		Study	 participants	will	 be	made	 up	 of	 service	 users	 and	 service	 providers	with	 a	 broad	range	 of	 experiences,	 and	 with	 different	 levels	 of	 knowledge	 about	 NIPD.	 	 In	 order	 to	address	 this	gap	 in	knowledge,	 short	vignettes	will	be	used	 to	explain	and	contextualise		current	and	possible	future	applications	of	NIPD	where	appropriate.	 	 It	 is	envisaged	that	the	CI	will	make	use	of	this	research	tool	during	the	majority	of	interviews,	and	that	use	of	vignettes	 would	 not	 typically	 be	 required	 only	 with	 those	 service	 providers	 who	 have	direct	experience	of	NIPD.	 	Recognising	that	vignettes	can	only	provide	a	limited	amount	of	 information	on	a	complex	technology	such	as	NIPD,	the	CI	will	make	it	clear	that	they	are	designed	only	 to	prompt	discussion,	 and	 that	participant	 can	ask	 for	 clarification	on	any	of	the	points	raised.		
Data	analysis			Interview	 transcripts	 will	 be	 analysed	 thematically	 and	 the	 data	 will	 be	 grouped	 and	categorised	 according	 to	 key	 themes.	 	 Data	 collection	 and	 analysis	 will	 be	 undertaken	concurrently	allowing	one	process	to	inform	the	other.		Particular	attention	will	be	paid	to	the	language	and	terms	used	by	the	participants	themselves	in	order	to	maintain	a	focus	on	their	perspective.		A	qualitative	software	analysis	package	such	as	NVivo8	will	be	used	as	a	tool	for	organising	the	data	more	effectively.		This	analysis	work	will	be	informed	by	a	reflexive	approach	which	ensures	that	the	researcher	stays	attuned	to	the	ethics	of	 their	own	 research,	 taking	 account	 of	 how	 their	 presence	 and	 participation	 effects	 the	 co-construction	of	meaning	within	the	interview	process.			
3.7	Ethical	considerations		It	 is	 recognised	 that	 all	 participants	may	 be	 physically,	 psychologically	 and	 emotionally	vulnerable,	 and	 that	much	 of	 the	 subject	matter	 of	 this	 research	 is	 highly	 sensitive.	 	 In	accordance	with	 the	 research	 design	 outlined	 above,	 participants	will	 be	 informed	 fully	about	the	purpose,	methods	and	intended	possible	uses	of	the	research,	well	in	advance	of	their	participation.	 	Participants	 	will	be	 fully	 informed	about	what	 their	participation	 in	this	research	entails,	and	what	potential	risks	may	be	involved:	avoidance	of	harm	is	a	key	
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concern	and	the	rights,	safety	and	wellbeing	of	participants	are	of	central	import	to	every	stage	of	 the	research	design.	 	Participants’	right	 to	anonymity	and	confidentiality	will	be	respected	throughout,	and	the	CI	will	take	steps	to	ensure	that	participation		is	voluntary	and	 free	 from	any	 coercion.	 	 Participants	will	 be	made	 fully	 aware	 from	 the	 outset	 that	they	have	the	right	to	withdraw	from	the	research	at	any	time.		Any	conflicts	of	interest	or	partiality	on	 the	part	of	 the	CI	will	be	made	explicit	and	 	 formal	ethical	approval	will	be	sought	when	and	where	necessary.		The	CI	has	 the	 support	 of	 academic	 supervisors	 from	Cardiff	University	 School	 of	 Social	Sciences,	 who	 will	 ensure	 that	 the	 project	 continues	 to	 meet	 appropriate	 ethical	 and	professional	standards.		This	project	is	also	supported	by	a	clinical	supervisor	from	the	All	Wales	Medical	Genetics	Service,	who	will	help	to	ensure	that	the	research	is	appropriately	designed	to	reflect	the	needs	of	service	users	and	service	providers.		In	addition	to	this,	the	CI	has	 received	advice	on	research	design	and	management	 from	a	number	of	 clinicians	already	known	to	the	CI	through	various	professional	networks.		The	CI	has	also	consulted	the	 British	 Sociological	 Association’s	 ‘Statement	 of	 Ethical	 Practice	 for	 the	 British	Sociological	Association’	(2002)	in	designing	this	research	protocol.		As	 previously	 outlined,	 throughout	 the	 recruitment	 and	 interviewing	 stages	 of	 the	research,	 the	CI	will	 remain	sensitive	 to	any	signs	of	distress	of	dissent.	 	 If	 a	participant	were	 to	 become	 upset	 or	 distressed,	 they	 will	 be	 asked	 whether	 they	 would	 like	 to	withdraw	from	participation.		If	they	clearly	indicate	that	they	wish	to	continue	the	CI	will	ask	whether	 there	 are	 any	 issue	 they	 feel	 uncomfortable	with	 discussing	 as	 part	 of	 the	research.		If	participants	choose	to	withdraw	from	the	study	they	will	be	given	the	option	of	having	all	data	 that	has	been	collected	up	to	 the	point	of	withdrawal	disregarded	and	destroyed.	 	 If	 they	 withdraw	 during	 the	 interview	 process,	 then	 they	 will	 be	 asked	whether	 they	would	 like	 to	withdraw	 from	 the	study	altogether,	or	whether	 they	would	like	to	rearrange	the	interview.			It	 is	 recognised	 that	 the	 study	 could	have	 impact	 on	 the	health	 and	wellbeing	 of	 the	CI.		Regular	 meetings	 will	 be	 held	 with	 the	 project	 supervisors,	 which	 will	 allow	 for	 any	problems	 or	 concerns	 the	 CI	might	 have,	 to	 be	 fully	 discussed.	 	 The	 CI	 is	 also	 aware	 of	Cardiff	University’s	‘Lone	Worker	Guidance’	and	‘Health	and	Safety	in	Fieldwork’	policies,	and	will	work	in	accordance	with	these.		A	key	step	that	will	be	taken	to	ensure	the	safety	of	the	CI	when	working	alone,	will	be	the	development	of	a	clear	communication	strategy.		Regular	communication	with	a	named	contact	(colleague	or	other	responsible	person)	will	
	 283	
be	carried	out	during	the	fieldwork	stage,	with	this	person	being	informed	of	all	dates	and	times	of	each	appointment.			
	
Data	management		The	confidentiality	of	the	data	produced	and	the	anonymity	of	all	participants	will	remain	of	key	 concern	 throughout	 the	 research	process.	 	 In	order	 to	protect	 confidentiality	and	privacy,	 certain	 practical	 cautionary	 steps	will	 be	 taken.	 	 Each	 interview	will,	with	 each	participants’	 permission,	 be	 audio-taped;	 it	 will	 not,	 however,	 contain	 the	 participant’s	personal	 details.	 	 Each	 participant	 will	 be	 allocated	 a	 unique	 identification	 number	 to	protect	their	identity.		This	coding	system	will	link	the	tape-recordings	to	the	participants,	and	 is	necessary	 in	case	 further	participation	or	clarification	 is	required	of	an	 individual	participant.		Only	the	CI	will	have	access	to	this	coding	system	information	to	ensure	that	the	 confidentiality	 of	 participants	 is	 safeguarded.	 This	 identification	 information,	 along	with	the	transcripts	of	each	interview,	will	be	stored	in	a	password	protected	folder	in	the	CI’s	account	on	the	Cardiff	University	shared	drive.		The	CI	will	be	the	only	person	to	have	access	to	this	data.		Paper	copies	of	consent	forms	will	be	stored	securely	on	site	at	Cardiff	University.	 	 All	 information	 will	 be	 stored	 for	 a	 period	 of	 ten	 years	 following	 the	completion	 of	 this	 study,	 after	 which	 time	 it	 will	 be	 securely	 destroyed.	 	 All	 interview	transcript	 data	 will	 be	 anonymised	 to	 ensure	 that	 it	 will	 not	 be	 possible	 to	 identify	individual	participant’s	from	data	contained	within	written	documents	produced	from	the	study	(PhD	thesis	and	other	publications).			
3.8	Involvement	of	stakeholders		This	 study	 places	 service	 users,	 their	 experiencees,	 and	 their	 responses	 to	 an	 emerging	technology	of	social	significance	as	central:	its	primary	aim	is	to	highlight	and	give	value	to	their	voices.		The	study	methods	have	been	designed	to	enable	as	rich	an	account	of	each	women’s	experiences	and	responses	to	be	presented:	the	use	of	semi-structured,	narrative	interviewing	techniques	with	minimal	input	from	the	researcher	will	allow	participants	to	fundamentally	direct	the	course	of	the	data	that	is	produced.		The	voices	of	service	providers	will	also	be	highlighted,		and	they	will	be	closely	involved	in	the	dissemination	stage	of	the	project.		It	is	hoped	that	this	study	may	help	facilitate	the	development	 of	 a	 clinical	 and	 regulatory	 approach	 to	 NIPD	 that	 is	 as	 informed	 by	 the	experiences	 and	 responses	 of	 the	 service	 users	 and	 service	 providers	 most	 directly	
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involved,	 as	 it	 is	 by	 clinical	 and	 scientific	 data	 on	 the	 technology	 and	 its	 practical	application.		
3.9	Expertise	of	the	research	team		Whilst	the	research	will	be	carried	out	by	the	student	alone,	the	study	will	be	monitored	and	 informed	 by	 two	 academic	 supervisors,	 and	 one	 clinical	 supervisor.	 	 This	 team	provides	 relevant	 expertise	 in	 clinical	 genetics,	 medical	 sociology,	 bioethics	 and	philosophy,	and	qualitative	methodology.			The	centre	for	Economic	and	Social	Aspects	of	Genomics	(Cesagen)	is	a	multidisciplinary	research	centre	at	Cardiff	University’s	school	of	social	sciences.	 	The	centre	has	a	proven	track	record	of	research	in	medical	sociology	and	clinical	practice,	with	a	particular	focus	in	 expertise	 on	 developments	 in	 new	 biotechnologies.	 	 The	 centre	 provides	 access	 to	 a	wide	range	of	professional	and	academic	expertise.		The	All	Wales	Medical	Genetics	 Service	 (AWMGS)	provides	 specialist	 genetic	 services	 to	individuals	and	families	with,	or	concerned	about,	rare	genetic	conditions.		The	service	is	made	 up	 of	 clinical	 and	 laboratory	 services	 which	 together	 provide	 medical	 genetics	services	 to	 the	 population	 of	Wales.	 Cardiff	 and	 Vale	 University	 Health	 Board	 hosts	 the	AWMGS	 at	 the	University	Hospital	 of	Wales	 (UHW),	Heath,	 Cardiff.	 Specialist	 consultant	geneticists,	 doctors	 and	 genetic	 counsellors	 provide	 genetic	 services	 in	 all	 the	 main	hospitals	throughout	Wales.			
3.10	Study	outcome	and	dissemination		This	 study	 is	 being	 undertaken	 for	 the	 fulfilment	 of	 a	 PhD	 in	 social	 science,	 at	 Cardiff	University.	 	 For	 this	 purpose,	 a	 written	 thesis	 will	 be	 produced	 based	 on	 the	 work	undertaken	here.		It	 is	 envisaged	 that	 the	 results	 of	 this	 study	 will	 also	 be	 published	 in	 peer-reviewed	journals.		Information	about	 the	study	will	also	be	made	available	 to	participants,	 in	 the	 form	of	a	short	written	summary	of	the	results.			
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